

ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
GRADUATE PROGRAM



2014 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN: THE ROLE OF
GENERAL DOSTUM AND UZBEK ETHNIC POLITICS

Master's Thesis

Murad Hamidi

ANKARA - 2017

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
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
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
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
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- I prepared this thesis in accordance with ATILIM University Graduate School of Social Sciences Thesis Writing Directive,
- I prepared this thesis within the framework of academic and ethics rules,
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Murad Hamidi

ÖZET

"Afganistan 2014 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimleri: General Dostum'un Rolü ve Özbek Etnik Politikaları" adlı kapsamlı çalışmamda, özellikle Kuzey Afganistan Türk Halklarının 1992'den başlayarak ırkçılığa ve etnik monarşiye karşı verdikleri hayatta kalma savaşı ve direniş mücadelelerini geniş bir şekilde bahis konusu edip ve tartıştım.

Özellikle, 2014 Afganistan Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimleri sonrası şunu göstermiştir ki Özbekler (Türkler) toplumsal temsilciliğın demokratik - doğru araçlarını kullanarak, Birleşik Afganistan'ın önemli bir etnik ve siyasi faktörlerinden biri haline geldiğini tescillemiştir.

Bu çalışma, Afganistan'ın sosyo-politik tarihinin son 25 yıldaki statükoya karşı o ülkenin kahraman halkının ve liderinin hikayesinin mücadelesini geniş bir şekilde incelemektedir.

Ayrıca, bu çalışma, onun onursal mücadelesinin ana hatlarını belirlemektedir; bazen yalnız ve bazen istenmeyen bir adam ilan edilmesine karşın, o askeri ve siyasi hayatı boyunca hep birçok suçlama -önyargıya maruz kalmıştır ve kalmaktadır. Bunlara rağmen o kahraman halkının sonsuz destiğı ve sevgisiyle her zaman hayatta kalmayı başarabilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Genel Dostum, Türk, Özbek, Taliban, El-Kaide, Başkanlık Seçimi 2014, Eşref Ghani, Abdullah Abdullah, İsyen, Etnik Milliyetçilik, Vekaleten Savaş, Güç Dengesi Politikaları, Savaş Efendisi, Oghlaq Oyunu.

ABSTRACT

This is a comprehensive study of "2014 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN: THE ROLE OF GENERAL DOSTUM AND UZBEK ETHNIC POLITICS " in which I studied and discussed in widespread illustration, survive and revolutionary struggle of the Turkic People of Northern Afghanistan beginning in 1992 against racism and ethnic monarch.

After Afghanistan's presidential election of 2014 and using right democratic instruments of the social representation the Uzbeks would become a key ethnic and political factors of the United Afghanistan.

This study widely examines the struggle of a nation's heroic people and its leader's story against the status quo in the last 25-years of Afghanistan's socio-political history. Further, this study outlines in his sacred struggle, he is a lonely and sometimes unwanted man, and has been subjected to many accusations during his military and political life. Nevertheless, the hero has always been able to survive with great support of his people.

KEY WORDS

General Dostum, Turkic, Uzbek, Taliban, Al-Qaida, Presidential Election 2014, Ashraf Ghani, Abdullah Abdullah, Insurgency, Ethnic Nationalism, Proxy war, Balance of Power Politics, Warlord, Game of Oghlaq Tartysh.

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Notably, the contribution and selfness of my courses instructors, assistance and their stimulation throughout the life of academic studies it was thankful and appreciated. Expressly, Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal, Ass. Prof. Dr. Cenk Aygöl, Prof. Dr. Halil İbrahim Ülker and other dedicated instructors who are made this research studies unforgettable.

I am also feel thankful during organizing a meeting schedules and interviews for the purpose of thesis research for helping me to collect primary data from the office of the first vice presidency of Afghanistan (Sadarat) and NIMA especially, Aziz Sarwari, Rahmatullah Qorioghlu and others.

And finally, I would like to express to many thanks to my wife, for her limitless patience and support during life of study and when I was abroad, and to my kids and numerous friends who endured this long process with me, always offering support and love.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAN	: Afghanistan Analyst Network
AD	: Anno Domini
ARG	: Afghanistan Presidential Palace
CIA	: United States Federal Government's intelligence services: The Central Intelligence Agency
CRS	: Congressional Research Services,
FVP	: First vice Presidency/President
HRW	: Human Rights Watch
IEC	: Independent Election Committee
IECA	: Independent Electoral Commission of Afghanistan
IR	: International Relation(s)
IIWSA	: The Islamic Union of Northern Provinces of Afghanistan
ISAF	: International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan
ISI	: Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan
Junbish	: Junbishi Milli Islami Afghanistan, refer to NIMA
KGB	: Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (The Committee of State Security of USSR, the primary function was internal repression and external reconnaissance)
Loya Jirga	: Grand National Assembly of Afghanistan (This is not parliament, a type of elders commission in which delegates from all provinces and top officials of country)
MA	: Master of Art(s)
MOIS	: Islamic Republic of Iran Intelligence Ministry
NIMA	: National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NUG	: National Unity Government of Afghanistan
PDPA	: People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
SOF	: United States Special Operations Forces
US/USA	: The United States of America
USSR	: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

LIST OF MAP(s)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In this research, being my thesis for my M.A. in IR course in ATILIM UNIVERSITY of ANKARA, I have put an enormous self-dedication and tremendous efforts to write the thesis and I hope this would be a useful and a reliable source of reference and study in concerning subject for future generations. Uzbeks or Turkic peoples of Afghanistan¹ are in fact one of the oldest native people of country but deprived from their deserving rights for decades deemed as one of the minority ethnics in Afghanistan. Despite the glorious past of Turkistan Lands and in which they had been reached the golden era in 15-century AD by emerge of the Great Amir Timur (Timurid Dynasty, re-builder of the Mongol Order and city builder), and continued by the Babur Shah era until the Turkic peoples of Southern Turkistan lost their hegemony in their homeland in 1747 to the rival Pashtun tribes under Durranis.

The re-emerge of Turkic Peoples particularly the Uzbeks in Southern Turkistan (today's Northern Afghanistan) took almost two and half century (245 years), and it happens when were established their political party "*Junbishi Milli Islami Afghanistan: Turkic Resistance Movement*" (NIMA) in 1992 under General Abdul Rashid Dostum commands and leadership. Its members includes by gathering Jihadist (Islamist and Nationalist) and none-Jihadist (reformist and secularist) people of Northern Afghanistan. It has been survived in the last three decades of Afghanistan's turbulent by offering peace, freedom and identity to the Turkic peoples of Northern of Afghanistan as well as other minorities. However, the main subject of my thesis is regarding the 2014 Presidential Elections of Afghanistan, when it appeared a new page to the history of Afghanistan; yes, it is unbelievable for those who would never imagine of Uzbeks being the First Vice President of Afghanistan but they made it.

¹ The area mostly known in middle century as a South Turkistan (Turkish: Güney Türkistan, Uzbekcha: Guney Turkiston, Farsi: Turkiston-e Junubi), which is today called as North of Afghanistan.

A historical victory² for the Turkic people of Afghanistan which brought hopes to the hopeless hearts of disappointed people. By distinguishing the ethnic group of people, I do not mean nationalism or ethnic discrimination, of course the Uzbeks care about the national interest of all ethnic group of people in Afghanistan but the victory of Uzbeks as a First Vice Presidency of country proved that even the group of people in minorities can change the destiny of a nation and achieve what they really deserved.

In this thesis, I have tried to reflect the brief history of Afghanistan, appearance of Turkic people in Afghanistan from Babur Shah up to 20th century and the kingdom hierarchies of Afghanistan in 20th century. Further, all the historical occasions such as a Soviet Union (USSR) invasion, Civil and Ethnic Wars and emergence of Taliban have been discussed until 2001, when Afghanistan entered to a new history.³ After long complicated periods of governance and turbulence in 2004 the Afghanistan held by the assist of US led coalitions the first presidential elections of Afghanistan and in which Hamid Karzai elected as the first elect-president in history of Afghanistan. After 10 years of Karzai's presidency in two terms of 5 years, the 2014 elections was a new challenge for Afghanistan as the power was officially and legally transmitted for the first time in Afghanistan. As anticipated, the process was not free of challenges and risks associated with elections due to several ethnic groups of people with different ideologies and advocacy of different parties. On the other hand the walk out of the US-led Coalition Forces from Afghanistan in 2014 was the other factor affecting challenges of 2014 elections. However, I have discussed its within thesis with the details but as a quick reference; finally Ashraf Ghani's team having General Abdul Rashid Dostum (Uzbek/Turkic ethnic) as a 1st vice president and Sarwar Danish (Hazara ethnic) as a 2nd

² Especially ruling homeland by Turkics in this land ends in 1747 by creating new Afghan Government by Pashtuns tribes.

³ This is referred as the new history of Afghanistan when in 2001 the Taliban government collapsed and the US forces entered to Afghanistan and the new Afghanistan Government was established which still exists as an Islamic Republic country.

vice president, with two vice presidents from minority ethnics in Afghanistan, could win the elections after plenty of conflicts and chaos with the rival team.

1.1. Statement of the problem:

One fact have to recognized that politically and sociologically the Afghanistan never comes back to the political conditions before 1992⁴, in where the Pashtun ethnic supremacy⁵ was prevailed countrywide. Before 1992, it was not questionable. But after formation of Junbish Political Movement (NIMA) the political structure and governance of the northern Afghanistan suddenly changes its face. After these radical changes, the Turkic people in Afghanistan were seen as an important step towards becoming an equal citizen of this country.

After the fall of the Taliban guerrilla state and the establishment of the new transitional Afghan government, followed by ratification of new Constitution by Constitutional Loya Jirga (Grand National Assembly of Afghanistan) in 26 January 2004 in which the ethno -linguistic rights are still far from satisfactory. Constitution of Afghanistan accepted the Turkic ⁶(Uzbekcha/Turkmenche) Language as the third official language in areas if the majority where speaks it. This was conditionally acceptance in paper not in full text. If you born in Afghanistan as an Uzbek ethnic, you must to speak at least three languages in order to reach your final destination and if you want to be treated as citizen at an equal level. In whereas the mandatory requirement of language knowledge is for Pashtun and Tajik ethnics are only two. Add one international language (English/French/German/Russian). If so in today's new world system one Uzbek man/woman must at least speak four different languages and plus one profession (higher education). Roughly it's mean the five languages. To be realistic, Uzbek nationality is not a supernatural being. Everyone is just as ordinary people are as we are. Based on what reality the Afghan government can force the Turks to speak more than

⁴ Fall of Mohammad Najibullah's communist regime in Afghanistan by impact of General Dostum and establishment of north autonomous state up north.

⁵What they call themselves as superrace.

⁶ Article 16 of the 2004 [Afghan Constitution](#) states that "The Turkic languages (Uzbekcha and Turkmenche) as the third official language in areas if the majority where speaks it.

one official language. It is the cost of being an Uzbek in Afghanistan! Still in Afghanistan doesn't exist a trustable data concerning the census and population density, just a few estimations. If so, how can be the Turkic peoples counted as a minority. If the Turks are minority the Tajiks are also not in majority. The following issues are supposed be addressed during next years by the Afghan government and Constitutional Loya Jirga otherwise we cannot speak about united Afghanistan:

(i): Linguistic issue shall be resolved: the Uzbek Language shall be the third official language of entire Afghanistan or one single official language (Pashtun/Dari) and two regional languages (Pashtun/Dari +Uzbek).

(ii): Minority issue shall be resolved: Until new census's law and date come up, in the new electronic identity cards (Tazkira) shall be specified the ethnic identity they are.

(iii): Autonomous state or federation options are shall be discussed. Based on the recent developments and political insolvency the Afghanistan cannot be ruled from Kabul in peace atmosphere.

So long as the injustice continues in this way, Afghanistan will soon be doomed to divide. The Turkic peoples in Afghanistan don't lives like in 18th century anymore.

1.2. Research Questions:

Following are the some of the questioning which are going to be answered or illustrated in my work.

Q No.1. What is mean of Southern Turkistan and its Geo-political importance for both side of Amul Irmaq (Amu River)? What it is impact on Central Asian's developments?

Q No. 2. What will be happen if Southern Turkistan (North of Afghanistan) became a state or semi -state? What are the impacts to the neighboring countries and Central Asia?

Q No. 3. How can be solved ethno-linguistic and minority issues of Afghanistan?

(Conclusion)

Q No. 4. How long the Afghanistan can rule by the central governance system? When it should exercises the federal governance system? (Conclusion)

1.3. Hypothesis:

If the Uzbek politics, elites and thinkers are can be gathered united under one or two political parties in recent years and if reassured and convinced the rise awareness the other minorities (Aimaqs and even Hazaras) and bring them under united umbrella, - if so, in the short run there is a high possibility of the formation of *North State* of Afghanistan⁷ or *autonomous state* in the northern Afghanistan. North state will include the provinces that the Turkic ethnics are in majority. But today it seems impossible to create a *National North Front* with the existing political balance of power and with existing strategies. The main obstacle in way of the formation north state it looks that new reformers have to solve and negotiate the north capital status – Mazare-Sharif with the Tajik's former warlord and existing governor of Balkh, the Ata Mohammad Nur. North state without Mazar-e-Sharif is not meaningful for the Turks. The Junbish followers and new reformists are supposed to be joined under new political title and with new strategy and political agenda which could be extensive and accountable for entire Turkic dominated provinces and in addition the rise of awareness and confidence in other minority people in the region.

1.4. Literature Review:

When typing the thesis on paper, the both primary and secondary sources of the information are useful. The primary sources of the data contents interviews, discussion, panels, questionnaires and samplings in whereas secondary sources of information includes books, articles, news items and online sources from varied school of thoughts i.e. Afghanistan, Turkey and foreign writers. Furthermore, different articles and news items are also being used as the Literature. The current articles and discussion on neutral Newspapers and News channels are also being considered. Following paragraphs are some of the existing academic data regarding this thesis work.

During the studying the authors inputs from 15-century onwards 21-century almost the historical background covers of Timurid dynasty of Babur Shah, as his successor in global perspective. In 26 January 1996 John F. Richards, wrote a book named "*The Mughal Empire: the New Cambridge History of India*" and published by the

⁷ North State will later transformed into the Sothern Turkistan.

Cambridge University Press. He narrates that "the Mughal Empire was one of the a few centralized states in the pre-modern era and until begun of modern era; further explains their land expansion, institutional innovations in land revenue, coinage and military organization, ideological view and governance system with the Islam combination.

Another important archive and illustration to the Turco-Mongol conquerors of the 15-century onwards was "Babur Shah" (Zahiruddin Mohammad Babur Shah, known as a *Timurid Tiger*); founder of his empire and successor of his grandfather's (4th generation grandson) path– the Timurid dynasty. *The Baburname [the Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur , Prince and Emperor]* is the highly personal and chronological memoirs of Babur Shah (1483-1530) which represents a bright and extremely comprehensive life cycle in Indian subcontinent today's Afghanistan, Pakistan and India in 15 and 16-centuries. There are exists many translation of this book but I focused mainly to "The Baburname" that was translated by Professor Wheeler Thackston, the Islamic Scholar at the Harvard University and published in 18 December, 2007 by Modern Library, New York. *The Baburname* originally written in Uzbek (Chaghatai) Turkic Language and translated into Persian language during reign of his grandson Akbar (r. 1556-1605), but the Persian was as an administrative language of his empire beside his mother tongue. Unfortunately nearly 18 years of his records has been lost; from 1502-03, 1508-1519 and January 1520-November 1525 (translated by Annette Susannah Beveridge and edited by Dilip Hiro, *The Baburname: Journal of Emperor Babur*, published by penguin books, in 2006, India)

I am criticizing that all of the emperors of the 14 century onwards 19 century are based on Central Asian Turkics, warriors and emperors but when the western authors translated archives-documentaries from Turco-Islamic sources into European languages they named its Mughals or Mongols. According to Dilip Hiro's (*Journal of Emperor Babur, page xxi*) point of view; there are three main ethnic groups: Mongols, Europeans and Persians. And he calls them as a primary and secondary races and combinations of the primary and secondary races and vice versa. Based on his believes; out of Mongols and Europeans emerged the Turks/Turco-Tatars; and out of Mongols and Persians is came out the Tajiks; And then appears combinations of primary and secondary ethnics:

out of Turks/Turkics and Persians emerged the Uzbeks, and out of Turks and Mongols is a Kazakhs. Meanwhile, I agree that the Turkic ethnics have a close relative relationship with the Mongols, they have a parallel origin but they are not Mongols (Mughals), and the Central Asian and Indian Subcontinent's emperors starting from 14 century onwards were the Turks/Turkics.

As a fact the main exploring area of the thesis is emerge of Uzbeks Politics and General Dostum's impact on Afghanistan's political life (1992-2017) and warlordism, which caused lose of charm of the Pashtun dominance and devastation of its magic. The pre-1992 the Pashtun supremacy was untouchable but after General Dostum's impact on new Afghanistan's political life; we begun questioning the future of Afghanistan as a united country. Thereinafter, below a few sources and authors in which they are illustrates the emergence of General Dostum as a new Political and Military leader in Afghanistan's balance of power game despite his sinusoidal political life.

According to Willem Vogelsang, the named book "*The Afghans (People of Asia)*". Publisher: Wiley –Blackwell (1 edit), Nov 28, 2001, P.232, General Dostum's forces played an important role in the fall of Kabul in 1992. The United Front forces mainly composed from General Dostum's Jawzjan militias, Shah Massoud forces, Sayed Jafar Naderi (the head of Ismail'I community) begun their walk to capital against the Communist regime of Mohammad Najibullah in April 1992. Coalition of Dostum and Massoud was against Gulbiddin Hekmatyar the leader of Hizbi Islami of Pakistan backed party. The Coalition of Dostum - Massoud positioned in different part of Kabul to defend capital from Hekmatyar forces. General Dostum positioned between 4000-5000 troops of his Sheberghan based Infantry Division of 53rd and Balkh based Special Guards Division in Bala Hissar Fort, Maranjan Hill and today's Kabul International Airport. According to Anthony Davis, "*The Battlegrounds of Northern Afghanistan*" Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1994, p.323-4 in 1994, Dostum allied himself with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud.

While General Dostum established his Northern State of Afghanistan before the Taliban took over in 1998, in where women were able to go about unveiled, girls were

allowed to go to schools and girls-boys are can study at the University of Balkh in Mazar-i Sharif, cinemas showed Indian films and music played on television, but all of these freedoms were ended upon took over of Taliban regime in 1998. According to Willem Vogelsang, "*The Afghans: People of Asia*". (2001) p. 232. In addition, the right of higher education not only in Mazar-e-Sharif but in entire Northern State in where education was available including Higher education universities of Jawzjan and Faryab.

The Neamatollah (Nematullah) Nojumi former fighter against Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan and Lecturer at the school of law and diplomacy of Tufts University of Medford wrote a book named "*The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region*".^{1st} ed. Palgrave, New York, 2002. In his book he describes turbulent political history of Afghanistan from the uprising of Mujahiddin against Soviet invasion and aftermath to an attack to WTC, New York and catastrophic events of 9/11. Further explains the importance of the region to external powers and reason of conflict and instability in Afghanistan. Also pointed out the brutal rise of Taliban insurgency to governance and fanatic Islamists including Osama Bin Ladin in the struggle Afghan swamp.

Another valuable author brought an illustration to the issue of Southern Turkistan (Northern Afghanistan) was Faiz Mohammad Katep Hazara (from Afghanistan's Hazara ethnic), in the book named "*Saraj-al-Tawarikh*", published in Kabul in 1912, pages 990-1107:

"The northern and north western regions of Afghanistan were called as Southern Turkistan or Turkistan. In today's Afghanistan and in some references the whole country is called as Afghanistan or Turkistan. The Southern Turkistan was a developed territory in aspects of social, economical, and political demands and ruled by Beiks and Khanates."

Further explains that the Pashtuns entered to the Southern Turkistan at the reign of Ahmad shah Durrani (1747 onwards), then Dost Mohammad Khan and finally at the time of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan the process of assimilation (Pashtunization) the

northern Turks were formed based on planned strategy and government support, which includes the changing demographic structure of the habitants and by armed force to migrate them from Northern Turkistan to south and south west deserts (Helmand, Farah and west-south of Kandahar), and instead bringing southern tribes mainly to the Faryab and Balkh's fertile soils.

As known a variety of available sources concerning the Uzbek General Rashid Dostum and his political party *the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Junbish)* was pointed out as a negative impact on Afghanistan's civil wars and turbulence. But still there are existing and an excellent authors and researchers who can bring all the reliable bitter past of turmoil and demonstrate the fact and evident behind of scenes. If so one of these important and valuable writer and researcher is PhD Brian Glyn Williams. Mr. Brian Glyn Williams is a professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts. He has worked for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) tracking suicide bombers in Afghanistan. In his book named *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, The Afghan Warrior Who Led US Special Forces To Topple The Taliban Regime*, which published by Chicago Review Press in January 2013.

“A riveting account of a warlord’s rise to power that has all the drama, intrigue, and warfare of *The Kite Runner*, only this Afghan story is real.” —Scott C. Levi, associate professor of Central Asian history, Ohio State University.

In *The Last Warlord*, scholar Brian Glyn Williams brings Western World to explore the mystery of General Abdul Rashid Dostum, who is one of the most powerful strongman of the Afghan society, and had been, dominated the country since the Soviet invasion. According to Mr. William's long face-to-face interviews with General Dostum, his family and subordinates, as well as local aq sakals (chieftains), mullahs, community elders, Taliban enemies and prisoners of war, and women’s rights activists... *The Last Warlord* expresses the story of Dostum’s uptrend to power from peasant villager to the man who survived for his nation's freedom and resisted against tribal system injustices and ethnicity based civil wars (causes of ethnic conflicts) as well as the against the

uncivil Taliban's persecution and torture and Al-Qaeda fanatics who sought to repress his people. The book also narrates how and post- 9/11 evident, the CIA's request to the mysterious Uzbek warrior to help the US Special Operations Forces (US SOF) in liberation his homeland from Islamic extremists and fundamentalist, their horse-mounted struggle in outskirts of Mazar-e-Sharif (Dara-i-Suf valley) that resulted *in saving the region from the 21st century plague* and victory. Further, how General Dostum and the US Green Berets liberated the ancient shrine of Mazar-i-Sharif, the Afghanistan's holiest blue mosque (the Prophet Mohammad's brother in law and 4th caliph of Islam); and how sensational media accounts have made him the object of rampant mythologizing. While the US –led coalition forces withdraw their troops from Afghanistan in 2014 and General Dostum again re-enter the world stage to fight against a Taliban resurgent. *The Last Warlord* provides a unique data which was hidden until its publication with the true historical context to the controversy swirling around Afghanistan's political, social and cultural life and its rivalries...

1.5. Objective of the Research:

I find it useful for the central government of Afghanistan to pay close attention to the academic work that has been widely analyzed in this research for the future consideration of the united Afghanistan. We acknowledge that Afghanistan one of the unsecure and instable country with the full of corruption within 196 countries around world. If we know the fact that the Turkic People of Northern Afghanistan having more than 2.8 million registered voters⁸ and had played a key role and turning point in the selecting of Ashraf Ghani's as a 13th term president, if so making a required reforms and changes in the constitution it will brings security and stability to the united Afghanistan and happier citizens. Important and precise steps to be taken in long and short walks are:

- i. Linguistic issue: the Uzbek Language shall be the third official language of entire Afghanistan, if it cannot possible with having different excuses, if so the single official language (Pashtu or Dari) and two regional languages (Pashtun/Dari +Uzbek)

⁸ The registered vote census in some sources might be counted differently, but based on General Dostum's speech during registering himself as first vice president was 2.8 millions in head quarter of Independent Electoral Commission, Kabul.

supposed to be considered. It will help government to avoid such a huge dissatisfied mass of people by bringing them under umbrella of the United Afghanistan.

- ii. Minority issue: Until the updated and amendment of the new census bill is in progress and the general population census comes up, in the new electronic identity cards (Tazkira) shall be specified the ethnic identity that they are.
- iii. Autonomous state or federation options: It is factual, based on the recent developments and political insolvency during civil war and post Taliban era that the Afghanistan cannot be ruled from Kabul in peace and stable atmosphere. Instead of insisting to governance the country from Kabul why not to take into consideration the examples are already in use by the several industrialized and developed states are kind of USA, Federal Germany and even Russian Federation and many others.

1.6. Methodology

This research is based upon analytical, qualitative and descriptive methodology. Analytical approach is used to break the research into parts and analyze it separately and then synthesize it with qualitative information based on obtained from different sources. This research is also descriptive which explains and describes the impacts of Turkic small-resistance movements pre- Junbish era, and after establishment of Junbish Party (NIMA) in 1992, and new political map changes and new formations and rivalries in the struggle of power balance (balance of power) in Afghanistan. Karzai Administration and political formations and rivalries in side of Junbish party and emerge of new reformists. Bottom-line; Ghani-Dostum alliance in 2014 presidential elections brought the victory as 13th term presidency.

For the purpose of Literature review, I have read and reviewed a number of books, articles and online resources from different perspectives to illustrate a correctness and impartiality of this study. In order to be subjective, the selected literature reviews from variety sources and with different backgrounds in term of their authorship and publications. In order to be able to demonstrate an impartial and fair research work, many foreign and western sources have been applied besides the local resources.

1.7. Limitation of the Research:

I have used enormous efforts and financial resource for conducting an impartial and fair research, but despite my several attempts to setup a 'direct interview' with H. E. General Dostum, First Vice President of Afghanistan or 'his response in paper' as a primary source but I couldn't succeed over through his first barrier⁹ and let him know about the topic and research framework. During conducting field work search I used a reasonable count for the obtaining the primary source of information but I could able to interviewed Mr. Faizullah Zaki, NIMA Spokesman, former lawmaker and Uzbek politician at NIMA compound, Kabul and Social Advisor of the First Vice President Mr. Hamidullah Tawachi. Detailed interview of these politicians can be read in chapter four of the thesis.

1.8. Time period:

The first chapter of the research deals with the introduction phases of research and highlights a general overview, the second chapter mostly historical background of Timurid Dynasty of Babur Shah until formation of Afghan Government under Durrani Dynasty and its descendants. This timeframe covers from 15th century until 19th century of AD in Afghanistan's political history. Soviet Invasion, Civil Wars and rise and fall of Taliban this timeframe covers from post WW-II until 2001 Karzai Administration. Chapter three also elaborates the scenario how the Turkistan (Southern Turkistan) movements are appeared in the Afghan political history. The emergence of Turkic movements and nationalist ideological allies under and before fall of Soviet invasion and new formations and political struggles for the balance of power in the Northern

⁹ During the time period of 18 months I made several international flights from Ankara to Kabul and had attempted many times to meet with General Dostum in person either in his Kabul compound or Sadarat Palace. The interview, if not possible in person can be in writing in order to conduct and ask him from first word a sensitive question about 2014-presidential election and post election. But office of FVP frequently refused my request by saying *be patient, I will let you know*. In addition I found some relatives and friends in his first circle of barrier with the hope of at least giving him a message if not an interview possible. As a last attempt I sent an official letter to the his Office of FVP, when there was no back response and then posted it from my Facebook page. Unfortunately I couldn't pass through the barrier that he has around and may doesn't know about it but isolating him from his people and public. In my point of view it is a big sanction for the leader having a millions of supporter. If one day he learns my enormous efforts and attempts in reaching him I wonder to know what will be his reaction?!

Afghanistan, this timeframe covers years between to 1979-1992. The creation and formation of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Junbish) Party in 1992 and its struggle for survive. This time period covers General Dostum's first autonomous state beginning from 1992 until his collapse in 1998 fully to Taliban.

In chapter four of the thesis, mainly discussed and reviewed 2014 presidential elections of Afghanistan; Ghani-Dostum alliance, Junbish's internal struggle for the leadership and Independent Electoral Commission of Afghanistan's (IECA) failures and fraud of votes, and finally the winning the long term election rivalries and declaration of the *Transform and Continuity* Team under Ashraf Ghani leadership. The general timeframe of the thesis will cover and illustrates the past developments and processes after 1992 and the re-birth of Turkic movement and its outcomes to the political balance of power. Some of the important events and outcomes which took place in 2017 will also be included according to the importance of the events.

1.9. Division of the Study:

The study is divided into different sections and chapters. The chapter one is the introductory chapter that is aimed to give general overview to the overall thesis scope and to introduce what is going to be described in overall. The second chapter mostly contents a short narration about the historical and political background of Timurid Dynasty of Babur Shah until formation of Afghan Government under Durrani's. But in this chapter I gave a widespread focus on the Soviet Invasion, Civil Wars and rise and fall of Taliban. An overlook from bitter past of Soviet invasion and struggles during its withdrawal narrated with details in order to give wide perspective from different angles. In this chapter the Taliban and Civil Wars in brief and it will be covered more broadly in the chapter three.

Chapter three shortly narrates the emergence of Turkic movements and nationalist ideological allies under and before fall of Soviet invasion and new formations and political struggles for the balance of power in the Northern Afghanistan. The creation and formation of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Junbish)

Party in 1992 and declaration of autonomous state by General Dostum after two and half century (245-years) in the history of Afghanistan.

