

ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME

**VENEZUELAN AND SYRIAN POPULATION UNDER TEMPORARY
PROTECTION IN COLOMBIA AND TURKEY:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY**

Master's Thesis

Kevin Augusto RAMÍREZ BLANDÓN

Ankara-2022

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Ankara-2022

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

This is to certify that this thesis titled “Venezuelan and Syrian Population under Temporary Protection in Colombia and Turkey: A Comparative Study” and prepared by Kevin Augusto RAMIREZ BLANDON meets with the committee’s approval unanimously/by a majority vote as Master’s Thesis in the field of International Relations following the successful defense conducted on 21/01/2022

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ETHICAL STATEMENT

I accept and acknowledge that I have prepared this thesis study, prepared in line with the Thesis Writing Guidelines of Atılım University Graduate School of Social Sciences;

- within the framework of academic and ethical rules;
- presented the information, documents, evaluations, and results in a way that meets the rules of scientific ethics and morality,
- I have referenced each work from which I have benefited while preparing my thesis, and that
- I hereby present a unique study.

I hereby also understand that I shall accept any loss of rights against my behalf in cases otherwise.

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ÖZ

RAMIREZ, Kevin. Kolombiya ve Türkiye'de geçici koruma altındaki Venezuela ve Suriye nüfusu: karşılaştırmalı bir çalışma, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara 2022.

Bu tez, birbirlerinin mülteci deneyimini geliştirmek üzere, Suriye iç savaşı ve Venezuela ekonomisinin kötüleşmesiyle ortaya çıkan mülteci krizine çözüm bulmak adına Kolombiya ve Türkiye tarafından uygulanan politika ve programlara dair karşılaştırmalı bir tezdır. Bu çalışma, 20. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında Kolombiya'nın yaşadığı iç sorunlardan başlayarak, Afrika ve Asya'daki göç alan ülkelerin uyguladığı politikalar da dâhil olmak üzere dünyadaki güncel olaylara değinerek göç akışı yaratan önemli vakalardan oluşan tarihsel bir bölüm içermektedir.

Karşılaştırmalı bir çalışma olarak bu tez, her iki ülke tarafından uygulanan politika ve programları; yasal çerçeve, sağlık, eğitim, işe erişim, barınma ve Suriyelilerin yarattığı krizle başa çıkmak için alınan uluslararası yardımlar gibi diğer önemli noktaları içermektedir. Bu ülkelerin politikalarındaki temel farklılıkları bulmak için inceleme sonrası elde edilen bilgiler çaprazlanmış ve sonuç olarak ülkelerin mülteci deneyimini geliştirmek adına verimli olabilecek unsurlara sahip olduğu bulunmuştur. Türkiye özelinde, ulusal ve uluslararası fonlardan Suriyelilere maddi yardım sağlanmasına yönelik gelen bütçenin Kızılay Kart sistemi ile uygulanması, mülteci nüfusuyla ilgilenilmesi adına sınır illerinde tam donanımlı kampların kurulması ve Suriyelilerin ülkede yerleştirmek adına yeniden dağıtım uygulamaları bu çalışmalardandır. Öte yandan, Kolombiya'nın deneyimi, geçici koruma sona erene kadar uzun süreli oturma vizesi sağlanması ve 2011'den sonra ülkede doğan çocuklara Kolombiya vatandaşlığı verilmesi gibi Türkiye ile paylaşılacak önemli hususlar içermektedir.

Bu tez, Joseph Nye'in akıllı güç teorisine dayanmaktadır ve bunların uygulanmasının dış politikada fayda sağlamak için nasıl değerli olabileceğini göstermektedir. Bu durumda Türkiye, yalnızca ülkeye değil, aynı zamanda mülteci nüfusuna da fayda sağlayan avantajlar ve anlaşmalar için mültecileri Avrupa Birliği ile olan ilişkisinde bir baskı unsuru olarak etkili olarak kullanmıştır. Bu durum, Kolombiya'nın mülteci nüfusu için avantajlar elde etmek adına bölgesel ölçekte kullanabileceği bir olguyu ön plana çıkarmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: göç, sığınmacılar, Kolombiya, Türkiye, Akıllı güç

Yıldırım
Göç

ABSTRACT

RAMIREZ, kevin. Venezuelan and Syrian population under temporary protection in Colombia and Turkey: a comparative study. Graduate Thesis, Ankara, 2022.

This thesis is a comparative study of the policies and programs applied by Colombia and Turkey in order to respond to the refugee emergency created by the deterioration of the economy in Venezuela and the civil war in Syria, with the aim of finding aspects that could benefit each other's refugees' experience. This work provides a historical outlook, offers the current point of view regarding the refugee situation around the world, and describes relevant cases that generated a flux of emigration, starting with the flux of refugees caused by the internal problems of Colombia during the second half of the 20th century, and moving on to current cases in Africa and Asia, and the policies applied by the receiving countries.

Considering that this thesis is a comparative study, it focuses on aspects, such as legal framework, health, education, access to work, housing, other important aspects, and the international assistance received in order to attend the crisis generated by the population under temporary protection. The information obtained after the investigation was crossed finding those elements that may enhance each other's refugee experience. In the case of Turkey, the aspects that would set an exemplar found correspond to features such as the application of the Kızılay Kart system for providing financial aid with national and international funds, the instauration of full-equipped camps in the borderline cities, and the redistribution implemented to accommodate the Syrians around the country. On its side, Colombia's legal framework provides important aspects to share with Turkey, such as the possibility of acquiring a long-term residence visa by the expiring time of the temporary protection, and the grant of Colombian citizenship to the children population born in Colombia after 2011.

The thesis is based on the smart power approach of Joseph Nye and shows how a smart strategy may prove to be valuable for obtaining benefits in the foreign policy. In this sense, Turkey effectively used the refugees as a leverage tool in its relationship to the European Union, in order to obtain advantages and agreements

that profited not only the country, but also the refugee population, and this configures a fact that Colombia could replicate in a regional scale.

Keywords: migration, refugees, Colombia, Turkey, Smart power



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INDEX OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

3RP	Refugee and Resilience Response Plan
AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AFKEN	Disaster Temporary City Management System
ANIF	National Association of Financial Institutions
ARL	Labor Risk Administrator
CARM	Refugee and Migrant Care Centers
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CWW	Concern Worldwide
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
DPS	Department for Social Prosperity
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
EPS	Public and Private Health Provider Institution
ESSN	Emergency Safety Net
ETF	European Union Regional Trust Fund
ETPV	Temporary Statute of Protection for Venezuelan
GEIH	Great Poll Integrated of Homes of Colombia
ICBF	Colombian Institute of Family Welfare
ICFES	Colombian Institution for the Evaluation of the Education
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILFL	International Labour Force Law
INGO	International Non-governmental Organizations
IOM	The International Organization for Migration

LFIP	Law on Foreigners and International Protection
LWPF	Law on Work Permits for Foreigners
MADAD	Regional Trust Fund for the Syrian Response
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoLSS	Ministry of Labor
MoNE	Ministry of National Education
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
PAE	School Feeding Program
PEP	Special permission of permanency
PIKTES	Project on Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into the Turkish Education System
PIP	Permanency and Entry Permit
PIP-TT	Permanency and Entry Permit for temporary transit
RAMVC	Administrative Registry of Venezuelan Migrants in Colombia
SENA	National Learning Service
SGP	General System of Participation
SIRE	Information System for the Report of Foreigners
SPDC	The State Development Committee
SPE	Public Employment Service
TAC	Temporary Accommodation Center
TEC	Temporary Education Centers
TMF	Border Mobility Card for the pendular migration
TP	Temporary Protection Regulation
UN	United Nations

UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	The United Nations Refugee Agency
UNICEF	The United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID	the Agency of the United States for the International Development
WALD	Local Government and Democracy Foundation
WFP	The World Food Program
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
YOBIS	Higher Education and Foreign Affairs Department

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is located in the field of migration, and it is a comparative study between the policies and the programs applied in the case of the Venezuelans that emigrated to Colombia, and the Syrians that emigrated to Turkey, who are referred interchangeably throughout this study as, “immigrant”, “asylum seeker”, “person under temporary protection” and “refugee”. The term “immigrant” is used because it refers to any foreigner found outside the country of birth, “asylum seeker” is used because in both cases these populations are looking for the protection of the local government, the term “person under temporary protection” is used because it is the status conceded by the local governments. On the other hand, the term “refugee” is used in this study considering its use along the literature, for both the Colombian and the Turkish cases, but acknowledging that these populations are not granted a refugee status due the fact that most of the Venezuelans migrating to Colombia are doing it so for economic reasons, and because Turkey applies a geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention Relating the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol, that establishes that such agreements protect only individuals coming from Europe.

This dissertation is relevant because both Colombia and Turkey are going through similar experiences with the immigrants, and the comparison of both cases generated differences that could be shared in order to enhance both countries’ refugees’ policies. On the other hand, this study is original because, even if there are comparative studies related to migration, this is the first one that compares Colombia and Turkey, along with their policies and programs applied in migration, which fills that gap in the literature.

This research, within the framework of the smart power concept, would make a comparison of the Colombian and Turkish cases with respect to their policies concerning the refugee phenomenon and management, in order to address the question of whether or not there are any outcomes in Colombia’s and Turkey’s refugee policies and programs that could be shared to enhance each other’s refugees handling experience. The hypothesis is that the comparison of the implementation of policies and programs of Colombia and Turkey will lead to the detection of aspects that could be shared in order to enhance each other’s refugee experiences. This hypothesis is tested by an investigation throughout the chapters of the legal

background of both countries, which includes access to health, education, work, housing, and other important aspects such as social security, women vulnerability, illegality, among others, that put in evidence the different outstanding policies and programs that could be implemented by the counterpart in order to enhance its refugees' policies.

The main challenges presented during the investigation process was the excess of sources on the Colombian side, which ended in the construction of a chapter that had to be edited several times in order to reach a final product. On the other hand, the information found for the Turkish chapter was considerably less in quantity and more concise, which actually simplified the information gathering and the writing process. This really helped molding the Colombian chapter once the Turkish counterpart was finished.

This thesis is divided in three main parts. The first part refers to the theoretical framework that supports this dissertation, which is the smart power concept developed by Joseph Nye Jr. in 2003, but before describing in detail what this form of power is, it is necessary to explain what the hard and soft power theories are, considering that, according to the smart concept, in order to obtain smart strategies in the international arena hard and soft power features must be combined. On the other hand, since the soft power is a Neoliberal attribute, this study elaborates on the Neoliberal theory, as it is important to define it before getting to the smart concept itself. The decision of implementing this concept as the main component of the theoretical framework arose from observing how Turkey has developed a smart strategy that bring benefits for the country, its nationals, and the refugee population, by considering migration as a leverage tool towards the European Union.

The second chapter delineates the conceptual and theoretical framework related to the field of migration and contains information on the international conventions that protect the refugees around the world. Then it moves on to presenting a historical background related to the Colombian migration flux as a way to illustrate that Colombia has its own share in history in generating mass migration because of the internal problems that the country was facing in the second half of the 20th century. Afterwards, the chapter goes upon the main cases of mass migration generated in the African continent, especially by Sudan and Somalia, and then moves on to describing the policies of the receiving countries, such as Guinea, Uganda, and

the European Union. Finally, the chapter moves on to Myanmar, by describing the situation that has generated a mass flux of migrants, and the policies applied by the receiving countries Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Thailand.

The third chapter touches upon the history of Venezuela, and how it led to the displacement of millions of people to the world, and specially, to Colombia. Then, there is an explanation of the return of Colombian nationals that were living in Venezuela, and how they were deported by the Venezuelan government, generating an emergency in the bordering cities of Colombia. Afterwards, the chapter describes the legal background, which includes the National Constitution, laws, rulings, decrees, permits, statutes, etc. that grant rights to the immigrant in Colombia. Within this framework there is a description of the main policies and programs applied, as the detection of the different challenges presented in health, education, access to work, housing, and aspects such as irregularity, personal safety and citizen security, illegal recruitment by the guerillas, provision of services, women and children struggle, etc. and finally, the chapter provides information regarding the different national and international organizations that have been providing assistance to Colombia since the beginning of the migratory emergency.

The fourth chapter is elaborated as a parallel to its counterpart Chapter 3, and just like the latter, it touches upon the Syrian history and the reasons that originated the refugee crisis. Afterwards, the chapter provides information regarding the legal background, where there can be found information about the previous laws applicable to migration, as the main aspects of the Temporary Protection Regulation of 2014. Afterwards, it moves to the relevant policies and challenges found in fields such as health, education, access to work, housing, and other important aspects such as women vulnerability, security, ethnographic and religious differences, etc. and finally, it provides information regarding the national and international assistance offered to the people under temporary protection.

The last part of the thesis goes around the conclusion. In this part there is a presentation of the findings that arose from applying a comparative method to the Colombian and the Turkish case. In order to be able to detect such differences in the policies, the information provided through the chapters was organized as a parallel that started with the legal framework of the country where it was evidenced the different laws, agreements, decrees, statutes, etc. that were implemented towards

the refugees of both countries. The next aspects that were compared were access to health, education, work, housing, other important aspects, and there was also a parallel on the international assistance received on both sides. The documents used for creating these chapters were gathered from official data provided by both governments, international organizations that were directly working in the field, and academic literature.

The findings were as follows: in the field of housing, it was found that Turkey was very successful at building camps that were equipped with medical centers, vocational programs, and recreational facilities, which proved to be very valuable for the refugees, and for attending their immediate needs. Such an implementation of camps, if applied in Colombia, could be useful for helping the Venezuelans that are in urgent need of assistance. The second difference regards the redistribution that Turkey applied. This is an important aspect that Turkey has to offer, since Colombia is having serious problems in the bordering cities due to the excess of Venezuelans, which has created social tensions, and there are areas of the country that have a lot to offer and could welcome this population with lower social and economic negative impacts.

Two final important aspects were found in the Colombian legislation, and they are important tools that could be applied by Turkey in order to enhance the integration of the population under temporary protection in the future. The first one is regarding the possibility of obtaining a long-term residence permit for the Venezuelans once the 10 years of the Temporary Statute of Protection for Venezuelan (ETPV) concludes. Turkey may benefit from the implementation of such a policy since it goes in accordance with the harmonization program that has been launched, and it would provide the Syrians with a full integration into the Turkish society.

The second aspect is regarding the nationalization after August 2015 of the children born out of Venezuelan unions in Colombia (resolution 8470 issued on 5th August, 2019). This measure, complementary to the previous one, proves to be important for an integration to the Colombian society. The implementation of such a policy in Turkey could benefit not only the harmonization of the parents, but the total integration of the family into the Turkish society.

In this part it is also mentioned that Turkey has applied an effective smart strategy by taking advantage of its geostrategic position. This provided the opportunity to obtain benefits and funds from the European Union in order to keep the Syrian migration within the Turkish territory. The implementation of the smart power converts migration into a hard power tool and provides the opportunity to apply soft power tools such as treaties and collaboration between states that are beneficial for both Turkey and the population under temporary protection.

Literature review

In order to locate this thesis within the literature, it is important to take into consideration different studies that are part of the field of migration. One of these studies is the book *Theories of Migration* (1996), written by Robin Cohen, Director of the International Migration Institute, and Professor of Development Studies in the University of Oxford. Cohen integrated in one book a considerable number of attempts of generating a general theory of migration, and he argues that these schools and disciplines have failed at providing such a framework because of the constraint of great variety of migrations, such as professional and unskilled, settler and temporary, internal, and international, compelled, and voluntary, legal, and illegal (Cohen, 1996).

The book *International Migration: the human face of globalization*, written by Brian Keeley, in 2009, takes a look at the long history of human migration, and proceeds to provide a current overview with the introduction of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD's data regarding the movement of migrants within its territory. Also, it provides information regarding the international rules that govern the international migration and presents the impacts of migration on economic growth. Then it proceeds to analyze and provide recommendations for enhancing the performance of migrants in fields such as work and education, and it also examines the roll of migration in the developing countries by studying cases such as "brain drain" and the money migrants send back to their countries.

The book *Forced Migration and Global Politics*, written by Alexander Betts in 2009, is based on the content that the author teaches at the Refugee Studies Center of the University of Oxford, and was written with the purpose of filling the gap in the literature between the application of the concepts of International Relations and the

empirical context of forced migration. This study unites the literature on International Relations and the literature on Forced Migration and explores what both fields have to offer to each other.

The book *Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security*, written by Jane McAdam in 2008, focuses on an analysis based on human rights regarding the contemporary challenges that the international protection regime is facing, due to the increase in politics aimed at enhancing the security of people, borders, institutions, and national identity. In the book, the author provides an analysis on the impact on the refugee policy derived by the domestic and international laws on anti-terrorism, and then proceeds to analyze how the immigration controls have an effect on the access to the territory and entitlement of the asylum seekers.

The book *The Refugee Convention at Fifty*, written by Joanne van Selm, Khoti Kamanga, John Morrison, Aninia Nadig, Sanja Spoljar-vrzina, and Loes van willigen in 2003, contains a series of papers presented at the seventh conference organized by the International Association for the Study of Forced Migrations LASFM, in 2003, and focuses in areas such as: solidarity between states in ensuring the compliance of legal and political commitments; human and social consequences of forced migration on those cover and excluded from refugee protection; and regional approaches to refugee protection. The chapters of the book cover areas such as anthropology, sociology, law, and political science, and it contains articles written by policy makers, practitioners, and academics.

The book *Causes and Consequences of Human Migration, and Evolutionary Perspective*, written by Michael H. Crawford, and Benjamin C. Campbell in 2012, contains the experience of both authors, who identify themselves as migrants, and contribute to the book with their personal history of migration, which could be personal, or ancestral, and the background of counting on different cultures, languages, and customs. This book was created as a result of of the interdisciplinary conference on human migration that took place at the University of Kansas in 2010 and had as a purpose to analyze the causes and consequences of human migration, looked from a multidisciplinary point of view.

The book *Migration and Human Rights*, written by Ryszard Cholewinski, Paul De Guchteneire, and Antoine Pécoud in 2009, explains how the United Nations

(UN) Convention on Migrant Workers' Rights, adopted in 1990, and entered in force in 2003, settles the international standards for the migrants to have access to human rights. Such convention has only been ratified by 40 states, which does not include the ratification of any major immigration country. The book focuses on the information of the convention, and the reasons why the states are reluctant to ratify it. Finally, the book *Migration, Globalization and Human Security*, written by David T. Graham and Nana K. Poku, looks at issues related to security and human security, and how tenuous existence of migrants may lead to innumerable security threats. Then it provides an examination of the major theories related to the recent migration trends, and analyses in deep these cases.

This dissertation has 4 main chapters, and every one of them was constructed by using different literary sources. The chapter *Theoretical Framework* was constructed based on the definitions of power of different authors such as Max Weber, Harold D. Lasswell, Morton Kaplan, Hanna Arendt, Robert A. Dahl, among others, and then moves to the main theory of the chapter, which is the concept of smart power of Joseph S. Nye Jr., but first elaborates on the theories that are needed for the construction of smart power, which are hard power, and soft power as an attribute of the Neoliberalism.

After the theoretical framework and the revision of the international conventions that protect the refugees, this thesis presents an overview of past and current refugee cases around the world. The first section focuses on the Colombian diaspora originated by the waves of violence in the second half of the XX century. Regarding this aspect Navarro (2010) touches upon the main reason that generated the flux of migrants towards Costa Rica, and analyzes the latter's pull effect and explains the main characteristics of the different migratory waves, and the main challenges that arose during the migration process. On his side, Polo, Serrano & Granados (2017), complement the information of Navarro (2010) by giving an overview of the current conditions of the Colombians living in Costa Rica, and their insertion process to the society of the hosting country. In their article "Costa Rica: un reto social para los migrantes Colombianos" the authors touch upon the sociopolitical conditions of Costa Rica and present statistic and demographic information aimed at providing an understanding of the Colombian migration to the country.

