An Investigation of the Effect of Free-Players on Global Cooperative Behavior in a Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Environment

dc.contributor.author Efe, B.
dc.contributor.author Çerkez, E.
dc.contributor.author Kılıç, H.
dc.date.accessioned 2025-04-07T18:54:13Z
dc.date.available 2025-04-07T18:54:13Z
dc.date.issued 2025
dc.description.abstract In this research, we introduced the concept of Free-Player who rejects to play the dictated rational strategy Defect of the original Prisoner’s Dilemma game setup. Then, we investigated whether Free-Players have any impact on the persistent and stable cooperative behavior of the Players in the context of two dimensional spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game environment. In simulations, two different Player strategy update setups are considered: State-based Majority and Payoff-driven Stochastic. The results for both setups showed that Free-Players have impact on global cooperative behavior of the system. According to the obtained State-based Majority setup results, the increased number of Free-Players has no direct regulative impact on the control of global cooperative behavior of the proposed system. For the Payoff-driven Stochastic strategy update setup, the increased number of Free-Players has an observable regulative impact on the control of global cooperative behavior of the proposed system. However, the net effect of Free-Players on the cooperativeness of the environment was only in the range 0.007 < Net_Coop(α, β) < 0.036 while the attained cooperation ratio results are mostly not sensitive to the initial cooperation ratios. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2025. en_US
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/978-981-96-0692-4_14
dc.identifier.isbn 9789819606917
dc.identifier.issn 0302-9743
dc.identifier.scopus 2-s2.0-86000445967
dc.identifier.uri https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-0692-4_14
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14411/10526
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH en_US
dc.relation.ispartof Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) -- 17th International Conference on Multi-disciplinary Trends in Artificial Intelligence, MIWAI 2024 -- 11 November 2024 through 15 November 2024 -- Pattaya -- 327709 en_US
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess en_US
dc.subject Cooperative Behavior en_US
dc.subject Free-Player en_US
dc.subject Payoff-Driven Stochastic Strategy Update en_US
dc.subject Repeated Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma Game en_US
dc.subject State-Based Majority Strategy Update en_US
dc.title An Investigation of the Effect of Free-Players on Global Cooperative Behavior in a Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Environment en_US
dc.type Conference Object en_US
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gdc.description.department Atılım University en_US
gdc.description.departmenttemp Efe B., Atılım University, Kızılcaşar Mah., 1184 Cad., No:13, İncek, Gölbaşı, Ankara, 06830, Turkey; Çerkez E., Atılım University, Kızılcaşar Mah., 1184 Cad., No:13, İncek, Gölbaşı, Ankara, 06830, Turkey; Kılıç H., Atılım University, Kızılcaşar Mah., 1184 Cad., No:13, İncek, Gölbaşı, Ankara, 06830, Turkey en_US
gdc.description.endpage 176 en_US
gdc.description.publicationcategory Konferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı en_US
gdc.description.scopusquality Q3
gdc.description.startpage 164 en_US
gdc.description.volume 15431 LNAI en_US
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