In chapter four of the thesis, mainly discussed and reviewed 2014 presidential elections of Afghanistan; Ghani-Dostum alliance, Junbish's internal struggle for the leadership and Independent Electoral Commission of Afghanistan's (IECA) failures and fraud of votes, and finally the winning the long term election rivalries and declaration of the *Transform and Continuity* Team under Ashraf Ghani leadership. The general timeframe of the thesis will cover and illustrates the past developments and processes after 1992 and the re-birth of Turkic movement and its outcomes to the political balance of power. The chapter five it will be last chapter of thesis will be followed by a comprehensive conclusion.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AFGHANISTAN POLITICS

In this chapter widely discussed and narrated the historical background of Afghanistan since 15th century, the arrival and era of Babur in Kabul up to beginning of 21st century; year 2001 when a new page to the history of Afghanistan was opened. The historical background includes the era of Babur and Afghan Kingdoms until the 20th century, and 20th century Kingdom of Afghanistan, Soviet invasion, civil wars, Taliban and finally the establishment of current Government of Afghanistan.^{10&11}

2.1. Afghanistan from 15th Century of Baburs to the 21st Century

2.1.1. Emergence of Babur in Kabul and Rise of the Mughal Empire: 1504-1526

Afghanistan's history starts with Babur Shah in 1504. Babur, which is mostly known in Afghanistan as Babur Shah (King Babur) was a descendent of Turco-Mongol conqueror the Amir Timur (Tamerlane the Great, founder of the Timurid Dynasty, city builder, promoter of culture and re-builder of the Mongol Order and warrior for the spread of Islam)¹² came to Kabul from present day of Uzbekistan. He soon began to strengthen and spread his power and Kabul was his military headquarter.¹³

Babur was not interested to get involved with the Safavids¹⁴ in the west, but he was more interested and focused on controlling the Indian subcontinent, which included

¹⁰ Anthony Davis, July 1994. *Battleground of Northern Afghanistan*, *Jane's Intelligence Review*,

¹¹ Kenneth Katzman, , September 21 2012, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Services

¹² Beatrice Forbes Manz, April 1998, *The Temür and the Problem of a Conqueror's Legacy*. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Third Series*, Vol. 8, No. 1 pp. 21-41

¹³ Encyclopedia Britannica, 2007, *Timurid Dynasty*, Online Academic Edition,.

¹⁴ The Safavid Dynasty was one of the most prominent ruling empire of Persia (today's Iran) after fall of Sasanian Empire against the Muslim conquest of Persia, 7th Century of AD, and is considered the commencement of modern Persian history. The Safavid kings are ruled over one of the self-styled gunpowder empires, and established their a Twelve (-r) School of Shi'a Islam as official religion of the empire and bringing a new milestone to the Islam history, and herewith the opening a bloody disputes between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims for centuries, even today.

...the Order of the Lion and the Sun, a device which, since the 17 century at least, appeared on the national flag of the Safavids the lion representing 'Ali and the sun the glory of the Shi'i faith.

Mikhail Borisovich Piotrovskiĭ, J. M. Rogers, *Hermitage Rooms at Somerset House*, Courtauld Institute of Art, *Heaven on earth: Art from Islamic Lands : Works from the State Hermitage Museum and the Khalili Collection*, Prestel, 2004, p. 178.

Roemer, H. R. 1986, *The Cambridge History of Iran: The Safavid Period*. P. 189

the region known as Kabulistan¹⁵. In 1526, Babur managed to conquer Delhi Sultanate, which was possessed by the Afghan Lodi dynasty of India. After defeating Ibrahim Lodi and his army, Babur turned Delhi into the capital of his newly established Mughal Empire¹⁶ which included today's Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh as Indian sub-continent.¹⁷

Babur Shah was the founder of Moghul Empire or Dynasty in the Indian Subcontinent and being a well-known and famous as one of the greatest conquerors in history and successors of the Timurid dynasty. Babur Shah was able to capture Samarkand on three separate occasions but each time he had only controlled it for a few months, but we cannot hide the special and unique characteristics and charismatic personality he had as a young prince. He could capture Samarkand for the first time when he was only fourteen. In 1504 when he conquered Kabul he was 21 years old and he was able to establish a settled court, improve gardening, art and agriculture.

Peter Jackson and Lawrence Lockhart, 1986, *The Cambridge History of Iran: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*, Vol. 6: New York/USA, Cambridge University Press, pp. 189–350., p. 331

Robert L. Canfield, 1991. *Turco-Persia in Historical Perspective :Islamic Culture and Literature in Iran and Central Asia in the early modern period*. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 86–7.

¹⁵ Kabulistan is a historical and regional name of today's Kabul Province, and capital city of Afghanistan. The former land of Kabulistan is Peshawar now located in Pakistan, north-west of Kabulistan was called as a Khorasan but today it is called a north-west of Afghanistan.(Quotes from: Zahiru'd-din Muhammad Babur Padshah Ghazi), Annette Susannah Beveridge (trans.) 1908, *The Babur-Nama*, , Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, New Delhi, p. 202.

¹⁶ The Mughal Empire or Mogul Empire, self-designated as Kuragan was an empire based in the Indian Subcontinent and parts of Central Asia. The establishing empire is conventionally dated to the founder of Babur Shah's victory over Ibrahim Lodi, the last ruler of the Delhi Sultanate in the First Battle of Panipat (1526). The Mughal emperors were Central Asian Chagatai Turco-Mongol belongings to the Timurid dynasty. Zahir-il-Din Mohammad Babur, who direct descendent from both Amir Timur (4.-generation grandson of Amir Timur Kuragan, meaning from Mongolian language as 'son-in-law', founder of the Timurid Empire) and Genghis Khan (founder of the Mongol Empire, through his son Chagatai Khan).

James Richards, 26 January 1996. *The Mughal Empire*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 73–74.

Wheeler M., Thackston, December 18, 2007. *The Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor*. New York: Modern Library. p. xlvi.

Annemarie Schimmel, 2004, *The Empire of the Great Mughals: History, Art and Culture*, Reaktion Books, p. 22

Lisa Balabanlilar, January 15, 2012. *Imperial Identity in Mughal Empire: Memory and Dynastic Politics in Early Modern Central Asia*, I.B.Tauris, p. 2,

¹⁷ John F. Richards, 26 January 1996. *The Mughal Empire: The New Cambridge History of India*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 73–74.

At that time, there was two powerful dynasties to the west under Ismail I and in the north under a powerful Uzbek Shaibanid Khanate¹⁸. Therefore Kabul was the main center of surviving Timurid tradition and this was one of the main reasons that Babur focused on expanding of his territories into India.¹⁹ With a powerful new Persian dynasty to the west (under Shah Ismail-I) and an aggressive Uzbek presence to the north (under Shaibani Khan)²⁰, Babur's Kabul becomes the main surviving centre of the Timurid tradition and legitimacy. The powerful neighbors in the north and west left only one option to Babur to expand his empire towards the south and the east. From the 16th century to the 17th century CE²¹, Afghanistan was divided into three major regions. The northern Afghanistan was ruled by the Khanate of Bukhara, the west was under the rule of the Iranian Safavids, and the east was under the Mughals of northern India. The Kandahar region in the south served as a buffer zone between the Mughals and the Safavids, with the native Afghans often switching support from one side to the other. Babur explored and re-arranged a number of towns in the region before his campaign into India. In Kandahar city it can be found his personal epigraphy in the Chilizina, Rock Mountain²². Like in the rest of the territories that used be part of the Mughal Empire,

¹⁸ The Shaybanids or Shaybanid Khanate were a Persianized linguistically (language and cultural assimilation of non-Persians, specifically the Turkic natives) of Turco-Mongol origin in Central Asia. The founder was Abdul Khair Khan and his grandson and ruler Mohammad Shabani Khan (1500-10) extended and established his short-lived Shaybanid Empire by ending the Timurid Dynasty. They were descendants of Shayban , the fifth son of Jochi and grandson of Genghis Khan. The Shaybanids accepted the Islam in 1282 and gradually assumed the name of Uzbeks. The Shaybanid Khanate, were included east part of today's Iran (Khorasan), Afghanistan and parts of central Asia.

Robert L. Canfield, May 2002, *Turco-Persia in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, P.19.

Ira M. Lapidus, 2002. *A History of Islam Societies: Shaybanids*, Cambridge University Press, p. 347

¹⁹ Mahajan, V.D. (2007). *History of medieval India (10th ed.)*. New Delhi: S Chand. pp. 428–429

²⁰ Mohammad Shaybani Khan (also known as Uzbek Abul Fath Shaybani Khan), was an Uzbek warrior who had able to consolidate the Uzbek tribes and established his Bukhara Khanate in Transoxiana between 1488-1510.

Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, 1546.*Tarikh-i-Rashidi: A History of Turkic Mughals of the Central Asia*. Kashmir

Abraham Eraly, 1997. *Emperors Of The Peacock Throne: The Saga of the Great Mughals*. New Delhi, Penguin Books Limited. p. 25.

²¹ CE is Common/current Era equivalent to AD (anno domino) as opposed to BCE/BC (Before Common Era/Before Christ)

²² Afghanistan's second biggest city is the Kandahar which is located in the southern part of the country and neighboring with the Pakistan. Chilizina is a rock-cut chamber on the northern side of the old citadel and is accessed by forty steps. A Persian inscription at the site reveals that the chamber was completed

Afghanistan holds tombs, palaces, and forts build by the Timurid Dynasty of Babur Shah.²³

2.1.2. Hotaki dynasty (1709-1738)

Shah Hussain Savafi (Safavid) appointed Governor George XI (Gurgin Khan)²⁴, to govern the territories of the Great Kandahar region in 1704. One of the main objectives of Gurgin was to defeat the native Afghan tribes. He soon began to imprison or kill the natives accusing them in taking part in rebellions. One of those imprisoned was a native Afghan called Mirwais Hotak who was sent to the Persian court in Isfahan (in Iran) and was back to Kandahar because the charges against him were dismissed.²⁵

Mirwais Hotak, upon his return to Kandahar, suddenly rebelled against Gurgin Khan in April 1709 along with his militia. The rebellion began when Gurgin and his escort were killed after a party which was prepared by Mirwais Hotak at his villa located outside the city. When Georgians of Safavid realms heard about the death of Gurgin Khan, a few days later and army of Georgians arrived in Kandahar but they were defeated by Mirwais Hotak and his Afghan forces. Mirwais and his militia could defend their realm against several attempts of Persian armies from 1710 to 1713.

Southern Afghanistan had become his an independent tribal Pashtun Kingdom and he founded his first Ghilji-Hotak dynasty which had life around 29 years centred in Kandahar. He was called by his people as general of his national army. Mirwais Hotak died in November 1715 aged 42 years and his brother Abdul Aziz Hotak was in charge of Kandahar for about two years when Mahmud Hotaki (Mirwais' son) killed his uncle. Mahmud Hotaki had visions of enlarging his territory towards Persia and he led an

under the auspices of the Timurid dynasty of Babur Shah in the 16th century. But in 1738, Nadir Shah the Persian ruler was destroyed the old fortress as rival in the region.

²³ Robert L. Canfield, Robert L. (1991). *Turco-Persia in historical perspective: "The Mughals-Persianized Turks who invaded from Central Asia and claimed descent from both Timur and Genghis – strengthened the Persianate culture of Muslim India"*, Cambridge University Press, p.20.

²⁴ George XI known as Gurgin Khan in Iran, was a Georgian monarch who ruled the Kingdom of Kartli as a Safavid Persian subject from 1676 to 1688 and again from 1703 to 1709. He is best known for his struggle against the Safavids which dominated his weakened kingdom and later as a Safavid commander-in-chief in what is now Afghanistan. Being an Eastern Orthodox Christian, he converted to Islam prior to his appointment as governor of Kandahar.

²⁵ George Bruce Malleson, 1878. *History of Afghanistan, from the Earliest Period to the Outbreak of the War of 1878*. London: Elibron.com. p. 227.

Afghan army into Persia in 1722 and defeated Safavids at the famous Battle of Gulnabad. After capturing of Isfahan (Safavid capital), Mahmud became the Persian Shah and was known as Shah Mahmud.

Shah Mahmud was merciless towards the Persians who were not eager to obey him and soon he was also killed by his own cousin Ashraf Hotaki in 1725. After Mahmud's death, Ashraf Hotaki became the new Afghan Shah of Persia. At the time, territory of Afghanistan was ruled by Mahmud's younger brother Shah Hussain Hotaki. Ashraf was able to secure peace, at highly unfavorable terms, with the Ottoman Empire in 1727 defeating a superior Ottoman army, but the Russian Empire took advantage of the continuing political unrest, civil strife and utter disgust and disloyalty by the vast majority of people in the empire, to seize former Persian territories for themselves, limiting the amount of territory under Shah Mahmud's control.

The Hotaki dynasty was eventually removed from power by 1729, after a very short lived reign. They were defeated by the emerging Iranian military commander Nader Shah, head of the Afshar Turkmens²⁶, in the October 1729 in battle of Damghan, also banishing the Hotakis to southern Afghanistan. The last ruler of the Hotaki dynasty, Shah Hussain, ruled southern Afghanistan until 1738 when the Afshars and the Abdali Pashtuns crushed him at Kandahar.²⁷

2.1.3. An Afghan Formation: From 1747

Afghanistan and its regions had important relations with the historical Persian dynasties. The region of Afghanistan has for much of history been part of the Persian Empire. The history indicates the linkage of northern plain of India under Kushani

²⁶ The Afsharids, were ruler in Persian Dynasty (today's Iran) but originated from the Turkic Afshar tribes, Turkmen or Turcoman tribe of Khorasan province of today's Iran. The Afshars came from Turkistan and Azerbaijan into Persia in 13th century AD but moved to Khorasan. Nadir Shah or Nadir Qoly Beq is belongs to Afsharid dynasty who were admirer of the Tamerlane the Great and Genghis Khan.

Michael Axworthy, 26 July 2006. *The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from Tribal Warrior to Conquering Tyrant*. I.B. Tauris

Ph.D. Lawrence Lockhart, June 1938. *Nadir Shah : A Critical Study Based Mainly Upon Contemporary Sources*. Al-Irfan Historical Reprints, Urdu bazar, Lahore, British India

Ernest Tucker, 29 June, 2006. *Nadir Shah's Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran*. University Press of Florida, USA

²⁷ Martin Ewans , 2001. *Afghanistan: a short history of its people and politics*. Curzon Press, London. p. 30.

dynasty. We can say that in the time of Mahmud of Ghazni²⁸, the modern borders of Afghanistan were more or less shaped.

We can call the modern era of Afghanistan started from 1747 AD, when the Afghan army returned home after Nadir Shah's death. The commander of Afghan army was Ahmad Khan Abdali who turned back to Kandahar and was elected as the King of Afghans. He was entitled as *Durr-i-Durran* which means pearl among pearls and that's why he changed the name of his tribe to Durrani.²⁹ Ahmad Shah Durrani was able to learn a lot from Nadir Shah, the strategy of running an empire, protecting the boundaries and many other key qualities of being a King. He was very successful in this regard and even got the title of *Baba* which means father of the nation. However plenty disputed amongst his descendants caused their collapse from Kabul in 1818.³⁰

2.1.4. A brief history of Uzbeks in Afghanistan: Social Life and Political Conditions from Abdali's Empire 1747

The genealogies of Uzbeks are semi-Mongoloid with considerable Mediterranean admixture. Uzbeks are Sunni Muslim and speaks the largest Central Turkic dialect called as *Uzbekcha* (Uzbek(-ish): *O'zbekcha*/اوزبیکچه, Farsi: *Uzbeki*/اوزبیکى or in Turkish: *Özbekçe*)³¹. The Uzbeks of four provinces (South-West Turkistan) Balkh, Jawzjan, Saripul and Faryab mainly Mediterranean face and average men height around 1.70-1.85 meter (taller) and female is 1.60-1.70 meter, speaking the west Uzbek dialect (it close today's Turkish language) but the Uzbeks of five provinces (South-East Turkistan) Samangan, Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar and Badakshan are mainly semi-mongoloid type

²⁸ Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni s/o Sebük Tegin (*Sebük Tegin: from Uzbek/Turkic is meaning Beloved Prince*) was the most popular ruler of Ghaznavid Empire, his reign from 977 until his death in 1030 AD. But his father Abu Mansur Sebük Tegin was ruled from 977 until his death in 997 and was founder of Ghaznavid Dynasty. Ghazni is a ancient city in Ghazni Province of today's Afghanistan.

Erdoğan Merçil, 1987, *GAZNELİLER*, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, Ankara. P.366-388

²⁹ Frank A. Clements, Dec 2nd, 2003. *Conflict in Afghanistan: Roots of Modern Conflict*. ABC-CLIO. P. 81

³⁰ Ganda Singh, 1959. *Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of Modern Afghanistan*. Asia Publishing House, Kabul.

³¹ The origin of the word Uzbek remains disputed. One view holds that it is eponymously named after Oghuz Khagan, also known as Oghuz Beg, became the word Uzbek. Another states that the name means independent or the lord itself, from O'z (self) and the Turkic title Bek/Bey/Beg meaning lord/mister/sir.

of face, speaking east dialect (Uyghur) native and average men height around 1.60-1.70 meter (medium)³² and female is 1.55-1.60 meter. In recent years the population of three provinces such as Faryab, Jawzjan and Takhar overwhelming majority is an Uzbek identity in where Pashtun and Tajiks are minority together under % 10.³³

Based on some historian believes that the Uzbeks are came from Central Asia to the Northern Afghanistan in where they had became a political power upon fall of the Timurid dynasty in 1506, centered at Heart. The Uzbeks are founded eleven powerful principalities among the Northern provinces under brave khans, sometimes independently and occasionally determining their loyalty to the Bukhara Khanate or Kabul kingdom. Amir Abdul Rahman³⁴ could gain the control these Uzbek Khanates under his rule by the end of 19th century. After while, the new migrations took place during the 1920s and 1930s as Russians advanced and local uprisings in Central Asia continued. During this same period many Pashtuns settled among the Uzbeks which were resulted with Uzbeks becoming a minority within the region which they were dominated. Since 1992, the Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the primary leader of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban Invasion and other external interferences began controlling the vast majority provincial centers of power in the Northern Afghanistan.³⁵

³² This information obtained based on my personal knowledge and observation. There is not yet a specific statistic.

³³ The Central Statistics Organization (CSO) October 2009, *Statistical Year book: Women and Men in Afghanistan, 2011. Pp.9*

³⁴ Abdul Rahman Khan (between 1830 and 1844 – October 1, 1901) was Emir of Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901. He was the third son of Mohammad Afzal Khan, and grandson of Dost Mohammad Khan. Abdul Rahman Khan re-established the writ of the Afghan government after the disarray that followed the second Anglo-Afghan war. He became known as The Iron Amir after defeating a number of rebellions by various tribes who were led by his relatives.

Hugh Chisholm, 1911. *Abdul Rahman Khan*. Encyclopedia Britannica, Cambridge University Press. pp. 37–38.)

³⁵ Based on an article issued in *130th Anniversary of Faiz Mohammad Kateb Hazara* in Kabul University in 1989 in Dari language and second time issued in Uzbek language in 1995 by Mohammad Halim Yarqin.

Mohammad Halim Yarqin, 1995. *History of Uzbeks in Afghanistan*.

Faiz Mohammad Kateb Hazare, 1912. *Seraj-al-Tawarikh*. Kabul, pp. 990-1107

Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

Culture of Afghanistan enormously impacted by Uzbeks, especially in carpet weaving, music and violent sports. Uzbeks have introduced the ancient-nomadic sport that was called Oghlaq Tartysh Oyunu ³⁶(game of Oghlaq) in where this violent game playing by teams of horseback with a headless goat into circle. In recent decades, the Oghlaq game became Afghanistan's national sport and was symbol of resistance and liberation by anti –Soviet opposition. The game of Oghlaq Tartysh filmed and screened widely in "Rambo –III" by Hollywood star a Sylvester Stallone in 1988 and used as a campaign against Soviet interference to the Afghanistan. In general, Uzbeks are creative and sociable people; loves poetry and playing music using unique instruments such as two-stringed fretted lute. The Uzbek culture and customs was maintained during centuries of assimilations through the folkloric dance and traditional handcrafts; like as metal working, wood carving, leather craft and wall or textile painting. Most of the Uzbeks who lived in the city were businesspersons, others are skilled artisans. However, the Uzbek women are talent in producing exquisite kilims and part of the contribution of textile heritage of Afghanistan.³⁷

Delicious food and traditional dress of Uzbeks were always trendy. Especially, the Uzbek's "Toun" (Chapan, gown) made of silk is very famous and express the nobleness and richness. Today similar *toun* examples can also be seen in Afghanistan's former president Hamid Karzai. The Uzbeks had always offered their hospitality with traditional green tea "Kok chai" and sesame bread as a symbol of friendship, respect and welcoming. Another world-famous Uzbek flavor even today is "Uzbek Pilaf"³⁸, which is includes; rice, labm (offenly fresh), onions, sesame oil, carrots, dried fruits (apricots, raisins and plum can be), nuts (peanut and pistachio) and several piece of garlic. After all preparation can be serviced with dishes. Another unpredictable delicious is "Toppa"

³⁶ Oghlaq or Oqlaq Tartysh in Native Uzbek (Kock Boru in Kazak, Buzkashi in Persian meaning of Goat dragging) have begun with the nomadic a Turkic-Mongol peoples who have come from farther north and east spreading westward from China and Mongolia and Altay Mountains/Steps between the 10th and 15th centuries in a centuries-long series of migrations that ended only in the 1930s.

³⁷ Mohammad Halim Yarqin, 1995. *History of Uzbeks in Afghanistan*.

Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

³⁸ The English term pilaf is borrowed directly from the Turkish pilav, which in turn comes from Persian polow (پلو)

(pasta, macaroni) and "Dushvora or Tushvora" (pasty) which is not familiar in Afghan diet but usually common in Uzbek menu. Another famous fruit is "Qavun" (melon) in the north plains of Afghanistan mainly in Aqcha and Kunduz world-widely known. The word of "Uzbek" which has seems be adopted in 14th century AD translated from "Uz" as "independent or self-ruling" and "Bek" meaning master. The Uzbeks are always been independent khanates under name of Sothern Turkistan or Afghan Turkistan until disappearance from the political map by Pashtun tribal government.³⁹

In Afghanistan, the extended family always had been the foundation of social culture; however, the marriage outside of tribe or family always been undesirable. Out of existence a strong political leader, the Uzbeks are represented by a single party for more than two decades despite a providing such opportunity by allied forces post-2001 era. Uzbeks are continues to be defender of oppressed ethnic groups' right with the less representation in central government. However, they could able to control local issues in the provinces. After 1992 formation today, Uzbeks had represented by senior members and in the past was less but in any way without this unique nation, Afghanistan is not affordable. Afghanistan contents in its body numerous nationalities, ethnicities and groups who all have contributed to the colorful history of Afghanistan. It is obvious that understanding, studying and searching ethnicities in Afghanistan would be very important on recognizing the historical elements, civilization and social life of Afghanistan. Based on many Afghanistan historians' point of view (Ahmad Ali Kahzad, Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghubar, Habibi and so on) history of Turkic peoples in Afghanistan goes back to ancient times.⁴⁰

It is pertinent to mention that Pashtuns entered to these regions at the time of Ahmad Shah Durrani as commanders and soldiers, then during Dost Mohammad Khan but at the time of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan this process was formed based on a planed strategy supported by Government. In the book of *Siraj- al-Tawarikh* one of the most

³⁹Louis Dupree, December 21, 1973. *Afghanistan*. Publisher: Princeton Legacy Library 1st edition.

⁴⁰ Mohammad Halim Yaqin, 1995. *History of Uzbeks in Afghanistan*.
Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

reliable history books, the northern and north western regions of Afghanistan is called as Southern Turkistan or Turkistan. In today's Afghanistan and in some references the whole country is called as Afghanistan or Turkistan. The Southern Turkistan was a developed territory in aspects of social, economical, and political ruled by Beiks and Khanates.⁴¹

When the smoke finally cleared, the Afghans ruler identified himself as Abdul Rahman, the Iron Amir. He was quick to demonstrate why he had earned such a fearful moniker. Slaughtering the Uzbeks and allied Turkmen and Tajiks in the tens of thousands and deliberately spreading famine to break the spirit of the northerners, Abdul Rahman crushed all resistance. Southern Turkistan, the Uzbek lands south of the Amu River (Amul Irmaq)⁴², were his by 1881. From that year forth he proclaimed himself to be the ruler of the "God-Granted Kingdom of Afghanistan, Turkistan and Their Dependencies." (In 1920, "Turkistan" was removed from the country's title, and in 1967 the name officially disappeared from the map as well.) Following their conquests, thousands of Uzbeks, Turkmen and Tajiks, and Hazaras were subsequently led in chains from their burning villages to the Afghan Pashtun capital, Kabul. Many were cut to pieces, strangled, poisoned, hanged, dismembered, boiled, crucified, disemboweled, sawn in half, or left to bleed to death after having their mouths slit open.⁴³

When the butchery was over, the Afghan ruler built an imposing fort known as Sawash Qalas-e (the Fortress of War) to the west of Mazar-e- Sharif as a symbol of his power. Sawash Qalas-e and other fortresses built with British help, Abdul Rahman brought in tens of thousands of Pashtun settlers." These "internal colonists" would help him and his heirs subjugate Uzbek rebellions right up until the 1930s. For generations after their conquest, the Uzbeks sought to understand why the Christian British had worked to destroy their ancient independence. Only much later did they realize that the slaughter,

⁴¹ Faiz Mohammad Kateb Hazare, 1912. *Seraj-al-Tawarikh*. Kabul, pp. 990-1107

⁴² It allegedly derives its present name from the city of Āmul, which is said to have occupied the site of modern Türkmenabat (formerly Chärjew) in Turkmenistan, <http://global.britannica.com/place/Amu-Darya>

⁴³ Mohammad Halim Yarqin, 1995. *History of Uzbeks in Afghanistan*.

enslavement, and conquer of their people had been a chess move in the Great Game, a cynical struggle for power and influence in Central Asia. To preempt any possible Russian moves toward India, their crown colony, the British pushed Abdul Rahman to conquer the surrounding peoples and create a buffer state south of the Amul Irmaḡ (Amu River). The Afghans were then encouraged to centralize or "Pashtunize" this tribal conglomeration so it could serve as a cohesive shock absorber between the Russian and British empires, and thus was born the multiethnic Kingdom of Afghanistan.⁴⁴

Having done as his British allies requested, Abdul Rahman had the Uzbeks' *Aḡ Saḡal*⁴⁵ white beards arrested and humiliated. But this was not enough for the conqueror. Having publicly humiliated the Uzbeks' elders, then he had them chained across the barrels of field cannons and blown to bloody bits over the heads of their terrified families and communities. While the vast majority of the Uzbeks had been forced to end their seasonal migrations into the Hindu Kush, their love of horses and the culture that surrounded them lived on. This passion for horses, more than anything else, allowed the Uzbeks of the twentieth century to maintain links to their former steppe homeland to the north. Like their nomadic forebears who roamed the open plains of Central Asia, Afghanistan's Uzbek shepherds continued to live on horseback. They also continued to play the horse-mounted game of *Oḡhlaḡ* (literally "goat grabbing"), which had been used by their Turco-Mongol ancestors as a war game to develop raiding skills.⁴⁶

In addition to *Oḡhlaḡ*, Uzbeks also gathered to watch their ancient form of wrestling known as *kurash*, which, like their horse-mounted games, taught them how to fight. It is no coincidence that some of the best chapandaz (*Oḡhlaḡ* players) were also famous *pahlawans* (wrestlers), a claim that could be made by few polo players. Despite

⁴⁴ Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

⁴⁵ *Aḡ Saḡal* (-saḡally): (from Turkic Uzbek as a White Beard) or known as representatives/house of elders in rural area/village. And today is still in use.

⁴⁶ Mohammad Halim Yaqin, 1995. *History of Uzbeks in Afghanistan*.

Faiz Mohammad Kateb Hazare, 1912. *Seraj-al-Tawarikh*. Kabul, pp. 990-1107

Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

the fact that the backwater village of Khowaja Dokuh appeared to be consigned to inconsequence, in the late twentieth century it was to be home to a leader who would go on to bring down two Afghan governments and awaken his people to reclaim the heritage of Shaybani Khan , Amir Timur⁴⁷ and his warriors. Before Ahmad Shah Durrani, Southern Turkistan was ruled by Shaybanids and Ashtarkhanid (Khans of Bukhara) Dynasty which was ruled from Bukhara. In 1737 Nadir Shah Afshar sent his son Reza Qoli with troops to Southern Turkistan. In 1738 the Nadir Shah Afshar's troops defeated Shaybanid and Ashtarkhanid forces and the Southern Turkistan came under the control of Nadir Shah. He assigned governors from Afshar tribe and a few from Uzbeks in the region. After the murder of Nadir Shah in 1747 by his oppositions in Fateh Abad and his empire collapsed, the cities of Faizabad, Sheberghan, Aqcha, Maimana, Andkhai, Mazar-e-Sharif and other Southern Turkistan regions were controlled independently by Khans.⁴⁸

When Ahmad Shah established his dynasty in Kandahar, Southern Turkistan was in turmoil between the khans, they were not united which was the main reason for penetration of other powers in this territory. In third year of the empire of Ahmad Shah in 1749, Haji Bek Maimanagi, one of the khans, went to meet Ahmad Shah in Kandahar and asked for help as they were under pressure and cruel rule Rahim Khan Bukharayi in Southern Turkistan. In fact, this coalition with Ahmad Shah helped him to get back to Southern Turkistan. Therefore, after the capture of Southern Turkistan, Ahmad Shah assigned Haji Bek as the governor of Balkh and Chief of Treasury and Attaullah Turkmen was assigned as the General Commander of Army in Balkh. After that, Haji Bek known as Haji Khan and the local governance of Maimana was inherited to his family until Amir Abdulrahman Khan.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Amir Timur (Tamerlane) known as a Great Amir Timur (his title given when he became an emperor, in whereas the Khan title can be used only if he comes from Mongoloid or Genghis Khan dynasty) in Turkic World especially in Uzbek but his enemies and who were with anti-sympathy to him knowingly calling him as a Tamerlane or Timur the lame.