Mejía (2012) in his article “Colombia y las migraciones internacionales. Evolución reciente y panorama actual a partir de las cifras” explains, parting from the official available data, the migratory behavior of the Colombian population and explains the different migration aspects for the main countries chosen by the Colombians to migrate such as Venezuela, Ecuador, United States, and Spain. On the other hand, Cardenas & Mejía (2006) focus on the immigration and migration waves that Colombia presented. In this particular chapter, this thesis focuses on the emigration of Colombians, for this reason, the information on their article is useful because the authors analyze the different waves, and the determining factors that obliged the people to migrate from Colombia, focusing on the last wave of the 20th century, and just as Mejía (2012), the authors touch upon the main destinations for emigrating. Finally, another important country that received Colombians was Argentina. Regarding this case, Melella (2014) presents the main characteristics of the Colombian population in the country, and describes the strategies of cultural insertion such as gastronomy, cultural and sport practices, and the use of information and technology tools that allowed the Colombian population to create links with the hosting society.

The thesis then moves on to presenting the current cases that generated a flux of migrants, and the policies that the receiving countries have been issuing for responding to the emergency. The first cases presented belong to Africa. Pablo Blanco (2011), in his article “Migraciones desesperadas en África Subsahariana poscolonial” touches upon the historical reasons, such as the foreign interventions in the African countries, and how these have caused the current sociopolitical problems that the African countries face today. Also on the same note, Degu (2020) elaborates upon the historical developments, such as the decolonization, that have created the current challenges that present this part of the world. Furthermore, the author supports her article on the theories of Ideology and Development, and presents definitions of nationalism, ethnicity, socialism, globalization and regionalization, and links them to the current problematic situation of the African countries by analyzing and presenting relevant information from an historical perspective of the cases of some of the African countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan,

Manger (2006), focuses on the situation presented in Darfur, Sudan, and explains how external and internal circumstances may create peace or violent

situations among the residing communities. The author touches upon the relations among the ethnic groups, and how their clashes due to differences in ideology and religion have created a nation problem, and a flux of refugees. Furthermore, the World Bank (2019), informs about the policy response in Uganda by informing about the living conditions of the refugees and the hosting community, and evaluates the sustainability of the current refugee policy by assessing through sampling and presenting the findings and comparing them to conditions of the host community. Also on the topic, the UNDP (2017) describes Uganda's contribution to refugee protection and management, touches upon the progressive refugee policy applied by the country, and assesses it by presenting an analysis of data collected regarding the country's contribution to the refugee hosting. Roberts, Murphy & McKee (2016) elaborate upon the European reaction towards the refugee crisis and explain how the way that Europe has addressed the refugee crisis could be considered as a collective failure because of the lack of a clear framework for handling the refugee population, and the negative behaviors adopted by some of the members of the European Union towards the asylum seekers.

The dissertation then moves on to Myanmar, in this case Lee (2019), elaborates on the role that the state authorities' have played in the refugee crisis by implementing and supporting a speech that creates negative reactions towards the ethnic minorities, especially the Rohingya community found in the northern part of the country. Likewise, Iqbal (2017) presents a historical framework that helps the reader to understand the important aspects that have led to this problematic and exposes historical facts that lead to the conclusion that the state is wrong about denying the Rohingya community as a part of the country. Then, the author proceeds to describe the relations of this ethnic group with the central government, and mentions the actions taken by the state against this minority. On their side, Imran & Mian (2014) describe the policies applied by Bangladesh, which is the country that has been affected the most by the Rohingya population. The authors elaborate on the welcoming policies that the country has applied and contrast them with a critical analysis on the current situation of the refugee population, and the measures that could be implemented to enhance their living standards. In contrast with this, Fishbein (2020) presents the reality of this minority in Malaysia by exposing the challenges that this population is facing in the country due to the harsh migratory

policies applied by the local government. Another important state that has been affected by the Rohingya population is Thailand. According to The Humanitarian (2019), the situation of this population was difficult due to the lack of a refugee framework that allowed them to remain legally in the territory, fortunately, according to Bangkokpost (2020), in 2016 the Prime Minister of Thailand announced the implementation of a mechanism aimed at distinguishing the population in need of international protection, on this topic, HRW (2017), also explains that Thailand has started to re-think their migration framework and has begun to implement commitments towards the assurance of the rights of the refugees.

After the presentation of the refugee cases around the world, the thesis moves onto its first main case. The immigration of the Venezuelan population to Colombia. In the first part, Heredia & Battistessa (2018) present data on the Venezuelan migration and elaborate on the main countries chosen as destination, for then concentrating on Colombia, United States, Peru, Ecuador, among others. Also on the same topic, Koechlin & Eguren (2018) present a historical background and then move to providing information about the migration towards different countries such as Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, among others. The next part of this dissertation touches upon the return of the Colombian citizens that emigrated to Venezuela due to the violence of the second half of the XX century. On the topic Angela María Carreño Malaver wrote in 2014 an article titled “Colombian refugees in Venezuela: fifteen years in search of protection” and through the document she provides information regarding the Colombian context, the emigration towards Venezuela through history, and the conditions of this population in Venezuela. On their side, Aliaga, et al. (2020), provide in their article information regarding the politics applied by the Colombian government towards the Venezuelan refugees and provide an overview to assist the reader in understanding the reality of the Colombian population returning from Venezuela.

From this point the thesis moves to an analysis of the legal background of Colombia. In this section aspects such as health, access to education, work, housing, health, international assistance, and other important aspects are taken into consideration. For this fragment the National Constitution of the Republic of Colombia provided an initial outlook of the rights that protect the migrant in Colombia, and the World Bank (2018) presents a document that includes the

characteristics of the Venezuelan migration to Colombia by providing information regarding the migratory tendencies, the response of the Colombian Government, the profile of the migrant population, the geographical distribution, the characteristics of the receiving areas, and the perspectives for the future. Also, the World Bank elaborates on the impacts that the Venezuelan migration have in Colombia by analyzing the institutions, the economy, and the impacts on the society, and the provision of basic services such as health, education, employment, social security, shelter, among others. Also, Francy Johanna Mejía Madroñero, in her article analyses the compromises acquired by Colombia through the different international instruments for the protection of the refugees. Furthermore, the Pan American Development Foundation PADF, OAS, with a partial financing of the Government of the United States, and in alliance with the University of Rosario created a booklet aimed at informing the Venezuelan migrants about their rights, the regularization framework, the risks associated to the migratory process, the different channels for protecting the rights, among other aspects.

The following chapter corresponds to the second equally important case of this study: the Syrian migration to Turkey. This chapter starts with the historical background that led to the mass migration of Syrians to Turkey. For this part Hacıoglu (2018) provided a historical background of the migration from Syria and analyzed the profiles of the migrants through a fieldwork in Ankara and the Nizip Temporary Accommodation Center in Gaziantep. The book written by Kemal Kirişçi “Syrian refugees and Turkey’s challenges: going beyond hospitality”, launched in 2014 touches upon the historical factors that led to the migratory process, and provides important information that fits the formulation of the legal background of Turkey, which just as the Colombian counterpart, contains an analysis of aspects such as health, education, etc. as a contribution for this part, Kirişçi (2014) analyses the challenges found in areas such as employment, education, health, shelter, and social, political and administrative issues. On its side, the book written by Ahmet İcduygu in 2015, titled “Syrian refugees in Turkey: the long road ahead” enriches the historical part of the chapter, provides information regarding the evolution of the legal framework in Turkey, and analyses the challenges found on the settlement and integration of the Syrian refugees in the country. On the other hand, it is important to mention that this part also contains information on the Temporary Protection

Regulation of Turkey (2014), which was aimed at allowing the Syrian population to remain legally in the country. Furthermore, İçduygu & Şimşek (2016) elaborate on the legal and administrative tools implemented by the Government in response to the Syrian crisis, and Akbulut, Goktas, & Kutlu (2018) contribute to the elaboration of the legal framework by providing information regarding the use of the hospital facilities by the Syrian population, and the challenges and solutions that arose from this experience.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis is based on a comparison between the Colombian and the Turkish experience in handling the immigration of Venezuelan and Syrian citizens, respectively. Regarding this, the theoretical framework that will be applied is the smart power approach introduced by Nye in 2003, since it is an aspect that Turkey has used in its foreign policy as a way to obtain certain advantages, by profiting of migration as a leverage tool in its relationship to the European Union, but before arriving to this particular approach, it is important to take a look at the origins of the concept of power, and then to focus on the concepts of hard power, soft power, and Neoliberalism as the origin of soft power.

Power, as a subject, has attracted the attention of social scientists for a long time, even centuries, if we consider the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli. Nonetheless, there is a lot of ambiguity and lack of consensus in a clear definition of power in academia (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 1). Peter Blau defined power as the ability of a person or group to effectively impose their will on others, in spite of the resistance, through deterrence that can be applied through punishment, sanctions or by withholding regularly supplied rewards; definition that is similar to those of Harold D. Lasswell, and Morton Kaplan, which establish that power is the ability to change other's policies by means of threats or actual deprivations regarding the non-compliance of the imposed policies (Pallaver, 2011, p. 33). Hanna Arendt defined in 1970 power as an attribute that does not belong to an individual, but rather to a group, and will continue to exist just as long as the group stays together (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 1). On the other hand, Robert A. Dahl proposed the use of the term "actors" for any individual that is a part of the relationship of power, may this be a person, a group, offices, nation-states, etc. (Dahl, 1957, p. 3).

According to Max Weber, power is like a game where either you win or lose, which is known as a zero-sum game (Pallaver, 2011, p. 32). It is defined by the resources, capabilities, and qualities that provide the actor with the possibility of accomplishing his will within a social relationship, despite of the resistance (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 2). In this theory, power refers to the possibility of achieving success, and it is also potential since it refers to the capacity of doing something, and not exactly to the actual display of actions and effects (Pallaver, 2011, p. 37). The

theory of Weber attracted criticism. In this regard, Martin (1971), argued that in his zero-sum theory Weber did not only fail in providing a definition of power, since he just provided a basis for comparing the different attributes of actors, but he also disregarded the possibility of a convenient mutual power relation (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 2).

Talcott Parsons defined in 1967 power from a different perspective, rather than conflict. For him power is the ability of the units to materialize the current obligations in a system of collective organization, and these actions are legitimized by means of collective goals and fearing negative sanctions in case of recalcitrance (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 2). Regarding this, Martin assured that it created more difficulties than solutions since Parson replaced Weber's conflict with consensus among the actors, and forgets about the hierarchical nature of power, and the interests that come with it (Pallaver, 2011, p. 35). On the other hand, Anthony Giddens (1968), expressed that this definition does not take into consideration that power is exercised over someone else, and also highlights that Parson disregards the hierarchical character of power by implying that it has to be legitime and consensual among the power holders (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 2).

Hard and soft power forms have been the topic of discussion for a long time for scholars such as Joseph Nye, Judah Grunstein, and Janice Bailly Mattern (Brito, 2010, p. 112). Both models are considered to be ideal forms of power from a Weberian approach, which means that, as any ideal case scenario, it is not possible to find them in the real life, and sometimes both theories can complement or even interfere each other (Pallaver, 2011, p. 99). For the purpose of this study, it is relevant to define both hard and soft theories before getting into the smart power, as it is also relevant to elaborate on the Neoliberal theory, considering that it is the theoretical origin of soft power, and it is a key element in understanding the current migration phenomena around the world.

1.1. Hard Power

For a long time, power was seen in international relations as an exclusive part of realism. For the realists the nation-states are considered to be the main actors in the international system, and, according to John Mearsheimer (2001), these actors belong to an international system that is characterized by its anarchy, the offensive

and military capability of the great powers, the uncertainty of the intentions of other states, their rationality, and their survival as primary goal (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 3). For the realists, the sovereign states need to grant power in order to secure their survival, that is why the world is seen as a chaotic place where there is no superior authority over the nations (Lee T. C., 2018, p. 1). Because of assumptions like the previous one, hard power is considered to be the oldest form of power, connected to the idea of an untamed and anarchic system where the actors do not recognize any superior authority (Pallaver, 2011, p. 3).

Power has always been central to the discussion and theoretical construction of the realism. In this regard, Hans Morgenthau argues that the international politics are characterized by the struggle for power, and how the immediate aim of the actors is to obtain such power, moreover, E. H. Carr agreed with Morgenthau, and added that politics are in its core power politics (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 3). Kenneth N. Waltz believes that power is a property and argues that it can be generated by the attributes of the nation such as population size, territory, military capacity, among others (Lee T. C., 2018, p. 2). Furthermore, Waltz argues that a possible war could be caused by the negligent behavior, the nature of the man, and his misdirected aggressive impulses, the desire of the states to change the status quo, and the pursue of their own interests as they see fit (Rasheed, 1995, p. 97).

Hard power is considered to be the “traditional” power, and it is mainly focused on the use of coercion and force (Ivanchenko V. & Margoev A., 2017, p. 3), in that sense, both terms are intimately linked because coercion is related to the possibility of an actor to use force, in this case, to have the capacity of exerting physical violence in order to obtain the desired outcomes (Pallaver, 2011, p. 81). There are ways to understand the power of an actor by assessing factors such as territory, population size, economic capability, resource endowment, political stability, competence, and military strength (Gallarotti, 2015; Nye, 2015; Raimzhanova, 2015). The effects created by the hard power are easier to measure, and its display is easy to detect (Pallaver, 2011, p. 81). In this kind of power, it is important to have an accumulation of physical resources that will allow the actor to impose its will, by threatening to use them against others (Pallaver, 2011, p. 80). In this sense, the menacing actor can symbolically or manifestly use these tangible

power resources to deter or oblige other states to comply or submit to his will (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 4).

As seen above, hard power relies on the use of threats or “sticks”, but it is also known by the use of inducements or “carrots” (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 7). The “sticks” represent a threat of military attack or imposition of economic sanctions (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 19), that will menace the receiving actor’s economic stability or survival, which will guarantee his obedience because of the asymmetrical relation of the actors involved, leaving the menaced state with no exit, voice or options (Pallaver, 2011, p. 82). On the other hand, the “carrots” represent the reward granted to an actor in response to the compliance of the will of the threatening state (Akçay & Kanat, 2017, p. 419). In this case the power of the menacing state derives from the capacity to “buy” the other actor, which can be seen as a “reward” given that the receiving state is willing to accept the instruction, as long as there is a “prize” (Pallaver, 2011, p. 82). Finally, it is important to mention that not always hard power is seen as pernicious in nature, since it may create admiration and respect of other actors, especially when it is applied through actions that are consistent with these principles (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 14).

Hard power represents an essential part of the Realism that was of great importance until the post-war years, afterwards, and in response to the Neorealism of the late 1970s, Neoliberalism appeared sharing some principles with the former, such as the existence of anarchy and the difficulty at the time of cooperating, but the Neoliberalism stayed closed to the Liberalism in many aspects, especially considering its main focus on the importance of the international institutions in international relations (Gomichon, 2013, p. 1). On the other hand, soft power is a feature that belongs to the Neoliberalism (Mattern, 2012, p. 358), for this reason the next paragraphs elaborate on the Neoliberal theory before moving forward to the soft power theory, and then to the smart concept.

1.2. Neoliberal Theory

The concept of neoliberalism refers to a “paradigm” or economic model that started to gain importance in the 1980s (Steger & Roy, 2010, p. 30). In this scenario, human-wellbeing could be enhanced by liberating skills and individual entrepreneurial freedoms within a framework characterized by rights regarding

private property, free trade, and free markets (Mammadov & Hasanov, 2016, p. 293). This ideology and policy model emphasizes on the value of free market competition, and it is characterized by the belief that sustained economic growth represents the means to achieve human progress, a free market as a way to efficiently allocate resources, and a minimal state intervention in social and economic affairs (Smith, 2019, p. 1), considering that the roll of the state under the neoliberal model is aimed at using its power in order to guarantee an open economic exchange, generating a win-win situation for all the parties involved in the trading process, as it allows every country to specialize in the production of the goods that represent a comparative advantage (Steger & Roy, 2010, p. 22).

Considering the international sphere, Neo-liberalism has been characterized by free trade in goods and services, freedom of investment, and free movement of capital, which emphasizes the exchanges across nation-states. Also, the neoliberals used their power to convince most of the nations to adopt to this structure by agreeing to promote the liberalization of the trade market, to reduce administrative supervision, cut public cost, and to adhere to the principle of individuality (Saleh, Danwanzam, & Stephen, 2019, p. 115). On the other hand, migration has become an important component within the capitalist restructuring under the neo-liberal globalization. This liberalization represents a transformation that generates forced emigration caused by the lack of job opportunities in the sending areas, the uneven development context generated by this economical model, and the permanent social tensions that this type of globalization has brought (Grenville, 2016). Furthermore, the most important receiving countries have classified the different types of migrants, according to the situations that obliged them to migrate, under different categories such as: voluntary migrants, forced migrants, economic migrants, political migrants, low skilled migrants, highly skilled migrants, etc. and some states have adopted points-based systems as a way to assess the contribution that the migrant may potentially have to the national economy, which is considered to be designed in order to serve the state, rather than as a true commitment to the human rights (Pianezzi, Cinquini, Grossi, & Sargiacomo, 2021, pp. 4-5). Finally, it is important to mention that the forced migration created by the different unbalances generated by the neoliberalism, does not only affect the low strata producing asylum seekers, refugees, and displaced persons that decide to leave in order to search for better

livelihoods, in a less strict sense, it also affects the educated population that is overqualified and that due to the lack of opportunities, the limited institutional backing, and the structural imbalances of the different countries, is forced to emigrate since they are not able to find fitting occupational opportunities in their country (Grenville, 2016).

The next paragraphs elaborate on the Soft Power approach, which, as explained before, constitutes a theory that emerged as a subset of the Neoliberal logic, and that embraces in a more emphatical way the convergence of the interests among nations (Kearn, 2011, p. 71).

1.2.1. Soft power

The term “Soft power” was first used in 1990 by Joseph Nye in his book “Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power” (Ivanchenko V. & Margoev A., 2017, p. 2). In his book, soft power is described as the ability of an actor to get what he wants through attraction, rather than coercion or payments (Nye J. , 2004, p. 10). In this scenario, legitimacy is vital because it makes other actors to follow and to be attracted to your values and ideas without threats or bribes (Pallaver, 2011, p. 13). This attraction is founded by the use of the country’s political ideas, culture, and policies that enhance the soft power of the actor when these aspects are seemed as legitimate (Nye J. , 2004, p. 10), moreover, soft power has shown to be essential to gaining peace, since it is easier to attract other states to be democratic, rather than forcing and coercing them into becoming democratic (Pallaver, 2011, p. 13). It is important to mention that normally it takes years for a country to develop and strengthen its soft power, and then become a role model for other countries. This kind of power is easier to be employed among friendly states and enables the applying actor to use a target approach, which is implemented individually taking into consideration the cultural, societal, and historical context of the receiving state (Ivanchenko V. & Margoev A., 2017, pp. 3-4).

According to Nye (2004), soft power rests mainly on the state’s culture, political values, and foreign policies. In this sense, culture is viewed as the set of practices and values that provide meaning to a society, being this divided into highbrow culture, such as art, education, and literature; and popular culture, which includes mass entertainment (Pallaver, 2011, p. 94). On the other hand, an actor is

able to strengthen its soft power by living up to its political values at home and abroad, when his foreign policies are seen as legitimate and when he is perceived as having a moral authority (Nye J. , 2004, p. 11). Moreover, a state's domestic and foreign policies represent an important source of soft power, and may decrease or even reinforce it depending on how these policies are perceived, for example, policies that are seen as hypocritical and indifferent to the eyes of the other actors can negatively affect the state's soft power (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 6). Another important way of generating soft power is through commerce, visits, personal contacts, and exchanges, regarding the latter, it constitutes a source of exporting values and ideas that tends to reach the powerful elite of the home countries when the student returns to the homeland (Pallaver, 2011, p. 95). These international students return to their country with a higher appreciation of the values and institutions, which constitutes an important reservoir of goodwill, taking into consideration that these former students will eventually occupy positions where they will have the power to affect policies that may positively affect the soft power of the applying country (Nye J. , 2004, p. 45).

