On the Success Probabilities of Differential Attacks On Present

Abstract

Advanced growth in ubiquitous devices leads to increasing popularity of lightweight cryptography and as a result, various block ciphers are designed. The analysis of these algorithms has become popular and as a result, underlying theory of analysis tools including success probabilities has widely been studied recently. In this work, we focus on Present, a lightweight block cipher introduced by Bogdanov et al. and the analysis of this algorithm. We give a detailed information of differential cryptanalysis and multiple differential cryptanalysis on Present. Also, the underlying theory of statistical cryptanalysis are presented. As an important part of cryptanalysis, success probability is examined and expressed by the formulas given by Selçuk and Blondeau et al. The main aim of this work is to contribute to the theory of statistical cryptanalysis. Therefore, we give a general framework of statistical cryptanalysis and success probabilities. The details of success probabilities are given with experimental results. Also, we apply the sieving phase to decrease the cost of the attacks