⁴⁸ Faiz Mohammad Kateb Hazare, 1912. *Seraj-al-Tawarikh*. Kabul, pp. 990-1107

Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

⁴⁹ Faiz Mohammad Katib Hazara, *Siraj al-Tawarikh*, Kabul, p. 990

2.1.5. Dost Mohammed: 1818-1838

Dost Mohammad being the leader of Barakzai tribe one of the twenty-one sons of the tribal chieftain take the dominance of Kabul in 1818. There happened several civil wars between Duranni supporters and Dost Mohammad for several years until 1826 when the country was safely divided between Dost Mohammad and some of his brothers. The regions from Ghazni to Jalalabad including Kabul belonged to Dost Mohammad. Due to his territory and power, he soon became the leader of the nation and got the title of Amir from 1837. He was known and accepted to this title by the Afghan tribes as well as foreigners.⁵⁰

Due to geographical location of Afghanistan, the relations with foreign powers were a very important factor. At that time Russia was interested in developing trade with India and the reason of Russian influence in this region and on the other hand they would have easy access to Indian's empire which was mainly Britain. When Dost Mohammad was surrounded by both sides, a British mission took place in Kabul in 1837. The British broke off the negotiations and were ordered to leave Kabul. The Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland used the breaking of negotiations as a pretext and invaded Afghanistan in 1838 and was a vision in mind to bring back the Duranni dynasty in power. This was the first of three occasions on which the British attempted to impose their political objectives on Afghanistan. All three attempts were disastrous.⁵¹

2.1.6. Two Anglo-Afghan Wars: 1838-1842 and 1878-1881

A British army managed to invade Afghanistan from India in December 1838. The finally captured Kandahar in April 1839 and assigned Shah Shuja as the new king, further they captured Kabul four months later and they crowned Shah Shuja again. The British army sent the Amir Dost Mohammad and his family as prisoners to India. After

⁵⁰ Christine Noelle, 1997. *State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826-1863)*. London, Routledge. p. 19.

⁵¹ Mohan Lal, Jan 1, 2012. *Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan [Volume 1]of Kabul*. General Books LLC.. Page 1-3.

that, the British army noticed that it is almost impossible to control the local authorities and tribesmen in their affairs.⁵²

Finally in January 1842 the British army being around 4500 troops got out of the Kabul and left Shah Shuja with no supports and he was soon assassinated after British army left Kabul. In summer 1842 a British army again recaptured Kabul and bringing back Dost Mohammad to power. Amir Dost Mohammad came back to Kabul from India in 1843 and dominated peacefully for another 20 years and expanded his territory up to Herat. It is said that he governed peacefully without interference of British Government.⁵³

After Dost Mohammad, his third son Sher Ali came to power, who was more interested into Russia rather than Britain. He even welcome a Russian mission to Kabul in 1878 and on this occasion rejected a British one. Therefore three British armies entered again Afghanistan in November 1878 and by the end of year, they captured Jalalabad and Kandahar and they achieved what they were looking for. Further, an agreement was signed in May 1879 with Yakub Khan, son of Sher Ali who died in February that year. Based on the agreement, Yakub Khan accepted a permanent embassy of British in Kabul and also agreed that the foreign affairs of Afghanistan to be decided by the British. Yakub found that such rights to British can be very dangerous for Afghanistan. In September of 1879 the British ambassador and all his staff were somehow butchered in Kabul. This issue caused reaction of the British as they decided to exile Yakub Khan to India and accepted Abdul Rahman Khan, grandson of Dost Mohammad as the Amir. In 1880 Britain accepted Abdul Rahman as the Amir of Kabul and agreed to not reside any British envoy anywhere in Afghanistan. When British troops finally withdrew in 1881 (having meanwhile helped Abdul Rahman against some rebellious cousins), the political achievement of two costly wars against

⁵² William Habberton, 1937. *Anglo-Russians Relations Concerning Afghanistan: 1837-1907*. Urbana, Illinois

⁵³ Craig Baxter,. "The First Anglo-Afghan War". In Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Richard Nyriop, January 1986. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*. In Federal Research Division, Library of Congress

Russian interference seems on the debit side. But at least Abdul Rahman proved to be an excellent Amir.⁵⁴

2.2. Afghanistan in the 20th Century: A Kingdom

2.2.1. Abdul Rahman Khan and his successors: 1880-1933

The era of Abdul Rahman Khan is followed by three generations of his family. He paved the ways for a regime following the introduction of technology and investments from other countries; however the violence and anarchy of Afghans' life often created problems on modernizations.⁵⁵

After Abdul Rahman, his son Habibullah Khan became the king in 1901 whose government played a neutral policy during World War I. After the end of World War I, Habibullah Khan was seeking for the recognition of Afghanistan's independence. Habibullah Khan was assassinated in 1919. During this time, British managed their third intervention in Afghan affairs and Amanullah Khan, son of Habibullah Khan was the person who had to deal with this issue. Amanullah Khan's Afghan forces fought against British army nearly about a month and finally the both sides decided to conclude an agreement signed in Rawalpindi in August 1919. With this treaty the British recognized Afghanistan's independence. This era seemed a new page to history of Afghanistan as Amanullah Khan reformed the programs of relationships with European countries. Despite the achievements that Amanullah Khan was gaining, he was forced into exile during the civil war in 1929. Order is restored by Amanullah's cousin, Nadir Khan, until he in his turn is assassinated in 1933. This act of violence brings to the throne Nadir's only surviving son, as the 19-year-old Zahir Shah.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ L. W. Adamec/J. A. Norris, ANGLO-AFGHAN WARS, in Encyclopedia, online ed., 2010

⁵⁵ Emir Abdul Rahman Khan, 1885. *Pandname-i Din ve Dunya*, [The Autobiography of Emir Abdul Rahman Khan-Worldly Advice in the Affairs of World and Religion], Kabul: Matbaa-I Dar-al Saltanat-e Kabul.

⁵⁶ Peter Tomsen, 2011. *The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers*. Public Affairs. p. 42.

2.2.2. Zahir Shah and Dawod Khan: 1933-1978

Afghan interests were promoted during Zahir Shah to a normal extent. One of the benefits was neutrality of Afghanistan during World War II. Afghanistan could benefit from some fundamental services as both the United States and the USSR built some highways and hospitals in a competitive manner which was somehow managed by Dawod Khan who was the prime minister from 1953 on. Dawod Khan was Zahir Shah's cousin and brother-in-law as well.⁵⁷

Due to some issues with Pakistan, Dawod Khan resigned in 1963. After resignation of Dawod Khan, Zahir Shah reformed the constitution. The constitutional monarchy failed and unrests took place in 1964. After two elections were held in 1965 and 1969 which seemed the system would work but due to some conflicts between King and Parliament and other economic difficulties in early 1970s, Dawod Khan came back to power with a military coup in 1973 and Zahir Shah was exiled to Via Cassia north of Rome/Italy.⁵⁸

Dawod Khan was the new prime minister of the new Republic of Afghanistan. In 1977, a new constitution and election made Dawod the President. Dawod had some of his own royal relatives in his cabinet which in 1978 another revolution converted Afghanistan to a new history.⁵⁹

2.2.3. Reform and reaction: 1978-1979

In 1978 the coup was complete and Mohammad Dawod's⁶⁰ government was collapsed by the opposition party in military and he with most of his family was killed. The power was handled by two powerful parties called Khalq⁶¹ (The People's Party) and Parcham⁶² (The Banner Party).⁶³

⁵⁷ "The King of Afghanistan". *Daily Telegraph*. 2007-07-24. Retrieved 2008-03-18

⁵⁸ "Afghanistan - Daoud as Prime Minister, 1953-63". *Country studies .us*. 1961-09-06. Retrieved 2013-07-29.

⁵⁹ Tim Judah, Sep 23, 2001. *Mohamed Zahir Shah*. The Guardian Press

⁶⁰ In 1987 coup of Dawod Khan and emergence of Saur Revolution (April Revolution) and establishment of People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

⁶¹ Khalq ("Masses" or "People" in Pashto) was a faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Its historical leaders were Presidents Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin. It was also the name

The leaders of Khalq Party, Noor Mummer Taraki and Hafizullah Amin were assigned as the president and prime minister, while the Parcham Party leader Babrak Karmal was the other deputy minister however he was exiled to Prague soon as an ambassador. Noor Mohammad Taraki's and Hafizullah Amin's policies were mainly based on communism school, but they were advised by Soviet Union to be more conservative to not provoke Muslims' ideologies. On that time most of Parcham Party's leaders and members were killed and most of them including Babrak Karmal escaped to Moscow, Soviet Union.

In March 1979 the resistance group called Mujahiddin announced the Jihad or holy war against government regime in Kabul, while more than 100 Soviet citizens were arrested and killed in Herat.⁶⁴ The leaders of Khalq Party became enemies of each other as in September 1979 president Taraki attempted to kill his prime minister Hafizullah Amin, but Taraki himself was arrested by Hafizullah Amin's supporters and the official sources announced president's death caused by an illness. The Soviets seemed that they had achieved what they were looking for. Their presence in Afghanistan increased and due to chaos of 1979 in Kabul, Soviet's army moved toward Kabul in December 1979. As Britain always feared, Soviet Union finally bids to control Afghanistan.⁶⁵

2.3. Soviet Invasion and Civil Wars: 1979-2001

2.3.1. Soviet occupation: 1979-1989

The conflicts in Afghanistan begun when the April overthrow (7th Saur Revolution) took place in 1978 by replacement of Afghan kingdom to ideologically the

of the leftist newspaper produced by the same movement. It was supported by the USSR and was formed in 1965.

⁶² Parcham: word meaning "Banner" or "Flag" from Persian. At the beginning, the Parcham faction was the left wing of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Nevertheless, after overthrowing the Afizullah Amin government by the Soviet interference they had reached out the power in the country. The main target of Parchamist ideology was smoothly moving towards socialism in Afghanistan like as in Soviet Central Asian republics.

⁶³ Henry S. Bradsher, 1983. *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*. Durham: Duke Press Policy Studies, p. 72–73

⁶⁴ Afghanistan: *Politics, Economics, and Society: Revolution, Resistance, Intervention*; page 128

⁶⁵ The chronological history backgrounds adapted from study and review of: *World History* Written by Bamber Gascoigne

Marxist –Leninist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The ideology of socialism and communism was so far from understanding by people of Afghanistan on that time when Afghanistan was ruled for centuries by tribal monarchs. The vast majority of population was uneducated and peasant and bringing new modern system were out of understanding and knowledge. However, Afghanistan kept his neutrality during WWI, WWII and Cold War too. But after this intervention the radical fundamentalist Muslims (mujahedeen) by support of Pakistan, Iran, China, Saudi Arabia and United States are allied all against the anti-religious and feminist communist regime. A hundred thousand army of the Soviets had fallen apart and was worthless fighting against Mujahiddin and its allies.⁶⁶

Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister warned the Politburo (Political Bureau was the highest ruling body of USSR) in March 1979 that intervention of Soviet Union in internal affairs of Afghanistan would be a violation of international law and would be globally condemned. In addition, the intervention of the Soviets damages détente with US and Western Europe. Despite urgent request of Kabul regime the Moscow was not willing directly to be involved instead stepped up the shipments of military equipment (artillery, armored personnel carriers and 48,000 machine guns) and one hundred thousand tons of wheat. Meanwhile, the White House followed these events closely with worries about possible invasion plans of Soviets to its south neighbor.⁶⁷

Nurmohammed Taraki (1917-79) was a pro Kremlin prime minister who was killed and replaced by his deputy Hafizullah Amin (1929-79) in September of 1979. He became the leader of Khalq faction of PDPA and begged for more Soviet intervention. But the Soviets suspected of Amin's request as switch over to the US and China and therefore the Moscow double crossed him first. The Kremlin asked him at first invite the Soviet military intervention to the Afghanistan. And Amin was loyal communist and he did as requested. But the decision of occupation of Afghanistan was made based on

⁶⁶ Gibbs, David N., August 22 2006. *Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan: a Declassified History*. Critical Asian Studies

⁶⁷ Bradsher, S. Henry, November 15, 2001. *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*. Oxford University Press

strong recommendation of the Head of KGB, Yuriy Andropov (1914-84) and Soviet's Defense Minister of Dmitriy Ustinov (1908-84), in whereas leader of USSR the Leonid Brezhnev (1906-82) was sick and incompetent by 1980s and the opposition decision never reaches him. One day after the Soviet invasion, Hafizullah Amin was vaguely killed or maybe committed suicide. So, Soviets brought back puppet Babrak Karmal (1929-96) from Moscow to Kabul.⁶⁸

The Soviets tactics and control over Afghanistan failed in 1986 when the US begun supplying shoulder fired Stinger surface –to- air missiles to the Pakistan based Mujahiddin groups which made it enormously difficult to airplanes and helicopters for air operations. Furthermore, the war day by day toke longer and had happened varies unexpected problems such as poor trained and young Soviets troops, low morale and poor sanitation of their installations. Muslim soldiers of Central Asian Soviet Republics were treated as second class citizens, unwillingness, and high desertion rates; as result of this evident they are replaced by the Slavs soldiers. Soviets could not be successful on their invasion and occupation the Afghanistan. They could attack anywhere by their tanks or bombing by their planes but they were not able to keep the control and in ten years of occupation only Kabul and provincial centers were safe for Soviets.⁶⁹

The only achievement of Soviets can be referred to convincing of seven Afghan guerrilla (Mujahiddin) groups gathered in a common cause. They met in Peshawar in 1985 and called the Union as the *Ittehad –e Islami Mujahiddin Afghanistan* (*اتحاد اسلامی مجاہدین افغانستان*: *Islamic Unity of Afghan Warriors, or IUAW*).⁷⁰ The war of Soviet Union and Mujahiddin caused plenty of disastrous outcomes in Afghanistan while more than four million people escaped to Pakistan and Iran.⁷¹

⁶⁸ The Russian General Staff, 2002. *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*. University Press of Kansas.(Edit: Lester W. Grau, Michael A. Gress)

⁶⁹ Daugherty III, Leo J., March 1995. *The Bear and the Scimitar: Soviet Central Asians and the War in Afghanistan 1979-1989*. Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Pp. 73-96

⁷⁰ Joseph J. Collins, Jun 30, 2011. *Understanding War in Afghanistan*. National Defense University Press, Washington, DC

⁷¹ Due to neighborhood borders with Pakistan and Iran, based on the report of UNHCR, almost 4 million escaped to these countries during the Soviet war and civil wars.

In 1985 when Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, one of his main concerns was issue of War in Afghanistan and he decided to dismiss Babrak Karmal from the power instead he assigned in 1987 the former head of Secret Police (KHAD) Dr Mohammad Najibullah (1947-1996) as a new president of Afghanistan. However, in 1988 the Soviet leader Gorbachev aware that he cannot win the Afghan war against US backed Mujahiddin with the blaming Dr Najibullah that he was ineffective in compromising the Afghan people to the Soviet existence. In 14 April 1998, the Soviets signed the Geneva Accord with US, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and then he announced that the Soviet troops would be withdrawal in a phased basis from Afghanistan. This withdrawal ended in 15 February 1989 when the last Soviet troop past the cross bridge over the Amul Irmaq (Amu River). From now on Dr Najibullah was on his own risqué in order to run a communist regime against Mujahiddin opposition.⁷²

2.3.2. Afghan Civil Wars: 1989-2001

2.3.2.1. Civil war: 1989-1992

Mohammad Najibullah remained in power for about three years whereas no one expected that his government would remain stable so long. Najibullah could have semi-controlled the Mujahiddin Groups in this period by use of General Dostum's Jawzjan Militias, but in 1992 his government collapsed because he was ordered to disarm and arrest his top loyal battlefield commander General Dostum. When Dostum learned about Najibullah's disloyalty then he joined with the opposition and led his collapse to the anti-Soviet Mujahiddin Groups. He was escorted to UN office in Kabul but they failed to protect him and he was finally lynched by his opponents in Kabul.

After the fall of Najibullah's government, the Islamic State of Afghanistan created a government in April 1992, which all the Mujahiddin parties came together unified under this government except *Hezb-e-Islami* led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The newly established government was headed by Sibghatullah Mujaddadi; on the other hand Hekmatyar's *Hezb-e Islami*, for its part, refused to recognize the government for

⁷² Schultheis, Rob. "Night Letters Inside Wartime Afghanistan", 1992. p. 155

most of the period and launched attacks against Government forces and Kabul generally. Shells and rockets fell everywhere.⁷³

Sibghatullah Mujaddadi acted as a president for two months, and then Jihadi leaders chose Burhanuddin Rabbani as a new President of Afghanistan. Professor Rabbani was a well known university lecturer and also the leader of *Jamiat-e Islami* (Persian: جمعیت اسلامی افغانستان: *Islamic Society*) party who fought against the Soviet Union as well.⁷⁴ Since 1992 up to 2001, Rabbani was the president and officially through the *Shura-i Mujahiddin Peshawar* (*Peshawar Mujahiddin Council in Pakistan*) he handed over the power to Hamid Karzai the next interim president who seemed to be appointed by US in 2001.

During Rabbani's presidency northern parts of the country including all West-North provinces such as Balkh⁷⁵, Jawzjan, Faryab, Saripul, Samangan and some parts of Baghlan, Takhar and Kunduz provinces were controlled by General Abdul Rashid Dostum as a *de-facto* Autonomous State⁷⁶. General Dostum was the leader and ruler of Northern Afghanistan until its collapse to Taliban Insurgency. During Rabbani's first five years before the emergence of Taliban, the eastern and the western provinces and the some of the northern provinces such as Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, main parts of Baghlan Province, and some parts of Kandahar and other southern provinces were under the control of central government while the other parts of southern provinces did not obey Rabbani's Government. During the nine years presidency of Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was directed, funded and supplied by the Pakistan National Army.⁷⁷

⁷³ Norm Dixon, 12 December, 2001. *Revolution and counter-revolution in Afghanistan*. www.greenleft.org

⁷⁴ *The Demise of the Soviet Union*, 1991 - Library of Congress country studies – Retrieved on 2007-08-21

⁷⁵ Balkh is provincial name and Mazar-e- Sharif, the regional/provincial capital of Northern of Afghanistan

⁷⁶ The theory of autonomy is a simply as general sense of “self-rule” or “self-government” in whereas General Dostum as a new self ruler and founder of a semi-government in Afghanistan was a able to terminate the Pashtoos rein after 245 years of lose Turkic warriors in the Southern Turkistan lands. Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Plato.stanford.edu. Retrieved on 2013-07-12.

⁷⁷ McCarthy, Rory; Carter, Helen; Norton-Taylor, Richard (October 26, 2001). *The elite force who are ready to die*. The Guardian.

Pakistan realized that the new Islamic government leaders would be harmful for their national interests and that's the reason Islamabad was back forcing Hekmatyar who managed plenty of attacks and rocket bombing in Kabul and civil victims. Based on some reliable sources, it is said that the foreign countries interference caused of civil wars as Iranian agents were supporting the Shia *Hezb-i Wahdat-i Islami Afghanistan* (Persian: حزب وحدت اسلامی افغانستان - *the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan*) forces of Abdul Ali Mazari, as Iran was attempting to maximize Wahdat's military power and influence. Saudi Arabia was trying to strengthen the Wahhabite through Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and his *Ittehad-i Islami* faction.⁷⁸

The main forces involved during that period in Kabul, northern, central and eastern Afghanistan were the *Hezb-i Islami* (Persian: حزب اسلامی افغانستان - *Islamic Party*) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar directed by Pakistan, the *Hezb-i Wahdat* of Abdul Ali Mazari directed by Iran, the *Ittehad-i Islami* of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf supported by Saudi Arabia, and the *Junbish-i Milli* of Abdul Rashid Dostum (mostly powerful in North), the *Harakat-i Islami* of Hussain Anwari and the *Shura-i Nazar* (Persian: شورا نظار - *Supervisory Council of the North*) operating as the regular Islamic State forces (as agreed upon in the Peshawar Accords) under the defense ministry of Ahmad Shah Massoud.⁷⁹

The southern Afghanistan mainly city of Kandahar was ruled by the Pashtun tribal councils where the lawlessness and crime said to be at the high rate. The appearance of Taliban in 1994 was also took place from Kandahar derived from Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan which was also developed in Afghanistan as a political-religious force. The Taliban leader named Mullah Omar started his movement with his armed followers from his home town Kandahar. As Hekmatyar was not succeeded to capture Kabul, So Pakistan supported Taliban

⁷⁸ James A Phillips, May 18, 1992. *Winning the Endgame in Afghanistan*, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #181.

⁷⁹ Ahmad Shah Massoud, (September 2, 1953– September 9, 2001) was an Afghan political and military leader. He was a powerful military commander during the resistance against the Soviet occupation between 1979 and 1989 and in the following years of civil war, during which time he became known as the Lion of Panjshir. Massoud was assassinated on September 9, 2001. (Source: Barry, Michael, Massoud: de l'islamisme à la liberté, p.57.)

accordingly. In 1994 the Taliban took power in several provinces in southern and central Afghanistan.⁸⁰

In 1995 Ahmad Shah Massoud who tried to initiate a nationwide political process with the goal of national consolidation and democratic elections, defeated the Hezb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Iranian-backed Hezb-i Wahdat as well as Abdul Rashid Dostum's Junbish Milli militarily in the capital Kabul by forces of the interim government. Masoud's interim government also invited the Taliban to join the process but Taliban declined.⁸¹

2.3.2.2. The Taliban: 1996-2001

By early 1995 Taliban managed to enter the Kabul but they were defeated by forces of the Islamic State government under Ahmad Shah Massoud command. This was the first time that Kabul residents and residential buildings were targeted by military attacks.⁸² Finally on September 27, 1996 Kabul has fallen to Taliban who were then so powerful by the military support of Pakistan and financial supports of Saudi Arabia. After capturing the capital, the Taliban established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They restricted the human rights especially for women by forbidding them working or attending schools outside and many other strict rules which were against the human rights.⁸³

The fall of Kabul caused Taliban could control about two thirds of Afghanistan. Only over the mountains of northern Afghanistan remained an opposing force called Northern Alliance led by the previous government in Kabul. The Taliban areas were mainly included of Pashtun tribes while the Northern Alliance included of Uzbeks, Hazaras, Tajiks and others. In the north, a conflict arose between General Dostum and one of his subordinates General Abdul Malik who was the Junbish's Foreign Minister. In 1996, when his bodyguard (Abdul Samad) in Mazar-e-Sharif assassinated General Rasul

⁸⁰ "Kabul at War (1992–1996) : State, Ethnicity and Social Classes". Gilles Dorransoro. 14 October 2007.

⁸¹ Rashid, Ahmed (September 11, 2001). "Afghanistan resistance leader feared dead in blast". The Telegraph. London.

⁸² 15 Oct 2001, *Deobandi Islam: The Religion of the Taliban*. Defense Language Institute wrc.lingnet.org

⁸³ Kamal Matinuddin, 1999. *The Taliban Phenomenon, Afghanistan 1994–1997*, Oxford University Press, pp. 25

Pahlawan⁸⁴, General Malik accused General Dostum of having a finger in killing his elder brother. That was his allegation in order to broad control over the Northern States. This thought had been proved when he begun undercover negotiations with the Taliban; they asked for the capture of Islamic State's commander the Ismail Khan located in Herat as their most strongest enemy in western province in return promised to accept his rule over Junbish territories in Northern Afghanistan. Still not, found, that there was any writing agreement or just trust to verbal promises. However, on 25 May 1997 General Malik arrested Ismail Khan, surrendered him to Taliban, and allowed Taliban forces to enter to Mazar-e-Sharif. Since he was out of control the Junbish territories by the interference of Taliban forces, he could gain control over Northern Afghanistan. As result, General Dostum forced to flee to Turkey. Suddenly General Malik learned that the Taliban were not going to take their promises instead, they started disarming this troops. The situation forced him to join with Northern Alliance and begun counter-attack against his former allies in order to drive out the Taliban forces from Mazar-s-Sharif and in the last from Northern Afghanistan. In October 1997, General Dostum back from Turkey and made a counterattack against his subordinate, as result of Malik's men were beaten and he fled to Iran. By defeating Malik he again established his temporary authority over Northern Provinces.⁸⁵

In 1998, when the Taliban guerrillas captured Mazar-e-Sharif for the second time, they have massacred thousands of Shia Muslims in the city. In 1998 the Taliban guerillas renewed their attack on Mazar-e-Sharif and they won more lasting control of the city, giving them now about 90% of Afghanistan.⁸⁶

With this development, Taliban were thinking of some compromise and in March 1999 the Taliban representative and the Northern Alliance agreed moving towards a joint government. But there was no useful results as Taliban were emphasizing on their own interest that would be more concerned to their contact with Al-Qaeda. The events of

⁸⁴ Despite argue of General Malik, the accusation of General Dostum never been proved by independent observer or documented. Even decades later after the assassination of his brother he never applied for jurisdiction.

⁸⁵ William Maley, 2001. *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*. C Hurst & Co. p. 14.

⁸⁶ Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-I Sharif (Report). Human Rights Watch. November 1, 1998.

September 11th, 2001 caused the collapse of Taliban's Government. After the US-Northern Alliance (United Front) the Coalition Forces defeated them, they began reconstruction of Afghanistan, first time since the withdrawal of Soviet troops.⁸⁷



⁸⁷ Frank A Clements, 2003. *Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia (Roots of Modern Conflict)*. ABC-CLIO. p. 219.

CHAPTER III

AFGHAN POLITICS AND UZBEKS: 2001-2014

3.1. Abdul Rashid Dostum: Early Life

Abdul Rashid Dostum was born in 1954 in Khowaja Dokuh District of Jawzjan province in Northern Afghanistan. Dostum from Uzbek ethnic and one of the large branches of Central Asian Turkic and came from an indigent family⁸⁸, he received his basic state education (eight classes) and then he was forced to drop out of school as teenager. From there, he took up working as worker in Sheberghan Gas Station. Dostum began working in 1970 in a state-owned gas refinery in Sheberghan, participating in union politics, as the new government started to arm the staff of the workers in the oil and gas refineries. The reason for this was to create "*groups for the defense of the revolution*". Because of the new communist ideas entering Afghanistan in the 1970s, he enlisted in the army in 1972 he joined the Afghan military where his physique and reputation as a leader made him an ideal candidate for the Commando training in Jalalabad. As the top non-commissioned officer, he rose through the ranks as a small group commander (ten men) and then commander of all small commanders (100 men). After his military service, he worked in the oil and gas fields in Sheberghan, Jawzjan Province, as a driller, supervising a crew of 12 men under the auspices of the Ministry of National Security. Abdul Rashid was given the name "Dostum" which means "my friend" in Uzbek, by his fighters when he fought for 11 months in the mountains against the mujahedeen. In the late 70s Dostum was arrested, beaten and jailed when he stood up to Khalqi nationalists who came to his village pushing for unpopular land reforms and edicts.⁸⁹

In 1979 when the Soviets invaded and toppled the Khalqis, Dostum and thousands of other political prisoners were released. During the Soviet period under the more moderate and ethnic tolerant Parchams, Pakistani supported mujahedeen groups began to attack installations, communications lines and populations centers to destabilize

⁸⁸ His late father was seller of carpets when he at a child age

⁸⁹ Based on information obtained from Uzbek politician Mr. Faizullah Zaki, former spokesman of NIMA, and personal experience and observes of Lieutenant General Abdul Karim Khan, former commander of Special Forces of General Dostum...

the country. Because of his military background and previous leadership ability, Dostum was asked by village elders to head a homeland defense group of 600 men. By the mid of 1980s his platoon had grown in stature, reaching company status. He commanded around 20,000 militia men and was considered to be equivalent to a regimental commander. While the unit recruited throughout Jawzjan and had a relatively broad base, many of its early troops and commanders came from Khowaja Dokoh and Misirabad outskirts of Sheberghan. He left the army after the purge of Parchamist, but returned after the Soviet occupation began.⁹⁰

During the Soviet occupation, Dostum was commander a militia battalion to fight and rout mujahidin forces; he had been appointed a commissioned officer to prior military experience. His militia became a regiment and later became incorporated into the defense forces as the 53rd Infantry Division. Dostum and his new division reported directly to the President Dr. Najibullah. Later on he became the commander of the military unit 374th in Jawzjan. He defended the Soviet-backed Afghan government against the U.S., Pakistan, and Iranian-backed mujahedeen forces throughout the 1980s. While he was only a regional commander, he had largely raised his forces by himself. The Dostum's Jawzjan militia controlled was one of the few in the country which was able to be deployed outside its own region. They were deployed in Kandahar in 1988 when Soviet forces were withdrawing from Afghanistan. Dostum's rank of fourth star general honored by former president Sibghatullah Mujaddadi at the visit of Northern Turkistan. At his peak time he commanded 60,000 troops complete with air force, armor and nationwide operations and his units were used to defend population centers and crush insurgents.⁹¹

In 1992 Dostum founded the political party "Junbish" or NIMA⁹² (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) which was seen as a multi-ethnic party. The primary

⁹⁰ Based on information obtained from Uzbek politician Mr. Faizullah Zaki, former spokesman of NIMA, and personal experience and observes of Lieutenant General Abdul Karim Khan, former commander of Special Forces of General Dostum...

