Browsing by Author "Bektas, Eda"

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Citation - WoS: 2
Citation - Scopus: 2
Legislative Committees in the Turkish Parliament: Performing Procedural Minimum or Effective Scrutiny?
(Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2023) Bektas, Eda; Political Science and Public Administration
This study examines committee influence on government bills during the AKP's 2011-2015 majority government term in Turkey, an era characterised by democratic backsliding. It explores whether committees introduce more substantial amendments to government bills when they draw on their scrutiny powers (i.e. hearing sponsoring ministers, hearing stakeholders, forming subcommittees, secondary committee review) providing them diverse information and policy expertise. I hypothesise and test under what conditions committees use these competencies to initiate substantial changes. Overall findings based on a novel dataset indicate that legislative committees introduce more substantial amendments to government bills when they consult with sponsoring ministers and stakeholders. These findings suggest that the formal capabilities of legislative committees provide opportunities for legislators to influence government legislation even in adverse political contexts, as these mechanisms limit the government's ability to impose its legislative agenda unilaterally. It contributes to the debates on strengthening legislatures for effective government scrutiny.
Neopatrimonial Rule Through Formal Institutions: The Case of Turkey
(Cambridge University Press, 2025) Bektas, Eda
This study examines how formal institutions in hybrid regimes, particularly presidentialism, party organization and electoral rules, actively foster and sustain clientelistic networks, leading to particularistic outcomes. While existing literature highlights the weakening of formal institutions and pervasive clientelism as drivers of democratic breakdown, this study uses the concept of neopatrimonialism to analyse how formal institutions themselves consolidate patron-client relationships to maintain power and stability. Focusing on Turkey, the analysis demonstrates that the institutional incentive structure consolidates the president's role as the central ‘patron’, controlling resources and offices, and encourages clientelistic networks to coalesce around the presidency. The discretionary allocation of resources through patron-client relationships sustains neopatrimonial authority as long as clients' loyalty is rewarded. However, this governance increases clients' dependence on the patron, binding them at the expense of representation and responsiveness. The analysis offers insights into how such institutional configurations contribute to authoritarianism and particularistic governance in hybrid regimes. © 2025 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.