Legislative Committees in the Turkish Parliament: Performing Procedural Minimum or Effective Scrutiny?

Abstract

This study examines committee influence on government bills during the AKP's 2011-2015 majority government term in Turkey, an era characterised by democratic backsliding. It explores whether committees introduce more substantial amendments to government bills when they draw on their scrutiny powers (i.e. hearing sponsoring ministers, hearing stakeholders, forming subcommittees, secondary committee review) providing them diverse information and policy expertise. I hypothesise and test under what conditions committees use these competencies to initiate substantial changes. Overall findings based on a novel dataset indicate that legislative committees introduce more substantial amendments to government bills when they consult with sponsoring ministers and stakeholders. These findings suggest that the formal capabilities of legislative committees provide opportunities for legislators to influence government legislation even in adverse political contexts, as these mechanisms limit the government's ability to impose its legislative agenda unilaterally. It contributes to the debates on strengthening legislatures for effective government scrutiny.