⁹¹ Anwar Iqbal, 24 June, 1992. *Afghan leader to transfer power to this war council*. United Press International

⁹² For the details of NIMA refer to section: 3.3. NIMA

mission of the party was to unite people with both jihad and non-jihad background on basis of regional interests favoring a united Afghanistan under de-centralized power structures. This spirit of unity continues today. When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, they left the government of President Najibullah in charge of the country. By 1992 when Dr. Najibullah realized his end was near, he consolidated his control by giving more power to the Pakistani supported mujahedeen groups as well as to his tribe. In doing this, the Pakistani based groups demanded the removal of Dostum as a military leader. The several attempts to arrest Dostum by Dr. Najibullah's secret agents and regional commander in charge of staffs were failed and instead Dostum arrested the officers and returned them to Kabul. This triggered Dostum's split from the Najibullah's communist government and alignment with the mujahedeen groups and as result of this betrayal action of the Dr. Najibullah, he lost his government, life and family including the Pashtun's ruling since 1747 (except temporary ruling of King Habibullah Kalakani or by other name Bacha-e Saqao).⁹³

3.1.1 The First Battles of Dostum (1955-70)

*"He was always a fighter. He never had the sense to back down. Even as a child."*⁹⁴

From the first advent of Rashid Dostum to the world dominated by ancient traditions and misery the struggle comes always first in his life. His first fight: as for as for every children born in Afghanistan surviving is the first. In mid of 1950s the rate of infant mortality in Afghanistan was the highest amount the other countries. As an example Rashid Dostum's sister who is name was Anar died at the age of two and many children in Afghanistan not reaches the age of the five of their life. So, this is one of the reasons that in uneducated people mostly in rural areas given false name to their baby for specific period (three days) after birth. By giving temporary names, they were in

⁹³ Louis Dupree, 1973. *Afghanistan*, Princeton University Press, p. 459

After establishment of Pashtun Kingdomship in 1747 the Tajik/Persian King Habibullah Kalakani could able to revolt and overthrown the modernist and pro-western King Aminullah Khan in 17 January 1929 and became ruler only for 10 months and known by his opponents as Bacha-e Saqou)

⁹⁴ Muhammad Omar, Dostum's elder brother statement (chapter 9) from book named *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* by Brain Glyn Williams William, January 2013, Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

believed that trick the devil into stealing the soul to the wrong kid (based on the urban myth).⁹⁵

In every sense, the future legendary warlord, General Rashid Dostum was born as a fighter. In made of mad household he with his nine siblings including step brother and sisters he would have to struggle to get just his share of the food too. Living in this type of poor family having a dozens of siblings it was not easy for him. He was always must fight in order to survive, and one of his story from his youth. When he was six years old kid, filled the jar with water came from an irrigation channel. Abruptly, the flood came and fills out the ditch and run out him too. As the mud waters overwhelmed him despite he tried to take deep breaths and push up himself to the surface. After several unsuccessful rose up to avoid from flood and breathing but his lungs filled with mud water and not help him to be scattered.⁹⁶

He was saved only by a villager. The villager saw a child's limp body being carried away by the current and snagged it in the branches of a dead tree limb. Before returning the child's body to his parents, the villager decided, almost as an afterthought, to try pumping the water from the boy's lungs. As the man pressed up and down on the boy's tiny chest, Abdul Rashid suddenly vomited water and came back to life. When the color came back to his face, the boy opened his eyes and grabbed the grinning villager's hand in terror.

The Khowaja Dokuh's clergyman was Mullah Chakbashi who had traveled around and had basic but right knowledge about the Islam in where most of village's mullahs were illiterate, narrow-minded and fanatic. In whereas Rashid Dostum and his siblings were certainly lucky that they had a knowledgeable clergyman. The religion education (Qur'an) in rural were simply teaches by mullahs based on method of memorizing Arabic scripture without actually knowing or teaching them the Arabic language, even today this method quite popular and widely in use. Another outcome was Abdul Rashid's teacher Mullah Chakbashi was died and he had a strong ties with him and sad upon his replacement with young clergyman named Ahmed who ridiculed

⁹⁵ Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

⁹⁶ Ibid.

as being too open with unbelievers and infected with seriously loosed ideas, in whereas Mullah Chakbashi was one of the recent times teachers who were expert on the ancient Sufi-Mystic traditions of the Central Asia.⁹⁷

From the very first entrance to the school Abdul Rashid's teachers taught him and the rest of class mates that the Uzbek history was insignificant and their worthless peasant language was useful only for farm and agriculture affairs. Furthermore they were taught that the Uzbeks and neighboring Turkmens were uncouth Turkic invaders of the Pashtuns Afghanistan. Their bright Afghan state was founded by Ahmed Shah Durrani an 18-century Pashtun who could able to unify the various Pashtun tribes under singly name: "Afghan/Afghanistan". The Afghan Turkistan was the last region on the political map of Afghanistan which reintegrated into Afghanistan by 1884 AD.⁹⁸

Regardless of the accuracy and content of the lessons he received, Abdul Rashid's education was, like that of all students in Khoja Doko, extremely basic. He was forced to share just a handful of books with the other children in a school that was devoid of heating and lacking in desks, pencils, paper, and other supplies. As the students grew older, even this simple education ended for many. The poorer ones were gradually forced to quit school to work in the fields, and this number soon came to include Abdul Rashid. When he turned thirteen his father sat him down and told him that his prolonged education was over. "There are mouths to feed in this family. Reading and writing will get you nowhere in life. You need to work to help feed the family and find your own way in the world."⁹⁹

Abdul Rashid's submission to his father's will did not mean that he had lost his fighting spirit. As he grew into his teens he continued to refuse to back down to people outside his immediate family. On one occasion, when he was fifteen, three older boys decided to gang up on him and beat him with sticks after an argument in the village square. Warned in advance by his best friend, Yar Muhammad, Abdul Rashid armed

⁹⁷ Barfield, Thomas, March 25 2013. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Publisher Princeton University Press, (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics)

⁹⁸ Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

⁹⁹ Ibid.

himself with a stick of his own and went in search of his ambushers. When he found them, he fought all three with the same fury he had always fought with as a child. By the time the fight was over, Abdul Rashid was covered in blood: his own-and that of his opponents.¹⁰⁰

While Abdul Rashid's wounds were limited to a damaged hand, a cracked tooth, and a few bruises, two of his opponents suffered broken bones. When their parents saw their condition, they furiously reported Abdul Rashid to the authorities and had him dragged down to the local police station. When the teen was brought in, the police commander found himself in the presence of a proud but respectful village lad who seemed to be incapable of lying in his own defense. When asked if he had beaten the other two boys whose parents had filed the complaint, Abdul Rashid replied in the negative. He explained that he had actually beaten three individuals, not two. He confessed to having beaten them thoroughly, but only in self-defense.¹⁰¹

Exasperated by the thickheaded lad even as he admired his self-defeating honesty, the police chief declined to press charges no matter how hard the other boys' parents demanded it. Instead, he had Abdul Rashid sent home and ordered his father to keep him out of trouble. This proved to be easier said than done, though, for Abdul Rashid was by this time developing skills as a leader among the poorer lads in the village.' With his friend Yar Muhammad by his side, he and his gang were even prone to fight back against the sons of the khans, the landowning class. Abdul Rashid, whose family came from a long line of poor sharecroppers who worked on a local khan's lands, found himself unable to endure the taunts of "*Qara deqon*" which meant "black peasant." When the local khans from the nearby town of Sheberghan came in their American- or Russian-built cars down the dusty dirt road to check on their village's lands, it hurt Abdul Rashid's pride to see his father and other respected villagers bow their heads in submission to them. And he was infuriated to see his own people's khans ingratiating themselves with the more powerful Pashtun khans and government employees from Kabul. As the fights with the khans' sons grew worse, Abdul Rashid's

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

father decided the time had come to send his son away from his village to earn money. In truth, Rahim was also worried that the family's khan might evict them if he knew Abdul Rashid was fighting with the landowners' sons.¹⁰²

3.1.2. The Soldier of the Republic of Afghanistan: 1970-78

*"For me the army was the only way to gain respect and serve my country."*¹⁰³

As Dostum is growing from child life when he worked in the oil and gas fields of Sheberghan, then he changes from peasant boy of the his Khoja Dokuh to the cheerful belligerent with the with the proven reputation as a hard-to-beat Oghlaq (*Oghlaq Tartysh*) rider and *Qurash* (wrestler). Despite his peasant past that he was not come from any of noble (Khan) family he could able to make his reputation through influence to his surrounds. Either he was not in need of his glorious past in order to have a followers and fight for his believes against Khan's sons. When he left his Khoja Dokuh he was knew that one day he will be punished for his behavior against khan's sons. And result of his behavior he was arrested, jailed and beaten but he was not agreeing on the accession simply saying that "unjust accusations were made against me".¹⁰⁴

After being released from the prison, Rashid Dostum made his trip to the holy capital of the Southern Turkistan, the Mazar-e-Sharif. In where he first time in his life seen the blue domed shrine which is calling the "Shrine of Hazrat Ali, Rowze-i Sharif" which means the "Holy Grave, Shrine Sharif". In this holy grave buried body of Hazrat Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. January 31st 661 AD) the cousin and son-in-law of the Islamic Prophet Hazrat Muhammad. Despite its destroy by Genghis Khan's army in 1220s AD while the original building and current view built by Great Amir Timur dynasty under ruler of Sultan Husayin Baiqara (1469-1506) between 1480-81s. The idea and supervising the shrine was with the personal involvement of "Timurid Elite" Amir Ali Shier Nawai (1444-1501) who was the Sultan Huseyin's right hand and cultural minister. Before the time of

¹⁰² Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

¹⁰³ General Dostum's statement quoted from the bok *The Last Warlord* written by William Glyn in 2003. Page 10

¹⁰⁴ Pelton, Robert Youn, March 2002. *The legend of Heavy D & The Boys. National Geographic Society. Pp. 111-130*

Mohammad Shaybani Khan had been repaired over the centuries, the shrine appeared much as it would have during the time of the Uzbek conquests. The marble courtyard surround the blue mosque was filled with white doves, while whole building is covered with polychrome tiles; dominating color is blue of different shades. The Shrine of Ali is very important for all Afghans even today it has visitors from south neighbor and west as well. When Abdul Rashid's arrives to Mazar-e-Sharif was just before the great festival of Nowruz¹⁰⁵. For the people of Afghanistan the New Year's festival had associated that westerners connotes with their Santa Clause and New Years.¹⁰⁶

While he was in Mazar-e-Sharif, Abdul Rashid, who had turned eighteen, was forced to do his national service in the army. He, like all the local recruits, was subsequently transported over the mountains from the only homeland they had known, Turkistan, for military training. There was little that Abdul Rashid, or anyone else, could see from the enclosed military vehicle on the long journey over the Hindu Kush and down to the capital. Things did not get better when they finally got to Kabul. To his dismay, Abdul Rashid and the recruits were confined to the base as they learned how to follow orders, shoot various weapons, speak Dari and Pashto, and work with heavier military equipment. While the training was difficult and on occasion led to beatings, Abdul Rashid seemed to excel. After several months his skills were duly noted, and he was promoted to squad leader. This, however, did little to break up the monotony of a life spent in constant training.¹⁰⁷

But one day their drill sergeant came to announce that they had the day off to celebrate Pashtunistan day. Unable to contain their excitement, the recruits were driven through the city to enjoy the afternoon at the Bagh-e Babur, the Bagh-e Babur, or Babur

¹⁰⁵ Nowruz (literally "New Day") is the name of the Persian New Year which is celebrated worldwide by Persian peoples, and mostly all Turkic people along with some other ethno-linguistic groups, as the beginning of the New Solar Year known as Hijri Shamsi. Anatolian Turks and Central Asian Turks celebrate mostly as a symbol of nature's wake up or spring festival. A New Year's ceremony commemorates the legendary ancestral escape from Ergenekon. The capital referred to is assumed to be Ordu-Baliq, Mongolia.

Dursun Yıldırım, 2002. Ergenekon Destanı", *Türkler*, Vol. 3, Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, pp. 527–43.

Andrew Finkel, 1990. *Turkish State, Turkish Society*, Routledge, p.80

¹⁰⁶ By wondermondo, *Shrine of Hazrat Ali, Mazar-e-Sharif: Blue Mosque*.

<http://www.wondermondo.com/Countries/As/Afghanistan/Balkh/ShrineOfAli.htm>

¹⁰⁷ Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

Gardens, was a series of terraced gardens in western Kabul built in the shadow of the tomb of one of Central Asia's greatest military legends, Zahiruddin Babur, the famous Timurid Tiger. On the way to the garden, the recruits took in the sights of modern concrete buildings, government architecture, airliners coasting into Kabul International Airport, the occasional foreign tourist, and hundreds of women out and about wearing makeup and stylish Western clothes. Of course the city was also filled with the more mundane sights and sounds they all knew as well. There were the usual donkeys, beggars, women in burqas, blacksmiths, bazaars, mullahs and goats eating refuse on the side of the road. But for a simple Uzbek from the provinces, entering the Afghan capital was like stepping into another world. Abdul Rashid instantly loved Kabul and everything it stood for. In the provinces ignorance prevailed, but here the government was working to bring the people of Afghanistan into the twentieth century. It seemed, however, as if Abdul Rashid's fate belonged to the provinces where ignorant mullahs and tyrannical khans ruled.¹⁰⁸

After visiting the capital Rashid Dostum returned to his compound with the inspiration what he saw in the capital and compared with his village life style. Next day morning training sergeant came and announced that three soldiers from among you have been selected to continue remained military service in the elite "444 Commando Unit" located in Jalalabad, Nangarhar province. Rashid Dostum went to receive outstanding training skills and qualification in this unit from the greatest military experts in the country. His friend with tone of astonishes but no one surprised when his name was announced first. His talent for use of weapons, close combat, obeying the orders, and leading others skills are not gone unnoticed by his superiors and his friends. Rashid Dostum as 21-years old tough young from northern plains was led the other two chosen recruits with head of excitement. In his life first time his talent and skills are officially recognized by his superiors. This was the moment when young man begun changing from a peasant up to four-star general and mass leadership.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Barfield, Thomas, March 25 2013. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Publisher Princeton University Press, (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics).

When the convoy pulled into their base in the eastern city of Jalalabad, Abdul Rashid was filled with enthusiasm and eager to begin his training. But as he and other commando recruits began their courses, it became obvious that they still had much to learn. Before they learned their fighting craft they needed the political education. For Abdul Rashid, whose schooling had ended at the seventh-grade level, this next phase was to be a fascinating exposure to the political developments that would one day tear his homeland apart. On the first day, his commander, a tough commando who had been trained in the Soviet Union-gave them a history lecture the likes of which Abdul Rashid had never heard. The historical journey the commander took him on was strongly shaped by a watered-down version of Communism that many Afghan officers subscribed to. In Afghanistan the army was the liberal voice of reform and progress, and Communism was seen as the antidote to the religious fanaticism and ignorance the military felt held their country back. The speech was an outline of various reformist governments' failed efforts to improve the lot of the peasants and modernize the country. The villains in tills telling were always the conservative village mullahs, who considered everything novel to be *bid'ah* (heresy), and the khans, who kept the landless peasants in a state of poverty. It was the mullahs who called for the public stoning of women and the khans who had peasants thrown off their land if they did not work as sharecroppers. Together these forces worked to keep Afghanistan in the middle Ages.¹¹⁰

For Abdul Rashid, the bold words spoken that day were electrifying. He had never heard anyone speak out against the powers of the conservative countryside with such fiery determination and confidence. What his commander was proposing was both heresy and a call for revolution. Abdul Rashid's political indoctrination in the army did not go much deeper than that; but as perfunctory as his introduction to Communism was, it inspired him. He gradually came to identify with the modernist agenda of a moderate Communist faction known as the *Parchamist* (the "banner" group), even if he was unable to understand the complexities of Marxism-Leninism. For most *Parchamist*,

¹¹⁰ Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

Communism did not mean enforcing Soviet- style atheism or extending the Soviet workers' revolution across the planet. It meant forcefully ending poverty, social inequality, ignorance, fanaticism, and misogyny in their own homeland. While some of the *Parchamist* were more versed in the complexities of Marxist rhetoric, most were practicing Muslims who, in another context, would be called liberals, modernizers, or reformers.¹¹¹

Basically early 1970s of the Afghanistan in where anyone who wants to increase the women's literacy, end peasants debt to their brutal land owners, or who wants to away the power of the clergymen and sharia law (Islamic Law) was a communism. Ideologically the mullahs and land owners were considered the Communist regime as their mortal enemies. Meanwhile the Communists were in secret move to enlarge their local support and enforce their demand on the country, whereas the landlords and mullahs were mobilized for the rise up the provincial masses. The same time in Kabul University increased the new generation of Muslim conservative-fanatics, one of those threw acid in the face of uncovered and liberated woman and clashed with communist supporters who were dreamed unveiling women and literate them. By another words it was cultural war between two classes of the public with different point views.¹¹²

By the mid-1970s the battle lines had been drawn. In the impending struggle for Afghanistan, the traditionalists would eventually gain control of the mosques and the countryside while their progressive Communist struggle for Afghanistan, the traditionalists would eventually gain control of the mosques and the countryside while their progressive Communist foes would control the government, cities, and milit.ary. One side claimed Allah, centuries of tradition, and the support of the Arab Muslim Brotherhood. The other maintained a grip on the urban centers, universities, schools, the army, and the support of the Soviet Union. But before the cataclysmic war for Afghanistan commenced, an Afghan Uzbek conscript named Abdul Rashid completed his national service and returned home with

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Pelton, Robert Youn, March 2002. *The legend of Heavy D & The Boys*. National Geographic Society. Pp. 111-130

his head held high. When his elite commando unit delivered him to his home village after a two-year absence, the people of Khoja Doko saw a changed man. Gone was the angry teenager who had clashed with the khans' sons and fought to earn his reputation by wrestling and playing *Oghlaq*. In his place the villagers found a thoughtful, confident young man who brought with him new ideas.¹¹³

As his best friend Yar Muhammad and his oilier village friends gathered around him to hear of his adventures, Abdul Rashid sought to share with them all that he had learned. While the village elders called his new ideas dangerous, the younger men eagerly imbibed them. They were thrilled by Abdul Rashid's stories of "naked" women without veils in Kabul, strange lands lying beyond the Hindu Kush, and men who boldly challenged priests and khans. But mostly they envied Abdul Rashid the fighting knowledge and experience he had acquired as a member of the elite commando unit. This was as exciting as his tales of miniskirt-wearing Kabuli women, soldiers who were not afraid of mullahs, and dreamers who planned to overthrow the old order.¹¹⁴

Word of Abdul Rashid's return quickly made its way to Khadija, who had grown to be a strong-willed woman in the years since he had last seen her. This was best demonstrated in her relationship with her father. When he had decided to marry her off to a khan twice her age in order to acquire new lands, she had threatened to kill herself. Seeing that his daughter meant it, her father relented-but only after rendering a brutal beating. For months afterward he had refused to speak to her, until one day he came home with a new focus for his anger. Abdul Rashid, the local troublemaker, had returned to the village.¹¹⁵

The fact that Rashid Dostum's relations with Khadija's father went not well but his combative manner made him popular in Khowaja Dokuh, in where Khadija was liked. He had become a well known not a politician but as first and foremost bands man. He didn't spend a long time with the jobless youth; he was in military service as a

¹¹³Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...*Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

noncommissioned officer commanding a unit of 100-elite commandos in Jalalabad area which resulted to finding him a well paying job. A state owned oil and gas company hired Abdul Rashid as a driller in the nearby of Sheberghan. Soon after the money he brought from the work and respect that he received from his superiors made him newfound stature among the other poorer villagers. He was one of them but he changed it. Abdul Rashid's personal behavior and tracking job characteristics had been put him in the face of his employers with praises. For the next few years he spent himself with this job with the single minded energy like as he done when he was in the army service. So, based on these seemed that he may have a bright future very soon. Having strong capabilities and well paying job as a driller he could be spent the rest of his life working in the oil-gas fields of Sheberghan. But the evident of April 27 1978 (7th Saur Revolution) bigger than him and would change destiny not only Rashid Dostum's life but the millions of his countrymen. On that day when Dawoud Government was overthrown (Saur Revolution) he came tired from gas filed to home suddenly called by his uncle to the main room. "You have traveled beyond the borders of Turkistan Land to the capital and other faraway Afghan lands. Tell us what this terrible news means!" Uncle's order was pointing to the family radio with miserable view on his face.¹¹⁶

His curiosity aroused, Abdul Rashid sat down on the floor cushions between two of his brothers, Mohammad Omar and Abdul Kadir, and listened to the radio. Sitting in rapt silence, he heard someone on the radio claiming to be from the "Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces" and repeating the same shocking words over and over again in Tajik Dari: "People of Afghanistan, today is the dawning of a new era. Today President Dawud has been overthrown! "For the first time, power has come to the people. The last remnants of the imperialist tyranny, despotism, and the royal dynasty have been ended. A glorious future awaits you in the People's Republic of Afghanistan! Long Live the People's Republic of Afghanistan!"¹¹⁷

As he heard the stunning news, Abdul Rashid had no way of knowing that the message portended a time of horror that would take the lives of over one million of his

¹¹⁶ Yavuz, Selim October 2004. *Afganistan ve Dostum*, Publisher Hiler yayımları, Ankara

¹¹⁷ Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

countrymen. Nor could he have foreseen that the rash act of Afghanistan's small Communist Party would lead to the intervention of both the United States and the USSR in an internal Afghan civil war between the conservatives and the modernizers. But somewhere deep inside, Abdul Rashid knew that this momentous event would shape his own destiny-for better or worse. Looking at his uncle, Abdul Rashid suddenly remembered his commando trainer's words about dragging the country into the modern era one beard at a time. "My God," he whispered under his breath, "those Communist dreamers actually did it. They overthrew the president!"¹¹⁸

Seeing the frown on his uncle's face, he added, "Forgive me, Togha (Uncle). I am not sure what it means-but I think it means the old ways are coming to an end. I believe it means that a new wind is blowing across the land". Nodding in silence, his uncle stroked his beard and said nothing. Everyone sat listening to the disturbing message over and over again. Finally his uncle got up to leave, and the three brothers rose in respect. But as he left the room, their uncle looked back and spoke directly to Abdul Rashid: "Mark my words and pay heed. You may think you know Abdul Rashid: "Mark my words and pay heed. You may think you know the world, but you do not. I am older and have earned my wisdom over the years and decades. The old ways exist for a reason, they are ordained by God to keep order here on earth during our short lives. I have seen enough to know that no good will come of this overthrow of the old order. Ordinary men have no right to remove kings and presidents. It is arrogance, it is immoral, and it is against the will of God. These impetuous men are consumed by *ghurur* (the sin of pride), and they will bring calamity down on us all. May God protect us from their folly."¹¹⁹

3.1.3. The Uprising in 1978: Jawzjan and Sar-e Pol

When the new Communist regime formatted the poor people of Khowaja Dokuh, Misirabad and other villages of Jawzjan province cautiously welcomed it. Despite knowing the country's folk deep - seated fanatics the moderate Parchamist faction of the

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) begun its first attempt to move progressively in practicing its revolutionary social policies. As it first field implementation the Parchamist government sent its envoys to the northern villages to create and open up a health clinics and literacy programs.¹²⁰

The Parchamist Government inspired from their Soviet companions, who had offered a significant advantages to the downtrodden non-Slavic ethnic groups of the former Russian Empire in their Soviet republics. The Soviet's way self determination and freedom for oppressed peoples of monarch state impacts mass movement at world-wide level. The Parcham Afghan government begun reaches out and established a linkage with non-Pashtun minority ethnics. These socio-cultural programs even reaches cell corners of places like Khowaja Dokuh and Misirabad. It was unbelievable when Rashid Dostum asked by his father to come up to the living room of his house when he saw tears goes down from his father eyes: "They are speaking our language on the radio!" He screamed in shock, " Come quickly before it ends, the news is being given in Uzbekcha!"¹²¹

Although skeptical, Abdul Rashid followed his father into the room and for the first time in his life heard his tongue being spoken over the airwaves. When a woman came on the radio afterward and began to sing about the Afghan homeland in Uzbek, he was overwhelmed with emotion. Having heard nothing but Pashto or Dari on the radio since his childhood, the moment had a tremendous impact on him. That was not all. The new Communist government soon began to publish the first Uzbek language newspaper, Yulduz (the star). In the evenings Abdul Rashid would sit with his extended family and listen as his younger brother, Rustam, who was much better at reading, went through the paper. Among the most

¹²⁰ Barfield, Thomas, March 25 2013. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Publisher Princeton University Press, (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics)

¹²¹ After the collapse of Turkic rulers in Turkistan homeland and before commencing the communist regime the Uzbek language was under oppression of central government to be not spoken and there was no education at full in Uzbek Language. Article 16 of the 2004 [Afghan Constitution](#) states that "The Turkic languages (Uzbekcha and Turkmencha) the third official language in areas where the majority speaks them but there is no support from the Central Government in order to achieve this order and teach/educate the young Uzbek generation in their native tongue.

interesting bits of news was that the new Communist government would allow non-Pashtuns to enter the high ranks of the army for the first time.¹²²

Rashid Dostum's seniors in the army and at work always been Pashtuns and it was difficult to understand him the situation. But one thing has been told and clear to him that new Parchamist Government will going to reach out to the Uzbeks and other oppressed minorities in Afghanistan in order to offer equal citizenship for entire Afghanistan. The Parchamist Government became aware that the USSR which had given to the Uzbeks of the north Amul Irmaq (Amu River) their own socialist Soviet republic of Uzbekistan why not in Afghanistan as well. Thus, new Parchamist Government had begun recognizing the rights of its oppressed minority ethics specially the Uzbeks. Upon this, the group of peoples from Uzbek Nationalist Intelligentsia in Mazar-e-Sharif came to the conclusion that the Uzbeks were not a race of peasants instead they are a nation with the glorious past. After fall of its dominance to rival Pashtuns in the Southern Turkistan, the Turkics never had an opportunity for freewill likewise given by the Parchamist government. Therefore, they felt and were drawn to the Parchamist Government and its ideology. Many members of inspiration were dreamed to revitalize again the Turkistan's independence which had been lost two hundred forty five years ago.¹²³

Across the north, progressives who had liberal ideas about giving women and peasants more rights also came to support the new government. Of course the conservative mullahs muttered that God had not created women to be equal to men, and the khans ridiculed the notion that *Qara Deqon*¹²⁴ had rights, but this discontent did not initially translate into action. Nor did the Pashtuns initially rise up against the new Communist regime, because its top leaders were all Pashtun like they were. But for those who were not living in the cosmopolitan bubble of Kabul, it was apparent that the provinces were like dry kindling waiting for a spark to set them on fire. That spark

¹²² Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

¹²³ Barfield, Thomas, March 25 2013. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Publisher Princeton University Press, (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics)

¹²⁴ Qara Diqon: means black/land peasant

came in the summer of 1978 when the moderate Parchamist faction of the Communist Party was purged from power by a more extreme branch the *Khalqi* (translation: "people") faction. Led by devout Marxists, the *Khalqi* faction was eager to pick up the pace of the reforms. Like Stalin. Who had brutally secularized the conservative lands of Soviet Uzbekistan during the 1930s, the *Khalqi* Communist leadership dreamed of modernizing the country at the barrel of a gun. By the summer of 1978 the *Khalqis* had begun a series of reforms that would inadvertently ignite the flames of resistance in the countryside and drive the khans and mullahs to declare jihad. Considered to be among the most ungodly of the *Khalqi* Communists' decrees was their law forgiving landless peasants—who made up more than 70 percent of the country's population—their debts to their wealthy landlords. With the stroke of a pen, the new revolutionary regime claimed to have ended "the backbreaking burden of usury and mortgage" and announced that "millions of peasants were freed from the clutches of moneylenders." They also began to arrest khans and mullahs, even those who were not resisting the unpopular reforms.¹²⁵

When unveiled (without headscarf) women activist came from Kabul into villages and publicly begun campaigning about the revolution and women rights; especially explained that they have a right go to school and receive an education, work, choice of husband, birth control and life without headscarf. This was shocked by uneducated village's women and for most of those women-girls it was unbelievable. But this propaganda triggered the conservatives mullah were driven away. Additionally to this view, the *Khalqis* faction of new communist regime issued an unwanted Decree Number 7, in which the girl-women cannot be forced for marriage with old and reach men and against their desire, and her father-mother cannot ask for qaalin (haqq-e-mehr: bride cost) and prohibited the regulation of forced marriage. One of the stipulated items of unwanted decree was that a girl cannot be forced against her desire for the marriage. This were upset the mullah and khan's at full. It was for centuries in the Afghanistan traditions of paying a large amount of qaalin (dowries) for young girls (around 12-years

¹²⁵ Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

but for some cases might be around 9-10 years also can be found even today) and forcing her for unwanted marriage and create a strong political and or economic ties. It was one of the big mistakes of Khalqist faction of communist regime by challenging new front against customs and tradition that was became part of their solid life in countrywide.¹²⁶

It quickly became apparent that the village Afghans drew a line when it came to interference in their domestic affairs. As the decree became known, rumors began to spread that the Communists were empowering women in order to transport them to Moscow to serve as prostitutes. It was time for God-fearing Muslims everywhere to put an end to what they considered to be un-Islamic interference in their customs by the liberalizing Communists. The reaction against the Jaw began in the mountains of the eastern province of Nuristan but quickly spread to other tribal areas. By the late summer of 1978, bands of *ashrars* (rebels) led by their village khans or mullahs had begun to kill teachers and burn schools, health clinics, and other symbols of the detested Communist regime. The Parchamist Communist faction, which had been driven from power, pleaded with the Khalqis to moderate their policies. But the Khalqis made the fateful decision to fight fire with fire, determined not to allow the forces of ignorance and bigotry to defeat their glorious revolution. Taking a page from Stalin's book, the Khalqis sent their dreaded secret police across the land to arrest "counterrevolutionaries." Villages that resisted were surrounded by the army and bombed or assaulted. Tens of thousands of innocent people were arrested and taken to the notorious Pul-e-Charkhi Prison east of Kabul, never to be seen again.¹²⁷

In winter of 1978, the Nur Mohammad Taraki's (July 15 1917-October 1979) new communist government was begun a new full-scale fight against provincial counter-revolutionaries who threatened their covetous plans to reshape modern society in Afghanistan. But their inspiration was came from famous and brutal leader of the former

¹²⁶ The full story quoted from narration of Ms Nazir Khola (Nazir aunt) who from Misirabad outskirts of Sheberghan and who was the revolutionary commander of 25-50 men and fought against mujahiddinn resistance during reign of former president Babrak Karmal and met with him several times in person in Kabul. She was the fruits of the communist regime and woman decree.