As seen before, soft power is more than just persuasion, or convincing the counterpart, it is related to attraction. If a country projects its values and policies in such a way that other actors find it attractive, they will automatically want to follow or even imitate these principles (Pallaver, 2011, pp. 89-93). On the other hand, a positive image is imperative for forging such attraction since it creates admiration and respect, which in return generates endearment that leads to imitation, creating a system of nations with similar values, goals, and policies which paves the path for the soft power nation to implement his will without the use of carrots or sticks (Gallarotti, 2015, pp. 5-7). This form of power is not simple multilateralism or power surrendering, but rather a powerful power strategy (Pallaver, 2011, p. 93). The principles that are necessary to generate the attraction of other nations derive from the cultural and political institutions. At a cultural level, soft power is generated for aspects such as high quality of life, social cohesion, abundant opportunities for the citizens, freedom, cultural prominence, and tolerance, while the political institutions must be founded under the principles of constitutionalism, liberalism, democracy, and pluralism, directed at reducing political gaps and empowering the social society (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 6).

In contrast to the hard power assets such as armed forces, and natural resources, not all the soft power attributes are generated or controlled by the state (Nye J. , 2004, p. 15). Non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as civil society groups, corporations, and even individuals have become important soft power generators with the help of the globalization and technology (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 10). Such entities could be seen also in the forms of foundations, churches, and universities, and their own generated soft power may reinforce or even be at odds with the official government policies, moreover, even popular culture and commercial purveyors may serve as a support or an obstacle to the completion of governmental goals (Nye J. , 2004, p. 32). These institutions are viewed as legitimate and powerful because of their priorities and foundation, and because their primary objective is to encourage common goals both domestically and internationally, furthermore, it is believed that they can provide the transparency and objectivity that at times the state and the market institutions cannot provide (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 10). Also, these institutions have the power to press the government and business leaders into changing policies, and even if they count on lower hard power resources, they may be able to attract the attention of people, and that is why the central governments have to take them into consideration (Nye J. , 2004, p. 90).

Soft power is a total different form of power that needs to be understood in order to effectively apply it, for this reason, countries that are smaller in size, and even smaller in terms of hard power tools, enjoy of a great soft power for including in their policies aspects such as intervention in peace making processes, and economic aids for other countries (Pallaver, 2011, p. 92). Other states that are also smaller in size have discovered that they may have soft power aspirations above their “weight”, considering that they are attractive because of their democratic, economic development, or even more common cultural aspects such as gastronomy (Nye J. , 2004, p. 89).

In order to create a differentiation between hard and soft power, we can argue that hard power shows to be effective even without legitimacy, while soft power strongly relies on it (Pallaver, 2011, p. 89), also hard power depends mainly on tangible power sources implemented through coercion and threats, that may be symbolic or actually implemented, while soft power is cultivated through the qualities, actions and policies employed by the country (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 7).

Furthermore, values and ideals such as democracy, individual opportunities, and human rights, create an attraction and seduction that turn out to be more beneficial than using carrots and sticks to get the other actors to do as you want (Nye J. , 2004, p. 10). Additionally, practitioners have a tendency to avoid using soft power because of their eagerness to obtain immediate results, and hard power provides them with effects that are indeed easier to see and measure, while soft power manifests itself often through intangible results and with benefits that are not visible until many years of the implementation of the policies, nonetheless, the results obtained from the utilization of soft power may be more efficient and satisfying than those of its counterpart (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 13). Also, it is important to mention that soft power does not depend on hard power (Nye J. , 2004, p. 9), since it is an independent attribute that even the smallest countries may enjoy, as it was previously seen.

As expressed before, the soft power was developed by Nye, but there were other authors that sought to complement it with their own appreciations. One of these authors is Jonathan McClory, who in 2011 expanded the pillars of soft power, and expressed that the soft power of a country may be found considering the following 5 attributes: Government and political values of the country; Culture, or values that create meaning to the society; diplomacy, or foreign policy; and education and business innovation, moreover, the author extracted education from the cultural aspects of the soft power because he considered that the impact created by the education warranted it an individual sub-index, and finally, McClory included business and innovation as an attribute of soft power (Raimzhanova, 2015, pp. 6-7).

Finally, it is important to mention that the practitioners and scholars have started to realize that it is necessary to shift from the classic application of hard and soft theories, since the world has evolved in a way that the political and economic challenges cannot be resolved anymore by using military power or just policy innovation (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 1). It is also very important to understand the context and to be able to choose the correct instruments for every situation, may they be hard or soft (Pallaver, 2011, p. 88). This is called “smart power” and it is our next concept to discuss.

1.3. Smart Power

The concept of smart power was introduced by Joseph Nye in 2003 as a way to describe the behavior of the United States of America in foreign policy (Pallaver, 2011, p. 22). It was originated as a way to clear the misconception that soft power by itself was enough to produce an effective foreign policy, considering that such a policy requires the implementation of both hard and soft tools (Joseph S. Nye, 2009, p. 1). This concept was first clearly defined by Nye as neither hard, nor soft, but both (Pallaver, 2011, p. 102), and it is often associated to the Obama administration, which differs from the previous presidencies, considering the application of soft power principles, shifting from the policies of Bush that were mainly focused in hard power application (Brito, 2010, p. 114).

Smart power is defined by Nye as an approach, considering the way that the power is exercised, since it provides the decision-makers with the opportunity to choose the pertinent way to deal with a different issue, furthermore, smart power is mainly about institutions, taking into consideration that the institutional framework through which this power works is essential, besides, this kind of approach cannot be applied alone, as it needs allies and partners in order to reach the objectives of global public good, as expanding legitimacy and influence (Pallaver, 2011, p. 105). Also, it is important to mention that this approach goes beyond hard and soft power, fitting well in the modern international relations' arena, considering that this kind of power is a mix of diplomatic, military, economic, legal, political, and cultural tools (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 14).

The appearance of this approach goes in line with a "progressive realist" foreign policy, which was introduced in 2006 by Robert Wright, and it consists of a term that could attract both liberals and conservatives, furthermore, Joseph Nye highlighted the importance of developing a "progressive realist" strategy that combines military hard power, and the attraction of soft power (Pallaver, 2011, p. 102). Such a strategy is necessary considering that a country may influence others into following his preferences, saving a lot on carrots and sticks, but rarely hard and soft power can replace each other, which implies the need of creating smart strategies that combine the tools of both power sources (Joseph S. Nye, 2009, p. 1).

As said before, smart power is the ability to combine both soft and hard power into an effective strategy (Ivachenko V.& Margoev A., 2017; Nye, 2004; Nye J. S., 2008; Pallaver, 2011). The need of implementing such approach becomes evident as the line between realpolitik and liberalism becomes that blurry that hard and soft power often interact and even reinforce each other (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 13). On the other hand, in the current world arena elements of hard power like threats and force have become of less use, especially during modern times, considering that a war between potencies is costly and unthinkable, and due to the increase of democracy around the world. It is also complemented by the fact that people enjoy a high degree of political power over the decision-makers, impeding the latter to implement such policies against the former's will (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 8). On the other hand, globalization has enhanced the democratic culture, the modernization, and the socio-economic and political interdependence, leading leaders into a liberal culture that prevents them from using hard power tools (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 9). Furthermore, the creation of international organizations and regimes in the post-war period has established a framework of civil behavior in international politics by creating an environment regulated with laws and norms, where unilateral actions against these institutions are seen as illegitimate and could end in costly repercussions for the failing state (Gallarotti, 2015, pp. 10-11). On the other hand soft power alone is not enough as an effective foreign policy, and if its tools are not carefully aligned with the core values and policies of the state, it may be perceived as hypocritical or arrogant, and it would result in a negative impact on the nation's soft power (Nye J. , 2004, p. 14). For this reason, policy makers need to combine both power sources into a smart strategy that may result, if properly applied, in the increase of the national influence (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 8).

American policymakers, such as Hilary Clinton, are well aware of the importance of implementing a smart foreign strategy that includes diplomatic, economic, military, legal and cultural tools, and a deep analysis of the context of every individual situation (Pallaver, 2011, p. 103). Regarding context, Nye explains that the pattern of distribution of power among nations seems like a complex three-dimensional chess game, where on top of the board there is the military power that is largely unipolar, but in the middle, the economic power distributed among the strongest actors is already multipolar (Pallaver, 2011, p. 104), and in this game, it is

important for the policy-makers to understand how to mix the leadership style and available power resources in different contexts (Nye J. S., 2008, p. 84).

This power approach, even more than any other model, is focused on the use of strategies that takes into consideration acting smart and determining the action to take by evaluating the specific needs presented in the national and international contexts, the current political system, the cultural and economic characteristics, etc. (Brito, 2010, p. 114). This winning strategy will include aspects such as capacity building, diplomacy persuasion, projection of influence and power, in ways that will have social and political legitimacy and will prove to be cost-effective, furthermore, it is significant to invest in partnerships and alliances, and it is important to enhance the institutions at all levels so that the country can spread its influence and gain legitimacy (Pallaver, 2011, p. 13). Regarding strategies on smart power, Gallarotti (2015), expressed that by using one of the following 4 strategies, a country will be able to enhance its smart power:

According to Strategy 1 (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 23), one should constantly question the theories of power and carry out power audits considering the changing nature of power in world politics, in order to constantly assess the effectivity of its sources of influence in world affairs. This way, the state can reconfigure or eliminate power sources that have a poor performance with the aim of finding the optimal mix of resources. With this strategy the policymakers will avoid the over-reliance on hard power resources and the sense of limit vulnerability that comes with the big inventory of armory.

In the second strategy (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 24), leaders must consider the consequences that may result out of the power enhancing strategies since a decision that is taken without considering the complexity of the international politics may generate non-desired self-defeating effects that may have a negative impact on the actions and policies of the state. A clear example of this is the counterproductive effect that emanates from the over-reliance on the hard power tools, forgetting the benefits of soft power policies because they are usually seen indirectly and in a long term. This strategy obliges the decisionmakers to engage in a serious evaluation of the effectiveness of the soft power strategies, which will result in the recognition of the complete inventory of national power that will allow the state to find the optimal combination of both soft and hard power, in order to optimize influence.

For Strategy 3 (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 25), it is important to think of net power, instead of nominal power, which is a continuation of strategy 2. These net effects are the outcomes obtained after the reactions to the implementation of the initial power mix. Again, this is important for avoiding the self-victimization tendency for over-relying on hard power resources when the states assess their power in nominal terms. This will allow the decisionmakers to evaluate the costs and consequences of accumulating, acquiring, and using such resources, and contrast them with the impact on the nation's influence in the international arena.

According to the strategy 4 (Gallarotti, 2015, p. 4), power must be judged based on the outcomes and not on the resources. This is important because of the tendency of being tolerant to failures when attending important foreign policy objectives considering that the excess of resources does not generate a sense of panic and urgency that may appear in the case of scarcity. This may lead to a self-victimization from over-relying on hard power tools, considering that they are easily quantified and evaluated, in comparison to the soft power resources.

Turkey has developed a smart strategy by using migration as leverage in the foreign policymaking. One of the most important occasions took place in 2020 when the Minister of Interior announced a boarder-opening, in response to the air strike by the Syrian government forces in February 2020, leading to the rise of a refugee crisis in the European Union, which was solved by the announce of support to Turkey with 500 million euro, and the reconsideration of restarting the visa-liberation talks (Kaya, 2020, p. 34). Also, the strategic use of migration diplomacy has provided the Turkish government with the possibility of leveraging the European Union into obtaining more financial support, and better access to the European market (Goeldner, 2020). On the other hand, this kind of diplomacy has proven to be effective in making agreements, like the mutual understanding of refugee burden-sharing, and financial support obtained out of the meeting between Turkish President Erdoğan and German Prime Minister Merkel in Istanbul, prior to the general elections of November 2015, which led to the formulation of the EU-Turkey Statement on the Protection of Refugees, implemented as 18th of March 2016 (Kaya, 2020, p. 38).

The smart power was included into this thesis as a way to understand though the theory the effective implementation of a smart strategy by Turkey. Such a strategy was obtained by using the available resources and understanding the context

in order to attain the outcomes desired from the international arena. It is important for other countries like Colombia to learn how to read the context and have the possibility to plan and execute smart strategies that in return may benefit the country and enhance the national influence. On the other hand, this thesis is relevant because it presents a parallel of the refugee policies applied both in Colombia and in Turkey. This will result in the detection of the good practices of both sides, which could lead to improvements in the refugee experience for Turkey and Colombia.

CHAPTER 2: THE REFUGEES IN THE WORLD

Before starting with the cases regarding the refugees in the world, it is important to first define the different concepts to be applied in the migration process. This includes going through the reasons that make a person, or a group of people take the decision to leave their home country, and the names that these individuals get according to their motivation for migrating.

The term migration is defined by the dictionary of Cambridge as the process of traveling to a new place in order to live there. Such a process is normally done in large numbers. In an economic way, it implies the temporal or permanent migration of a person in order to have better job opportunities (Cambridge Dictionary). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2019), the term migration is defined as the movement of people from their usual place of residence, across the border or domestically (International Organization for Migration, 2019).

The IOM defines the term Migrant as an umbrella term that is not defined under the international law. This term reflects, as a common understanding, a person that moves away from his usual place of residence, domestically or crossing an international border. This action may be temporary or permanent and may include a variety of reasons. Under this definition falls a wide spectrum of well-defined legal categories of people such as those whose migration is due to working purposes, persons whose movement is classified as legally defined, and those whose movements and status are not defined in a specific way under the international law, like the example of the international students (International Organization for Migration, 2019).

Asylum is defined by Cambridge as the protection granted by a State to people that has been forced to leave their home country because of the war, fearing for their safety (Cambridge Dictionary). The IOM, in its glossary, defines Asylum as the process by which a state grants protection on its territory to a person that is outside of his country of nationality or residence, fleeing persecution, serious harm, among other reasons, and Asylum seeker is the person that is looking for international protection. This person is characterized by a waiting decision on a claim in order to become a refugee (International Organization for Migration, 2019, pp. 13-14). An asylum-seeker is a person who seeks safety from persecution or

serious harm in a country other than his or her own, and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments (Metcalf-Hough, 2015, p. 3).

As for refugee, the 1951 Convention defines refugee as a person that falls under certain conditions such as being outside of his country of origin due to fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, nationality, religion, political opinion, membership of a particular social group, etc. This person is not willing to claim the protection of his country of origin, or once outside, is unwilling to return, or does not have a nationality. As for the case of those who have more than one nationality, the term applies for every country of which this person is national, and he or she shall not be considered as lacking protection if he or she has not availed himself or herself of the protection of one of these countries (United Nations General Assembly, 1950). In addition, the Declaration of Cartagena adds upon the definition of refugee, in its third article, that the recommended definition or concept of refugee in the region is the one adapted by the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, which considers also as a refugee the people that run away from their countries due to menaces to their life, security, liberty, or that have been threatened by the generalized violence, the foreign aggression, the domestic conflicts, the massive violation of the human rights, or any other circumstance that has deeply perturbed the public order (Coloquio Sobre la Protección Internacional de los Refugiados, 1984, p. 3).

Another important aspect to understand is the push and pull factor of the migrations. People's reason for migrating are a mix of political, economic, and environmental factors (Boswell, 2002, p. 3). The push factor is the reason why the migrant is leaving the home country, while the pull represents the reasons that attract the migration into another State. According to Boswell (2002), the push and pull factor can be analyzed in the macro, meso, and micro spheres. The macro level involves the structural part of the push and pulls conditions such as unemployment, low salaries, or low per capita income, while the pulling factors are configured by the legislation on migration and the labor market situation. The meso theory rejects the macro focus on the push and pulls effect, as it tends to explain the process through a system of linkages between the countries. For the meso theory the systems and networks are important. In the case of two countries that share economic, political, and cultural aspects, migration is more likely to happen specially if there is a

dynamic relation between them. The network is related to the links that can influence the direction and volume of the migration. This can be explained by the access to resources that help people to move, which includes contacts, information, and social support. The effective use of the network can make it more attractive or feasible for an individual to migrate, and in some cases, it can generate a “chain migration”, which means that there is a large-scale migration from a country to another. The micro theory focuses on the individual decision to migrate. It analyses the process by which a person weights the costs and benefits of the migration, may them be economical or psychological, while contrasting them with the possible benefits to be received. Aspects like physical safety or a better salary are relevant for the micro theory analysis (Boswell, 2002, p. 5).

The pull and push theory of migration started with Ravenstein¹ in the 19th century in England, and establishes that people migrate because of factors that are pushing them out of their place of residence, while another nation is pulling them in, and this process happens because of the desire of the human beings to be in a better situation than the current one (Velázquez, 2000, p. 138). The push factor is the result of the transformation of the country of origin in a social, cultural, or political way (Stanojoska & Petrevski, 2012, p. 5). Among the pushing factors of a State there can be found political instability, economic crisis, conflicts and civil wars, ethnic cleansings, the development of market economy, social inequality, gender discrimination (Stanojoska & Petrevski, 2012, p. 3), economic underdevelopment, severe social fragmentation, a weak state (Boswell, 2002, p. 4). On the other hand, the pull factors are the features that attract migrants to a country. These are the promise of a better employment, higher wages and better working conditions, attractive amenities, and facilities (Thet, 2014). A country with a pull factor is one that has a demand for migrant workers willing to perform low-wage jobs that are normally undesirable (Stanojoska & Petrevski, 2012, p. 4).

¹ Ernst Georg Ravenstein (1834-1913) was a German-English cartographer and geographer born in Germany, who migrated to England and became a naturalized British subject. Upon his arrival to Great Britain Ravenstein became a pupil of Dr. August Heinrich Petermann, who is another German exile in England. Ravenstein worked in the topographical-statistical office of the British War Office from 1855 to 1875 and held the position of Professor of Geography at Bedford College from 1882-1883. Ravenstein is considered to be the earliest migration theorist, and he is best known for his *Rules on Migration*, which is a detailed study of human movement (Geographicus.com, s.f.).

2.1. The International Conventions Protecting the Refugees in the World:

International Asylum Regime under the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol, International Humanitarian Law etc.

The Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of the Refugees signed in 1951 (UN General Assembly, 1951) is important in order to understand the refugee policies applied in the countries that constitute the focus of this dissertation. In the document it is clearly stated the granted rights to the refugees and the obligations acquired by the signing states, and the most important points are:

In order to improve the traveling conditions of the refugees, it was agreed that the issuance and recognition of travel documents were necessary in order to facilitate the movement of the refugees, especially for their resettlement. Also, in the subsection B, a principle of familiar unit was established, by means of which, the rights granted to a refugee are also extended to the members of his family. With this regard, the familiar unit is important to be kept, as well as it is important the protection of minors.

In the first chapter, General Provisions, in the Article 1, *Definition of the term Refugee*, the condition by means of which a person can be defined as a refugee are established. Among these descriptions are: a person that is outside of his country of origin due to fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group. This person is not willing to claim the protection of his country or origin, or once outside, is unwilling to return, or does not have a nationality. As for the case of those who have more than one nationality, the term applies for every country of which this person is national, and this person shall not be considered as lack of protection if he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries where he is a national.

As for a cease of appliance of the convention, in the subsection C of the first article, the convention explains that the refugee condition is annulled when the person has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality, or in case the person voluntarily re-acquired his nationality, after having lost it. Also, the status is lost once the person re-settles in the country that he had initially left for the fear of persecution, or if the original circumstances by means of which he was granted the refugee recognition cease.

The subsection D clarifies that the convention does not apply to persons receiving protection or assistance from the UN, or the UNHCR. Although, if such assistance ceases for any reason, *ipso facto* the person will be entitled to the benefits of the convention.

As for the prohibitions in the application of the convention, the provisions shall not be applied to any person who has committed a crime against peace, a crime against humanity, or a war crime. Also, it does not apply to a person who has committed serious non-political crimes outside of the country of refuge prior to be admitted to the country, or in case he has been guilty of any act that goes against the principles or purposes of the United Nations.