¹²⁷ Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

USSR and chief of KGB, Josef Statalin who was made a big assault to Islam during his reign, but the Khalqi's communist armed resources were limited. They found another way to fix their lack of armed forces with the drastic measures by mandatory enlistment inductees into the army. The new rookies would be used to protect the revolutionary regime and prevent further impact of mullahs and khans to march of communism in miserable life of peasants. As these rashness events are appeared, and deep sense of instability come down in the village of Khowaja Dokuh in where many poor peasants were excited to the communist egalitarian ideas and some numbers were appreciated. Meanwhile, reach khans and mullahs who were feed from peasants were unhappy and declared it as blasphemy and abandon of Islam. The provincial elite and front –benchers were gathered and begun their resistance with the infield rifles to struggle against the godless communist government of Taraki. The struggle between the two inressistalbe fronts would disrupt the Abdul Rashid's family too. Among those enlistment deductees to military service to the communist army was Abdul Rashid's younger brother was Rustam. When he back to home to explore what happenings to the country, he was shock greatly.¹²⁸

In the days following Rustam's call up to the army, Abdul Rashid grew sick with worry as he imagined his weak younger brother going through the brutal training he himself had experienced. While he had not minded the demanding physical instruction, hand-to-hand fighting, hazing, poor food, and officer brutality, he knew it would break Rustam. "God forbid Rustam be sent into battle against the mullahs and ashrrars in the provinces," Abdul Rashid confided to his older brother Mohammad Omar. "The rebels are fanatics. They're publicly executing captured Afghan Army soldiers as infidels." As the day of Rustam's conscription drew near, Abdul Rashid grew more concerned, and a deep gloom settled over the entire household. They all realized that national service now meant going to war. On the day the army arrived in their village, Abdul Rashid's mother could not control her sobbing. While the young man put on a brave face and tried to act as if he

¹²⁸ Barfield, Thomas, March 25 2013. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Publisher Princeton University Press, (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics)

were proud to be following in Abdul Rashid's footsteps, he could not hide the real fear in his eyes.¹²⁹

As the Afghan Army trucks that had rolled into Khoja Doko that afternoon dispersed soldiers out into the village to collect the recruits, Rustam began to physically shake. As his mother fell to the floor weeping, a squad of soldiers arrived at their door and demanded that he report to duty. Watching his younger brother bravely walk out to join the soldiers, Abdul Rashid understood that there was a good chance he was sending his younger brother to his death. Thousands of village youth just like Rustam were being thrown into combat without proper training, and many would not be coming back.

Abdul Rashid had always been the black sheep in the family, whereas Rustam had been his parents' favorite. As he imagined his family coping with the loss of their precious younger son, he understood what he had to do. It was time to act to save his brother. When one of the soldiers pulled his mother's hands off Rustam and began to take him to the awaiting transport truck, Abdul Rashid ordered him to unhand her. Though Abdul Rashid was unarmed, his voice carried a certain authority to it, and the soldiers' commander sensed that he was no ordinary peasant. Looking the tough Uzbek villager in the eyes, the troops' commander understood that this man would put up a fight if the men did not release his mother.¹³⁰

Upon banding his mother's hands Abdul Rashid became very serious and put his finger to the pistol and was ready for shot in which the commander wondered and ordered release of her hands. After stepping forward he submitted his respect and gave the commander a greeting and then provided what he learned in the army audibly: "I am Abdul Rashid, and I spent two years of serving with the 444 commandos in Jalalabad as a noncommissioned officer. I have had extensive combat training and am volunteering to fight to defend our homeland. The government has mandated one person per family, and his family agreed for his voluntary enlistment. By the way Abdul Rashid offered himself

¹²⁹ Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

¹³⁰ Ibid.

instead of his brother's name out of from the roster. Making an excuse that his bro was not enough instead he qualified commando soldier."¹³¹

After pausing to mull over the proposition and demonstrate 'who was in charge, the commander magnanimously consented. "Baley! (okay) You have permission to take your brother's place. You are now a member of the Army of the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and will serve your country for two years." Before his family could react, Abdul Rashid walked away from them and allowed himself to be hefted up into the back of the departing transport truck, Despite his outward calm, his ears were ringing from the shock of what he had just done. Looking back on his family, he realized he was leaving them, his job, his home, and everything he had dreamed of returning to back when he had previously been in the army. Now it would begin all over again.¹³²

3.2. The Islamic Union of Northern Provinces of Afghanistan (IIWSA)

3.2.1 Ittehad-I Islami Wilayat-i Afghanistan

The beginning era of *Ittehad-i Islami-ye Wlayat-i Shamal Afghanistan* (اتحاد اسلامی ولایات شمال افغانستان: The Islamic Union of Northern Provinces of Afghanistan) begins with Azad Beg who is the maternal great-grandson of Nasseruddin, the Kokand's last Amir (Kokand is a city of Fergana Province of today's Uzbekistan). Azad Beg Kerimi was born on July 4, 1952 in Campbellpur, British India (Attock, Punjab Province of today's Pakistan). His father, Abdul Waris Karimi, was an Uzbek doctor serving in the Pakistan Army. Azad Beg's mother was the daughter of Mahmood Beg, the grandson of Said Mohammad Khudayar, the Khan of Kokand. Azad Beg's father was born in 1914 in Tashkent, capital city of Turkistan Governorate of the Russian Empire (today's Uzbekistan).¹³³

¹³¹ Yavuz, Selim October 2004. *Afganistan ve Dostum*, Publisher Hiler yayınları, Ankara

¹³² Brain Glyn Williams, January 2013. *The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warrior Who Led ...* Chicago Review Press, Illinois, USA

¹³³ Antonio Giustozzi, 30 November 2009. *Empires of Mud: War and Warlords of Afghanistan*. Columbia University Press

Audrey Shalinsky, 1982. *Islam and Ethnicity: The Northern Afghanistan Perspective*. Central Asian Survey I, No. 2-3

In 1981, Azad Beg established IIWSA in Peshawar, Pakistan during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. His main goal was to recreate a military resistance and political voice for the Turkic minorities of Afghanistan when Uzbeks and Turkmens of Afghanistan until 1980s as social class was out of education and administration, and mostly they are busy with the agriculture as a peasant and soldier in Pashton's Army. Under dream of resistance he was able to successfully re-unite local rebel commanders of Northern Afghanistan under umbrella of IIWSA despite into a discourage alliance of Turkic speaking Mujahedeen. He had several clashes with *Jamiat-e Islami's* field commander Qazi Islamuddin from Ishkamish, Takhar Province and lose control of power in North-east, in whereas Ashir Pahlawan (assassinated in Sheberghan city by his bodyguard in 1991) from Jawzjan's Turkmens minority, Sauri from Almar (Farayab Province), Mawlawi Quddus from Samangan, and Basmachi¹³⁴ leader Ibrahim Beq's nephew Khauliddin from Kuchmen (migrant) Uzbeks of Soviet Central Asia but located in Kunduz area and many others...The aim to be of Turkic ideological party was so far as a fundamental Islamic movement was stronger in game against Azad Beg's party and mostly used by Kabul regime as a *Trojan Horse* in order to control and spilt the Uzbek's resistance. After the defeat and withdrawal of Soviet forces, Azad Beg forced to consolidate the political power and aligned himself with General Dostum, since his land forces was not enough-strong to control and leading military power as a leader against *Jamiat-e Islam-i's* of Burhaniddin Rabbani and *Hizb-e Islam-I* of Gulbiddin Hekmatyar and was weakened militarily and less popular within Uzbek-Turkmen local communities in compare to General Dostum.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Martha B. Olcott, Jul., 1981. *The Basmachi or Freeman's Revolt in Turkestan, 1918-24*. Soviet Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3 pp.352-369.

The Basmachi movement was known as a national liberation movement which was against Russian Empire/Soviet invasion and rule over the Central Asian lands that known as Turkistan, and also the protectorates of Khiva and Bukhara Khanate. The "basmachi" is an Uzbek word which refers to a bandit or marauder. The term of Basmachi was often used by Soviet Red Army because of its pejorative meaning

¹³⁵ Jo Ann Gross, 1992. *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change*. Duke University Press, London. P. 79

3.3. The National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (NIMA):

The *National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan* (Persian: جنبش ملی اسلامی افغانستان, *Junbish-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan*) is a political party of Turkic Peoples in Afghanistan. It founded in 1992 by General Abdul Rashid Dostum and the party still leading by him.

NIMA, at the beginning of its establishment described as a unique movement of Turkic minorities in southern Turkistan (today's Afghanistan) to defend and observe the rights and interest of Turkic minorities and to be a political voice of unified Turkics; the people somewhat secular and left-leaning inside the communist government and fighters with Islamists background who are fought against Soviet invasion and other nationalists-conservatives. Its voter base is vast majority Uzbeks, Turkmens and partially Aymaqs, Persianized Arabs, Persianized Qizilbash, Tajiks and other Turkic minorities, and it is predominant provinces are Jawzjan, Balkh, Faryab, Sar-e Pol, Samangan and Takhar, and semi-dominant Badakshan, Kunduz and Baghlan.¹³⁶

3.3.1. Formation

Junbish and its military wing, *Infantry Division No. 53* started as a “self-defense unit” for the Jawzjan oil fields in northern Afghanistan, growing to a platoon and then a company until it grew to a division of about 40,000 men by 1989. This division joined the Afghan government and was referred to as 53rd Infantry Division. In 1988 General Dostum forces replaced departing Soviet Union forces and took control of Kandahar as well as deploying to Khost, Logar, Ghazni, Gardez in Paktika all predominant Pashtun provinces and around Kabul. In recent years as result of General Dostum's campaign in those years the elder of local tribes of the mentioned provinces are dissatisfied about entering of Uzbek forces to their homeland as a minority and since 1747 they became state of their land.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ Famous Uzbek politician Mr. Faizullah Zaki, former spokesman of NIMA, and personal experience and observes of Lieutenant General Abdul Karim Khan, former commander of Special Forces of General Dostum...

¹³⁷ Ibid.

Many mujahidin commanders with the nationalist ideology of liberation of Southern Turkistan joined these units such as Lieutenant General Rasul Pahlawan, General Ghaffar Pahlawan who were both Uzbeks from Faryab and Saripul Provinces. General Majid Rozi, an Arab- Uzbek ethnicity from Balkh and General Jura Beg former officer of Dr. Najibullah's Government from Jawzjan also joined. Another expansion was aligning Azad Beg Karimi as a Jihadi leader (IIWSA) with nationalist ideology and his supporters. Most of the joining members were either Jihadi (fighters for Islam) leaders and from the Parcham wing of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).¹³⁸

3.3.2. Capture of Mazar-e-Sharif (1992): A 245 Years Long Interregnum

In 25 December of 1991, after failed coup attempt by Communist Party Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev the last Soviet leader resigned from his position and resulted dissolution of Soviet Union and emergence of Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin administration, in where he was denied further military and financial support for Dr Najibullah's government as Soviet Union's legal successor. When, on March 19, Dr Najibullah on his own (without support of Soviet/Russia) made his last attempt to replace General Abdul Mumin the last castle in feeding the Afghan Communist Government, a Khalqi Tajik who commanded the 70th Hair tan division (crossing bridge or friendship bridge between Afghanistan and former Soviet Union (today's Uzbekistan) over Amul Irmaq) sent a secret notice to Shah Massoud about turning point. General Mumin refused to obey Dr Najibullah's order and kept his position with Dostum's support. Under these circumstances General Dostum and Ahmad Shah Massoud entered into negotiations how they can properly split the government and regions. General Dostum, after takeover the Hair tan, a border city, simultaneously took over the control of Mazar-i- Sharif, the regional capital of Northern Afghanistan and became a dominant party in Baghlan, Samangan, Balkh, Jawzjan, Sar-i-Pul and Faryab Provinces. This

¹³⁸ Anthony Davis, July 1994. *The Battlegrounds of Northern Afghanistan*. Jane's Intelligence Review -6, p. 322-327.

victory over Northern Afghanistan resulted rise of autonomous state and formation of regional political power dealing with the international – regional players since 1747.¹³⁹

This event marks a very important turning point in the history of Afghanistan and especially in the history of Turkistan. Simply because of the reason that the historical homeland of the Turkic peoples of Afghanistan in the North have been so long ruled by non-Turkic dynasties, this event in 1992 marked the beginning of self rule of the natives of the north with their cultural and political capital in Mazar-e Sharif. It was only possible with the military and political power of General Dostum and remains as such.

3.3.3. Battle of Kabul and Fall of Communist Regime (1992-1994)

When General Dostum overtook the Mazar-e-Sharif and became unique political power and leader in Northern Afghanistan he immediately announced Swash Dalasi (19-century war fortress) his headquarter and center of command of his general-staff. Upon this Dostum dismissed all type of ties with former Soviet Union and provinces through the *North Corridor* to the capital and government of Dr Najibullah forced to be collapsed in April 1992. Immediately, the Junbish forces accessed the capital through the road near the airport and within a month held Tapa Maranjan, Bala Hisar, Kabul International Airport, Old Microrayon and Chaman-e Hozori, deploying artillery in the first two of those positions. When control of all roads to the Kabul International Airport came under Dostum's army he prevented the escape of Dr Najibullah to India and forced him to take refuge in the United Nations compounds in Kabul. Moreover the former communist officers who were loyal to the General Dostum and they changed the side and joined him, as result of this Dostum gained a significant advantages and control of airport, gave him to use jet fighters for a majority portion of the battle of Kabul.¹⁴⁰

By May 1992 the Junbish's Army chain of command was: the Lieutenant General Majid Rozi as the overall military commander, Major General Hamayoon Fawzi in charge of political affairs, Major General Jura Beg in charge of troop deployments and

¹³⁹ Kenneth Katzman , 23 October 2013. *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*. Congressional Research Service (CRS). P-6, 79.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. P-6, 79.

rotations and Major General Aminullah Karim in charge of logistics. By end of 1992, General Rozi was replaced to Mazar-e-Sharif towards the leaving General Fauzi command in charge, and Major General Abdul Chirik who controlled a 54th militia regiment. Governance and circulation was mostly established from the Naqlia base which was on the road from Kart-e-Naw and Shah Shahid.¹⁴¹

In July 1992, General Dostum sent a letter to Ahmad Shah Massoud asking to establish a general headquarters to manage and governance forces in the area. But Massoud rejected his offer and as result of this disagreement the tensions between them raised.¹⁴²

3.3.4. Alliance with G. Hekmetyar and defeat in Kabul (1994)

After increased tensions with Jamiat Islam-I (Islamic Society) of Burhaniddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, then the Junbish forces allied themselves with the Hezb-e Islami of Gulbiddin Hekmetyar upon face-to face meeting at Mohammad Agha District of Logar province in January 1994. When this agreement accepted by the parties Ahmad Shah Massoud immediately closed *Salang Pass* for movement by Dostum's army and exploded south part of the tunnel. Dostum's army sieges around its strongholds, land support through Salang Pass closed and air support was not enough, Junbish troops specifically without basic food and some of the its front-line commanders was sold, under circumstances withstand against government forces in side of Kabul city in whereas Massoud's forces can be easily supported by several location and plus local Tajiks involvement. However, Hekmatyar's betrayal resulted in losing several front-line south-west of city and Junbish's land forces being forced out from most of their strongholds in Kabul. Between January and June 1994 some of the fiercest fighting of

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴²Open Society Institute (OSI), 2005. *Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001*

the fight took place in *old mikrorayan along the Kabul River*, and result of this clash around 25,000 people were killed...¹⁴³

3.3.5. Re-capture of Mazar-e Sharif and expansion in the North

When Junbish forces lost its strongholds in Kabul, then Dostum changed his main strategy and focused to the Northern Afghanistan in where he can be supported by local peoples as Mossoud in Kabul. As part of Dostum-Massoud's agreement there was existed some forces of Jamiat Islami but after defeat in Kabul they begun rebellion movement against Junbish's homeland in Mazar-e-Sharif despite of mercy tolerance of General Dostum. Under circumstances General Dostum constrained to remove all of the remained Jamiat's forces from Northern Afghanistan entirely and resulted of a few clashes the Jamiat forces defeated in Mazar-e-Sharif and fled from the area totally. Furthermore, Dostum declared his semi-state (autonomous of southern Turkistan) ruling over nine provinces of north by establishing his cabinet of ministries and sending his high ranking diplomats/ambassadors to abroad, sending scholarship students for high education and printing Junbish's own money in Moscow and many infrastructure investments and development projects.¹⁴⁴

3.3.6. Coup of General Malik in 1996 & Rise of the Taliban in North

By mid of 1996, the Junbish's expansion and developments reached the peak time of its formation as Semi-State (Autonomous State) and they beginning the questioning of liberalization of Southern Turkistan. After formation of Junbish movement party General Dostum declared that Mazar-e-Sharif is the capital and administration center of Northern Afghanistan (Southern Turkistan) and Swash Qalasi (19-century war fortress) is a military head quarter (HQ) of armed forces. Meanwhile the Lieutenant General Rasul Pahlawan (former Jihadi leader against the Soviet invasion and one of founder members and supporter of Southern Turkistan's Liberation) was military wing of Junbish forces and deputy of General Dostum overall in whereas his

¹⁴³ Muhammad Tahir, June 29, 2008. *Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Return to the Afghan Insurgency*. Jamestown Foundation.

¹⁴⁴ "Afghanistan's Northern Alliance". BBC News. 19 September 2001. Retrieved

small brother General Abdul Malik was a Foreign Minister of Autonomous State of Northern Afghanistan (Southern Turkistan). Before outbreak of liberation and declaration of the autonomous state the intelligence services specifically Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Iran Intelligence Ministry (MOIS) and many more intelligence agents are involved and worked hard to stop the ideology and its movement for freedom and separation. In whereas, before fall of Dr Najibullah's regime the General Dostum was a commander of 53rd Infantry Division and General Rasul was the commander of 511th brigade¹⁴⁵. General Rasul was disagreed with Dostum's internal and foreign policy and mostly focusing on sovereignty and liberation of Southern Turkistan as sovereign state and out of Afghanistan, in whereas Dostum's focuses was on that time on multi-ethnic demography as equal Afghans. Another reason was that General Rasul becoming so powerful in the area and self lord in Faryab province and mostly not obeyed by Mazar-e-Sharif administration. Under this condition of disputes in June 1996 General Rasul Pahlawan was ambushed and killed by his bodyguard (Abdul Samad) during the opening of the tomb near Mazar-e-Sharif¹⁴⁶. But intelligence services specifically the ISI were sabotaged and provoked that in assassination of his elder brother "General Dostum has a finger". By this way ISI and others tried to weakened the Junbish forces and split the party in several directions. In 1997, when General Malik on behalf of his leader asked from top high ranking Junbish Generals to attending a meeting which are supposed be taken in Badghis Province (front-line) concerning operational tactics towards the western front. Upon arresting these top generals he initiated rebel movement and used Junbish forces loyal to him against to his vulnerable leader. But General Malik asked and joined to the Taliban guerillas to reinforce his power and become as a new leader and giving back credit the Ismail Khan, governor of Herat. Another fact is that General Malik's mother is from Pashtun ethnic and father is from Uzbek.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Ali Nimanı, 2014. *Afganistan – Türkiye İlişkileri*. Kırıkkale University. Kırıkkale, Turkey. P-10

¹⁴⁶ Rauf begi, 2001. *Adı Afganistan'dı Talibanların Eline Nasıl Düştü?* İstanbul. P-279

¹⁴⁷ The correctness of the information was verified by his brother-in-law Mr. Sabruddin Uzbek (Özbek), who is the known figure within Aydin Community.

In May 1997, when Dostum surprised by unexpected betrayal of General Malik and left the homeland for four months through *Amul Irmağ Bridge* to the Uzbekistan, in where Islam Karimov former president of Uzbekistan ordered to let him go out immediately otherwise he will be arrested, and then Dostum went to Turkey. When Dostum arrived on 26 May 1997 in Ankara Esenboğa International Airport met him Refah-Yol (welfare-the right way) coalition government's state minister Abdullah Gül and the Doğru Yol (Right Way) Party's representatives such as Ayvaz Gökdemir.¹⁴⁸ General Malik learned that Taliban is not going to take its promises and begun disarming his forces, he immediately decided to rejoin with Northern Alliance. After fiercest fighting and heavy loss the Taliban forced to withdraw from Mazar-e-Sharif.¹⁴⁹

In September 1997, Dostum returned to Mazar-e-Sharif and welcomed with flowers by thousands supporters (men and women) of him and accompanied by Mohammad Khalili leader of Hizb-e Wahdat party. However, General Malik during a small clash with Dostum's fighters in Faryab, then he defeated and his forces rejoined to Junbish forces under Dostum command. Finally, General Malik escaped to the Mashhad, Iran. But Junbish's forces during the several years of internal clashes lost all of their heavy-light weapons, artillery-tank, air forces and land forces became so weakened and there was no discipline at army at all and most of the brave commanders either died or fled out the country. By the direct involvement of Pakistan National Army and its intelligence service the Taliban forces second time overthrown the weakened Junbish forces in July 1998, and then re-captured Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998.¹⁵⁰

3.3.7. Northern Alliance & Collapse of the Taliban (2001)

After exile of General Dostum in August 1998 to Turkey and General Malik was to Iran, his remained resistance forces on the ground pulled-back under command of Lieutenant General Lal Mohammad, known as Lal Qumondan (commander) in the

¹⁴⁸ Izetullah Zeki, July 5th 2015. Dostum'un Türkiye İle İlişkileri

¹⁴⁹ Johnson, Thomas H. *Ismail Khan, Herat, and Iranian Influence*. Center for Contemporary Conflict. Archived from the original on 29 March 2007

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

Saripul Mountains and as a guerilla defense with the limited weapons and sources. At this time Dostum's most high ranked Generals/commanders are located in Iran, Turkey and Uzbekistan with their families. Dostum has continued his financial support and giving survival tactics to his resistance group when he was in exile. This was a unique link with his troops on remote locations. Based on this Massoud requested this return and asking General Dostum and his 12 fearless commanders to open up a second front in the Dar-e-Yusuf (South of Mazar-e-Sharif). Dostum's forces immediately began attacking the Taliban positions using cavalry charges and commandos. Recognizing the fact that his strategic value of skill as a leader and a military strategist, in October of 2001 General Dostum was given a full U.S. military support in order to push back the Taliban and its Al-Qaeda instructors. During the fall of Taliban Government, General Dostum and his Junbishi forces played a key role with the assist U.S. Special Forces, CIA, and with air support, Dostum forced to flee the Taliban from Mazar-e-Sharif and surrounded in Kunduz in less than three weeks within Northern Alliance Unity in 2001, effectively toppling the Taliban and Al- Qaeda nationwide. As Al-Qaeda fled into Pakistan, Dostum began the process of regenerating the shattered political process.¹⁵¹

3.3.8. Hamid Karzai's Administration (2001-2014): Dostum's Struggle

On 9 September 2001, Ahmad Shah Massoud was assassinated by two Arab suicide attackers in Khwaja Bahauddin District of Takhar Province in Northeastern of Afghanistan. Two days later about 3,000 people became victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, when Afghan-based Al-Qaeda suicide bombers hijacked two planes and flew them into World Trade Center's Towers in New York City¹⁵². Then US President George W. Bush accused Osama Bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the faces behind the attacks. When the Taliban refused to hand over Bin Laden to US authorities and to disband Al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan,

¹⁵¹ Neamatollah Nojumi, 2002. *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region*. 1st ed. Palgrave, New York.

¹⁵² The September 11 attacks (also referred to as 9/11) were a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks by the group al-Qaeda on the United States on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001. The attacks killed 2,996 people, injured over 6,000 others, and caused at least \$10 billion in property and infrastructure damage and \$3 trillion in total costs. Based on: The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Operation Enduring Freedom¹⁵³ was launched to stop Taliban Guerillas from providing a support to Al-Qaeda and to hold Al-Qaeda use Afghanistan as a base for planning of terrorist activities. US Special forces begun airstrikes and worked together with commanders of the United Front especially with General Dostum against the Taliban Guerilla from Mazar-e-Sharif until collapse of Taliban Emirate in capital of Afghanistan. At the same time the US-Airstrikes were bombing Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets everywhere inside of Afghanistan with cruise missiles as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda crossed over the porous Durand Line border into Pakistan. In December 2001, after the Taliban government was toppled and the new Afghan government under Hamid Karzai's interim administration was formed, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by the UN Security Council to help assist the Karzai Administration and provide basic security to the Afghan people.¹⁵⁴

While the Taliban began regrouping inside Pakistan, more coalition troops entered the escalating US-led war. Meanwhile, the rebuilding of war-torn Afghanistan kicked off in 2002. The Afghan nation was able to build democratic structures over the years, and some progress was made in key areas such as governance, economy, health, education, transport, and agriculture. NATO is training the Afghan armed forces as well its national police. ISAF and Afghan troops led many offensives against the Taliban but failed to fully defeat them. By 2009, a Taliban-led shadow government began to form in many parts of the country complete with their own version of mediation court. After U.S. President Barack Obama announced the deployment of another 30,000 soldiers in 2010 for a period of two years, *Der Spiegel*¹⁵⁵ published images of the US soldiers who killed unarmed Afghan civilians.¹⁵⁶

In the fiscal year of 2009, the United States resettled just 328 refugees from Afghanistan. By contrast, the U.S. admitted more than 100,000 Vietnamese refugees for

¹⁵³ <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/28/world/operation-enduring-freedom-fast-facts/>

¹⁵⁴ Academy of Achievement – Profile: Hamid Karzai". Achievement.org. 2 February 2005. Retrieved 13 January 2012.

¹⁵⁵ Der Spiegel "*The Mirror*" is a German weekly news magazine published in Hamburg. It is one of Europe's largest publications of its kind, with a weekly circulation of 840,000

¹⁵⁶ Matthew J. Morgan, 30 September 2007. *A Democracy Is Born: An Insider's Account of the Battle Against Terrorism in Afghanistan*. Greenwood Publishing Group.

resettlement during the Vietnam War. On the other hand, over five million Afghan refugees were repatriated in the last decade, including many who were forcefully deported from NATO countries. This large return of Afghans may have helped the nation's economy but the country still remains one of the poorest countries in the world due to the decades of war, lack of foreign investment, ongoing government corruption and the Pakistani-backed Taliban insurgency. The United States also accuses neighbor Iran of providing small level of support to the Taliban insurgents in whereas the US shall force to stop the main source of support for Taliban is Pakistan as they involved primarily to internal relation of sovereign state. According to a report by the United Nations, the Taliban and other militants were responsible for 76% of civilian casualties in 2009, 75% in 2010 and 80% in 2011.¹⁵⁷

Dostum initially supported the Bonn Agreement, but was quickly disenchanted with the lopsided governmental structure that favored exiled Pashtuns and Panjshiris under Fahim. A large number of the initial government ministers came from Ahmed Shah Massoud's home village of Roka while millions of Uzbeks, Turkmen, Hazara, Arab and Aimaqs had no political representation despite their contribution to the liberation of Afghanistan where hundreds of their men were killed. Upon objection on the Hamid Karzai the interim president of Afghanistan appointed General Dostum as the Deputy Defense Minister in order to placate his boycott.¹⁵⁸

In 2002 General Dostum founded the first an independent post-Taliban media network in Afghanistan history called *AYNA TV*¹⁵⁹. During the post-war period Dostum became a public figure who worked for political conciliation and furthering the concept of political unity amongst minorities into a cohesive Afghan state and strengthening the constitution to provide grass roots power. His support for the U.S. and vigorous opposition to the Taliban has made him a popular spokesman for the north and minorities in urban centers. This period was marked by specific incidents that began

¹⁵⁷ Brown University Watson Institute for International Studies (27 February 2001). " *Costs of War: Afghan Civilians*. Retrieved 30 June 2013.

¹⁵⁸ Kathy Gannon, 25 December 2011. *Afghan warlord Gen Dostum appointed to new government to placate potential challenger*. Associated Press, Kabul

¹⁵⁹ <http://www.ayna.af/en/>, Ayna TV official website

with unfounded accusations that the forces of General Dostum and U.S. soldiers were responsible for the deaths of thousands of Taliban prisoners while being transported from Kunduz to Sheberghan in late 2001. No proof has been offered or investigation has been conducted and General Dostum still welcomes a full investigation.¹⁶⁰

On May 20, 2003, General Dostum survived suicide bomber assassination attempt while at leaving the mosque for Eid Al-Adha. Before the 2004 election, unfounded stories of warlordism,” massacres and other malfeasance surface in the western press. In October of 2004, General Dostum ran for President and earned over 800 000 or 10% of the national vote. Mohaqiq, Dostum's traditional Hazara political partner, received 935,000 or 11.7% created a 21% voting bloc.

On March 1 2008, President Hamid Karzai appointed General Dostum as Chief of Staff to the Commander In Chief of Afghan National Army and as required by the constitution, resigned from his position as head of the Junbish Party (NIMA). Over the last nine years, the party has been reforming itself by holding two national congresses and adopting principles of modern democracy. The Third Party Congress elected a new leadership and a chairman for a two year term. General Dostum became known as ‘The Founding Leader’. The party represents the interests of Uzbeks, Turkmen, Persianized Aimaq, Persianized Arab, and Persianized Qizilbash voters in national politics. It also unites some Pashtun, Tajik, and Hazara voters through its recently expanded networks in thirty-one provinces of Afghanistan. Junbish’s main base of support is in the Northern provinces from Badakhshan to Badghis. Karzai's relationship with Dostum has been respectful due to his position as a ‘Heroic Popular Leader’. In 16 August 2009 General Dostum returned from Turkey in order to support Hamid Karzai's campaign for 2009 - presidential election but as an effort to organize the Northern Afghanistan and Turkic ethnic interests of the northern voters. The last day of the campaigning he flew by helicopter to his stronghold Sheberghan city in where he was welcomed by over 20,000 followers at the municipal's stadium. As result of his campaign for support of Karzai the

¹⁶⁰ Rich Opperl, July 17 2009. *Afghan Warlord Denies Links to '01 Killings*. Asia Pacific

Junbish Party organized and delivered 45% of the two million accepted ('clean') votes in 2009 presidential election to President Karzai's victory.¹⁶¹



¹⁶¹ Khshnood Nabizada, September 24, 2010. *Abdul Rashid Dostum*. Khaama Press

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL DOSTUM AND 2014 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS



Map-I. Political Map of Afghanistan.

Source: http://www.atozmapsdata.com/zoomify.asp?name=Country/Modern/Z_Afghan_Pol2

4.1. Before Presidential Elections in Afghanistan: 2014

General Dostum's first attempt as historical challenge was in October 2004 presidential election as a unique candidate under NIMA umbrella and as result of presidential election he earned over %10 of total votes which was equal to one million votes. The same historical challenge was made by Hazara's leader Mohammad Mohaqiq and earned %11.7 votes from Hazara's voting bank and evaluated as brave movement

since being Kabul's wheel driver and cleaners. Despite accusation of General Dostum being a war crime by western media network which is just an allegation for two decades out of prove of investigation. And his second attempt was in August 2009 presidential election for the favor of Hamid Karzai and as result of his support the Junbish Party delivered over %45 of two million of clean votes. However, he was aware that before going for third times candidacy attempt as vice president and he have to make a clearance for the bitter past and accusation about him. Under circumstances General Dostum made a public apology for those of his citizens who suffered during the civil war, it was first time in Afghanistan history made an announcement by a public figure and a masses leader. General Dostum, founder and leader of the Turkic *Junbish Milli Islamic* (NIMA) party made the statement a day after registering as running mate to Ashraf Ghani in the presidential elections of 2014. However some experts were criticizing that if General Dostum claimed by war crimes so there were a number of warlord/commanders that they needs to be investigated too. Specifically the investigation and prosecution period shall be cover before-Soviet and post-Soviet era and all involved parties including today's most known leaders: Gulbuddin Hekmetyar, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Ismail Khan, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Mohammad Mohaqeq, Ata Mohammad Noor, and many others. The judging ex-warlords must be fair and taking into consideration all the relative and irrelative elements that is direct or indirectly involved to the civil war of Afghanistan. Despite all these unclear topics, General Dostum made his public apology from the people of Afghanistan but none of the listed warlords are declared their apology for the bitter past.¹⁶²

4.1.1. Parties, Groups and Domestic Politics

By the time of election there were three predominant parties with strong support of different ethnic voting banks. Junbish, Jamiat and Wahdat parties, none of it is a Pashtun ethnic identity or its leader a Pashtun. If so these three parties can join together under unique candidate in order to be competent with Pashtun based candidates. However, none of them joined under unique candidate despite that they need to be

¹⁶² Kate Clark, October 8, 2013. *A Leader Apologies: General Dostum, elections and war crimes*. Rights and Freedom. Afghanistan Analyst Network, research organization.

together in order to overthrow the Pashtun dominance. Each party had different interest and political agenda. Junbish (NIMA) party's leader knows that he cannot pretend unique leadership for presidential candidature despite its high voting banks percentage which was estimated around %35-40, assuming that they don't have a qualified leader who can represent entire Afghanistan including extreme Pashtuns tribes.



Picture01: The photo has been taken when the ex-president Hamid Karzai accepts the 11 presidential nominees with their vice presidents who are the Afghanistan's top level political players including technocrats, academics and strong military figures. Upon end of meeting the Hamid Karzai starts the presidential campaign of 2014; it's immortalized with the memorial photograph in Kabul, February 2, 2014. In photo: second line from left to right: elected First Vice President General Abdul Rashid Dostum, elected President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and Ahmad Zia Massoud. Source: *Facebook RFL/RL*

General Dostum at this point remains is only suitable leader with 22-years military- political (1992-NIMA) portfolios who can represent entire Turkic ethnics but not as a president might be as a second countryman. Except General Dostum as a leader of masses, the Turkic ethnics or NIMA Party doesn't have a figure who capable to lead

the mass of people and forward to destination, even today. There are several politicians¹⁶³ with small range of destination but may be rise up in long term duration. Considering the above conditions and ethnic proportion Dostum thought it is time to bet for the right one instead going for new adventure. General Dostum had declared his support behind of ultra-nationalist Pashtun presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, a former World Banker considered to be a pro-western technocrat and not being a member of none of strong populated parties, and be mate as Ghani's candidate for vice president. Ashraf Ghani in 2009 presidential election had attacked General Dostum – who then supported Karzai – for his dismal record on human rights as a “known killer”¹⁶⁴ and criticized Karzai for this alliance. Ghani's second vice-presidential candidate is a former justice minister from the Hazara ethnic group. The same condition goes for Hazara's minorities too.

Tajiks are luckier than Uzbeks and Hazaras. During the reign of Pashtun dominance they not far away from government and had made one attempt by Bacha-e Saqqou (King Habibullah Kalakani) for short-term and their population mostly lives in urban area and creates around of %25-35 of government structure time to time until collapse of Dr Mohammad Najibullah's communist regime. The Tajik's main political party is *Jamiat-e Islami* (Islamic Society) and several parties derived from it and one of it is *National Coalition of Afghanistan (Etelaf-e Melli Afghanistan)*¹⁶⁵ and leading by very experienced leader in recent decades is Dr. Abdullah after martyr of Ahmad Shah Mossaud. Despite disunity of Uzbeks, Hazaras and Tajiks ethnics (National Front) the semi-Tajik Abdullah attempted to play a leadership role in 2014 presidential election against Pashtun taboo instead of acceptance of being a second countryman. This was the turning point of the rally. Meanwhile Junbish's educated and youth members, who for almost a decade have tried to push the party towards reform, have been disappointed

¹⁶³ Known small/medium-scale Uzbek politicians: Faizullah zeki-NIMA spokesman/NSA, Qudratullah Zeki-MP, Sardar Mohammad Rahmanoghlu former MP/Lower House, Alim Sayee- former governor and MP, Babur Farahmand-MP/FVP secretary...

¹⁶⁴ August 20 2009. *Kick out Karzai. We deserve a second chance.* published in Times Newspaper

¹⁶⁵ Thomas Rutting, 4 January, 2012. *National Coalition vs National Front: Two opposition alliances put Jamiat in a dilemma.* Political Landscape, Afghan Analysts Network, Independent Research Program

with their leadership that blocked their attempts. This has created a wider gap between the leadership and the reformists and resulted in the establishment of two separate youth movements outside the party as well as the emergence of independent candidates from Junbish for the 5 April 2014 provincial council elections.¹⁶⁶

4.1.2. Procedures

On 13 July 2013, the Afghan Parliament (the National Assembly) passed a pair of election laws considered crucial to holding the election on time; The first one was Duties and Structure of the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IEC)¹⁶⁷; second one was Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) which will govern in writing and how to conduct state's election management itself and its election watchdog. On 17 July 2013 the President Karzai signed IEC's duties and structure and Independent Electoral Complaints Commission's law on complaints about voter fraud and other irregularities. So in these laws, the most significant changes are the submission of a new selection mechanism to appoint IEC and IECC commissioners. The passed laws describes for the leading of both organizations to be selected by the president, but only after a Selection Committee composed of a broad spectrum of Afghan representatives submits a list of 27 recommended candidates to be considered by the president.

Head of commission, head of secretariat and members of Independent election commission totally nine commissioners for six years period appointed directly by the incumbent president. The composition of the Selection Commission includes the Speaker of the Ulusi Jirga (Abdul Rauf Ibrahimy, the lower house), the Speaker of the Meshrano Jirga (Fazal Hadi Muslimy, the upper house), the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Abdul Salam Azimi), the head of the Independent Commission on the Oversight of the Implementation of the Constitution (Gul-ul-Rahman Qazi), the head of Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission (Seema Samar), the heads of registered political parties with at least six members in parliament, and one

¹⁶⁶ This narration quoted from Faizullah Zeki and other Turkic politicians.

¹⁶⁷ 1392/5/15(06/08/2014), *Law and Structure of IEC and its Duties and Authorities*. Available in pdf format IEC's official web site. Translated from Official Gazette

representative from Afghan civil society. The decision to use a more inclusive mechanism to assign IEC and IECC leadership is a step forward in moving away from the perception of prejudice created by unilateral presidential assignments. However, the mechanism does not go so far as to create a more formal check on the assignments, such as parliamentary approval.

The Selection Committee has been chosen and offered its recommendations for IEC assignments to President Karzai, who was immediately made his choice. The selection committee will now turn its attention to the IECC's recommendation. Despite early progress, it remains to be seen whether this mechanism will lead to the assignment of commissioners that will be seen as neutral by Afghanistan's competing political coalitions, and whether it provides enough of a check on executive authority so as to instill confidence in the eventual leadership.^{168&169}

4.1.3. Candidates

In 6th October 2013 (The registration period for nominees was between 16 September until 6 October 2013), 27 presidential nominees including of two vice presidents (1st and 2nd vice presidents) for each, a total of 81 candidates confirmed their interest and have submitted their nominations to Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IEC) by closing day of the nomination period. 27 Immature candidates eliminated to 11 by the several reasons and their nominations are below.^{170&171} Another illustration; for the better understanding ethnical distribution of Afghanistan which had been provided in Map-I, in where the Pashtun tribes is a minority against other ethnic principal minorities. But almost all presidential candidates are from Pashtun ethnic tribes except Dr Abdullah as a semi-Tajik.

¹⁶⁸ Jed Ober, Augsut 6th 2013. *Afghanistan's New Election Laws*. The South Asia Channel, Foreign Policy news channel

¹⁶⁹ Ghanizada, July 29 2013. *Karzai Appoints New Members for Independent Election Commission*. Khaama Press/ Afghan News Agency

¹⁷⁰ <http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/finallist13/presidential.pdf>

¹⁷¹ Frud Bezhan, October 23 2013. *Afghanistan's Presidential Hopefuls*. Afghanistan, Radio Free Europe.



Map-II. Shows an estimated ethnic population of Afghanistan and its distribution by different colors as of 2013.¹⁷²

Before going to enlisting the presidential candidates and their vice presidents, the Map-I shows, Aimaqs (Aymak)¹⁷³ are labeled as Iranian (Persian) in whereas the other sources shows them as branch of Turkic minorities in Afghanistan. The word of Aymak or Aymak is equal meaning from original Turkic Uzbek is a wake up or leaving. During a century of assimilation their native tone had become a Persianized Turkic dialect and one of their famous poet and writer is Faizullah Aymaq.¹⁷⁴ The same example goes to Hazara ethnic, most of the sources show them as a Turkic branch of mongoloid dynasty and a century of assimilation of the Hazaras transformed them into Persianized Iranians

¹⁷² The source: October 10 2013, Afghan Elections: A Political Maturation. Assessment, world view, Stratfor (<https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/afghan-elections-political-maturation>)

¹⁷³ Sultanm Mahmood Toyghun, August 2013. *Günümüz Afganistan Özbek Nesri Üzerinde Muhteva İnclemesi*. Master Thesis Program, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Gazi University, Ankara. p.7

Feyzullah Aymak, 1980, *Halk Durdanaları*. Kabul, Kabul Print, p. 10

¹⁷⁴ Feyzullah Aymak, 1980, *Halk Durdanaları*. Kabul, Kabul Print, p. 10

and losing their mother tongue fully. Still we can hear some of basic Turkic words in their Persianized Hazaragi language.¹⁷⁵

Top 11 Candidates of 2014 -Presidential Election:

1. Abdullah Abdullah, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, leader of National Coalition of Afghanistan (Jamiat-e Islami's contester), presidential candidate in 2009. Islamic Society Party
 - First VP – Engineer Khayal Mohammad Khan, Pashtun ethnic, Hizbe Islam.
 - Second VP –Mohammed Mohaqeq from Hazara ethnic and leader Hizbe-Wahdat.
2. Mohammad Dawoud Sultanzoi, Tolo TV presenter and former MP from Ghazni and pilot for United Airlines, California located, US company. He from Ghaljay tribe of Pashtun ethnic. Independent
 - First VP- Farid Ahmad Fazli, from Tajik ethnicity.
 - Second VP – Kazima Mohaqeq, from Hazara ethnic and university lecturer
3. Abdul Rahim Wardak, former Minister of Defense, resigned as security adviser to the president to run. From Pashtun ethnic. Independent.
 - First VP – Abdul Ahad Afzali, Tajik ethnic
 - Second VP – Sayed Hussain Anwari, from Hazara ethnic
4. Abdul Qayum Karzai, brother of former President Hamid Karzai, businessman and politician. Pashtun ethnic. Independent
 - First VP – Wahidullah Shahrani, resigned as minister of mine and from Uzbek ethnic
 - Second VP – Ibrahim Qasemi, former lawmaker from Hazara ethnic.
5. Ashraf Ghani, former Finance Minister, dean of Kabul University, resigned as head of the transition coordination commission. Pashtun ethnic. Independent

¹⁷⁵ Hazara word from Persian is meaning a thousand(s) and Hazara(gi) is meaning a Hazara type of Persian dialect.

- First VP- General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Leader of NIMA and former Chief of Staff of ANA and from Turkic ethnic as an Uzbek.
 - Second VP- Sarwar Danish, former justice minister and from Hazara ethnic
6. Sardar Mohammad Nader Naim, grandson of King Zahir Shah. Pashtun ethnic.
Independent
- First VP – Taj Mohammad Akbar, from Pashtun ethnic however in some sources he looks as Tajik ethnic.
 - Second VP – Azizullah Pooya, former head of Ghazni provincial council and Pashtun ethnic.
7. Zalmay Rassoul, former head of the National Security Council, resigned Minister of Foreign Affairs. Independent
- First VP- Ahmad Zia Massoud, older brother of Shah Massoud and Tajik ethnic
 - Second VP- Habiba Sarabi, from Hazara ethnic
8. Engineer Qutbuddin Hilal, spokesperson of Hezb-e Islami Hekmatyar during the 1990s and, more recently, member of the Hezb-e Islami peace delegation to Kabul. Independent
- First VP – Enayatullah Enayat, an Uzbek ethnic
 - Second VP – Mohammad Ali Sakhizada, a Tajik ethnic
9. Mohammad Shafiq Gul Agha Sherzai, resigned as governor of Nangarhar province. Pashtun ethnic. Independent
- First VP - Sayed Hossain Alemi Balkhi from Hazara ethnic
 - Second VP- Mohammad Hashim Zare from Uzbek Ethnic
10. Prof. Abdurabl Rasul Sayyaf, leader of the Dawat Party (the former mujahedin faction of Ittihad-e Islami), resigned as Kabul MP and Pashtun ethnic.
Independent
- First VP- Ismail Khan, former Minister of water and Energy, Tajik ethnic
 - Second VP- Abdul Wahab Erfan, member of Ulusi Jirga and notable figure of Takhar province and from Uzbek ethnic group.

11. Hedayat Amin Arsalan, former finance minister, and from Pashtun ethnic.

Independent

- First VP – Let General Khudaidad from Hazara ethnic
- Second VP – Safia Seddiqi, a Pashtun ethnic.

In 22nd October 2013, after preliminary evaluation enrollment of nominees, Mohammad Yousuf (Yusuf) Nuristani the chief of Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IEC) disqualified 16 of the nominees, leaving only 11 in the competition. The different candidates were disqualified for a number of reasons; among them were education levels, documentation and the number of required signatures. The eliminated candidates had the right to appeal to the decision within 20 calendar days and the Independent Election Commission was due to present the final list of confirmed candidates on 19 November 2013.¹⁷⁶

4.2. Political Developments: Uzbeks

4.2.1. Leadership Struggle in Junbish Party towards General Dostum

After publication of first round of presidential election, one of main reason for the slump in votes was that the Junbish leadership has underestimated the importance, influence and mobilization power of reformist groups in its own party who have pushed for years, though in vain, for internal democratization. Junbish Millie's military wing originally includes a militia that protected natural gas installations in Jawzjan province and fought for standing the communist regime in the 1980s, upon disclosure of attempt to arrest and disarmament of General Dostum by Dr Mohammad Najibullah, Dostum stopped his further standing support and accepted the invitation to join the mujahedin group in spring 1992.

In the same year, General Dostum and armed companions established a political movement party trying to represent on that time Turkic's minorities rights and commanders networks of different organizational backgrounds of the Northern Afghanistan (Jihadist and non-Jihadist). Upon establishment, it was reorganized as a

¹⁷⁶ Kate Clark, February 2nd, 2014. *Rallies, Debate, Rain and Snow: The 2014 presidential election campaign starts*. Political landscape, Afghan Analyst Network

countrywide party seeking to represent mostly the Uzbeks and Turkmens interest. Even since, General Dostum has been the party's leader, but his refusal to give it more modern structures has led to pressure for reform in the party's own ranks. Among the reformers' demands was the replacement of former commanders with old style organization skill by the new young educated generation in high-ranking party_posts, for the better management of the party, transparency in its financial system, and was most critical issue for the General Dostum, as new leader for the party as well.¹⁷⁷

These demands are faced hard resistance by top level commanders who are close to General Dostum. At a party congress in 2008, Dostum made some concessions and allowed the election of a new party chairman, Sayed Noorullah Sadat, a former communist who was considered to be a Dostum loyalist. Dostum was given the ceremonial post of "*Founding father of Junbish*" and its "*honorary chairman*". General Dostum was under triple attack at that time. Furthermore, General Dostum like *tucked out in corner* by pressure of new reformist with support of Turkey¹⁷⁸ (especially under AK Party ruling based on strong advise and recommendation of Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu former foreign minister, Turkish Government had been decided to no further support instead for Sayed Noorullah, and later he visits Ankara for new leadership in Junbish Party) and president Hamid Karzai jointly agreed for his exile to Turkey. General Dostum remained there until Karzai need him for his campaigns publicity in 2009-presidential election which was held on 20 August 2009. But after 18 September 2010 parliamentary elections of Afghanistan the Junbish Milli's poor performance under Sayed Noorullah Sadat leadership, was opened pressure for reform in party again.¹⁷⁹

Despite weak performance of Junbish party, even Sayed Noorullah couldn't get required votes from his loyal Jawzjan supporters to be a member of parliament (National Assembly of Afghanistan). This was a turning point for Sayed Noorullah to be a new leader of party but he lost the historical opportunity. Based on this factual result, the

¹⁷⁷ Obaid Ali & Thomas Rattig, May 22nd, 2014. *How disenchantment with General Dostum split the Uzbek vote bank*. Political landscape, Afghan Analyst Network

¹⁷⁸ ANKA, August 19, 2009. *Davutoğlu: Afganistan için Türkiye'den asker talebi yok*. Dünya, Hürriyet

¹⁷⁹ Alper Çimen Keskin and Gün Türk, August 17 2010. *Türkiye Afganistan İlişkileri: Afganistan Türklerinin Durum*. Wordpress, Güney Türkistan.

Sayed Noorullah lost his popularity, confidence and new leadership in Northern Afghanistan as a political power. The Junbish Milli's followers re-decided that without General Dostum they cannot struggle for the balance of power in Afghanistan as Turkic ethnic. The reformers pushed for a new congress – according to the party's regulations, one should take place every other year. But the '*conservatives*' pushed back. With procedural tricks, they blocked the congress to be convened up to today, although the delegates had been elected in most areas already. In 2011, Junbish's supporters were dissatisfied mainly youth with performance of new chairman Sayed Noorullah and made attempt to turn down due to this poor progress and to be too pro-reformist. Finally, in early 2013, General Dostum with support of delegates and base voice could able to remove him. He and the commanders retained the upper hand and pushed the younger reformists out of the ring.¹⁸⁰

4.2.2. Influence of New Generation on the Uzbek Vote

Even if it true, ballot stuffing is not the only reason for the unsatisfactory Uzbek-Turkmen consequence of the Ghani-Dostum alliance. There have been significant splits of the Uzbek votes because, for the first time since 1992, there were strong pretenders who may drill Junbish's vote bank. There was an idea within new reformist and separatists, why entire Turkic vote banks shall place their bets on one candidate instead of they can be represented by several candidates. In case of lose one side they can be represented in second one or third. Another reason for the division of the Uzbek vote is the candidacy of Wahidullah Shahrani, (former minister of Mines) who is running as first vice-president for Qayum Karzai visa, a prominent technocrat, businessman and former parliament member and older brother of ex-president Hamid Karzai. Wahidullah Shahrani son of professor Nematullah Shahrani who was minister for Islamic affairs and the other candidate was Mawlawi Abdul Wahab Erfan, who is running as second vice-president for '*jihadist leader*' Abdurabl Rasul Sayyaf. Mawlawi Erfan – a religious scholar, former member of the Ulusi Jirga of parliament, notable figure from Takhar's Kalafgan district and well-known mediator in quarrels amongst local commanders –

¹⁸⁰Zabiullah Ehsas, June 26, 2013. *Interview with Voters - Sadat warns Dostum of exposing his real face.* Pajwork Afghans News

managed to attract Uzbek votes in his area. The main reason, however, is that apparently some of the Uzbek votes have been channeled away from the Ghani-Dostum alliance through Uzbek youth networks that have distanced themselves from Junbish due to frustration over the failed internal party reform.¹⁸¹

The mid-2013 clash between Dostum's followers and Mohammad Alim Sayee, the governor of Jawzjan in the Junbish heartland and a Turkish-educated reformer¹⁸² and member of the party's Central Council, had intensified the internal struggle in Junbish. At the begging the principle scenario was; Alim Sayee was under pressure of Karzai's government and its allies (US-led coalition) and besides all of these, a full support from Turkey for standing against General Dostum (his spiritual father) to provoke the situation in North, as result of to remove Dostum from Junbish leadership and decrease his effects from the party and public. A prominent member of the party said the conflict between Alim Sayee and General Dostum started when Dostum asked the governor to throw his support behind the newly established opposition National Front (NFA) and cut his ties with the Arg (Kabul Palace). (The front did not exist very long, however, and its major leaders – General Dostum, Zia Massoud and Mohaqeq – all ended up supporting different presidential candidates.) When the governor refused to obey his *spiritual father*, then Junbish followers staged mass protests against him by boycotting streets in Sheberghan and in Northern cities and asking his immediate resignation. In July 2013, Karzai's scenario was to removal General Dostum as opposition leader did not go well and resulted in replacement of Alim Sayee from Jawzjan governorship to reduce tension in the North. This, in turn, fuelled the belief amongst reformists that their efforts may not bear fruit. Hakim Turkoghlu, a former head of Junbish Party Faryab Youth branch in Maimana, he claimed the party as a “military organization where all the members are considered to be soldiers” and have to obey General Dostum's decisions and orders without questioning.^{183&184}

¹⁸¹ Martine van Bijlert, October 6th 2013. *The Last Minutes of Frenzy of Afghanistan's Candidate Registration*. Political Landscape, Afghanistan Analyst Network.

¹⁸² Mohammad Alim Sayee is one of the 10 thousand students that are sent to Turkey and around world for higher education scholarship by the General Dostum on mid 1990s by dream of to meet the educated cadre requirements of autonomous state of Southern Turkistan (today's Northern Afghanistan).

Mohammad Alim Sayee and Hakim Turkoghlu is one of the thousand students that are sent to Turkey and around world for higher education scholarship by the General Dostum on mid 1990s in dream of to meet the educated cadre requirements of autonomous state of Southern Turkistan (today's Northern Afghanistan). But this new reformist movement established several councils and two movements outside the party that, in defiance of their leadership, backed presidential candidates other than Ghani-Dostum alliance. Despite a presenting provincial council candidates independently, under Alim Sayee leadership they established new political organization as *Islahat ve Adalat* (Reform and Justice), which was considered to be a movement not a political party¹⁸⁵. *Islahat ve Adalat* organization aim was to calibration of Turkic nobles, intellectuals and opinion leaders to act as unified and to get a definite result in presidential election -2014 out of Ghani-Dostum alliance. Even if it contained only organization structure and with the above mentioned contest it was enough by itself. Only because of this reason the hard struggle between General Dostum's Junbish and new reformist *Islahat ve Adalat* had begun. This was happen when he exiled from Jawzjan Governorship. *Islahat ve Adalat* movement's influential public figures were and they are for somehow represented mostly Uzbek dominated provinces such as Dr Jamaher Anwari as a deputy of organization and former minister for refugees and repatriation. The member of administrative body were Wahidullah Shahrani, the former minister for mines, Hashim Ortaq, member of parliament, MP Nazari Turkmen, MP Sattar Darzabi, MP Abdul Wahid Faqirzada, MP Haji Ismail, MP Fetuallah Qaisari, Gul Mohammad Pahlawan¹⁸⁶ and public notable Khalifa Qizil Ayaq, and other parliament members from Ulusi Jirga (public house) and Meshrani Jirga of National Assembly of Afghanistan.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ February 15, 2012. *Foreign Minister Mr. Davutoğlu received Afghanistan's Jawzjan Governor, Mohammad Alim Sayee*. Turkish Foreign Ministry, Press 7 Information bureau, Latest developments.

¹⁸⁵ Based on statement of Mr. Alim Sayee, concerning his new political organization which established under his leadership, translated date May 9th of 2017.

¹⁸⁶ General Gul Mohammad Pahlivan was (known as a Gulli Pahlawan) famous warrior commander in western front line of Junbish forces during 1990s and a little brother of late General Rasul Pahlivan and General Malik.

¹⁸⁷ Alim Sayee, May 9th 2017. I asked a series of question to Mr. Alim, and his was responded through his Facebook messenger. I summarized his words within the text.

The allegation of *Islahat ve Adalat's* movement and its functions was to rival with Junbish and was to create an opposition inside of the party for the benefit of continued reforms and the replacement of old styled former military commanders with new educated generation and the transfer of the party's leadership with political background. During the first round of presidential election Wahidullah Shahrani backed *Islahat ve Adalat* movement was continued to support Abdul Qayum Karzai as a prize of first deputy, when he decided suddenly pullback from the race on March 2014 in the favor of Zalmay Rassul's team. The *Islahat ve Adalat* movement was surprised by this virtual turn and woke up, but it was so late to change the decision and they forced to support Zalmay Rassul. There was no back door. Most of the new reformist believes that the decision was improper at the beginning since only repeat of Karzai's surname was enough to make a determination in whereas the reign period was over and at any rate it was not possible to choose Qayum Karzai. Despite of disappointment they continued campaign in favor of Zalmay Rassul in Uzbek-dominated provinces by bringing 50,000 Uzbek votes, in reality several times below the expectations. But these votes made Zalmay Rassul third in the first- round of countrywide.¹⁸⁸

Another disappointed reformist group was *Eslahat ve Mosharekat* (Reform and Participation) organization. It is founding leader and member of Afghan National Assembly was Baz Mohammad Jawzjan'i which was established approximately in February month of 2014. He was killed on January 11th 2017 at blast attack in Kandahar province as part of UAE's_ambassador envoy to Kandahar.¹⁸⁹ *Eslahat* and *Mosharekat's* formation includes mostly parliament members of Junbish Milli's Party and influential public figures of the north such as; Qudratullah Zeki¹⁹⁰, Takhar Parliament member in Ulusi Jirga and Matin Bek s/o martyred Abdul Mutalib Bek, Takhar parliament member and former Junbish commander in eastern front who was assassinated in December 25

¹⁸⁸ Ali Nimani, 2014. *Türkiye ve Afganistan İlişkileri*. Kırıkkale University, Kırıkkale, Turkey. P-10

¹⁸⁹ ToloNews, January 11 2017. *High-Ranking Officials, Diplomats Victims Of Kandahar Attack*.