In the article 2 of the 1951 Convention, General Obligations, it is explained that every refugee has to act according to the laws, regulations, and measures for maintenance of public order of the country where he has been received. In the article 3, the signees accept to concede the refugee status without discrimination of race, religion, or country of origin, and then, in the article 4, the contracting States agreed to treat the refugees as favorably as they treat their own nationals regarding the freedom of religion, and the freedom of religious education of their children.

Another aspect that is important to mention is reflected in the Article 7. In this subsection the signee countries agree to concede the same treatment as it is generally extended to any alien. On the other hand, in the Article 9, Provisional Measures, it is established that nothing in the convention shall prevent any signing state from taking provisional measures that are considered essential for keeping the national security at times of war or any other circumstances considered to be grave, against a person that is in fact, a refugee.

In the Chapter II; Juridical Status, in the subsection Article 12; Personal Status, it is established that the personal status of a refugee shall be governed by the law of the country of his residence. Also, in the Article 13, Movable and immovable property, the signing States have agreed to concede equal or not less favorable treatment than those conceded to aliens in regard to the acquisition of movable and immovable property, rights like leasing and engaging into other contracts concerning movable and immovable property. As for the access to courts, in the Article 16, the

signees have agreed to grant free access to the courts of law securing the refugee the same treatment as a national.

The chapter III contains all the regulation regarding employment. In this particular case, in the Article 17: Wage-earning employment, the convention mentions that the signee countries will grant the most favorable treatment, as it is conceded to any foreigner, in regard to the right to be a part of a wage-earning employment. In any case, any restrictive measure that is imposed towards protecting the national labor market shall not apply to the refugee, due to the fact that his status exempts him from these measures, it may also apply when the refugee has completed 3 years of residency in the country, has a spouse that is national of the country where he is granted the status (in case of abandoning the spouse, the benefits of this provision do not apply), or if the refugee has one or more children that possess the residence of the country where he is residing.

As for self-employment, the convention grants the same treatment to a refugee in regard to any alien for engaging on his own account in industry, agriculture, handicraft and commerce, and in the establishment of any commercial and industrial company. The same applies under Article 19, Liberal professions, for the recognition of the diplomas for the refugees desiring to practice a liberal profession.

In the chapter IV; Welfare, the convention mentions in its Article 20 that in a country where a rationing in the system of distribution of products in short supply for the population exists, the same treatment will be extended to the refugees, as it is applied to the nationals. As for housing, in the Article 21, the convention grants rights to the refugees in the same extent as to the foreigners.

The Article 22 of the Chapter IV, Public education, establishes the same right for the refugees as the nationals in regard to the elementary education. As for education that goes beyond the before explained, the signee countries agree to provide the same rights that would be granted to a foreigner in regard to access to studies, recognition of foreign diplomas, degrees and certificates, remission of fees and charges, and award of scholarships.

The Article 24 of the Chapter IV; Labor, legislation and social security grants the refugees the same treatment as accorded to nationals regarding remuneration,

family allowances, hours of work, overtime, paid holidays, restrictions regarding homework, minimum age of employment, apprenticeship, the enjoy of benefits, among others that are governed by the laws or regulations of the country where the refugee resides.

The chapter V; Administrative Measures, in its Article 25; Administrative Assistance, explains that, when the refugee does not count on the financial resources to exercise a right that would normally need the support of the authorities, the signees of the convention shall arrange such assistance by its own establishments, or by the international authorities, and they shall deliver the documents or certifications as it would normally be sent to any foreigner. In case any fee arises from the services mentioned before, they shall be moderate and commensurate, in regard to those applied to nationals for such services.

Regarding the freedom of movement, the Article 26 establishes that the signee countries shall provide the same rights, as it would be conceded to any alien, regarding the right to choose his place of residence, and the person shall be allowed to move freely within the territory of the country of residence. Also, according to the Article 27 and 28, the country shall issue identity papers to the refugee that does not possess a travel document, with the purpose of traveling outside of the country, unless measures of national security or public order are required to be taken. In this sense, documents issued to refugees under previous international agreements shall be recognized.

In regard with the fiscal charges, the Article 29 of the convention establishes that any duty, charge, or tax should not be imposed on the refugee higher than those imposed on the nationals. As for the transfer of assets, the Article 30 explains that the signing countries shall permit refugees to transfer assets that were brought into the territory to another country where they were admitted for re-settlement, in accordance with the domestic laws and regulations.

Two very important parts of the convention are the Article 31: Refugees unlawfully in the country of refugee, and Article 32: Expulsion. Under the former article the signing countries agree not to impose penalties because of the illegal entrance or presence in the territory to a person who is coming directly from a place where his life or freedom is in danger, while under the latter, the contracting

countries accept not to expel a refugee, unless there is a threat to the national security or public order. In this case, the expulsion shall be completed after reaching a decision in accordance with the due process of law. During this process, and unless there are reasons threatening the national security, the refugee shall be allowed to present evidence that may clear his name and shall appeal for representation before the competent authority. On the other hand, regarding the prohibition of expulsion or return, the Article 33 states that no signing State shall expel or return a refugee to the place where he originally escaped from, because of the threat to his life or freedom, nonetheless, this benefit shall not apply to a refugee who is regarded as a threat for the security of the country of residence, or that after a court decision, represents a danger for the community.

The Article 34: Naturalization, explains that the signing parts shall facilitate, as far as possible, the naturalization and assimilation of the refugees, and the signees shall reduce as much as possible the costs of these proceedings.

The chapter VI of the convention touches upon the Executory and Transitory Provisions. Regarding this, the Article 35 establishes that the signing countries agree to cooperate with the delegation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any office that is in charge of those functions. Also, for the purpose of the elaboration of the reports of the United Nations, the country shall facilitate the supervision of the application of the different points of the convention. Furthermore, the signees shall provide the information and statistical data regarding the conditions of the refugees, the implementation of the convention, and any law, regulation or decree that are in force related to the refugees.

Finally, the chapter VII: Final clauses, in its Article 38: Settlement of Disputes, mentions that any dispute between parties of the convention, related to the interpretation or application, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, at the request of any of the signee parties, and in case it cannot be solved by any other means. As for the signature, ratification, and accession, the convention was opened for signature at Geneva on 28 July 1951 and reopened for signature until the 31 of December of 1952.

Years after the entrance in force of the convention of 1951, the signatory states saw it convenient to extend its appliance. This was made through the Protocol

Related to the Status of the Refugees. In its considerations, the protocol establishes that the convention only protected the persons that became refugees because of the events that took place before the 1st of January 1951, but after that date, and up to 1966 (date of entry into force of the protocol), new situations that displaced people as refugees had appeared. Regarding this, the protocol considered that it was desirable to provide an equal status to all the refugees. For this purpose, the appliance of the date of the term “refugee” was modified, giving non-time definition. And once again, the parties agree to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency that is in charge for supervising the application of the provisions of the protocol. Also, the signee countries agree to provide any information required for the formulation of the reports.

2.2. Cases of Mass Migration Around the World

Mass migration has been one important aspect of humanity for a very long time, and it has been happening due to different reasons. The Venezuelan mass migration initiated for economic reasons, while the Syrian counterpart represents a forced migration where the people are running away fearing for their lives. In this chapter there will be a presentation of relevant cases in order contrast them with the Colombian and Turkish reality.

2.2.1. The Colombian migration in the second half of the 20th century

At some point in the history, Colombia had its shares of emigrants looking for better opportunities because of the situations that will be explained in this chapter, and it is important knowing and studying this reality in order to contrast it with the current refugee cases around the world.

The two main reasons that created the migratory flux of the Colombian population were the economic crisis and the violence (Cárdenas & Mejía, 2006, p. 44) that was exemplified by brutal acts that affected the population in general. Such actions were committed by the anti-governmental groups that had the control over the drugs trafficking (Montes, 2008, p. 79), and they were characterized by kidnapping and extorting as a way of financing themselves (Cárdenas & Mejía, 2006, p. 44). Also, with the boom in the drug trafficking the illicit crops increased, which derived into violent activity coming from the guerillas and the paramilitaries (Montes, 2008, p. 80), especially in those zones where the drugs were being

produced, which created a violent environment for the population of these areas (Cárdenas & Mejía, 2006, p. 44). In the Colombian case, there was also an increment in the common delinquency because of the clear congestion in the judicial system, and the reduction in the possibility of getting justice (Britto, 2009, pág. 27). Without any doubt the insecurity and the other conflict manifestations forced many Colombians to take the decision to leave the country (Cárdenas & Mejía, 2006, p. 44).

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), by the end of 2011, the total number of Colombian displaced migrants due to reasons of violence would be over 438.518, representing around the 10% of the Colombian diaspora. Among these people, 113.606 are recognized as refugees, 282.344 are demanding international protection, but they have not still been recognized, and 32.569 more are requesting asylum around the world. From these numbers 53% are men and 47% are women, normally oscillating between 20 and 34 years old (Ochoa, 2012, pp. 199-200).

The Colombian migration has had important peaks after the second half of the last century. In order to have a better clarity about the reason why the Colombian migration has acquired a more important social and economic character, it is important to understand the evolution of these different migratory waves. According to Castillo (2010), and Cardenas & Mejia (2006), the first wave started in 1965 and went until 1975. In this occasion Venezuela, United States, Panama, and Ecuador were the main destinies to travel. Then, in the decade of 1985 to 1995, there was a reduction in the percentages of the Colombian emigration, specially to Venezuela, due to the fall of the petrol prices (Ochoa, 2012, p. 189).

The second wave came between 1996 and 2005 when a total of 1.9 million of Colombians left the country (Castillo, 2010, pp. 6-7). The main reasons for emigrating were the economic crisis of the end of the century, and the intensification of the armed conflict. At the beginning of this period the yearly average of emigrants was 174 thousand, but during 1999, when the economic crisis really hit the people's acquisition power, the number went up to 224 thousand people per year (Castillo, 2010, pp. 10-12). During this wave, the reasons for migrating changed, as well as the traveling destinations. This time around the main destinations were England, France, Germany, and the main Latin-American countries to migrate to were Mexico,

Ecuador, and Costa Rica (Castillo, 2010, pp. 13-14). At the end of this second wave the number of emigrants reduced drastically starting from 2002, as the security and economic conditions started to improve in the country. Nonetheless, the net population output continued to be over 100 thousand persons per year (Cárdenas & Mejía, 2006, pp. 6-7). Finally, the National Department of Statistics said that, up to 2005, the total stock of Colombian citizens that had emigrated was 3.331.107, and it was estimated that by 2012, the number could be rounded up to 4 million. On the other hand, if there must be a consideration regarding the generations born abroad that are entitled to the Colombian nationality, the number may rise up to 4.1 million (Ochoa, 2012, p. 203).

It is important to mention that the Colombian migration has not created a refugee crisis, and they were traveling to places where the pull effect offered them the ideal conditions for escaping from the reality that the country was passing through. In this sense, it can be said that there were not big handicaps for those who wished to migrate to these places since the conditions were allowing it. The main countries that received the migration of Colombians were Costa Rica, the United States, Spain, and Venezuela.

Costa Rica, as a destiny for immigration, has been very attractive during the nineties for people coming from the South American region and the Caribbean (Gamboa, 2008, p. 10). According to the Directorate General for Migration of Costa Rica, the main countries immigrating are Nicaragua, Mexico, Panama, Ecuador, and Colombia (Gamboa, 2008, p. 26). The migratory Costa Rican policy has been considered to be successful because they saw in the migrants an input with important characteristics that could help in the development of the country (Castillo, 2010, p. 24). Their policy has been of accepting migrants with the purpose of supporting the economic, social and cultural development. According to the census of 2000, the foreign population in Costa Rica reached up to 296.461 persons, almost an 8 % of the whole population. From the migrant number, 76.4% were from Nicaragua, 3.2% from Panama, 3.2% from the United States, 2.9% from El Salvador, and 2% from Colombia, with 5.898 migrants (Castillo, 2010, p. 24). In a posterior date, in the census of 2011, the foreign population increased to 385.899 persons, and this time the numbers changed placing Colombia as the second country with 16.514 migrants (Alvis, López, & Vela, 2018, p. 201).

In the decade of 1995 to 2005, Costa Rica represented an interesting place for the Colombian population that was in the search of a higher economic stability due to the critical situation of Colombia, result of the armed conflict and the problematic of the drug trafficking (Castillo, 2010, p. 20). During the decade of the nineties, as the Colombian migration was in its highest peak, Costa Rica represented a good option for those Colombians who did not want to engage in much paperwork. As for the education, the pull effect of Costa Rica derived from fact that staying in the country for studying was easy, considering that the immigrants get the same rights as the nationals in every aspect related to education. This shows that the government was making an effort for providing a good education to everybody (Castillo, 2010, pp. 26-27).

It is important to mention that there were two kinds of Colombian immigrants that traveled to Costa Rica, the first kind arrived to the country before 2006 and counted on a low scholar degree. For them, the Costa Rican government, along with UNHCR provided capacitation, legal protection, and benefits regarding health, employment, and education, in order to help them with their social insertion and economic condition. The overall experience was satisfactory, and the refugees were content (Alvis, López, & Vela, 2018). Such success is represented by the pull effect that Costa Rica has due to the excessive demand of working force that helped, not only the migrants, but the foreigners in general to find a source of income. The second kind of Colombian immigrants differed from the others because they possessed a good education level, important university degrees, and many counted on a capital to invest in housing (Castillo, 2010; Cárdenas & Mejía 2006). Their education level gave them the opportunity of getting enrolled in technical, administrative, and professional positions (Castillo, 2010, p. 35). It is also relevant to mention that during the last wave of migrations, Costa Rica did not become just the favorite destination for those Colombians looking for stability, but it was also seen as a trampoline to arrive to the United States.

The United States, contrary to the migrations towards Venezuela and Ecuador that had a frontier determination, appeared as “natural” considering the metropolis character that the country has, and the dependency relations that have been a part of the reality through the major part of the history of Colombia (Ochoa, 2012, p. 192). The migration flux to the United States started because of the important reforms in

the migratory legislation that were aiming at satisfying certain needs that the country had. Such reforms were launched because of the decrease of the European migration that was historically pleasing the work force needs of the country. For this reason the government introduced the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, also known as the Hart-Celler Act (History.com Editors, 2019), which eliminated the existing contingencies that impeded the arrival of immigrants coming from different countries. Such law entered in vigor during the time when the legislation applied an exclusion in the discrimination regarding criteria of race or nationality at the time of granting a visa. At this time, a mechanism of preferences was implemented based on familiar unification and professional qualities. On the other hand, it was also included a system of transitory visa for agricultural workers (Ochoa, 2012; Cardenas & Mejía, 2006).

According to the census of 1970, the first group of Colombians that arrived to the United States was about 63.538 persons. This group was the foundation for the social network that would later contribute to the emergence of the future episodes of Colombian migration (Castillo, 2010, p. 10). According to Cardenas & Mejia (2006), the first wave of Colombian immigrants was characterized for being university professionals, particularly doctors and engineers. This population settled down around New York, and in the south of Florida (Mejía-Ochoa, 2018). On one side New York offered wide job opportunities, while the south of Florida offered a Spanish speaking population, and diverse opportunities to start a business (Cárdenas & Mejía, 2006, pp. 5-6). Afterwards, towards the half of the seventies, the migration started to diversify. This time, not only university professionals arrived, but also people without professions looking for any kind of job, and also arrived a lot of merchants and middle-classed businessmen (Castillo, 2010, p. 11). Unfortunately, after the events of the 11th September, 2001, the United States reinforced its migratory restrictions, forcing the Colombian migrants to take a look at other destinies for traveling, preferring Spain, a country that until 2003 did not demand visa from the Colombian nationals (Ochoa, 2012, p. 196).

At the end of the 20th century, and beginning of the 21st century, Spain became an important destination for the Colombian citizens when the economic and social situation of Colombia worsen, due to the economic opening that weakened the protection to the national production, which caused the bankruptcy of many

companies and increased the level of unemployment, and with the fall of the international price of the coffee that negatively affected many people in the area known as the Coffee Axis of Colombia, which includes the cities and towns found in the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, Quindío, and Valle del Cauca (Ríos, 2020). This situation worsened by an earthquake that took place in 1999, and the exacerbation and generalization of the violence linked, not only to the domestic conflict, but also to the common crime (Ochoa, 2012, p. 195).

According to the census of 1990, Spain counted just on 9.343 Colombian nationals, but between 1998 and 1999 arrived more than 11.000 more, as a preamble to a great wave that continued during the first decade of the century, reaching its peak in 2001, with 71.575 entries (Ochoa, 2012, p. 196). Furthermore, Brand (2020) explains for RCN radio that in 2019, the asylum seekers coming from Colombian reached a number of 20.363. These citizens are requesting to be recognized under the same considerations as the Venezuelans. This shows that the peace treaty between the Guerilla and the Government is failing in its implementation, considering the constant menace, killing of social leaders, and the internal forced displacement that is still happening in Colombia, which stimulates its population to migrate.

As for Venezuela, the nationalization of the oil and steel, along with the increase of their production starting from 1973, provided the country with an important quantity of resources, that along with the democratic stability that took place from 1958, and a sustained economic growth that contrasted with the crisis that the industrialized countries posed over the non-oil-exporter Latin-American countries, constituted a special conjuncture that attracted migrants, particularly, Colombians (Cárdenas & Mejía, 2006, p. 5). The pull effect of the oil boom attracted people from the eastern part of Colombia, especially workers and people with a low degree of education that saw in Venezuela a land of opportunities. This situation lasted until 1983, when the fall in the price of the oil, and the decrease in the exports aggravated the situation that started from 1979, generating a crisis that reduced drastically the flux of Colombians to Venezuela, and accelerating their return (Ochoa, 2012, p. 189).

In the following section there will be a presentation of the most relevant cases that generated a flux of asylum seekers in Africa, and the responses of the receiving countries to such an emergency. This part is written as a way to create a contrast

between the cases in Africa and the main two cases of this study, considering that it is important not to be just limited to the Colombian and Turkish reality, taking into consideration that there are currently more cases around the world that need to be addressed.

2.2.2. Africa, and the conduct of the cases

The next subheading contains the main cases of refugees in the African continent and how the affected actors are responding to the emergency. They are relevant to the hypothesis of this thesis because they provide a current view of the refugee situation in other parts of the world, offer a better understanding of the way that they are being handled, and provide information for making a contrast with the Colombian and Turkish reality.

2.2.2.1. The cases of Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia

In 2019, the world counted on 272 million international migrants, which is equal to 3.5 % of the global population. The big majority of people migrated due to reasons of work, family, and study, while others leave their country for reasons linked to conflicts, disasters, and persecution (International Organization for Migration, 2020). During the last years there has been a great amount of domestic and international conflicts that have caused mass forced migration in Asia and Africa, a fact that was thought to be reduced with the end of the cold war, but instead, it increased in some concrete regions, augmenting the risks that come along with the migratory experience (Blanco, 2011, p. 521). For María Elena Álvarez Acosta (2005), Africa is an example of the famine in a continent, where lots of people migrate towards the cities, cross the frontiers or simply walk in circles looking for something to eat. This reality has been aggravated by the drought and the desertification, the economic deterioration, the lack of hydric resources, and the loss of forests (Blanco, 2011, p. 527).

In history, slavery is the first thing to come to mind when referring to a massive displacement of people. During the 15th century, the Europeans, taking advantage of ethnic rivalries, and the interests of the tribal aristocracies, among other factors, began a human exploitation that motivated the involuntary displacement in mass, creating the slave hunt (Blanco, 2011, p. 521). As for the contemporary Africa, the flux of people that has been forced to move from their place of origin has

occasioned an increase in the international assistance. Nowadays, the number of refugees in the continent represent the 40% of the total of the world, and the number has been increasing since the 1980s (Blanco, 2011, p. 525).