¹⁹⁰ The Qudratullah Zeki was a scholarship student as part of General Dostum's *target bear educated cadre requirement...* to Turkey in 1990s.

2011.¹⁹¹ Baz Mohammad aims and believes was to create another struggle front for Junbish and General Dostum and split the Uzbek dominated province's votes and self-benefited from it and at the cost of dissolution the historical NIMA resistance without having a plan and an agenda.¹⁹²

4.2.3. Junbish Conservatives: Opportunist & Immature

Furthermore, the Junbish's former military commanders opposite idea were that the young reformist demands were a timeless and irrelevant. Rahmatullah Turkistani¹⁹³, speaker for Faryab Provincial Council and NIMA's former commander in 1990s explains in interview to AAN that he and many other brave hearted fighters spent all their lives during the holy war against Soviet invasion and resistance movement against Taliban extremist and barbaric. The youth movement did not realize formation of the party and under which condition the party was established, they must remember that the resistance movement was survived at the cost of ten-thousands our people blood who were died only for freedom of the country. So this young generation has to realize their past and not to be obstacle of the regional interest and not be victim of the big games. Having a high degree qualification and modern western style life is not enough without analyzing the past and knowledge in political affairs and socio-cultural structure, by calling them as *an opportunist and immature*. Another critic is a Faizullah Zeki, Deputy Chairman and spokesman for Junbish movement has been told to AAN, that these young reformists are so opportunists and youth without consideration their past and not loyal to their elders, only concentrates to their own interest and benefits instead of their nation and Junbish interest. There are still many old-style commanders and General Dostum's critics are continued to support the Junbish Party beside the disputes. We had been faced a serious defiance and difficulties in presenting our goals and awakening policies to our community. The party structure shall be changed from military primarily and tribal

¹⁹¹Matin Bek (MP @ Ulusi Jirga), January 26 2012. *Finishing the Work of Afghan's Peach*. Op-Ed contributor, The Opinion Pages, The New York Times.

¹⁹² Obaid Ali & Thomas Rattig, May 22nd, 2014. *How disenchantment with General Dostum split the Uzbek vote bank*. Political landscape, Afghan Analyst Network

¹⁹³ Turkistan'I; is a famous surname of Southern Turkistan habitants, and word of Turkistan means from Persian the land of Turks and meaning 'I am from Turkistan or from Turkistan'.

network into modern, democratic platforms in where it can produces solutions and ideas and linked with the youth thoughts. He was compromising that the Junbish's ineffective luck to obtain a large number of votes in Uzbek dominated provinces was essential due to poor management and disagreeableness by appointing untruthful figures as head of campaign teams. The appointed campaigners mostly thinking to fill out their own pockets rather than running and understanding that this was a unique opportunity to reach the party's target. One of these examples, I can count the Said Sadat. The target was to gain the presidential election and prove the party's role and approach as a democratic achievement. Feda Mohammad Paikan, a member of Junbish Central Council and medical doctor of General Dostum during the anti-Taliban resistance period was told that poor management and disagreeableness one of the *unpredictable result* that party was had. In addition name of Uzbek worlds also created a bad image to our community in general.¹⁹⁴

He believes and fights for the reform in the party's leadership that Junbish still has a chance to gain their community confidence and belief. Even he and Sayed Nurullah as one of the new reformist inside the party leaves the party for goodness it will be ground for serious disintegration of the party. The Ghani-Dostum's *Unpredictable result* and vote collapse in first round of presidential election gives alarm bell in Turkic dominated provinces. Ashraf Ghani, strong presidential candidate and mate of General Dostum during this interview to AAN, told that he was reviewed the reason of lost votes with his running mate (General Dostum) and based on those results he would be re-organized and changes in head of campaign teams re-considered. He confirmed that his fortune negotiation with the elders of Uzbek and Turkmen community went well and in second round of presidential election in June 2014 they will support the *Ghani-Dostum Alliance*.¹⁹⁵

In the light of these developments, General Dostum disappeared from the public for a while and even not appearing in media. But most of the critics believe that he may have a sick problem but the events behind the scenes were the disagreement with the

¹⁹⁴ Obaid Ali & Thomas Rattig, May 22nd, 2014. *How disenchantment with General Dostum split the Uzbek vote bank*. Political landscape, Afghan Analyst Network

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

Ghani's accusation. At the beginning of the disagreement almost the Ghani-Dostum ally comes to end, but with the hard efforts of mediators¹⁹⁶ and supporters of Junbish party the ally re-evacuated from downfall. General Dostum first time felt his defenseless against new reformist rallies. He determined that the fight against the reformist and opportunist will continue very hard in second round of presidential election in whereas Ghani's opponent Dr Abdullah and his team will work hardly to penetrate among the Uzbek dominated communities and *muddying water to fishing*.

German geographer Dietrich Wiebe¹⁹⁷, in his 1984 country profile – which was estimated most 'recent' reliable, independent study –based on a general population of Afghanistan was a 12 million, that there were 1.2 million of Uzbeks (ten per cent) and 400,000 of Turkmens (3.3 per cent). He was narrated that recent studies (for the mid-1960s to mid-1980s) extrapolated population numbers based on an assumed high rate of population growth of 2.5 to three percent per year but said that “my own field studies and those of colleagues, however, show that for Afghanistan a zero population growth needs to be assumed.” Despite his determination, the Turkic population after establishment of Junbish Party and acknowledgement of semi-state administration over southern Turkistan the population of mostly Uzbeks raised up significantly. Based on considering the fact that most of Uzbeks-Turkmens were busy with the agriculture before revolution of Junbish and after declaration of semi state and the social life and commonwealth of Turkic nations rose up significantly; they became from farmer to commanders, educated people, city builders and businessmen. Today the Uzbek's population estimated to be around %20-%25 of total population. As for sureness, the Misirabad residents which has a 15 kilometers away from Sheberghan city center in

¹⁹⁶ Based on the statement of Sanjar Kargar, head of Ghani-Dostum's campaign in North-West (Andkhoy): " We had scheduled a breakfast at Juma Khan Hamdard's house in Balkh district of Balkh province (former Jawzjan governor) but relation of Ghani-Dostum was down it was difficult to re-unite them and with interference of Juma Khan and Zia Massoud and other influential figures of the Junbish the resentments is over and started rally of second phase which was scheduled on 14 June 2014."

¹⁹⁷ Dietrich Wiebe, 1984 “*Afghanistan: Ein mittelasiatisches Entwicklungsland im Umbruch*” (*Afghanistan: A Central Asian Development Country*). country profile, p. 124

1992 was 5,000 to 6500 but today its population is approximately around 15 to 16 thousands. Simultaneously these numbers goes for Turkmens too.¹⁹⁸

4.3. Elections: Campaigning, Promises and Coalitions of Uzbeks

In order to cover this part, I was able to personally appoint an interview with Mr. Faizullah Zaki, an Uzbek activist, politician, senior member and former spokesman of "National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan" (Junbish-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan) and discuss widely with respect to position of Uzbek ethnics and General Dostum in *2014-Presidential Elections of Afghanistan*. Our interview was conducted based on several questions I attempted to ask from Mr. Zaki which are documentarily narrated hereunder:

Date and Place of Interview: 1400 hrs, 17 May 2016, NIMA Head Office, Kabul, Afghanistan.¹⁹⁹

Question: Could you please kindly give us a history background overview regarding NIMA and Turkic Ethnics revolutionary activities?

Answer:

"The establishment of National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Junbish-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan*) has been the turning point and a revolution for people of Northern Afghanistan especially Turkic Ethnic (Uzbek, Turkmen and Hazaras) but focusing to spread and expand all over Afghanistan not only northern provinces. The party was established 24 years ago in 1992 based on multiple ethnic groups and pluralist, as it had included the leaders and commanders from other ethnics and groups such as Ata Muhammad Noor leader of Tajiks ethnic in north, Muhammad Mohaqqeq leader of Hazaras and Juma Khan Hamdard leader of Pashtuns and being pluralist as its focus and vision was based on National Interest not only one ethnic or group. Basically the party was formed approximately by 95% of military commanders and known as a political and military party.

¹⁹⁸ It's my personal inputs and observation based on the Misirabad statistic value.

¹⁹⁹ NOTE: All the statements and narratives provided hereunder have been quoted from Mr. Faizullah Zaki's interview with no changes and an addition.

The second congress of NIMA party was taken place in year 2002 after conference of Bonn with a new image. Almost 60% of the leading partners were civilians beside military and academic personalities. The party was again including of all ethnic groups and focusing on National Interests.

Question: What have been the roles and impacts of General Dostum in this era?

Answer:

Historical statement of General Abul Rashid Dostum in second congress of NIMA will always be remembered. His visionary perspective was for a better future of Afghanistan and not only for the Turkic ethnics but all the peoples of Afghanistan. He proved himself as a real leader when he submitted his list of candidates for ministries in Loya Jirga (National Assembly) in which you could find only one candidate from Uzbek and one from Turkmen ethnic and the rest were all from other ethnics including Tajik, Hazara and Pashtun.

Before second congress of NIMA, General Dostum was known as a military commander but after second congress he became known as a political leader as well. The first experience of elections for NIMA gets back to first Loya Jirga (National Assembly) which there was an election in North Zone and General Dostum got the most votes in Mazar-e-Sharif zone.

Question: What have been the policies of General Dostum and NIMA in elections history?

Answer:

The conference of Bonn was a movement to reflect the National Partnership of Afghanistan, where Hamid Karzai the former president of Afghanistan was assigned as the interim president until first elections. The reasons that General Dostum nominated himself as an independent candidate in the first election was based on many factors which we point on a few important ones.

After the conference of Bonn, it was obvious that Hamid Karzai would be the president of Afghanistan in elections but the reason of candidature of General Dostum was to show the National Partnership. On the other hand it was the first challenge of General Dostum to examine and judge himself among the people as there were many

human rights insults and accusations to him as *a war crime*. He did not accept to support Hamid Karzai and announced himself as the representative of not only Uzbeks but also all the people of Northern Afghanistan.

Question: Was he succeeded and achieved the expectations?

Answer:

The results were satisfactory as expected. General Dostum's votes were higher than 17 other candidates and he was placed in top four candidates. He was succeeded and being a real leader amongst the people of Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai got the 54% of votes and the remaining 46% votes were for the other candidates mostly for Mohammad Yunus Qanuni from Tajik ethnic, Mohammad Mohaqeq from Hazara ethnic and General Abdul Rashid Dostum from Uzbek ethnic, so it showed that if 54% have selected Hamid Karzai the remaining 46% did not accept him, therefore the idea of The National Unity Government was appeared even in the first elections but Hamid Karzai did not accept that and to avoid from any conflicts and chaos the other candidates gathered in Hotel Intercontinental in Kabul and expressed their congratulations to victory of Hamid Karzai.

Question: What about the second elections? What was the General Dostum's policy and target in second presidential elections?

Answer:

In second elections, General Dostum had placed him in a very good political position amongst the people as well as other political leaders. He has examined himself ones in first elections and was a winner for the people of Afghanistan especially its Turkic ethnic. He had more visionary perspective for future. He considered the National Interests as his first priorities and chose to go ahead with a team in second elections. After several meetings and negotiations, he noticed that coalition with Hamid Karzai would be much better for himself as well as National Interests rather than Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and therefore announced his support for Hamid Karzai. This time Hamid Karzai was stronger and became again the winner. According to his (Hamid Karzai) speech in Arg (Presidential palace), he would not be winner this time if he did not have General Dostum in his back. General Dostum and Hamid Karzai had plenty of

agreements towards democracy and National Interests but he did not fulfill his promises and that's why General Dostum and NIMA separated their way from Hamid Karzai in second year of his presidency and it was a bitter and bad experience for General Dostum.

Questions: Considering the first and second elections results and outcomes, what strategies and policies were taken by General Dostum and NIMA in last elections or frankly what have been the reasons of his coalition with Mr. Ghani?

Answer:

NIMA and General Dostum had achieved enough experience from the first and second elections and were seeking for a better strategy for a bright future of Afghanistan. However in previous elections NIMA and General Dostum were not the loser but again they wanted a revolution, for themselves and the people of Afghanistan.

In preparation process of third elections, all the parties invited General Dostum but considering the experiences from past, he entered the elections with a new policy and strategy. He said "The art of politics is to win not to lose". The target and strategy was to win this time, therefore they considered all the side factors to make a winning team, a winning team is not known but it is built. Therefore again considering all the factors especially National Interests, General Dostum affiliated with Ashraf Ghani. This decision was taken easily but after long and several negotiations, *written agreements*²⁰⁰, referendum from ethnic leaders and elders, anticipation of being in two front line candidates and many other winning factors.

Questions: Did they achieve what they had expected from the elections?

Answer:

As anticipated the results of elections were so close and turned into second round. We can say with dare that there has been never any cheating and fraud in

²⁰⁰ I personally asked several influential notable public figures of NIMA, but based on my research there is not existing any written agreements except verbal commitments. And Mr. Zeki was avoided to answer this question by single word "we have an agreement". According to constitution of Afghanistan (chapter three, articles 60-70); authorities, scope and area of responsibilities of the First Vice President is not specified but he/she can be acting as acting president when the president outside of the country for the missions or died. But the constitution of Afghanistan rules (3/68) that the president can accept the resignation of the vice presidents and not exists a ruling authority to dismiss a vice presidents (article 64 item 10, duties of president) even in case of accusation.

elections especially in Northern provinces. The claim of losing team on fraud is that they were the lead in first round, but the history shows that even in developed countries when the elections was turned into second round, the lead team became the loser so we cannot claim that if we were lead in first round we must be lead in second round as well, it is obvious that many candidates withdrew and support the leading candidates.

From every one's point of view as well as International agencies, the last elections of Afghanistan has been legalized and approved and Mr. Ashraf Ghani's team was the winning team and the reason of Executive Directorate formation has been based on order of President Ashraf Ghani.

Questions: Why the National Unity Government formed in last elections?

Answer:

Formation of The National Unity Government has been an achievement of several years attempt. This was one of the priorities of Ashraf Ghani to establish The National Unity Government as it was necessary even in the era of Karzai's presidency. As we see Mr. Ghani got 51% of votes, hence 49% means that have not selected him, and as obvious the ethnic psychological factors affects the elections, therefore the formation of The National Unity Government has been a democratic movement in history of Afghanistan.

After the announcement of results in second round of elections, the losing team made some conflicts which would bring Afghanistan into a crisis if the winning team did not considered the National Interests and decides to establish The National Unity Government.

Unfortunately after effective negotiations The National Unity Government was established for the first time in Afghanistan and the role of Mr. John Kerry, Foreign Minister of USA on this achievement was only an advisor not the main reason. He stated that it is your country, the elections would cause to either National Unity or National Crisis, therefore if you are united, we (USA) would continue to our aids to Afghanistan and if you go on conflicts and crisis, USA would not any longer assist Afghanistan. The formation of The National Unity Government has never been decision of USA but only Mr. Ashraf Ghani and his winning team's decision and a historical achievement.

Questions: What have been the key factors on General Dostum's success in last elections?

Answer:

The success of General Dostum is obvious and clear in all three elections, being supported by not only Uzbek and Turkic ethnics but by all the ethnics of Afghanistan. He proved that *politics is not only for educated people*.²⁰¹

Despite my several attempt to schedule an interview with H.E. General Dostum, First Vice President of Afghanistan I couldn't successes to obtain an interview time even for several minutes. I made several written letter to the office of FVP, Dr Babur Farahmand but unfortunately there was no a response, simply by saying *be patient, we will let you*. After passing almost 18 months still there was no response. But I did not lose my moral and decisiveness and continued to my research in order to cover thesis documentation. In this regard I was able to interview his social advisor Mr. Hamidullah Tawachi.

Date and Place of Interview: 2200 hrs, 12 April 2017, Mr. Hamidullah Tawachi's House, Kabul, Afghanistan.²⁰²

Questions: What were your preparations for 2014 elections as well as your reasons on alliance with Mr. Ashraf Ghani?

Answer:

We had complete preparation for 2014 election with complete support of all nations in Afghanistan. The main reason which we joined with Mr. Ashraf Ghani was, to solve and protect any ethnic problem which are exist or may happen between Pashtun and Uzbek ethnics. We had political and social problem with Pashtun ethnic. We will promise for all partisans to live in peace. And moreover, reason we were with Ashraf Ghani because he was right person to win election.

²⁰¹ This statement one of is very famous catchword around the public.

²⁰² NOTE: All the statements and narratives provided hereunder have been quoted from Mr. Hamidullah Tawachi's interview with no changes and an addition.

Questions: What were your obstacles and difficulties in 2014 presidential elections and its preparation processes?

Answer:

We had two problems, political and social. We established *Jabha-e- Milli* (National front) formation which was a political platform before presidential election. The contributions of new formation were the influential and notable public figures from all ethnic parties around country including Uzbek-Turkmen, Hazara, Tajik, and Pashtuns ethnics. We were believed that these *Jabha-e- Milli* will be the winning team in the presidential election, but when presidential election period begun the parties divided and joined other political groups. The separation decision from national front was caused a political obscurity for us (Junbish). Beside of these encounters, the common knowledge of the people about the election processes and even majority of the people didn't had registered for ID cards which was the requirement for the voting.

Questions: What was your anticipation with respect to elections?

Answer:

We believed for winning the election, we had strong miles stone to believe that the Turkic Ethnic people strongly will support with their endless effort and awareness for presidential election. Since this election was kind of *win or lose* (die) type of perception for the majority of the Turkic ethnics. If we succeed in the presidential election this time then we are for the first time in our history to overthrow the impossible. And Ashraf Ghani were knowingly selected to be mate with our party's leader and keeping in mind that his support made Karzai winner in 2009 presidential election. This was one of the enlisted advantages of the election in our favor and always we promised to our people that we are keeping going to struggle for our rights and achieve our final goal.

Questions: Could you please explain General Dostum's influences before the elections and also after the elections?

Answer: No answer

Questions: As known, General Dostum had been a presidential nominee in 2004 presidential elections, and in 2009 he was supported Hamid Karzai, why he didn't put his candidacy for 2014 elections?

Answer:

The reasons why the General Dostum nominated himself as an independent candidate in first elections after fall of Taliban were based on many factors which we point out on a few important ones. Turkic ethnics were taken into consideration as a minority population in Afghanistan and the reason of candidature was to prove that the Turkic ethnics are not minority and they are capable deep impact the ethnic balance of power. The other reason was the challenge of General Dostum to judge himself among the other notable leaders and despite an accusation and claim against him as a war crime. He is a real leader. In 2009 presidential election we were supported Hamid Karzia for his second term. In the last election we were preferred to support Ashraf Ghani as a first vice president. To achieve the final target as a solve nominee under above condition was difficult and we were selected easiest way to our aim. Despite Ashraf Ghani's poor performance in 2009 presidential election in where he got barely %3 of the ballots cast but considering the socio-cultural facts of the country we found it will a right choice to mate with him. As result of the election confirmed that we made true choice and General Dostum elected as a first vice president of Afghanistan.²⁰³

Questions: Did you achieve what you have expected from elections?

Answer:

No, the result was one thing but execution and sharing the half governmental key positions was another obstacle into way of strong administrative government. Despite our hard efforts and endless support the winning team, we were represented by key governmental positions which were under %5 of totals. After mediation of John Kerry secretary of state department, the government divided into two separate parts opening an executive branch (CEO) and presidential which was against constitution of the

²⁰³ All the statements and narratives provided hereunder have been quoted from Mr. Hamidullah Tawachi's interview with no changes and an addition.

Afghanistan. The National Unity Government (NUG) was less represented by the Turkic ethnic after mediation of US State Department.

Questions: As we seeing, this is the first time in Afghanistan history as a result of elections, the senior positions up to first vice presidency of Afghanistan led by Uzbeks ethnics, what were your roles and impacts on these achievements? Have you been personally an actor of this achievement?

Answer:

Yes, if we count from the reign of Ahmed Shah Durani which was since 1747 AD the election result for Turkic (Uzbeks) ethnics assumed to be a turning point. We transformed to a minority during the decades of Pashtunism (Pashtunization) in our homeland and not having a democratic and liberal system of representation. We were counted in our homeland as a second type of citizen before 1992. During holy resistance of struggle the Turkic ethnics lost over hundred thousand their young generation in order to reach the freedom and liberalization of Northern Afghanistan. We could able to reach this historical destination only by leadership of General Abdul Rashid Dostum. This is a great honor for all Turkic ethnics of Afghanistan.²⁰⁴

Questions: Did you encounter with any problems with Ashraf Ghani during the elections? If so, how did you manage to solve it?

Answer:

We had minor problems but we believed that, these problems would our decisions and nothing could cause our success. We were great team with Mr. Ashraf Ghani. So we were supported each other in any manner.

Questions: What were your key factors on your success in elections?

Answer:

Our key factors were support of our people especially (Uzbeks and Turkmen ethnics). We are always thankful from support of our peoples, we have committed to stay stable and keep struggling to achieve our right.

Questions: From your point of view, relations with which countries will credit to country in present and future?

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

Answer:

Afghanistan is neighboring in south and south-east with Pakistan, in west with Iran, and in north with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and minor neighboring with the China in north-east corner. Always having a good relationship with neighboring countries one of the key points in the way of mutual security, trade, economy, immigration, terrorism and sustainable developments. In the other way Afghanistan is located in Central Asia, and doesn't have direct sea connection. Most of our neighbor countries are directly or indirectly involved to our internal affairs by supporting one or other parties. Specifically when Taliban insurgency emerged and after establishment of an US led supported Afghan government the Pakistan's role was always catastrophic and on the top priority. During the Taliban and Al-Qaida terrorism the Pakistan's National Army with support of his security intelligence service (ISI) directly involved and made military operations and logistic support to Taliban forces inside of Afghanistan. The enemy threat of Pakistan resulted 10-thousands of immigration wave of innocent people from Afghanistan and killing thousands of Afghans against the invaders and becoming the country one of the poorest country in the world and destroying infrastructure and all obtainable resources.²⁰⁵

4.4. Election Day and Results: Uzbeks

4.4.1. First Round of Election, Ghani-Dostum Alliance

The First Round of presidential elections was held on 5 April 2014, with a second round planned on 14 June. The existing President Hamid Karzai was not eligible to run third -term due to constitutional limits. In April 2014 three nominees withdraw from the competition and decided to support remained eight candidates. Opinion polls proved that Abdullah and Ghani are the front-runners and result of the first round of presidential election Abdullah in the first and second were Ghani behind him. IEC's chairman, Yusuf Nuristani announced the first round's final result on April 26 2014 during the TV press-conference, see below:²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Sources: the results has been taken directly from IEC: <http://www.iec.org.af/results/en/elections>

1. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah : 2,972,141 (44.94%)
2. Dr. Ashraf Ghani : 2,084,547 (31.56%)
3. Zalmay Rassul : 750,997 (11.37%)
4. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf : 465,207 (7.04%)
5. Qutbuddin Helal : 181,827 (2.75%)
6. Shafiq Gul Agha Sherzai : 103,636 (1.57%)
7. Dawod Sultanzoi : 30,685 (0.46%)
8. Amin Arsalan : 15,506 (0.23%)

When I searched surprised outcomes of the Ghani-Dostum Alliance and appeared the following hidden facts: the final results of the first round of Ghani-Dostum alliance in the Turkic (Uzbek-Turkmen) dominated provinces in northern Afghanistan has caused a disappointment of Junbish's youth branches. The *Junbish movement* (The National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) under General Dostum leadership was expected to collect the entire Turkic ethnic votes plus local Tajik and Hazara minorities for the benefit of Ghani-Dostum visa but somehow they underestimated dissatisfaction of Junbish's youth movement and new reformist. The Junbish movement has been dominated in Northern Provinces of Afghanistan since 1992 with the strong Turkic population for more than two decades and results of the first round was surprised by a Ghani-Dostum Alliance team.²⁰⁷

Ghani-Dostum campaign team had expected to collect most of the over two million Uzbek-Turkmen votes²⁰⁸ and in addition these numbers confirmed by his campaign team. But the election results of Ghani-Dostum alliance based on Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) data, in where almost lost of 13.38% or close to eight hundred thousand Turkic votes shared between remained top three candidates as Abdullah Abdullah, Zalmay Rassoul and Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf. Most of the benefits from the dissatisfaction were on favor of Abdullah and Zalmay Rassoul. If we emphasize the ethnic composition of Afghanistan we see different politically manipulated

²⁰⁷ Obaid Ali & Thomas Ratting, May 22nd, 2014. *How disenchantment with General Dostum split the Uzbek vote bank*. Political landscape, Afghan Analyst Network

²⁰⁸ General Dostum made a TV speech during the registering himself as a first vice-president mating with the Ghani at the Independent Election Commission (IEC)'s HQ, Kabul

populations. But as known and based on some sources verification the educated old generation of Turkic population notably in rural areas counted in population records as a Tajik ethnic mostly and Persianized linguistically in order to find a job (entry way) in assimilated (racist) governmental organs of previous regimes and monarchs.

According to the most recent counts, there are five Uzbek majority and four Turkmen minority provinces in Afghanistan: Faryab has 67% Uzbeks and 8.6% Turkmens, Jawzjan has 54% Uzbeks and around 26% Turkmens, Takhar has 67% Uzbeks and no Turkmens, Samangan has 43% Uzbeks, Saripul has 37% Uzbeks population. But four relatively minority Uzbek provinces are: Balkh has around 15-18% Uzbek speakers (Sholgara, Tashkurghan) and 12.9% Turkmen speakers (Kaldar and Shortepa), Baghlan has 13.5% Uzbeks (Narrin), and Kunduz has 9% Turkmens (Qala-ye Zal) and around 12% Uzbeks (Imamsahib) and Badakshan has around 22.5% Uzbeks but mostly Persianized (natively Uzbeks but Tajik speakers) and major districts are Argu and Khash.²⁰⁹

Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of Afghanistan announced on 15 May the first round final results of the 2014 presidential election: it shows that Ghani-Dostum alliance won the rally in two major Uzbek-Turkmen dominated provinces; in Jawzjan highest scored number of votes was 101,985 (69.23%) and in Faryab was 173,225 (65.39%) votes. So, these numbers of votes proves the General Dostum's predominance in this two major Uzbek-Turkmen provinces but failed in other predominant provinces: Saripul, Takhar and Samangan, and Uzbek-Turkmen minority provinces are Balkh, Kunduz, Baghlan and Badakshan also failed to his major presidential candidate Dr Abdullah Abdullah who was ahead of the Ghani-Dostum mating. In Saripul votes number of Ghani-Dostum was 57,097 (38.53%)-Abdullah was 74,711(50.41%), in Takhar votes number of Ghani-Dostum was 121,100 (38.25%)-Abdullah was 159,375 (50.35%), in Samangan Ghani-Dostum ally was 37,632 (26.58%) and Abdullah was 86,845 (61.33%), in Baghlan 51953 (20.48%) and Abdullah 152,560 (60.14%), and in Balkh province Ghani-Dostum mating was 109, 694 (28.01%) in

²⁰⁹ Based on IEC (Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan) reports (<http://www.iec.org.af/results/en/elections>)

whereas Abdullah was 238,582 (60.92%), in Kunduz Ghani-Dostum mating won 80,893 (37.91%) but Abdullah gets 100413 (47.05%) votes and in Badakshan Ghani-Dostum ally fallen by 42,548 (14.43) votes to Abdullah by 191,260 (64.85%) votes. Based on above arithmetic the Gani-Dostum alliance in three of five predominantly Uzbek-Turkmen provinces and four north-east semi-dominant Uzbek-Turkmen provinces lost their impacts on rally against his major presidential candidate Dr Abdullah Abdullah.²¹⁰

The downgrade in General Dostum's impact is also clearly seeable when it balance with the presidential election of 2004 (10 years ago) when he was an unique presidential nominee and received over 10% of countrywide votes and in 2009 (5 years ago) presidential election when he has been support the president Hamid Karzai. In any ways the facts proved that these falls helped to wake up the Ghani-Dostum alliance to be proactive and prepared for the second round of presidential election which was held on 14 June 2014 and find out the reasons and way of solutions of dissatisfaction of new reformist and youth movement of Junbish branches. This paragraph widely explained and narrated in chapter four and section 4.2.2 (Influence of New Generation on the Uzbek Vote).²¹¹

Further, based on statement of Ashraf Ghani regarding General Dostum to Al-Jazeera television on 3 April 2014, 12 days before first round of presidential election was:²¹²

"When charismatic leaders emerge from history, they become more than the embodiment of their individual beings. People literally have walked two days to touch him. One has to have respect and harness that energy that is now focused on the individual to a collective process of building institutions. We are two strong men, we can work together."