Another important reason that explains the great domestic conflict in several of the African states is the decolonization, which is a missed chance that could have provided an opportunity to construct, or re-construct new post-colonial communities, increasing the national identity and establishing a new sense of political accountability, along with legitimacy in the political sphere, and political representation. This opportunity was missed because of the fear of the post-colonial new leaders to experiment with new types of administration, since it would not guarantee their continuance in power. This could be the case taking into consideration that the decolonization happened so fast in some cases, and the new leaders did not have the time or the motivation to develop a new political organization. In the African case, the intervention of the superpowers brought a globalization that ended up with a marginalization of the African continent (Degu, 2002, pp. 190 - 191). It is for that reason that during the postcolonial period the conflicts increased, along with the massacres and the forced displacements of people in the continent (Blanco, 2011, p. 256). The desire to keep the power led the leaders of some of these African countries towards the installation of political institutions that caused more instability and internal wars. This kept on increasing the number of people leaving their country in order to find better opportunities.

Even if Somalia and Sudan inherited a western-styled political system, in both cases such a structure was interrupted by dictatorial regimes in the name of socialism, and in the case of Sudan in the name of religion (Islam). On the other side, Ethiopia was under an absolute monarchical scheme until the arrival of a military dictatorship that took the power in 1974 in the name of socialism. As it can be seen, the three countries found in the Horn of Africa adopted socialism at one time or another. Such systems created more problems than solutions and led to the destruction of the government and the countries (Degu, 2002, p. 191). It is important to mention that the nationalism played a key role when reaching the independence, but unfortunately it failed at creating the system that the society needed at that moment since it did not solve the problems of ethnicity, tribalism and religion. Also, the countries tried to adapt liberalism to their policies, which allowed a mixed

economy with public and private enterprises to play a role within the domestic economy, but unfortunately such adaptation led to serious problems. While Somalia collapsed as a State, Ethiopia was divided into two states, and Sudan fell under an Islamic regime, along with an ever-worsening civil war, economic crisis, and international isolation (Degu, 2002, p. 191). On the other hand, these countries share characteristics, such as a non-completed independency process, dissatisfaction of the basic needs of the inhabitants, and foreign intervention (Blanco, 2011, p. 526).

2.2.2.2. Guinea

Guinea is one of the negative cases that can be found within Africa when it comes to the way the flux of refugees has been handled. The country is host to the second biggest refugee population in Africa, receiving 330.000 from Sierra Leona, and 126.000 from Liberia. In this particular case, as seen in Figure 1, the borders between Guinea, Sierra Leona, and Liberia have been the center of cross-border attacks, and the governments have been accusing each other of extending support to the rebels. On 9 September 2000, the President Lansana Conte blamed in a broadcast the refugees of supporting the rebels and asked the Guinean nationals to defend their country. This incited a wave of violence against the refugees, which led to groups of civilians, police, and army to break into refugee`s homes beating, raping, and looting their belongings, along with the arrest of around 5.000 people, and hundred others seeking refuge in the Embassies of their own countries (Human Rights Watch, 2020). As for the attacks that took place in the borders, the refugees were also attacked and many lives were lost, and even if these occurrences were claimed by a dissident movement called the “Rassemblement des Forces Democratiques de Guinee”, the Guinean government denies that Guinean dissidents have anything to do with them. Instead, the government claims that they are suffering a foreign invasion coming from the two neighboring countries (BBC News, 2000).



Figure 1. BBC (2000). Civil war fears in Guinea [image]. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/986375.stm>

According to UNHCR (2004), in the global report, positive programs started in Guinea with the aim of integrating 2.000 Sierra Leonean refugees who opted to stay, nonetheless, there have been shortcuts in the distribution of the food rations, which has led to negative reactions such as criminality, prostitution, conflict within families, and lower school attendance. The cut in the distribution of the food has been interpreted by the refugees as an attempt to force them to repatriate. And according to Human Rights Watch (2020), even if Guinea was characterized by its hospitality, the international community has failed to recognize the situation and the support is not enough.

2.2.2.3. Uganda

The most relevant case of how to handle the influx of migrants in the region is Uganda. The country ratified in 1976 the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol with several reservations (The International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI), 2018, p. 4). According to Sulaiman Momodu (2019), and UNDP (2017), Uganda hosts over a million refugees coming from South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda, and others, see Figure 2. Uganda has had an opened door policy since 2003, and around 200 people are arriving daily seeking asylum. Among the policies applied, the government grants the right to employment, health, and education, and also encourages entrepreneurship. On the other hand, the government has provided the refugees with lands for them to be able to construct shelters and have farms, empowering them to be self-sufficient. Also, Uganda stands out in the world because of the willingness of hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees, while

Europe and the United States try more creative ways to impede the refugees to reach their territory (The International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI), 2018, p. 3).




Figure 2. UNDP (2017) Uganda's contribution to refugee protection and management (chart). Retrieved from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/64687>

Uganda's progressive refugee hosting policy has been praised. The central government has not located the refugees in camps, but instead, as explained before, placed them in settlements provided with plots of lands for them to engage in agricultural activities that will help them reach their self-reliance. The refugees are granted property rights, the right to work, freedom of movement, and the provision of services. This will lead them to become less reliant on humanitarian assistance (UNDP, 2017, p. 2).

2.2.3. The Asian side: Myanmar

Burma became independent in 1948, and the next years the name was changed into Myanmar. During the nation-building the rise of nationalism has been the key factor for understanding the identity-based conflicts that have arisen (Iqbal, 2017, p. 1). The derivations of such conflict have resulted in security issues that include human trafficking, prostitution, forced child labor, spread of drugs, diseases, and environmental degradation (Roberts C. , 2010, pp. 56-57). The central government has been criticized for having policies that contributed to the displacement of people. Between 1996 and 2004 a number of 2740 villages were destroyed, relocated, or abandoned (Roberts C. , 2010, pp. 58-59). The Junta has been accused of frequently committing extrajudicial killings and imprisonments. Regarding the latter aspect, over the years there have been releases of political prisoners, but the government still holds over 1100 political detainees, which include

journalists, lawyers, teachers, students, writers, monks, and poets, as well as opposition leaders, who are subject to constant tortures, and those activists who have not been incarcerated are constantly harassed (Roberts C. , 2010, pp. 60-61).

In 1989 the State Peace and Development Committee SPDC focused on reaching a peace agreement with the “leaders” of some of the insurgent groups, allowing the government, along with its armed forces, to focus on the remaining groups, which includes some ethnic groups, but even with these peace arrangements, the level of personal security has not increased (Roberts C. , 2010, pp. 65-66), and the ethnic minorities have been subject to a constant persecution coming from the central government.

The areas where ethnic minorities are located are distinguished by the lack of central authority and an aggravated dispute that has claimed millions of lives, acquiring the characteristic of a slow genocide (Roberts C. , 2010, pp. 63-64). The central government of Myanmar has been in constant conflict with these ethnic minorities for more than 5 decades, mainly because of their differences in religion (considering that these ethnic groups are not by majority Muslims), and resulting in deathly clashes for both parties, considering that there are dozens of these ethnic groups that are armed (Lee R. , 2019, p. 3213).

The Bangladesh government has decided not to turn its back on the refugees, but the truth is that there is a lack of a clear domestic law regarding the asylum seekers, considering that Bangladesh is not a signee of the 1951 Refugee Convention (Imran & Mian, 2014, p. 3). Nonetheless, The Bangladesh government has signed several international treaties regarding human rights that are aimed at the promotion of refugees’ rights. Also, the government has helped the refugees by registering them and providing identity cards, humanitarian aid in the way of providing relief material, medical assistance, and shelter (Kudrat-E-Khuda, 2020, p. 9). Also, the government has allowed the international assistance for the refugees coming from NGO’s and international agencies, as the government is aware of its difficulties (The Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI, 2018, p. 5). On the challenge side, Bangladesh does not allow the Rohingyas, which are the refugees coming from the north of Myanmar, to buy sim-cards (Kudrat-E-Khuda, 2020, p. 11), and the central government struggles for providing the necessary in order to meet the basic human needs of the refugees, since their presence has put a big pressure on the domestic

economy (Kudrat-E-Khuda, 2020, p. 13). Also, Bangladesh refuses to register the births of babies born in its territory (The Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI, 2018, p. 7), returned 16 boats in 2012, and refused to accommodate refugees the same year, as they feared of the consequences that the flux could have in the economy (Imran & Mian, 2014, p. 12).

Aside from Bangladesh's help, the situation in the sea represents a big danger for the refugees. Fuller & Cochrane (2015) narrate about the situation that is constantly happening in the Barma Sea, where a number of 6.000 to 21.000 migrants are believed to be traveling by boat running away from the persecution that they suffer in their homeland, but some of those boats have been turned around by Malaya and Indonesia (Shivakoti, 2017, p. 2). In 2015 there was a crisis that came to be known as the "boat crisis in the Andaman Sea". Boats with thousands of migrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh were left without food or water because the traffickers abandoned them fearing an arrest as they arrived to the shore (European Commission, 2017, p. 2). Also, Malaysia has turned several boats containing Rohingyas leaving them stranded in the sea for weeks (Fishbein, 2020, p. 5), claiming that they were taking this action in order to prevent the spread of Covid-19 (Human Rights Watch, 2020, p. 2). Over that situation, there were critics over these States for refusing to accept the boats, which led to the acceptance of landing on a temporary basis by Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, see Figure 3 (Shivakoti, 2017, p. 2). But unfortunately, many of those who landed in Malaysia were arrested, as if they were illegal migrants, getting prosecuted for violations regarding the migratory process (Human Rights Watch, 2020, p. 2).



Figure 3. RFA (2011) Thailand Likely to Repatriate Rohingya (Figure). Retrieved from

<https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/rohingya-01252011162535.html>

The main countries that have been affected by the flux of Rohingya migrants, other than Bangladesh, are Malaysia and Thailand, which are characterized by the implementation of policies that are not favorable for the refugees.

By the end of 2019, Malaysia had nearly 180.000 refugees and asylum seekers registered by the UNHCR – UN's refugee agency, and many others are still pending registration (Fishbein, 2020, p. 1). Unfortunately, Malaysia is not a signee of the 1951 Convention on the refugees, and the 1967 Protocol (Human Rights Watch, 2020, p. 2). For this reason, refugees in Malaysia do not have the right to work, which forces them to be a part of the informal sector, and the country does not provide free health services to the asylum seekers (Kaur, 2008, pp. 14-16). Since Malaysia is not a signee of the before-mentioned 1951 Convention, the refugees are classified as illegal immigrants, and those who are waiting for registration are vulnerable to detention and deportation (Fishbein, 2020, pp. 1-2). As for the treatment of the minors in Malaysia, the country does not provide primary education (Kaur, 2008, pp. 14-16), and children have been subject to detentions, in a direct violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, despite being a signee (Human Rights Watch, 2020, p. 2).

Malaysia's strategy to fight against the illegal flux of migrants is to make it easier to legally enter the territory through some instruments, and to apply internal enforcement measures like a bigger control in the borders, punishing employees who contract illegal migrants, fining the irregular migrants, putting them in detention centers, deporting them, and punishing them by using resources that that may vary from monetary to physical punishment (Kaur, 2008, pp. 14-16). During 2019, media reports informed that at least 2.200 persons have been captured after immigration raids. UNHCR's spokesperson in Malaysia says that many of the captured people are believed to be asylum seekers, but the number of detainees is not available, and the UNHCR has been prevented from having access to the immigration detention centers since August (Fishbein, 2020, pp. 3-4). Additionally, according to the Vice-Admiral Aris Adi Tan Abdullah, National Task Force Commander, just in 2019, between May and November, more than 8.000 people have been detained for immigration violations, but only 281 had been deported. The rest remain secluded in the immigration detention centers (Human Rights Watch, 2020, p. 3). By May 2020 Malaysia had already deported 400 Myanmar nationals, and the government

expressed the intention of blacklisting and deporting more undocumented people (Fishbein, 2020, pp. 1-2).

As for the situation of the Rohingya population that immigrated to Malaysia, out of the 180.000 asylum seekers, 101.000 are Rohingya, and 52.000 belong to other ethnic groups of Myanmar (Fishbein, 2020, p. 1). As mentioned before, this population, just like the average illegal immigrant, is subject to detentions due to immigration raids, furthermore, the population is facing a serious case of xenophobia, as important members of the government, such as the Defense Minister, have described the raid operations as a way to cleanse the country of undocumented foreigners (Fishbein, 2020, p. 2), and the Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin has discredited the Rohingya refugees by saying that they have no status or rights, nor the basis to present any demands to the government, and condemned anyone who represented them (Human Rights Watch, 2020, pp. 2-3).

As a final point on the Malaysia refugee handling, the Covid-19 developments affected deeply the asylum seekers since they were not taken into consideration for the relief package that the government was providing to its nationals, furthermore, 60 to 70 percent of the refugee population lost their jobs, and many others are afraid to return to their places of work fearing to be arrested, considering that the Ministry of Health have ordered all the companies to test their employees and provide the list of workers, in order to re-open the companies (Fishbein, 2020, pp. 4-5). Also, during this coronavirus pandemic, the refugees have been suffering from xenophobia and arrests during raids. Just on 11 May 2020 a total of 1.300 people were arrested, which was followed by a lockdown (Fishbein, 2020, pp. 1-2).

The next country affected by the Rohingya immigration is Thailand. Thailand is a country characterized by being often taken as a transit point for those asylum seekers that wish to be resettled into another country once having gained the refugee status. The majority of asylum seekers in the country are religious minorities that face persecution in Pakistan and Vietnam, and countries in Africa and the Middle East, and of course, the Rohingyas from Myanmar (Quinley, 2019, p. 2). Thailand is currently having a refugee population of 150.000 persons, and around a million of illegal immigrants (Roberts C. , 2010, p. 59). Thailand, even not being signatory of the 1951 convention on Refugees, has allowed the Rohingya refugees to stay in

temporary shelters that are located in the Burma-Thai borders, nonetheless, taking into consideration that these persons were not entitled to a legal status in Thailand, they were exposed to exploitation and detention out of the camps (European Commission , 2017, p. 2), and the authorities did not make a distinction between the illegal migrants and the asylum seekers. Because of this, many asylum seekers were detained in terrible conditions in immigration detention centers product of police crackdowns (Quinley, 2019, p. 1). Also, the Thai government was characterized by the interception and turn of boats on the sea, and for unofficial deportations by leading migrants to the borders and sending them to a neighboring country, without any regard of their security or the risks that arise regarding human rights violations (Amnesty International - Joint statement , 2017, p. 3).

During the last years the refugee policy in Thailand has been improving. In 2004 the UNHCR negotiated permission for making a registration of the population living in the camps, and continued to advocate for an improved protection, the removal of the restrictions of movement, and the rights to work in the country (UNHCR , 2004, p. 394). On September 26, 2016, the Prime Minister of Thailand Prayut Chan-o-cha announced the instauration of a mechanism of identification for the people in need of protection, giving a category for those who would be in danger, if deported (Lewis & Davies, 2020, pp. 1-2). In the same date, the Prime Minister committed to stop the detention of children and establishing a refugee identification system, as well as to ensure that the return of refugees back to Myanmar would be on a voluntary basis (Amnesty International - Joint statement , 2017, p. 2). Also, the Prime Minister said that discussion are taking place over the possibility of providing access to education, healthcare, education and job opportunities for refugees and asylum seekers. As moving towards the consolidation of these promises, in 2019 the authorities created a new division under the supervision of the Immigration Bureau that will grant protection to the asylum seekers (Quinley, 2019, pp. 3-4). This set of actions implicitly means that Thailand is starting to take responsibility on the topic for the first time, which could lead the country into a new era of humanitarianism, and even if these policies seems to have some flaws, at least it is a step towards the instauration of an effective policy on refugee protection (Lewis & Davies, 2020, pp. 1-2).

2.2.4. European reaction

Another important case to mention is the reaction of Europe and its refugee policy. Europe is considered to be in a limbo between right and wrong when it comes to the way the flux has been handled. As it is known, the refugee seekers are fleeing to Europe running away from the conflict and violence in their homelands. According to UNHCR the conflicts in Afghanistan, Somalia, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, and Eritrea, put the life in danger of millions of people, forcing them to seek asylum in Europe or elsewhere (Metcalf-Hough, 2015, p. 2). The number of people leaving the African continent, especially towards Europe, has been increasing rapidly. The economic migration of Africa has augmented the African population in Europe. From 1970 to 1989, in Belgium, the African population increased from an 8% to a 20%, in Sweden it increased from 0.6% to 3.1%, and France passed from 34.6% to 44.5%, as for the Netherlands, it increased from 10.5% to 23.1%. Due to this situation more control has been applied, which has led to illegality, and trafficking of desperate people (Blanco, 2011, p. 539).

The members of the European Union have made long-term legal commitments for the protection of the refugees with the aim of protecting and promoting the human rights of the migrants. Since the States signed the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, and the 1967 Protocol, the countries are responsible for providing international protection for those who are escaping from persecution or serious harm. Within this framework the refugees are granted the right to work, housing, education, and access to the judicial system, also, they are protected from any punishment from entering illegally to the country, and they can't be expelled. However, the European Union does not count on a regional convention on refugees, nor does it have an integrated policy for migration and asylum. The current asylum directives² seeks to have a harmonization of the rules and conditions to be applied to the asylum seekers in the whole European territory. Nonetheless, there are deep differences among the European countries regarding their compliance, and even if the European Commission has been proposing different enhances on

² The Procedures Directive (2005), and its recast version (2013) are related to the procedures that need to be followed at the time of assessing asylum claims, and they contain the minimum standards that guarantee the rights of the refugees. This directive seeks to standardize the process around Europe in order to mitigate the so-called asylum lottery (Hatton, 2021).

asylum policies and joint migration, the process has been slow, and people tend to seek asylum in places where the policies are considered to be more favorable (Metcalf-Hough, 2015, p. 3).

Another important problem regarding the handling of refugees in Europe is concerning health care. Providing such a service for a population that is moving through Europe is challenging, and several of these countries have restricted even further the entitlements of migrants without documentation, making such a labor to fall on the shoulders of teams of volunteers such as *Mèdecins du Monde*, *Save the Children*, and *Mèdecins Sans Frontiers*. On the other hand, some governments like the Hungarian have been hostile towards refugees. As a clear example, the Prime Minister of Hungary called the refugees a threat to Europe's Christian identity (Noack, 2015). Furthermore, the response of the bigger countries of Europe has not been enough. As an example, the United Kingdom is only accepting a total of 20.000 Syrian refugees allowing them to stay only for 5 years. After this period the refugee shall apply for asylum or be deported (Roberts, Murphy, & McKee, 2016).

It is important to mention that the Syrian crisis of 2015 puts in evidence the lack of solidarity and compromise among the member states of the European Union regarding the reception of refugees (Joannin, 2021). On the other hand, the increase in the number of migrant deaths on European borders has shown to the world the failure at finding a shared solution to the crisis, and it is reflected through the disagreement among the states at the implementation of a burden share strategy, and the non-compliance of the relocation quota established by the European Commission of 40.000 migrants (Toygür & Benvenuti, 2016). 2015 will be remembered as a year that marks the European negligence towards their responsibilities to respond to the refugee emergency. the States did not only collectively fail to provide urgent humanitarian and medical assistance to the refugees arriving to their lands, but also pushed into the creation of migrant smuggling networks with their deterrence and anti-migratory policies (Medecins sans frontiers, 2016).

The hypothesis of this thesis establishes that there are aspects in both, the Colombian and the Turkish refugee experience that could benefit each other. This chapter was written as a way to contrast the situation that Colombia and Turkey are going through, with the cases presented around the world, as it is important to understand the different circumstances that are generating a mass migration, and the

way the international actors have responded to these emergencies. On the other hand, these particular cases were picked because they represent the current reality of the world on refugees, and it is essential to have a wider panorama in order to be informed about the conditions of the refugee population around the world, and the response of the actors directly affected by these migratory fluxes.



CHAPTER 3: IMMIGRATION OF THE VENEZUELAN PEOPLE TO COLOMBIA

In this sub-heading there will be a presentation of the legal framework that protects the rights of the migrants, as well as an introduction of the strategies and the actions taken by the government regarding the returnees -Colombian population that was living in Venezuela that was either deported, or that wished to return voluntarily-, and the different conditions for the Venezuelans such as work, education, sanitation, health, shelter, etc. on the other hand, during the chapter the use of the word “refugee” is understood as the Venezuelan that entered the Colombia territory seeking protection, but it does not mean that the refugee status has been granted to the individual.

3.1. The Venezuelan Migration to Colombia

Looking at the historical economic, social, and political memory of Venezuela, this society had never registered the experience of an international emigration that implied the abandonment of the country for a long and prolonged time. Until 1980, the emigration was an uncommon phenomenon because the Venezuelans considered that their life level was not in danger for the future foreseeing. Venezuela was a country considered to be attractive for the foreign population over certain well-defined periods of economic expansion associated to the high incomes from the oil rent that allowed the development of important investment projects and the elevation of the welfare indexes in the middle of a certain democratic stability. In this context, during 1950s, Venezuela attracted the postwar migratory waves of southern-European countries, and during the seventies had a pull effect on some Latin American countries that were under authoritarian regimes and deep economic crisis. After its golden age, Venezuela ended the 20th century by electing democratically the lieutenant colonel Hugo Chávez as the president of the Republic, who directed a coup attempt against the president Pérez in 1992. The new political forces led by the president Chávez, proposed the country as a project, based on the socialism of the 21st century, which is the rehabilitation of the classic idea of socialism with a new approach that makes it apparently new but keeping the same principles (Bohórquez, 2018). The implementation of this project was favored by the availability of great incomes derived from a good oil bonanza during the 2000s. This

new economic boom allowed the increase in the public expenditure, and in general, the temporary improvement of certain well-fare indexes, but it did not attract migratory waves like in the past, neither was it sufficient to reduce the risks of emigrating abroad, taking into consideration that the coexistence in the country remained altered by the social instability, and the problems related to the lack of security, not only in a personal level, but also in the economic and legal spheres (Koechlin & Eguren, 2018, p. 10).

After the exports collapsed in 2012, the country became highly dependent on the oil exports, which became the main fiscal revenue, then, the fall of the petroleum prices originated disastrous consequences in a country that depended deeply on the income of this natural resource for the development of its economy, nonetheless, this situation only revealed the reality, leaving in evidence the flaws of the economic model with socialist tinge imposed by the Chavism (Key & Villarroel, 2018). Also, there was a profound state of corruption in almost all the State's organisms of Venezuela, a circumstance that led the country to occupy the last position in the rank of the less corrupt countries of the region for 2014, in accordance with the numbers of the NGO International transparency (BBC News, 2014). On the other hand, it is important to mention that the violent repression that executes the government against the opposition, the lack of guarantee in the electoral processes, and the judicial abuses served as a flagrant violation of human and fundamental rights such as dignity, right to defense and liberty (López, 2018, p. 7).

This socialist model of the 21st century had as a central aspect, among others, the widening of the roll of the state in the economy as a regulator and as an entrepreneur. This led to the application of an intricate system of price and exchange control, the destruction of the productive capabilities of the private sector which generated a huge macroeconomic disequilibrium that took the country into the hyperinflation rate and the profound deterioration of the well-being levels that the Venezuelan population is currently facing. The project did not count on the full approval of the people, but Chávez tried to accelerate its implementation. Then in 2007, a constitutional reform proposed by Chavez was rejected, but he got to execute some of its points by enforcing the law. Consequently, he proposed an amendment that allowed all the popular elected offices to be re-elected indefinitely, and after being re-elected for the third time, he died in 2012, designating Nicolas Maduro as

his successor, and continuer of his revolutionary project (Koechlin & Eguren, 2018, pp. 9-11).

The administration of Nicolas Maduro led to a deterioration period that unchained a progressive social crisis hidden by the regime under the pretext of an economic war orchestrated by the opposition with the “help” of international enemies of Venezuela, but evidenced by international organisms that warned a deepening in the indexes of poverty, scarcity, and loss of the acquisition capacity of the people, generating an alarming humanitarian crisis (Santana, Alcántara, & Espinel, 2019, pp. 27-29). On the other hand, the International Monetary Fund indicated that Venezuela had lost half of its economy by 2013, along with this, the profound scarcity of medicines and medical supplies made the medical care impossible, and the constant shortage in the nourishment was an obstacle for meeting the basic needs of the family. Furthermore, it is important to mention that the central government denied the existence of such a crisis, and they had not articulated, nor implemented any effective policy for mitigating the situation on their own. On the other hand, there is a high level of violence and insecurity, persecution due to political opinion, discriminatory violence towards individuals or selected groups, such as opponents to the government, and also people are susceptible to extortion, among others serious situations (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 52). Such conditions led towards the exponential increase of thousands of persons forced to migrate to other countries in the region, as a survival strategy that may allow them to keep their vital rights such as life, personal integrity, personal liberty, health, and feeding, among others (López, 2018, pp. 9-11).

According to the IOM (IOM, 2018), up to that date the number of Venezuelans abroad was around 2.648.509, with 1.848.581 persons concentrated mainly in South America. According to Response for Venezuelans R4V, the Regional Platform of Interagency Coordination, in September 2019 there were already 4.307.930 million of refugees and migrants in the region coming from Venezuela, with a total of 1.408.055 located in Colombia. According to the last population census of 2018, Colombia’s total population was 48.258.494, which would constitute the Venezuelan population as equivalent to the 2.92% (Sáez, Andrade, Sicard, & Medina, 2020, p. 41). The Colombian government recognizes three stages in the migratory process from Venezuela: the first wave took place in

August 2005, with the expulsion of around 2 thousand Colombians, and the massive return of around 20 thousand more that were residing in the neighboring country. The second wave goes from 2014 to 2017 with a significant increase of migrants, reaching an estimate of 550 thousand Venezuelan nationals in Colombia by the end of the 2017. In this stage the Great Poll Integrated of Homes of Colombia GEIH, estimated that between 2014 and 2015, the stock of the population residing in Colombia, that reported to be living in Venezuela within the previous 12 months, increased by around 75%. The third stage was completed by the end of 2018 with the entrance of more than 385 thousand people. In this particular stage the rise of incoming migrants from Venezuela reached up to 114% in 2016, and 68% in 2017. These tendencies coincided with the deepening of the economic crisis in the neighboring country (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, pp. 49-50).

According to the World Bank (2018), and the IOM, the Venezuelans migrated to Colombia due to the geographic proximity and the close commercial, cultural, and family ties that link both countries. The number of Venezuelans abroad passed from 0.7 million in 2015 to 2.3 million in September 2018, on its side, Colombia reported that, by June 2018, the number of Venezuelan migrants was 2.3 bigger than the number reported by December 2017. On the other hand, the structure of the migrant homes in Colombia would suggest that the number of Venezuelans would increase due to a family reunification as a product of an economic stability. For this reason, it is possible that Colombia will register a constant flux of migrants over the coming years.

It is important to mention that not all the persons entering the territory of Colombia are considered as refugees. According to the decree 1067, expedited on the 26th of May 2015, the term refugee is reserved for a person that falls under certain conditions such as being outside of his country of origin due to fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, nationality, religion, political opinion, membership of a particular social group, etc. This person is not willing to claim the protection of his country or origin, or once outside, is unwilling to return, or does not have a nationality (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia, 2015). On the other hand, according to the Decree 2840, issued on December 06th, 2013, these conditions were aligned with the article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, establishing that “in case of persecution, every person has the right to seek asylum,

and be accepted in any country” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia , 2013). The government did not consider the case of the Venezuelans to be under this category since they were not running because of a fear. They were considered to be economic migrants, which means that they are not pursued, and there is not a founded fear that their life is in under risk. They just had basic needs that needed to be covered, which obligated them to migrate (Gil, Beltrán, & García, 2018, p. 24). Taking this into consideration, an exhaustive analysis of each particular case must be done, in order to identify if the applicant is a migrant or a refugee (Kerguelén & Murillo, 2018, pp. 11-12).

This influx of migrants into the Colombian territory can be divided in 4 groups: The first group is represented by the Colombians residing in the Venezuelan territory, who migrated escaping from the violence derived from the armed conflict, and a second sub-group that emigrated looking for better opportunities in the neighboring country. This group is returning to the country, some of them with resources, some others, a vast majority, seeking to start all over again since they have lost everything because of the Venezuelan crisis. A second group is formed by a group of people born Venezuelan but having the right to claim Colombian citizenship because one of the parents is Colombian. The third group is characterized by the Venezuelans running away from the persecution of the government for reasons regarding political order. In this sense, they are part of the opposition, and they cannot express themselves freely as they have suffered the rigor of the repression of the government. The last group is integrated by the Venezuelans that leave the country in order to satisfy their basic needs, such as nourishment, health, and housing. Most of them arrive to Colombia with their family nucleus, and this group can be subdivided into those who have intention of staying in Colombia, and those who are just transiting (Gil, Beltrán, & García, 2018, pp. 22-23). Regarding the pendular migration, according to Migration Colombia, about 37 thousand persons cross the border per day in order to find medicines and food (Kerguelén & Murillo, 2018, p. 8).

The grand majority of the migrants arrive to the country via land, but gradually scatter to the rest of the country or to other countries of destination such as Peru, Ecuador, and Chile. Preliminary data of the report of World Bank (2018), in its page 62, Figure 3: Number of migrants coming from Venezuela, contrasted with the

total population percentage of each department; indicate that those Venezuelans without a regular migratory status reside in zones that are different to the initial point of entry to the Colombian territory. In this case, the family ties, commercial and historical links play an important role in determining the selection of the final destination (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 62). Regarding the people living in the coasts of Venezuela, many of them move to the southwest towards the main road of the country, and through the states of Lara, Trujillo, Mérida and Táchira (Venezuela), and enter Colombia through Cucuta, in order to continue to the Caribbean coast of Colombia, where the conditions are similar to those of the places they used to live in Venezuela (Ellis, 2017, p. 4). In this specific case, according to Jassis & Battistessa (2018), the situation in the Caribbean part of Colombia is critical, since there are many municipalities that have more Venezuelans than Colombians. A situation aggravated by the fact that it is not possible to determine the exact number of Venezuelan citizens, due to the irregular immigration.

As for the Venezuelans coming from the interior, they have a different culture, and even if many of them still enter the territory from Cúcuta, a big number cross the border from the southern part of Colombia, including Arauca, Puerto Carreño, and Puerto Inírida, and proceed to move to the main cities of Colombia, like Villavicencio (Ellis, 2017, p. 4). It is also important to consider that a relevant portion of these migrants look for opportunities in Bogotá, the capital of Colombia, and in other main cities. It is estimated that around 300 thousand have officially registered in the capital, creating an important Venezuelan presence (Ellis, 2017, p. 4).

Another important aspect to mention is the Venezuelan presence in the borderline cities considering that these cities count on the highest migrant number in the country. According to the World Bank (2018), the frontiers are deeply affected because of the number of regular and irregular migrants, considering that these zones have historically been lagging areas in their development in comparison with the rest of the country. These municipalities present major gaps in terms of their economic level, and access to basic services, and in general, they have a less population density to those of the other regions of the country. Furthermore, according to World Bank (2018), on page 17-62, up to June 2018, the irregular migration was focused mainly in Arauca, Guajira, and Norte de Santander. In these borderline departments more

than 5% of the total population is made of irregular migrants. When looking at the overall distribution of the immigration, the World Bank affirms that the department with the highest Venezuelan population is Guajira, which has a population equivalent to the 4.5% of the total population of the department, followed by Norte de Santander (4.3%), Atlántico (3.1%), Sucre (2.6%), Cesar (2.3%), and Magdalena (2.2%).

Taking into consideration that the main part of the migrants are located in the borderline areas, reducing the geographic concentration of the Venezuelans in Colombia would not only relieve part of the pressure over the public services and infrastructure, but it would also mitigate the preoccupation regarding the lack of job opportunities in the frontier, but more importantly, it could potentially maximize and diffuse the possible benefits of this migratory flux in the whole country. Colombia has the capability to implement a successful scheme of voluntary redistribution, based on the best practices of other welcoming regions, and the academic literature (Bahar, Dooley, & Huang, 2018, p. 13).

3.1.2. The Colombian migration to Venezuela: a migration that will eventually return home.

Before the emergence of the Venezuelan refugee phenomena, Venezuela was known by its seasonal cultivation of coffee, sugar cane, cattle rising, mining and hydrocarbons exploitation. These activities, along with the commerce, served in the past as the activities that represented the main motivation of the Colombo-Venezuelan migratory fluxes (Flores, 2004, pp. 191-192). Due to the pull effect of the good years of Venezuela, the country was a receptor of qualified, non-qualified and peasant Colombian work force, especially in its bordering zones. Such a situation existed mainly because of the geographic proximity of both countries, and the permeability of the borders, which allowed the easy access to both sides of the frontiers (Malaver, 2014, pp. 102-103).

Between 1972 and 1974, there was a considerable rise in the prices of petroleum, which generated an increase of 250% in the country's tax income, leading to an expansion of the financial capacity of the country for implementing a vast development plan (5th Plan of the Nation 1976-1980). This plan needed a pronounced increase in the demand of workforce, in this context, there was an expansion of

investments, industrial and infrastructure growth, and the application of a policy towards the promotion of the immigration which had as a result the entry of a high number of migrants from all South America, being of special importance the Colombian immigration (Flores, 2004, p. 192). According to some estimations, between 1976 and 1980, the projects that were originated from the 5th National Plan, had incorporated around 900 thousand and 1 million new workers (Malaver, 2014, pp. 102-103).

The pull effect of Venezuela coincided with the armed conflict that Colombia experienced during the second half of the last century. Until 2005, approximately 3.7 million people had been affected by the internal long-lasting socio-political conflict, which locates Colombia in the second place after Sudan regarding internal migration (Builes, Arias, & Minayo, 2017, p. 1650). This conflict is basically caused by a territorial dispute among the armed actors, in order to establish and consolidate their sovereignty over strategic and economically exploitable territories (Builes, Arias, & Minayo, 2017, p. 1654), which led to continuous confrontations between the guerilla, the paramilitary, and the Colombian army (Eizaga, 2005, p. 102).

In numbers, according to the population census of Venezuela, the number of Colombians residing in the neighboring country between 1951 and 1971 had a significant variation, passing from 45.969 to 102.314 (Flores, 2004, p. 192). According to Malaver (2014), between 1979 and 1990, the increase in the Colombian residents in Venezuela was of 194%, but the periods of major affluence were between 1998-2000 and 2006-2007, when paramilitarism was in its highest point. The first period is related to its consolidation, while the second is regarding the demobilization. This population returning home after years of living in Venezuela marks an important period, not only in the diplomatic history of Colombia and Venezuela, but also in the dynamics of Colombia. The return process initiated on the 21st of August, 2015, with the unilateral decision of the Venezuelan president, Nicolas Maduro, to close the border between both countries, followed by an immediate deportation of more than 20 thousand Colombian citizens under the pretext of “stabilizing the situation in the borders” and “fighting against the paramilitarism” (Koechlin & Eguren, 2018, p. 21). These returned citizens were coming back to Colombia after years, even decades, living under conditions that required humanitarian assistance, without any documentation, or any host network,

and not knowing the mechanisms of labor insertion. This derives into a population that receives the same treatment that a regular migration would have, despite the fact that they are Colombian nationals (Aliaga, et al., 2020, pp. 286-288).

3.2. Legal Background

The Colombian constitution recognizes that all the foreigners within the national territory will enjoy the same fundamental rights conceded to the Colombians, in accordance with the following articles: Article 11: right to life; article 13: right to equality, and no discrimination; article 12: no one will be subjected to torture; article 17: slavery is prohibited; article 229: right for any person to have access to justice; article 15: right to intimacy; article 20: freedom of speech; article 38: right to create an association with other people; and all those other that imply the development of the individual within a society (Government of Colombia , 1991). The limitations to these rights consist of restrictions for the foreigners to access the electoral field, as well as restrictions in mobility that may be applied. This doesn't mean that the foreigner will not be able to transit freely through the country, but in order to do so, the person may need a special permission such as a visa, a Special permission of permanency (PEP), or an equivalent official document. In some cases, the freedom of circulation could be limited to where the normal place of residence is located (PADF, FUPAD, PRM, OAS, Universidad del Rosario, pp. 45-48). On the other hand, the Article 5 supports equality and no discrimination in the national territory, and the article 13 establishes that the State recognizes, without any discrimination, the primacy of the inalienable rights of the persons, and protects the family as the basic institution of the society, on the other hand, it enunciates that all the persons are born free and equal before the law, and they will receive the same protection and treatment from the authorities, as they will enjoy the same rights, liberties, and opportunities without any discrimination for reasons of sex, race, national or familiar origin, language, religion, political or philosophical opinion.

In the national legislation, the Law 1873 of 2017 decrees the budget for rents and capital resources, considering the appropriation law for the fiscal year that goes from the 10th of January to the 31st of December 2018. This law, in its article 140, refers to the assignation of resources that the National Government must complete regarding the attention of the social emergency in the borderline with Venezuela, due

to the mass migration of the nationals of that country (Madroñero, 2019, p. 19). Also, the law 1482 of 2011 was approved with the objective of guaranteeing the protection of the rights of a person, group of persons, community, or populace. This law typifies as a crime the acts of racism or discrimination, and the harassment regarding race, religion, political ideology, or national, ethnic, or cultural origin (Chacon, 2019, p. 9).

Taking into consideration the decrees issued by Colombia, as the country started to see the importance of the phenomena of the Venezuelan migration, a series of decrees were issued to respond to the emergency. The decree 452 was conceived in order to start the design of an integral policy regarding humanitarian attention (Koechlin & Eguren, 2018, p. 26), the decree 2228, issued in 2017, aimed at complying with the health needs of the returning nationals and the Venezuelan migrants, by assigning complementary resources for their care in case of an emergency (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 93), and the decree 542, issued on 21st March 2018 by the Administrative Department of the Presidency of the Republic, created the Administrative Registry of Venezuelan Migrants in Colombia (RAMVC), which serves as an instrument for the design of an integral policy for humanitarian care. This instrument has been useful for the different international organizations present in Colombia; among them the UNHCR, the International Organization for the Migration OIM, and the agency of the United States for the International Development (USAID). The RAMVC constitutes an initial input regarding the characterization of the Venezuelan migration in Colombia. It shows important results regarding the socio-demographic data of the registered Venezuelan population, like their place or origin, information regarding their familiar nucleus, differential focus, identity documents, level of education, work activity, and intention of staying in the country. Besides, it allows seeing the specific needs of some vulnerable Venezuelan migrant groups (Koechlin & Eguren, 2018, pp. 25-26). On the other hand, the data contained in the system is confidential, and will not be used for imposing sanctions, but it has been used as an accessing door to the regularization of the persons that entered irregularly to the country (Madroñero, 2019, pp. 19-21).

Another important decree is the 2840, issued in 2013, which establishes the procedure to follow in order to be recognized as refugee. It dictates the norms regarding the Advisory Commission for the Determination of the Refugee Status and

other dispositions, and establishes the conditions and procedures to follow by the Colombian State for recognizing an individual as a refugee (Madroñero, 2019, pp. 19-21). Subsequently, the decree 1067, issued on 2015 determines the procedure for requesting the refugee status, which must be presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then to the Advisory Commission for the Determination of the Status of Refugees CAPADCR, which is in charge of receiving the processes and studying the presented requests (Gil, Beltrán, & García, 2018, pp. 20-22).

With the migrant flux coming from Venezuela, Colombia tried to adapt to the new environment. For this reason, the central government created some especial permits that allow not only the mobility of the people from one country to the other, but the possibility of staying and having access to work, health, education, etc. It is possible to remain in the Colombian national territory with one of the following authorizations: 1. Permanency and Entry Permit (PIP) (Appendix 1: list of PIP permits). 2. Permanency and Entry Permit for temporary transit (PIP-TT). 3. Special Stay Permit (PEP). 4. Border Mobility Card for the pendular migration (TMF). 5. Recognition of the refugee status. 6. Visa (Appendix 2: types of visas). 7. Nationality, when it is viable (PADF, FUPAD, PRM, OAS, Universidad del Rosario, p. 19).