Based on AAN provided information; Ashraf Ghani mentioned that the Junbish performed his job outstanding (very well). In addition to this Ghani called General

²¹⁰ Based on IEC (Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan) reports (<http://www.iec.org.af/results/en/elections>)

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Sohrab Rahmaty, February 2015, *Post-Conflict Democratization: Warlord-Democracy Nexus in Afghanistan*. Mater thesis in Political Science at Guelph University, Guelph, Ontario, Canada

Dostum as “*one of the five most charismatic figures in Afghanistan*”. Concerning fall in Uzbek votes in first round of Ghani-Dostum ally, Ghani determined that there was a *small shortage* due to logistical and organizational difficulties within his team but the about the split of Uzbek votes he told to AAN during an interview in mid May month; that it was the unrealistic non-transparent behavior of IEC local staff. He also, gave an example in some polling station where an Uzbek woman had their fingers inked but had not been allowed to actually use her vote.²¹³

Another influential top official of Junbish is Faizullah Zaki, who was the deputy chairman and spokesman of Junbish, made the same allegation against Independent Electoral Commission. During an interview to AAN, he questioned, how it was possible that in Uzbek pre-dominants provinces such as Takhar and Saripul most of the IEC's local staff were non-Uzbeks?! Additionally, he claimed that IEC staff had not allowed Ghani-Dostum's alliance representatives to observe polling station in some Uzbek – Turkmen dominated provinces until 11 am of the election day in whereas most of the polling stations are faced a shortage of ballot papers. The IEC's provincial staff had fill out the ballot boxes for the favor of *a specific presidential candidate*, who potentially were Abdullah Abdullah.²¹⁴

4.4.2. Second Round of Ghani-Dostum Alliance & Victory

The results of second round of presidential election came after the run-off on 14 June 2014, almost two months later. Preliminary results were expected on 2 July and the final result on 22 July. However, widespread accusations of fraud by both parties Abdullah and Ghani teams, the official announcement of final results of second round by Independent Electoral Commission were delayed until September month.

The Independent Election Commission's chairman, Yusuf Nuristani announced final results in September 21st 2014, named Ashraf Ghani the winner:

1. Dr. Ashraf Ghani : 3,935,567 (55.27%)

²¹³ Obaid Ali & Thomas Rattig, May 22nd, 2014. *How disenchantment with General Dostum split the Uzbek vote bank*. Political landscape, Afghan Analyst Network

²¹⁴ Obid.

2. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah : 3,185,018 (44.73%)



Picture02: Based on some sources that the estimated attendants were around 50-60 thousands gathered to support *the Transform and Continuity Team* in General Dostum's stronghold in Kunduz. Source: General Dostum's Facebook page.



Picture03: The estimated attendants were around 45-50 thousands gathered to support *the Transform and Continuity Team* in one of the General Dostum's stronghold in Faizabad, Badakshan Source: General Dostum's Facebook page.



Picture04: Over ten thousands gathered to support *the Transform and Continuity Team* in Bamiyan city of Baghlan Province. Standing Buddha statute is still remains in the background but as a symbol of destruction and persecution of Taliban. Source: General Dostum's Facebook page



Picture05: Over ten thousands supporters of *the Transform and Continuity Team* gathered in Kabul to show their loyalty and support to the General Dostum and Ashraf Ghani. Source: General Dostum's Facebook page

However, one of the influential outcomes of second round of presidential election were mating the previous presidential candidates including vice presidents from first round joining to the Ghani-Dostum runoff. Ahmad Zia Massoud, leader of the National Front of Afghanistan, announced on 22 May 2014 his endorsement for the Ghani-Dostum runoff in second round of election. Massoud and Dostum were leading members in National Front despite his Tajik ethnicity and didn't go to support semi-Tajik Abdullah. He was a first vice presidential nominee for the Zalmay Rassoul presidential candidate in first round, in where Zalmay Rassoul joined Abdullah's team for the second round election. Ahmad Zia was made an announcement when a gathered hundreds of attendants of Ghani-Dostum's supporters, "we have been agreed to form an inclusive

government after winning the presidential election", and asked from the people of Afghanistan to support the Ghani and vote for him in the runoff election²¹⁵.

Another outcome was Sabghatullah Mojaddedi announced his support for the Ashraf Ghani team, by determining that under circumstances and challenges the country is facing the Dr. Abdullah was not suitable candidate for the future of country. Even he will support any candidates who win the runoff election. Despite these developments, prominent leaders as Sayed Hussain Anwari from Pashtun ethnic and MP Kabul, former commander Haji Almas Zahid from Tajik ethnic and MP from Parwan, Haji Fazel Karim Aimaq from Turkic Aymaq ethnic and ex MP from Kunduz and Lt Gen Hilaluddin Hilal from Tajik ethnic also confirmed their support to the Ghani's team in second round.²¹⁶

Meanwhile, presidential candidate Hidayat Amin Arsalan also confirmed his support to Ashraf Ghani's team for the second round of election. Arsalan is an economist and prolific politician who was former finance and foreign minister but his first- round of presidential election results were at the bottom and he had to retire from the race. Arsalan determined that the decision was taken based on two nominee's chance and winning capabilities of the second-round of runoff election. Added, we will work together to bringing peace and stability in the country and asked his supporters to vote for *Transformation and Continuity* team under Ghani's leadership.²¹⁷

Qayum Karzai, the elder brother of Hamid Karzai on Sunday, 8 June 2014 announced his endorsement to Ashraf Ghani's *Transformation & Continuity* team for the second round of election. The announcement made when he gathered with the Ghani's supporters in Kabul International Hotel. He was withdrawn from first round of election in favor of Zalmay Rassoul. He was asked the Afghan people to have a broad participation in runoff and their support for *Transformation & Continuity* team. In

²¹⁵ Ghanizada, May 22 2014. *Ahmad Zia Massoud endorses Ghani in the second round of election*. News, Analysis, Reports, Khama Press,

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ghanizada June 8 2014. *Hedayat Amin Arsalan endorses Ghani in second round of election*. News, Analysis, Reports, Khama Press

response, Ghani appreciated for his support the *Transformation & Continuity* team and promised to "serve jointly Afghanistan and build a bright future".²¹⁸

Another support comes from Mullah Tarakhel Mohammadi, member of two terms of parliament (2005 and 2010) and leader of Tarakhel tribes. He announced his support on Monday, June 9 of 2014 for the second round of presidential election on favor of Ghani's team and his people will support him unconditionally for runoff vote. In response, Ashraf Ghani appreciated for his support to the *transformation and continuity* team and told that "We respect our Ulemas (scholars) and we will seek their advice and help for our judiciary." Then added the justice and equality will be at the core of government priority. Mullah Tarakhel is known as "a crazy" commander having a 30 bodyguards for self defense and leader of Kuchi tribe, traditionally nomadic Pashtun ethnic. He was the head of the Committee on Nomads, Tribes and Immigration affairs in Ulusi Jirga @ 2005.²¹⁹

When, the Independent Electoral Commission's chief Nuristani announced the Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and his team the winner of presidential elections of 2014, and he declared that first time in Afghanistan history the political powers transferred to successor by way of democratic election and peacefully.

²¹⁸ Ghanizada, June 8 2014. *Qayum Karzai endorses Dr. Ashraf Ghani in election runoff*. Analysis, Reports, Khama Press

²¹⁹ Ghanizada, June 9 2014. *Mullah Tarakhel endorses Dr. Ghani in election runoff*. Analysis, Reports, Khama Press

4.5. Post Election Coalition Building: General Dostum

4.5.1. Inauguration & General Dostum



Picture06: The picture has been taken when the Afghanistan's elected President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (C) stands with his First Vice President General Abdul Rashid Dostum (L) and second vice president Sarwar Danish as they take the oath during his inauguration in Kabul, Sept. 29, 2014. *Source: Reuters.*

2014 -Presidential elections of Afghanistan marked the first ever peaceful and democratic transition of political power in Afghanistan's long history. Ashraf Ghani and his mates (General Dostum as first Vice President and Sarwar Danish is a second Vice President) elected as 13th term president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan under shadow and strict supervision of Dr Abdullah Abdullah who is be possible a Prime Minister. The Prime Ministry title still didn't created and against the constitution of Afghanistan. But until creation of Prime Ministry position in constitution the most willingly will use the title as a Chief of Executive Officer (CEO). Somehow

surprisingly, the inauguration ceremony lack of high-level attendance from several regional and super powers, including the United States. One of the key broker and mediator was U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who are helped to sign the agreement that led to the unity government being formed, remained in Washington D.C. White House advisor John Podesta with the U.S. delegation, Mamnoon Hussein, Pakistan President, Hamid Ansari the Indian Vice President and Yin Weimin, Chinese Minister for Human Resources were in attendance representing their countries to the inauguration. The inauguration ceremony held in Kabul on 30 September 2014 by the attendance of dignitaries and official from around world but lack of presence of regional leaders and foreign ministers who were assumed due to the ongoing 71st Secession of UN General Assembly in New York.

When Ghani overtook the office from his predecessor Hamid Karzai (who was in office 13 years, and most willing to put his candidacy in 2019 election, which was possible after one term by the constitution) his first duty was to sign a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between US and Afghan Governments. Hamid Karzai a former president has been refused to sign it, argued that the signing the treaty was his successor duty. The signed agreement allowed for formal residual of US troops in Afghanistan and limited counter-terrorism operation and training afghan security forces, it was taken in effect by end of 2014.²²⁰

After formation of join Government (National Unity Government) with the CEO, there were appeared a question "how they will governance the country?" In one side, Dr Abdullah who was the pretending for half sharing all of the Government organs and in other side existence of an Afghan strongmen, General Rashid Dostum as a first vice president. Mostly by westerners given him a title as "warlord" and claiming to him a war crime and major responsible of civil wars despite his a public apology in 2013. The other fact that he was not only responsible for all civil wars happened in side of Afghanistan, there are many ethnic and regional leaders including regional super powers that directly and indirectly involved and were used General Dostum and benefited from

²²⁰ Ankita Panda, September 30, 2014. *Afghanistan Inaugurates New President, Chief Executive*. The pulse, The Diplomat

him as per their foreign policy requirement. General Dostum became a worldwide known political leader after 2014 presidential elections despite his military past and accusations. Warlord or warlordism in the afghan context was to replacement of incapable government factions and notably the security services. General Dostum during country's decades of conflict, could able stand up against a regional ethnic and political leaders, who was protected and secured large parts of the country from other regional leaders, and from the brutal Taliban regime and its terrorist affiliates.²²¹

President Ghani proved that he was impressive thinker and specific concerning the ability of re-organizing difficult conditions even with Strongman. However Ashraf Ghani and his *Transform & Continuity Team* had been able to success in the technical perspective and rational-legal authority as he did. But in particular General Dostum was able to fulfill the traditional leadership role in this team as narrated by famous German sociologist Maximilian Karl Emil Max Weber (Max Weber)²²². If so, running mate with General Dostum was a combined methodology of rational-legal authority and traditional leadership (warlord/warlordism) that brought Ashraf Ghani to successful end which was resulted his 13th-term presidency. It cannot be denied that the Ghani would not have been elected without the backing General Dostum and his political party Junbish Milli (National Islamic Movement which was established in 1992 as a Turkic resistance movement with the dream of liberation as an autonomous state) with whom he associated. Junbish Milli is still considering to be the most organized and effective political party in Afghanistan over two decades of political and military past performance and serviced to Ghani-Dostum's campaign. General Dostum was an exceptional achievement in consolidation of Northern votes and deciding factor in Ghani's successful end. Furthermore, *Transform & Continuity Team* organized a largest campaign rallies in where had been seen over ten-thousands peaceful supporters (specially Takhar and Badakshan meetings) gathered together to demonstrate their loyalty and commitment to their leader (General Dostum) not in eastern or southern

²²¹ Sohrab Rahmaty October 26, *Afghanistan: Warlords and Democracy*. The features, The Diplomat

²²² Max Weber, 1921. *The Rational and Social Foundations of Music*. Southern Illinois University Press, 1958

region of Afghanistan in where Ashraf Ghani is belonged, but in where General Dostum has a greatest support.²²³

4.5.2. Ashraf Ghani and National Unity Government

The idea of the formation the National Unity Government (NUG) emerged upon announcement of the final result of 2014 presidential elections by the body of Independent Electoral Commission of Afghanistan (IECA) in where Ghani-Dostum alliance was winner. The Dr Abdullah's campaign team disagreed and boycotted the final results of the election, and in order to reduce the tensions and avoid possible chaos and clashes between two teams the US Secretary of State Department John Kerry has been made 27 phones calls with the two leaders separately and visited them in person two times in Kabul in their houses. After long discussion and negotiation the two sides came into bilateral agreement by the direct involvement and mediation of John Kerry, Secretary of State. Otherwise all the efforts and investment for the re-establishment and rebuilding of Afghanistan which was done by US-led allies will be destructed and was high possibility collapse of the US backed Afghan Government. The US interference occurred when 09/11 terror attack to WTC Towers in New York city and resulted killing around 3,000 US citizens including expatriates. Therefore, Afghan Government had to survive and exist after removal US-led coalition forces from Afghanistan in 2014 and it was crucial transition for Obama administration. Under these frustrated condition the bilateral agreement signed by parties. *The terms and condition of bilateral agreement* was electoral reform (body of IECA), parliamentary elections and district council elections, gathering the Constitutional Loya Jirga to create prime ministry position within first two years of the NUG life and being Ashraf Ghani as president in exchange to leave a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position to Abdullah and close the deal.²²⁴

After passing three years from the bilateral agreement none of the terms of NUG's executed. Abdullah is criticized Ghani's policy and not loyalty to his signature. In other hand, General Dostum, the first vice president also made a statement due to

²²³ Sohrab Rahmaty October 26, *Afghanistan: Warlords and Democracy*. The features, *The Diplomat*

²²⁴ Hamid M. Saboory, September 29, 2016 - *What Is Going Wrong With Afghanistan's National Unity Government*. *The Pulse, The Diplomat*.

holding his duties by Ghani and apologized from his supporters and declared that he ready to leave the office if they (supporters) ask him. The self-acting of Ghani concerning the bilateral agreement aroused main concerns within two blocks and separation of influential notables and their support from unity government. We don't know who are behind of scenes and who are impacts his decision and behavior to the bilateral agreement and self-acting but if he wants to control the government by self he needs to look at the different alternative mechanism instead the rise of political tension. Based on Ghani's behavior and self-acting there is no ground for Abdullah believe to his words. Upon this behavior, Abdullah vent strengthen his political position and by making a difficulty in the circulation of the government mechanisms. The aim of formation of a national unity government from the beginning was wrong but the situation enforced two blocks with the two different political positions and with two different ideas comes together. But according to the procedures, the formation of two headings in the state administration will cause extinction and damage the country. There was another element that Ghani supposed to consider before self-acting that Atta Mohammad Noor, the strong provincial governor of Balkh looks as acting governor and opposite of Ghani's policy and main supporter of Abdullah.^{225&226}

Ashraf Ghani's main slogan during 2014 presidential election campaign was on ending the bribe and corruption in governmental organs and promoting meritocracy which was created a difficulty instead of progresses. As known; the corruption and tribal negotiation in the structure of Afghanistan's tribal government always existed. It was impossible to abruptly remove past habits and irregularities in a single step that Ghani is looking for. The other fact that the Ghani has to moderate the process of selection tribal candidates based on merits and qualifications, however there exist many examples that president Ghani assigned candidates based on his tribal past rather than meritocracy. Another points he has to remember, that the fact of ethnic proportion. Specifically in

²²⁵ Hamid M. Saboory, September 29, 2016. *What Is Going Wrong With Afghanistan's National Unity Government*. The Pulse, The Diplomat.

²²⁶ Sudarsan Raghavan, October 17, 2014. *New Afghan leaders face culture clash as they form Cabinet*. World, The Washington Post.

beginning 2017 fiscal year (FY) he begun a strategic campaign to minimize impacts of Turkic ethnic who had direct link with General Dostum in the governmental organs by removal the top-generals from Uzbek ethnicity in ministry of defense and interior by exchanging them with his tribal Pashtuns ethnic. If Ashraf Ghani wants to be a president of entire Afghanistan not only Pashtun tribal ethnic, instead he need to be moderate and respect to the other ethnic proportion concern of the country. The fighting against to end corruption it will not end with a single move but it will be end with serious of small steps. Seems his current policy will encourage the Taliban and Daesh insurgency, instead the dissatisfaction and hopeless of his running mates who are had supported him during the elections and as result of frustration an inadequate and ineffective central government. The theory of meritocracy is governance system in every democratic state but not today's divided tribal country in which at least three decades under war conditions.²²⁷

4.5.3. Conclusion:

People of Afghanistan under security threat of Taliban and other terrorist groups especially suicide attack and variety of truck bomb explosions in Kabul's streets and countrywide, political instability, economic difficulties and jobless, rise of bribery and corruption made the people more hopeless to the remained life of NUG. But still there is no ground for the mass movement against the National unity government's rulers and political oppositions looks yet weak or not waked up.

²²⁷ Shawn Snow, January 13, 2015. *Ashraf Ghani and a Game of Fiefdoms*. The Pulse, the Diplomat

CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS

The Junbish Movement established in 1992, in where they are mostly residing in northern Afghanistan known as "Southern Turkistan". Ethnic strife has always affected the history of Afghanistan, as minorities have always been deprived from their rights. The election of General Rashid Dostum in 2014 Presidential Elections as the First Vice President was a radical change in the politics of the country. Many rival groups in the country have long been even questioning the existence of Turkic ethnic groups within the country. During an interview with the former president of Afghanistan Dr. Najibullah, when he came to power, in regard to the question "How many Uzbeks are living in north of Afghanistan?" His response to the journalist question was incredibly amazing and regrettable. Or as if he had intention of denying Uzbek existence in Afghanistan. He stated that:²²⁸ "Yes, as much as remember there are a few tribes living in the northern Afghanistan."

Now after nearly three decades, the Uzbeks are one of the leading ethnic groups within four major groups; of course it has never been easy. It is not the matter of three decades; it is the matter of decades and centuries. This election marks the first major political triumph of the Uzbek people in Afghan politics within the last three centuries. Uzbeks, as one of the Turkic ethnic groups, have contributed in every political situations of Afghanistan so far, and had been proved a struggle for national interests in every aspect. Their key role during the Soviet invasion led by General Dostum was the beginning of a new era. After the Soviet withdrawal, during the civil war in Afghanistan, Uzbeks, along with Hazara and Tajik actively sought adequate representation in political balance of power at the centre. But the formation of autonomy state in Northern Afghanistan in 1992 was beginning new era in the country's life period.

Uzbeks did not have their own political organization and even a representation at all until General Dostum defeated the Mohammad Najibullah's communist regime and,

²²⁸ The statement quoted from the word of ex-ambassador of Afghanistan in Turkey, Dr. Al-Murad Arghun during his speech to the higher education students in embassy compound, Ankara.1998

with his control over the northern Afghanistan, became a leader and spokesman for the rights and freedom of Turkic peoples of Afghanistan. Uzbeks were part of the Northern Alliance, which fought against the Taliban regime from 1997 until and during the war 2001. Thus after the fall of the regime Uzbeks have gained an even more influential character into the military and political life of Afghanistan as 2014 having their political and military leader elected as the First Vice President of Afghanistan. In addition to Uzbeks, Junbish and Dostum have achieved to integrate and represent the Turkmen and Hazaras within the political framework of Afghanistan, through direct and indirect alliance building. Dostum and Junbish have developed a united Afghanistan notion in politics despite the persistent isolation efforts of the ruling ethnic Pashtun groups. At this point it is important to underline the strong unitary stance of his politics for Afghanistan even if the peoples he and his party represent are deprived of their political rights.

Beside the above findings; if the ruling power wants to a united country which is the life time for the decades and centuries the below recommended options are in near futures supposed be discussed in wider platform and find out way of mutual solutions. If we overlook the country's last three decades of its main problems beside of Taliban insurgency, security threat by regional players and involvements and instability, there are basic problems which the country faces for a centuries it must be addressed in peaceful atmosphere. We can count at least three of them; *Linguistic, Minority and State governance systems* are needs to be re-assessed and re-solved based on four major ethnic groups proportions. The last 30-years of wars including civil wars of 1990s proved that Afghanistan never come back to prior to 1992s conditions and Pashtun ruling class is not capable to rule entire Afghanistan any more, and it is not welcomed. If so, the rapid regional developments especially in the field of higher education and triangle alliance of three major ethnic groups; such as Turkics, Hazaras and Tajiks, somehow exceeding the Pashtun ethnics. In recent decades despite of direct support (politically and financially) of the US Administrations and Pakistan (military and intelligence services) Pashtuns are quickly becoming a minority in Afghanistan. In other way by use of technological opportunities and rapid increasing in education level other three groups and their anti-Pashtun alliance is making it difficult in Afghanistan for any single group to claim

political exclusiveness. If so, in order to balance the Pashtun dominance and legitimacy in the country it seems that they are using the Taliban insurgency, as a control mechanism against the troy besides their external link of support.

If Afghanistan cannot solve its basic internal problems with the *linguistics, minority and federal governance system* it will be very soon questioning dissolution of the country simultaneously and rise of inter disputes, conflicts and easiest impacts by neighbor countries and home for terrorist groups. Bottom-line; If we want to see a united Afghanistan with a higher development rate (now the Afghanistan one the poorest country in the world) and having a sustainable foreign policy and capable to a deal with international and regional problems, Afghan Governments and its administrators have to re-consider the following basic issues in their top-agenda a very soon:

(i): Linguistic issue must be resolved: the Uzbek Language should be the third official language of entire Afghanistan or one single official language (Pashtun/Dari) and two regional languages (Pashtun/Dari +Uzbek).

(ii): Minority issue should be resolved: Until new census law and date come up, in the new electronic identity cards (*Tazkira*) shall be specified the ethnic identity that they are.

(iii): Autonomous state or federal governance system alternatives are should be re-considered: Based on the three decades of developments and political insolvency the Afghanistan cannot be ruled from Kabul in peace atmosphere under existing ruling class.

One of the major issues during and after the election campaign was the war crimes accusations towards Dostum. Factual things that is most popular in western media (New York Times, Washington Post, and many others) including Afghan leaders accusing General Dostum on war crime against Taliban insurgents and civil wars in 1990s but none of these media network and some state officials not considering the following facts: (1) if General Dostum made a war crime against Taliban's rights; if so how about the US special armed forces, CIA and Bush Administration made with him an alliance in order to remove Taliban Government, (2) Based on the recommendation and direct involvement of the US led coalition forces the Hamid Karzai appointed as interim president. The allegation concerning his crime was in 1990s, if so when General Dostum was in exile for different reasons why Karzai Administration and his allies were agreed

on Dostum's back from exile where he was in Turkey and asked for his strong support during presidential election of 2009? (3) And recent afghan president Ashraf Ghani who was sent a petition to London Conference on Afghanistan in 2009 that the General Dostum is "known killer", despite his accusation he made a partnership with General Dostum in 2014 presidential election. As result of rally Ashraf Ghani won presidency against runoff Dr. Abdullah in where the vast majority of votes came from the Turkic voting bank. So, based on these disputed chronology how we can verify the correctness and which of these suspicious allegation is rightful?

There are possible two hidden scenario:

(1) Beneficiary sides: (US Special Operations Forces (SOF), CIA and Afghan Leaders as such as former president Hamid Karzai and incumbent president Ashraf Ghani).

- US Benefit: By the direct support and to ally with General Dostum the US Special Forces and under CIA guidance were able to fall down the Taliban cruel regime in 2001. For somehow, Barak Obama administration unofficially denied his visa to visit America and attend to the UN National Assembly for counternarcotics traffic in New York in 2016.²²⁹
- Hamid Karzai: By the direct of support of General Dostum he won the 2009 presidential election against Dr. Abdullah Abdullah.
- Ashraf Ghani: Ashraf Ghani continued his allegations against General Dostum prior to mating with him in 2014 presidential elections, despite his western block support he couldn't reach one fifth of his expectation in 2009 presidential election and disappointed his supporters with failed result. But mating with the General Dostum guaranteed him a presidential palace (Kabul Arg) with over two million known Turkic votes and became a president with the mediation of Jon Kerry the US Secretary of State.

(2) Victim side: General Dostum and his followers; by basic calculation and realization the cost of support of General Dostum to his followers which are mostly Turkic ethnic

²²⁹ Matthew Rosenberg, April 25, 2016. *The Afghanistan's Vice President is Barred from Entry to the U.S.*. The New York Times, Asia Pacific

(Uzbeks, Turkmens, Persianized Hazara, Persianized Aimaq, Persianized Qizilbash and Persianized Arabs) and if adding a proportion by percentage based on two recent presidential election (2009 and 2014) their estimated voting value is around %(40-45). Based on this calculation if the population of Afghanistan is roughly 30 million, thereafter the victimized people of Afghanistan is around 10-12 million.

Considering the above mentioned facts how it can be a rightful judgment!? If General Dostum is "Known Killer" (the words of Ashraf Ghani when he sent a letter to London Conference in 2009 (*Kick out Karzai. We deserve a second chance*. Published on 20 August 2009 in Times Newspaper), calling the General Dostum a killer what hells the Ashraf Ghani doing mating with him? All of these accusations were an excuse, the main reason was to accuse him and take advantage of it. In this case Ashraf Ghani is also the partner of this allegation in crime, and he will be responsible for all charges or penalty committed to General Dostum. Then what about the Hamid Karzai's behavior for his lawlessness? Is he innocent? Before 2009 president election General Dostum was in Turkey in exile with the same allegations, what the fact forced him to allow the environment to General Dostum turn back from exile and support his candidacy against his rally to Dr Abdullah?!

The below roster has been taken from Afghanistan Justice Project, in where clearly visible that General Dostum is not an unique person who had been accused for bitter past. But western media and Afghan critics mostly focus on Dostum's past in whereas there are huge lists of accuseds. What was the real aim was hidden under this accusation?²³⁰

Possible Blame List:

1. General Dostum, Vice President of Afghanistan
2. Gulbiddin Hekmatyar, Leader of Islamic Party. Due to his involvement in civil wars in 1990s and killing masses in Kabul and support of Taliban insurgency, period of 2001-2017.

²³⁰ Casting Shadows: *War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001*. The Afghanistan Justice Project, 2005. <http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org/>

3. Former President Hamid Karzai, due to allying, cooperation and benefitting from General Dostum in presidential election 2009. His strong link with Taliban Insurgency and calling them "We call on our Taliban brothers to come home and embrace their land" in his several official speeches.²³¹
4. Incumbent President Ashraf Ghani, due to allying, cooperation and benefitting from General Dostum in 2014 presidential elections. His strong link with Taliban Insurgency and calling them "they are our Brothers" in his several official speeches.
5. US Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA, due to allying with the General Dostum during the liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban persecution.
6. Ata Mohammad Noor, Governor of Balkh Province. Based on HRW investigation: he controls and fund local militias implicated in serious abuses. There are also allegations he has direct links to figures involved in kidnapping and other major crimes.²³²
7. Abdurabl Rasul Sayyaf, leader of the Dawat Party (the former mujahedin faction of Ittihad-e Islami), accused in massacre on the Hazara's in Kabul during the civil war in 1990s (*Massacre and Mass Rape in Afshar (February 10-11, 1993)*).²³³
8. Engineer Khayal Mohammad Khan, Islamic party, he did as head of Hezb-e Islami intelligence during the jihad and the civil war, both periods in which his faction carried out grave war crimes.²³⁴
9. Mohammed Mohaqeq, the leader of Shia Hizbe-Wahdat Party, accused in war crime in the Karta-e-3 District of Kabul in 1990s.
10. Mohammad Ismail Khan, former minister of water and energy

²³¹ Ben Farmer, 3 November 2009. *Hamid Karzai reaches out to 'Taliban brothers' in Afghanistan*. The Telegraph

²³² Human Rights Watch, March 3, 2015. *Today we shall All Die: Afghanistan's Strongmen and the Legacy of Impunity*.

²³³ Casting Shadows: *War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001*. The Afghanistan Justice Project, 2005. <http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org/>

²³⁴ Kate Clark, 12 June 2014. *Elections 2014 (26): The other possible vice president – Dr Abdullah's running mate Muhammad Khan*. Political Landscape. AAN

As a result, same indictments and the same injustices continued. This is a smear campaign. If there is an abuse of duty in the middle, it should be put together with all the facts and evidence. Based on the *article 69 of the constitutional law in force of the Afghanistan*, any type of misuse the duty of his obligation or alleged accusations to the title of vice-presidents simultaneously goes to the president title as well. In this case, General Dostum is an elected Vice President of Afghanistan and second top official of the country must be voted in the National Assembly with a majority of 2/3 in order to be tried (according to article 69 of the constitution). If a decision is reached in Afghan Parliament, then he must go to the Constitutional Loya Jirga. And then Constitutional Loya Jirga should be established and there again should be a vote of 2/3 majority of votes. However, on that time he can be tried in the Supreme Court of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

The election of General Dostum in 2014 as the First Vice President of Afghanistan, despite the ethnic, political and international obstacles, can be considered as a real game changer in the politics of the nation. This development has reduced the possibility of the disintegration of the country and potential bloody civil wars to come. However, keeping the ethnic and political balance in the country would not be easy in the foreseeable future as well.

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ANNEX –I, CURRICULUM VITAE

CURRICULUM VITAE

Name and Surname: Murad Hamidi

Education:

Degree	Field	University	Year
Undergraduate	Department of Architecture & Engineering Civil Engineering	Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Isparta	2000
Graduate	Master of International Relations	Atilim Universitesi, Ankara	2017

Work Experience:

Work Place	Position	Year
MOQA GROUP	Chief Executive Officer	2008-up to date

Foreign Languages: English, Turkish, Uzbek and Persian

Publications: N/A

E-mail: moqaconstruction@gmail.com

Date: 07/07/2017

Turnitin Orijinallik Raporu

Tez Murad Hamidi tarafından

ÖDEV 2 (SBE TEZ 1) den

- 27 –Tem-2017 15:22 EEST’ de işleme konu
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- Kelime sayısı: 40782

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Yayımlar:

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Öğrenci Ödevleri:

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