Out of these permits explained before, it is important to mention the Special Permanency Permission (PEP) which was established by the resolution 6045, issued in 2017 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia. This permission aimed at regularizing the migratory situation of the population that entered the country through an authorized control point (Madroñero, 2019, pp. 19-21). Also, the Decree 1288, issued on 25th July 2018, the Resolution 6370, issued on 1st August 2018, and the Resolution 2033, issued on 2nd August, 2018 explain that the Venezuelans registered in the RAMVC holding a PEP would have access to the basic services of health, and education, and may have the opportunity to find job opportunities in the formal sector (Aliaga, et al., 2020, pp. 252-253).

In February 2021 the central government of Colombia revoked the PEP by launching the new Temporary Statute of Protection for Venezuelan migrants (ETPV), which is considered to be a regularization plan, and an important step for finding a better solution to the Venezuelan crisis. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Claudia Blum, assured that the creation of the Temporary Statute of

Protection for the Venezuelan Migrants is the most important migration policy in Latin America and the Caribbean region. She highlighted that it is a historical decision for the region and for the world, grounded in the principles of solidarity, fraternity and equity that conform Colombia's migratory policy (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia, 2021). Also, it is a complementary mechanism to the regime of international protection for refugees, which offers protection to the vulnerable persons that run away from their country of origin (Revista Semana , 2021). With this new measure Colombia seeks to diminish the irregular migration, to protect the migrants through regularization, and to integrate them into the productive life by guaranteeing all their rights (Riaño, 2021). The new statute will be valid for 10 years and will allow the Venezuelan migrants to acquire the resident visa, in case they decide to stay in the country (Migración Colombia , 2021).

The ETPV is directed to those migrants coming from Venezuela found in Colombia in a regular way, either because they hold an entry or permanency permit, because they made an extension of permanency, or because they hold a PEP. This statute will also benefit the asylum seekers, the holders of a Safe-conduct SC-2 (This is a granted permission while the situation of a foreigner is being defined, for instance while the asylum seeker is waiting for a response on the application for the M-4 visa) (Presidencia de Colombia , 2021), and irregular migrants who can prove to be in the country by the 31st of January, 2021. Also, as a way to discourage the irregularity, it is proposed that those who enter Colombia in a regular way, within the first two years of entry in vigor of the Statute, may apply and benefit from it (Migración Colombia , 2021).

According to the Presidency of Colombia (2021), the main characteristics of this statute are: 1. It is a humanitarian and apolitical act; 2. It must be flexible for quickly reacting to the crisis, providing a minimum level of protection as humanitarian response; 3. It contributes to the improvement of the management of the global response to the humanitarian crisis and cross-border population movements; 4. It provides a humanitarian protection response that reduces the motivation for irregular migration; 5. It is oriented towards finding solutions within a defined period; 6. It allows the regular entry and stay of foreigners fleeing because of the crisis, based on a set of minimum human rights standards; 7. It provides formal identification, registration and documentation tools, as well as the timely detection of

people in conditions of specific needs or vulnerability that other specialized service channels require; and 8. It seeks to shelter those refugees that have no resources, as those who do not meet the requirements for staying legally in Colombia.

Also, the Colombian Presidency, created the Decree 216, on March 1st, 2021³, with the aim of providing migratory flexibility within a defined term. It also has as an objective the identification and registration of the Venezuelan migrant population in order to plan and design policies to face the negative impact of migration, and to be able to detect and provide assistance to the vulnerable population. On the other hand, this decree seeks at providing options for accessing the ordinary visa regime and it establishes the benefits and duties for the migrants that are already in the national territory.

On the other hand, according to the Decree 216, issued on May 1st, 2021 the obligations that the migrant acquire when covered by the statute are (Decreto 216 , 2021, pp. 23-24): 1. It is mandatory to make the transition from the PEP to the Permission of temporary protection for unification and control; 2. Those Venezuelan migrants who included their information in the registry, and despite being able to request the permit did not do so, will also be subject to administrative sanctioning actions; 3. Prior to the expiration of the ETPV, the Venezuelan migrant who wishes to remain in Colombia must apply and obtain a visa; 4. The Venezuelan migrant who, on the expiration date of the ETPV, did not make a transition to the ordinary regime of migratory regularization, will incur in irregular permanence and will be subject to the corresponding administrative sanctioning measures. Finally, it is important to mention that from the moment that the statute enters into force, no PEP will be issued or extended, and those that are in force will make transit to the Permit for ETPV, prior compliance of the requirements established in the Statute (Presidencia de Colombia , 2021).

3.2.1. Access to health

The Colombian and foreign population residing in Colombia will enjoy the fundamental right to health in every stage of life (PADF, FUPAD, PRM, OAS,

³ The Decree No. 216, issued on the 1st of March 2021 was expedited and signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Claudia Blum, and it contains all the relevant information provided by the President of Colombia, Iván Duque, regarding the adaptation of the Temporary Statute of protection for Venezuelan Migrants (Decreto 216 , 2021).

Universidad del Rosario, pp. 50-51). As for the refugees, the Colombian Ministry of Health and Social Protection has designed an action plan for the health care of this population by establishing a series of measures to guarantee the right to access health according to their status. For instance, if the individual enters the country regularly, and if this person has a PEP, he or she is considered as resident and can join the General System of Social Security as dependent or independent, likewise, this refugee can request enrollment into the subsidized regime (Ministry of Health and Social Protection, 2018). On the other hand, as also indicated by the Ministry of Health and Social Protection (2018), in the case that the migrant only carries a TMF, this person will only be attended by a public and private Health Provider Institution (EPS), in case of events considered as emergencies. Otherwise, the costs of care and procedures will be borne by the user directly. Likewise, in the case of the Venezuelan population that is in the Colombian territory irregularly, health care is ensured in emergency cases, in the terms defined by the norm (Madroñero, 2019, p. 12).

Regarding the health sector, the World Bank (2018) presents the resolutions and circular notes expedited by the Ministry of Health: Resolution 3015, issued on 2017; Circular note 012 and 029, issued on 2017; Circular note 025, issued on 2017; Circular note 040, issued on 2015; and the joint Circular note 017, issued on 2018 between the Ministry of Health, and the National Institution of Health. These instruments contain the designation of the PEP as a valid document for the affiliation to the health system, and it indicates the health institutions in Colombia to grant access to health to the foreigners. It also contains instructions for prevention, attention, surveillance, and control in order to face different diseases (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 93).

This crisis in Venezuela has led not only to the deinstitutionalization of the system, but also to the shortage of medicines and vaccines, as well as the massive emigration of health professionals. This has had an impact on the reappearance of previously eradicated diseases, the increase in controlled diseases and the deterioration in the treatment of chronic diseases such as hypertension, diabetes and cancer, among others, a situation that has been an additional reason for the emigration of Venezuelans to Colombia in search of a solution to these problems (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 91). The massive influx of Venezuelans has

caused the health system to collapse, and resources to dwindle. Despite the fact that hospitals have continued to attend the migrants, they do not have the necessary financial oxygen to meet all the needs (Albor-Chadid & Díaz, 2018, p. 108). This situation has exacerbated particularly in those cities with the greatest migratory flow. According to data provided by the different hospitals in receiving areas, services for more than \$ 43.3 billion pesos have been provided. Said costs will rise in the short term, not only due to the continuous increase in the number of migrants, but also due to the multiple needs in terms of migration (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 92).

Another important issue derives from the living conditions of the immigrants. Many migrants and returnees live in precarious informal settlements, where they live in overcrowded conditions, without access to public services such as water, basic sanitation and energy, influencing negatively their health conditions. Likewise, there have been situations that affected the health of both the Colombian and migrant population, such as the sale of food in poor conditions (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 93). On the other hand, according to Garrido & Torrado (2020), the COVID-19 pandemic has negatively influenced the perception of the locals regarding migration, which has created tensions. This has led many Venezuelans to return since the lockdowns have prevented them from working, and it has created some cases of xenophobia.

Finally, faced with the current crisis in the Colombian health sector, the National Government created the Health Sector Response Plan to the Migratory Phenomenon, which has as an objective managing the health response to situations generated by the migration in the receiving territorial entities, developing relevant strategies, strengthening capacities, promoting social coexistence, and mitigating the impacts of emergency situations through coordinated actions by sector agents, including communities, international agencies, as other actors and organizations . The plan is developed in three components: 1. Public health management, 2. Strengthening of health care, and 3. Financing and monitoring. Through public health management, the aim is to recognize the health conditions of the migrant population in the bordering territories, and other receiving areas, in order to identify gaps to then be able to define the adequate approaches and achieve intervention

actions in the health of the migrant population (Koechlin & Eguren, 2018, pp. 109-110).

3.2.2. Access to education

According to the Convention on the Status of Refugees (United Nations, 1954), in its article 22 “States shall grant refugees the same treatment as nationals with regard to elementary education, and the most favorable treatment possible, and in no case less favorable than that granted in the same circumstances to foreigners in general regarding education, other than elementary, and in particular, regarding access to studies, certificates’ recognition of studies abroad, exemption from rights and charges, and granting scholarships”. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations General Assembly, 1959), states that it is imperative to have in mind the best interests of the child, and all the needs related to the children. This includes the generation of education services for all migrants (Moreno & Montenegro, 2020, pp. 15-17). In Colombia, children’s rights prevail over all others. The Constitution states that the right to education is mandatory for those between 5 and 15 years of age and includes at least 1 year of preschool and 9 of basic education. Also, the schools in Colombia must: 1. Educate without discrimination; 2. Provide quality education; 3. Adapt to all types of students; and 4. Secure their permanence (PADF, FUPAD, PRM, OAS, Universidad del Rosario, pp. 60-64).

The right to education contemplates a first phase of preschool, basic and secondary education (between 5 and 15 years of age), and a second phase that can be technical, technological and university. In the first stage, the migrant that wishes to enroll in preschool, basic or secondary education cannot be denied access if there are places available in the institution. Also, the migrant does not need to present any type of document that proves the migration status, and the schools cannot deny the enrollment of children because they do not have a visa, PEP, PIP or any other document. In case of not having any document, the school must assign an Identification Number established by the Secretary of Education of the city or municipality known as NES. Once enrolled, the rector of the educational institution must, within 30 days after the enrollment, make the report of this student in the Information System for the Report of Foreigners (SIRE) of Migration Colombia (PADF, FUPAD, PRM, OAS, Universidad del Rosario, pp. 60-64).

Current related data on Venezuelan school-age migrants is limited. According to the World Bank report (2019), it is considered that there are up to 513 thousand Venezuelan migrants of school age in Colombia. According to data from Migration Colombia, as of June 2018, 38% of the migrant population was between 0 and 18 years of age, representing the largest population group. Of these, almost 40% are estimated to be children between 0 and 5 years. The table below shows an estimate of children according to the migratory group with data collected by the World Bank (2019) (Moreno & Montenegro, 2020, pp. 20-23).

Table 1. Estimated number of children by immigration group

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY IMMIGRATION GROUP		
TYPE OF MIGRANT	NUMBER OF CHILDEN	CHILDEN OF 6 TO 17 YEARS
Irregular	168.662	96.586
Retorneé	96.298	55.141
Subtotal of population with intention of staying	408.497	233.930
Pendular	17.154	9.823
Transit	88.269	50.548
Subtotal of population without intention of staying	105.423	60.548
Total	513.920	294.302

Until June 2018, it was not possible to know how many children had access to the education system because the databases of the Ministry of Education (MEN) did not allow the identification of migrants until that year. Nonetheless, the data found in the RAMV show that only the 28% of the children registered in this system are currently receiving education. This is mainly attributed to the irregularity of the population, product of the lack of geographic settlement, and the absence of job opportunities that limits even more the educational alternatives. Most of these children are of basic school age. According to the World Bank (2019), the 56% of the irregular migrant children are between 6 and 11 years, and 44% between 12 and 17 years of age, they have limited access to nourishment, and there is a very frequent floating population (that travels from one city to another), which creates a lack of continuity in the education program. It is important to highlight the presence of the pendular population that gets education in Colombia and lives in Venezuela which moves making use of the TMF (Moreno & Montenegro, 2020, pp. 20-23).

On a second phase, in order to have access to the technic, technologic or university education the main requirement is to have a high school diploma that certifies the completion of the secondary education (grades 10 and 11), and the State Test carried out by the Colombian Institution for the Evaluation of the Education (ICFES), or its equivalent in other countries. Then, this process will depend on the institution of higher education where the student wants to continue the studies, which will determine the conditions for admission. Once the process is finished, the institution of higher education determines which classes can be validated and which ones would still be needed in order to obtain the degree (PADF, FUPAD, PRM, OAS, Universidad del Rosario, pp. 60-64). However, in the case of academic transfer processes, Colombian universities also have established standards for evaluating the applicant's academic programs, which will allow them to finish their professional career. For this reason, after the evaluation of the curriculum of the Venezuelan educational institutions, some of the applicants have the option of taking an exam to demonstrate sufficiency on the topics of a certain subject. They must adjust to the evaluations and diagnoses made by each university, if they want to finish their academic processes in a Colombian educational institution (Moreno & Montenegro, 2020, p. 47).

Another important aspect is the validation of diplomas. The validation of degrees awarded by a foreign higher education institution is a procedure through which the MEN, grants recognition to a degree issued by that institution by examining the legality of the degree and the institution that granted it, as well as the academic aspects of the program studied (Moreno & Montenegro, 2020, pp. 31-32). In this regard, the MEN, through its Resolution 10687, issued on October 9, 2019, changed the procedure and the respective requirements for the process of validation of academic degrees expedited abroad, shortening the response time, and giving agility in the validation process by approximately 50% to 70%, always taking into account the origin of the title and the issuing country. Based on the above, the Resolution 10687 (2019), establishes new validation criteria accompanied by responses times according to the nature of the request (Moreno & Montenegro, 2020, pp. 33-34). Furthermore, the Colombian State has instructed the institutions to apply a leveling strategy for the students coming from Venezuelan educational establishments, which includes an evaluation system in order to certify the

validation, in case of lacking the required paperwork. Also, the MEN, through its certified education secretariats, identified the available offer for accessing the education system, and prioritized the migrants coming from Venezuela, and the returned nationals (Aliaga, et al., 2020, p. 273).

One of the main challenges related to education is the deterioration of its quality in Venezuela, which creates an unbalance when compared to the Colombian system (Aliaga, et al., 2020, p. 270). On the other hand, many children and adolescents do not study, but rather work in order to increase the family resources, which is a violation of the fundamental rights of this population (Aliaga, et al., 2020, p. 269). It is estimated that around the 39% of the child population is not attending school, which is related to the fear of the Venezuelans because of their irregularity, or their arrival when the scholar year has already started (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, pp. 59-60). Another important aspect is related to the identity documents of the minors. Before 2015, children and adolescents who did not have a regular migration status could hardly have access to education in Colombia (DNP, 2018, p. 52). This situation changed after the MEN issued several circulars that allowed these students to attend class. However, since they do not have a legally valid document, they cannot take state exams or graduate (Aliaga, et al., 2020, p. 244).

Another important issue is related to the procedures of validation of school diplomas, which was simplified by the Decree 1288 of 2018, by establishing that the migrants shall validate their degrees through evaluations or academic activities in the educational establishments free of charge, and the government eliminated the apostille as a requirement for the validation process (Aliaga, et al., 2020, p. 272). Nonetheless the Venezuelans continue to have problems to access the requested documents and school certificates printed by Venezuelan authorities due to the institutional collapse (Aliaga, et al., 2020, p. 244). On the other hand, there is a significant impact on the quality of the validation services of the higher education, since the volume of applications for accreditation of degrees went from an average of 6 thousand applications per year in 2012, to 9 thousand applications, as of May 2018, which led to a backlog of cases, forcing the MEN to put into action a contingency plan by hiring additional staff to process applications. Due to the deterioration in the educational quality assurance systems in Venezuela, applications for validation of

degrees from that country must be processed by the longest and most detailed verification mechanism, which entails high costs for both, the applicants and the Ministry, and makes it difficult for the Venezuelan population, since they have to gather the necessary documentation (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 99).

A final important aspect is regarding the School Feeding Program (PAE) which presents problems in the rations to be distributed among the students. For trying to overcome this, the institutions gave priority to the students according to their level of vulnerability; this has led, in some cases, to institutions denying quotas to requesting children when the school year has already started or, in most cases, to the institutions providing the service outside of the system. Even with a rapid response from the central government in the allocation of resources, problems would persist in local capacity and implementation. This is a big problem especially for the institutions found in the bordering areas, which have been the greatest receivers of migrant student population, considering that they already had low infrastructure capacity, scarcity in the availability of teachers, and low access to providers of quality products and services, problems that, if not accompanied by greater injections of resources, will continue to exist (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 100).

3.2.3. Access to work

The Ministry of Labor, in concordance with the Article 100 of the Political Constitution on the rights and guarantees of foreigners in Colombia, and based on a non-discrimination policy against foreign workers, in compliance with ILO Conventions and Recommendations, indicated that migrants in Colombia have the right to: engage in an employment contract; receive a salary for the provision of their services; be affiliated to the social security system in matters of health and pensions; be enrolled with the labor risk administrator (ARL), and with a family compensation fund; join an association and / or a trade union organization; and receive vacation pay (PADF, FUPAD, PRM, OAS, Universidad del Rosario, pp. 65-66). Although the right to carry out a job or work is inherent to every person, for its exercise there are rules that consider the migratory status: Regarding people with documentation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established that the migrant shall acquire permits such as the PEP (Madroñero, 2019, pp. 15-16). The person is authorized only to carry out legal activities or occupations in the country that are not regulated,

including those carried out by virtue of an employment relationship or contract. In order to carry out regulated activities or trade, the person must acquire a work visa depending on the type of work to be performed. Those who do not comply with the above are forced to enroll in unregulated activities, poorly paid and without the necessary guarantees, such as membership in the Social Security System. For this reason, the State has established routes to favor regularization that will result in the enjoyment of decent work (PADF, FUPAD, PRM, OAS, Universidad del Rosario, p. 67).

According to the report of the National Association of Financial Institutions (ANIF), Colombia has an average of 2.4 million people seeking employment. When adding an additional number of migrants looking for a job, it becomes evident the deterioration of the citizen security and job income prospects in the lower strata (Kerguelén & Murillo, 2018, p. 14), taking into consideration preliminary estimations that indicate that higher immigration rates could have a negative impact on local labor markets in the short term. This phenomenon is mainly due to the difficulties that migrants face to enter the formal labor market, the possible increase of the informal employment, the increase in underemployment, and the rise in the supply of labor, which may decrease the real wages (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 21).

The change in the labor supply caused by the increase in migration may motivate the generation of employment outside the formal sector. This is due to the restrictions imposed by minimum wages and the need of the migrant population to generate income immediately. On the other hand, the restrictions faced by many of the migrants to regularize their stay in the country also make it difficult to find a job in the formal sector. In terms of employment, the greatest impact of migration from Venezuela has been the loss of formal jobs in receiving areas because the migrant population has a higher level of education and skills compared to the population of these places (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, pp. 21-24). On the other hand, many Colombian businessmen are afraid of hiring Venezuelans because they believe that such action is illegal, which deepens the unemployment migrant rate in the country. Furthermore, there are some other businessmen that see the migration as an opportunity for obtaining cheaper workforce (López, 2018, p. 17), considering that the labor supply of the migrant population is indeed cheaper, which conduces to

irregular hiring. This has become a common practice on the part of employers, which leads to an increase in the cases of labor exploitation (Aliaga, et al., 2020, pp. 256-257).

The unemployment has become an important aspect that is affecting the migrants and the returned population who have problems finding a formal job. According to RAMV data, 6.6% of the country's unemployment corresponds to Venezuelan migrants, and this situation is even worse in the cities near the border, in places such as Riohacha and Arauca where these citizens constitute more than 40% of the total unemployed population. Some of the causes of the high unemployment rate correspond to the employers' ignorance on how to hire foreigners, and to the small number of migrants with educational qualifications validated by the Colombian authorities. The difficult labor situation of the Venezuelan migrants in Colombia has led this population to have a labor informality rate of 32%, and 29.5% working independently (Aliaga, et al., 2020, pp. 245-246). It is important to highlight the big size that the informal labor markets have in Colombia. Large cities, for example, tend to have larger informal labor markets, and given the current low concentration of migrants and refugees in urban centers, it could be a smart policy to incentivize redistribution to these areas (Bahar, Dooley, & Huang, 2018, pp. 14-15).

Migrants' access to national employment programs presents several challenges as well, including problems of qualification, documentation, and high opportunity cost. A main obstacle regarding the access to employment services is that almost all of these programs require having completed high school. However, more than 50% of the Colombian returnees and Venezuelan migrants do not have this education level. On the other hand, the crisis context in which people are migrating from Venezuela implies that, although some have completed secondary school, they do not have the corresponding certificates. However, there are other offers of employability services with a broader entry criterion such as the technical training programs of the National Learning Service (SENA). Nonetheless, the opportunity cost for migrants is quite high taking into consideration the great need of generating income, which is satisfied more quickly in the informal market. Also, the presence of such institutions like SENA is limited in the borderline areas, which represents another challenge for providing the service to the migrants (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 105).

Another big challenge is the disinformation around the migrant population. In an survey conducted by Iglesia, Villa, Pichón & Durán (2018), in Maicao, Guajira, the researchers found out that the migrant population did not know about the international convention regarding the protection of the migrant workers' rights; the 60% knew about the guarantees and rights that they have as a migrant worker; just 20% of them knew where to go in case they needed to assert their rights, but none of them has ever done it out of fear or lack of information. On the other hand, out of the people interviewed, just 20% were aware of the minimum wage in Colombia, but just 15% of them were receiving such a salary, were affiliated to the social security, and were receiving all the social benefits, and extra hours. The results show not only the lack of information on the migrant's side, but the level of informality that there is in the labor market in Maicao, Guajira – one of the main migrant-receiving cities- , which hints that the situation is not very different in the other borderline municipalities.

On the positive side, some segments of the local economies have become more dynamic as a result of migration. Municipalities such as Villa del Rosario and Maicao have registered rapid growth in commercial activities in the border area. In particular, the sales of groceries, international calls, internet services, and national and international ground transportation services have expanded rapidly. On the other hand, some municipalities have managed to register some migrants in employment services, and most of these people have managed to obtain certification of labor competencies by the SENA, even if done with limited results in employment due to the rigidity of the labor market both in Riohacha and in Cúcuta (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 105).

Finally, regarding the job opportunities and training, through the issuance of Circular 056 of 2017, the Ministry of Labor provided guidelines to the entities with the capacity of providing employability services for taking care of the migrant and returned population. In this sense, the Ministry of Labor guaranteed the Venezuelan population access to the intermediation services of the Public Employment Service (SPE), regardless of whether or not they have a PEP. The purpose of this is to facilitate the job-finding process by registering the resumes of the Venezuelans in all the agencies of the SPE Providers Network (including the Public Employment Agency SENA), and by including services of job training for increasing the

migrant's opportunities of finding a job (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 104).

3.2.4. Access to housing

The migration has generated a significant demand for temporary shelter and housing, considering the level of vulnerability of the migrants, as many of them do not have the economic conditions to rent decent housing. Such situation has resulted in the occupation of public spaces (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 109) such as parks, courts, and others. In order to try to mitigate this problem the National Government has implemented passing-by homes providing shelter for a period of 48 hours. Unfortunately, these places have a limited capacity, leaving out thousands of Venezuelans wandering the streets of the cities (Albor-Chadid & Díaz, 2018, p. 80).

Many of these households occupying informal settlements are both in public and private properties, and normally in risk areas without any water supply, sewerage, and electricity. In the municipality of Arauca, there are at least 10 settlements located in flood areas along the banks of the Arauca River. Informal settlements were also identified in Cúcuta, Villa del Rosario, Riohacha, and Maicao (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 109). Temporary shelter services are provided by national and international humanitarian organizations, such as the Red Cross, UNHCR, IOM and Pastoral Social, providing temporary shelter to hundreds of vulnerable migrants living on the streets through care centers in La Guajira and Norte de Santander. No migrant centers were found in Arauca, where the occupation of public space is more visible. On the other hand, by law, the subsidies granted by the Colombian government for new housing are intended only for national citizens, whether they are residents or returnees, and there is not a normative that allows a definitive solution regarding Venezuelan households (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 111).

It is important to take into consideration the big effort that different entities in Colombia have put forward in order to assist the migrants. Colombian foundations such as Casa de Atención al Migrante: Un Corazón sin Fronteras (In English: "Migrant Care House: A Heart without Frontiers"), the Refugee and Migrant Care Centers (CARM) -created by the Diocese of Riohacha, through the Riohacha Social Pastoral Secretariat, in agreement with the UNHCR-, and the international donor

community are to be mentioned. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that the capacity of these institutions is not enough to cover all the migrant population that ends up sleeping in the streets or constructing improvised shelter units.

3.2.5. Other important aspects

Irregularity is an important issue among the refugee population. According to the information provided by Migration Colombia, up to 31st December 2020, within the national territory there were more than 1.729.000 Venezuelan migrants, out of which 966 thousand (around 56%) are in irregular condition. On the other hand, according to the data provided by the United Nations (UN), more than 5 million Venezuelan citizens have left their country in the last years, making Colombia the home of 34% of the total Venezuelan population. This migratory tendency is increasing, and it is thought that, by the end of 2021, this number may rise to 6.2 million, a number that surpasses the data of the Syrian crisis (Presidencia de Colombia, 2021).

According to the World Bank (2018), up to 2018, the Government had prioritized the identification of mechanisms for the regularization of migrants, which is a key aspect for granting them access to the supply of services. The main mechanisms for regularizing the immigration status include nationalization (for children of the returned population) and the ETPV. However, the irregularity condition responds in part to limitations in terms of documentation originated in Venezuela, as well as economic restrictions. The challenge for obtaining the identity documents such as apostilled birth records and passports necessary to obtain regular jobs, or for regularizing their immigration status in Colombia, include the non-issuance of the aforementioned documents by the Venezuelan Government, the cost of obtaining them, or their expiration, theft, or loss in the immigration process. This did not only affect the population's regularization process and, with this, their socio-economic and vulnerability conditions in the medium term, but also put them at risk of being victims of situations of human trafficking, labor exploitation, discrimination, xenophobia, and forced recruitment, in areas where there is the presence of illegal armed groups, such as the bordering areas (Sáez, Andrade, Sicard, & Medina, 2020, p. 46).

Regarding personal safety and citizen security, in Maicao, transportation and security are a big source of problems for the community. For instance, the parents of the Indigenous Educative Center No. 6 in Maicao highlighted the situation of insecurity for crossing the border both on the road and along the trails. Guajira just counts on small trucks, or motorcycle taxis as conveyance. This puts children and young people at high risk, who are often victims of accidents, abuse, robberies, among other crimes. Recently, children – who report walking up to two hours to get to school – were caught in the crossfire of criminal gangs (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 117).

Another important challenge regards public order problems that started with the migration. The number of judicialized citizens of Venezuelan origin prosecuted in the country has increased. According to the registry of the National Police, between the period 2016-2017, 1,243 citizens of that nationality have been prosecuted for committing crimes in the Colombian territory. The most frequent crimes are robbery from financial entities (197), robbery from people (188), drug trafficking or manufacture (176), favoring of contraband (70), among other crimes (236) (Santana, Alcántara, & Espinel, 2019, p. 49). These situations are even more delicate when taking into consideration the women population, which can be easily targeted for forced prostitution, sexual exploitation, servitude, and similar practices to slavery, as one of the means to meet their economic needs and that of their families (Santana, Alcántara, & Espinel, 2019, p. 33). Another aspect that increases women vulnerability is gender-violence. According to information from the National Institute of Health, medical care regarding cases of gender violence among the migrant community increased by 313%, passing in the period analyzed (epidemiological weeks 1 to 23 of 2017 and 2018) from 78 to 245 cases, respectively. Even though the data suggest a rise in the incidence of this type of violence, the numbers do not allow determining the scale of the problem, since most cases are not reported due to stigma, fear of deportation or lack of access to health services (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, pp. 87-88).

On the other hand, the Venezuelan migrant population has experienced a considerable level of trauma. According to IOM's figures, 48% of the migrant population registered through the instrument Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reported feeling anguish, sadness and anxiety mainly associated with leaving their

country of origin, their belongings, and their family. Despite the fact that this is a considerable percentage, so far, no systematic analysis of the psychosocial conditions of the migrant and returned population, nor an identification of the needs, in the short and medium term, for their proper management has been carried out. The support and psychological accompaniment that the population requires in these types of situations is important and critical for their adequate social integration (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 88).

Another serious issue is the recruitment of migrants by the guerillas groups that operate in the Colombian-Venezuelan border, where some criminal organizations are exploiting the Venezuelan people (Santana, Alcántara, & Espinel, 2019, p. 32). These migrants, particularly irregular ones, have been recruited as informants, combatants or as part of networks of illegal economies such as micro-trafficking, sale of narcotics, drug transportation to Venezuela, smuggling of fuels and minerals to Colombia, arms and human trafficking, etc. (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, pp. 88-89).

On the other side, the breakdown of families and the precarious economic conditions of Venezuelan migrants have generated an increase in minors in condition of abandonment which puts them at risk of human trafficking, recruitment by armed groups, abuse and sexual exploitation. As of April 27, 2018, the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) initiated processes to restore the rights of 418 Venezuelan migrant minors, 159 of which were in early childhood (between 0 and 5 years old). These children (234 girls and 184 boys) were under the protection of the ICBF for mistreatment, sexual abuse, malnutrition, abandonment, and human trafficking for sexual exploitation (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 87). As a way of trying to tackle down the problem, or at least reducing the cases, the World Bank (2018) informs that national, departmental, and municipal governments have made efforts to mitigate some of the negative social dynamics that have developed because of migration. Institutions such as ICBF, Ombudsmen and municipalities have generated institutional responses to protect vulnerable migrant populations, including abandoned children, and homeless population. Similarly, the National Police and the National Army have carried out different operations to prevent or control human trafficking and forced recruitment. Additionally, the national government and international organizations such as UNHCR and IOM have tried to facilitate the

integration of migrants into the communities through anti-xenophobia campaigns. On its side the ICBF reports on efforts to expand quotas even when the coverage is still restricted, especially due to the limited infrastructure. In Guajira, as a result of an intervention carried out between April 4 and 11, 2018, there was an expansion to 5 thousand places for the early childhood modality. Similarly, in Norte de Santander, the ICBF in the last year has expanded to around 4 thousand places in early childhood.

Another important issue is social protection, according to the World Bank (2018), the migration from Venezuela has not translated into an increase in the coverage and quality of public social protection services. National programs have limited access (they require registration in the SISBEN database) and it has quota restrictions. The municipalities do not have financial resources to expand the coverage and must follow the same access criteria as the national offer. In recent years, the Social Prosperity programs have not had variations or expansion of coverage to respond to an increase in the demand for care due to migration, and the differences in indicators of shelter, nutrition and sanitary conditions between the migrant population and the host population suggest that the supply of services is still not enough to cover the demand.

When looking at the provision of services, according to the World Bank (2018), the fiscal impact of migration in Colombia in the short term constitutes a challenge for the country. It is estimated that in 2018 between 0.26% and 0.41% of the GDP would be required to provide access to services to the returned and migrant population. According to the assumptions of the National Planning Department, and taking into account the limitations in the absorption capacity of the public service provision systems, by 2018 the cost of providing partial services to the migrant population would reach 0.26% of the GDP. Assuming a rapid expansion in public services that would allow a level of coverage of both the migrant and the local population in receiving areas, the cost would amount to 0.41% of the GDP. In addition to this, it would be necessary to consider in the medium term the cost of investments in infrastructure necessary to expand the network of services in receiving areas, particularly in education, health, drinking water access, sanitation, and even transportation.

Another vulnerable population is the indigenous Wayú. According to the World Bank (2018), The Wayú indigenous people have historically suffered from a lack of potable water, considering that only 16.3% of the dispersed rural population has access to that service, and only 4% have access to improved basic sanitation systems. The Wayú inhabit the desert part of La Guajira peninsula and have dual Colombian-Venezuelan nationality. Historically, they have been nomads traveling between the two neighboring countries, living from fishing, herding, handicrafts, and the trade of products coming from both countries. The closure of the border in 2015, together with a drought of up to 4 years, has affected the Wayú population. Before the border closure, the national government declared a public calamity in Guajira due to the drought. With the closure of the border, conditions for the Wayú worsened, and the flow of food and aid from Venezuela was interrupted, leaving the Wayú without food and water, resulting in an increase in the mortality rate associated with malnutrition in a 50% between 2011 and 2015. The Wayú population returned from Venezuela has a special status and can receive their Colombian nationality with a confirmation of the traditional authority of the community of origin before the Secretariat for Indigenous Affairs. However, not all authorities grant this right to the returnees. There are cases in which the Wayús claim their ancestral lands, creating conflicts, especially if those lands have a water source. The Vice Ministry of Water is implementing two pilot projects for public basins in the municipalities of Maicao and Manaure, as well as replication in other places in Guajira, in order to provide a solution to this problem. The department assembly is debating about the creation of a departmental water company to be in charge of ensuring the sustainability of rural water systems in areas where the largest Venezuelan migrant settlements have been evidenced.

Finally, the government decided to implement contingency plans to provide drinking water service to the migrant communities. For example, in Guajira the construction of public toilets has begun in areas with a high concentration of migrants. Likewise, the Government has facilitated the distribution of water in tank cars to human settlements. The Municipal Government in Cúcuta, in conjunction with the operating company, developed a plan for the implementation of public batteries, which is currently managed by the community action boards of the neighborhoods, and operated by the company Agua Kpital of Cúcuta. The program

began in 2011 with 59 batteries, and currently counts on 194 units that supply to around 13 thousand properties (a mixed population between Venezuelan migrants and Colombian citizens). The financing of this program is sustained with a basic charge, with resources from the General System of Participation (SGP), and some subsidies. If the consumption is greater, it is assumed as a loss by the operating company. This value is invoiced to the leader of the community action board, who receives the contributions from the beneficiaries of each pile. On the other hand, international organizations are also supporting the migrant areas. In the settlements visited, it was reported the distribution of water filters to migrants and locals, as well as the creation of capacities for waste management by organizations such as The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Save the Children, the Red Cross, and UNHCR (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 115).

The demand for social services in the border municipalities exceeds the existing capacities. Many of these needs are not exclusive to migrants and therefore compete with the current needs of the host population. The high poverty rate in the border areas, where the migrant and returnee population is concentrated, increases the demand for social services, while resources at the municipal level are limited. The highest coverage of social protection services occurs with programs offered at the national level, specifically by the Administrative Department for Social Prosperity (DPS) and the ICBF, which have as an objective the assistance to vulnerable population, especially children. On the other hand, Colombia is in great need of international assistance, but unfortunately the assignment of cooperation resources has been limited, and their coordination and alignment with the Government's priorities has been complex. Despite having assigned a total of USD 84 million, until July 2018, only USD 4 million have been executed by the different agencies, due to delays in disbursements and other logistical limitations. Most of the resources are executed through NGOs, which limits the Government's ability to direct resources to the sectors that experience the greatest impacts, such as health and education (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 64). A final important issue is regarding the registration of Venezuelan newborns in Colombia. Regarding this matter, the Colombian Government through the Resolution 8470, issued on 5th August 2019, has decided to concede the Colombian nationality to all the Venezuelan children born within the Colombian territory after the 19th of August 2015, with the

purpose of protecting these minors and saving them from their statelessness situation (Presidencia de Colombia , 2019).

3.2.6. National and international assistance

The international donor community has shown solidarity with the country for responding to the needs associated with migration. As of June 2018, the international community promised to mobilize USD 84.8 million to respond to the demands of migration in Colombia, but unfortunately, up to November 2018, only a total of 4 million has been implemented through the ONGs found in Colombia (Revista Semana, 2018). The USAID has been the main international donor, mobilizing USD 40.5 million, including emergency resources and an additional request for USD 18 million, aimed at supporting efforts related to the registration of migrants, food assistance, health, and economic stabilization. Part of these resources has been used to finance activities of the agencies of the United Nations´ system, which has mobilized additional funds for USD 18.6 million, particularly through (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018):

- The IOM, in matters of characterization and information analysis
- The UNHCR, which has focused on different aspects of protection, social integration, information, and documentation
- The World Food Program (WFP), on food security
- UNICEF, on issues of child protection, water and basic sanitation, nutrition, and education.

During the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, the US Government announced an additional aid package of USD 49 million to respond to this migration (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018). Other bilateral donors and agencies have also made important contributions to address this phenomenon. The European Union donated USD 1.5 million on 2020 (EFE, 2020), and Spain has promised a donation of 144 million of Euros (Camargo, 2021). On their side, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of the Red Cross, and the National Red Cross Society have provided support on issues, such as arrests, family reunification, vaccination, support for transit processes, food, basic hygiene kits, among others (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018). On the other hand, UNHCR supports by creating a full profile of the migrant population, identifying

their needs and establishing protocols according to the data obtained, in order to provide a better assistance. Also, UNHCR created campaigns such as Somos Panas (In English: “We are Friends”) for diminishing the manifestations of xenophobia towards the migrants, and for promoting the solidarity. Finally, UN Women compiles the stories of women who were victims of different abuses during their migratory path, and provides information regarding the current Colombian institutions, as a way to help the migrants to understand how to obtain state protection (Aliaga, et al., 2020, p. 238).

A number of national and international civil society organizations have also mobilized to respond to this situation. International organizations such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Save the Children, the Lutheran World Federation, and national and local organizations such as Pastoral Social, are carrying out key protection actions such as provision of shelter for migrants in streets, psychosocial support, food, safety, legal advice, health provision, local community kitchens and anti-xenophobia campaigns, among others. The local organizations have proven to be an important ally in responding to the needs derived from migration. With the exception of a few isolated outbreaks of xenophobia, the solidarity of the local population, particularly those most vulnerable, is outstanding. Colombians have generously mobilized on behalf of the Venezuelan migrants and returnees. Companies and individuals from all the economic strata finance community kitchens, shelter sites, school supplies and uniforms, and health services, among many other aspects, through their donations. It is noteworthy that this solidarity is also visible in areas where the migrant and returnee population is settling, where the local population, despite their vulnerability levels, has mobilized to provide shelter, food, and access basic services to the immigrants (Banco Mundial (World Bank), 2018, p. 58).

Another important action implemented by UNHCR was the creation, in a territory ceded by the town hall of Maicao, Guajira, of the Integral Center of Attention for the Venezuelan citizens, which opened in March 2019, and serves as shelter for around 350 migrants. By rule, the persons can remain only 30 days in the shelter, but in special cases it can be extended due to their vulnerability. In this place there is attention provided by the Danish Refugee Council, the Norwegian Refugee Council, UNHCR, the World Food Program, the ICBF, the Colombian Civil

Defense, and the International Red Cross (Morales, 2019). According to the data, in its initial state the shelter provided attention to more than 4.000 migrants, and in the second phase, which started in November 2020, the shelter was expanded to double its capacity in order to accommodate 7500 persons (Proyecto Migración Venezuela, 2020).

This chapter contained the historical facts that led to the flux of Venezuelan migrants towards Colombia, and it provided information regarding the response of the Colombian Government for facing the migratory crisis in aspects such as legal framework, access to health, education, work, housing, and other important aspects, as it also contained information on the international assistance provided for the emergency. The chapter was written in this particular order because these are the most important aspects that are covered in response to the refugee emergency, and it will serve as a way to establish the parameters to make a comparative study when analyzing the same elements of the Turkish counterpart.

CHAPTER 4: IMMIGRATION OF THE SYRIAN PEOPLE TO TURKEY

This chapter will cover the most important aspects that need to be understood in order to have an idea of the situation related to the refugees in Turkey. It is important to mention that during the gathering of the sources for writing this chapter it was difficult to come across official documents expedited by the government, so this part is constructed with the available literature on the refugee issue. Also, in the chapter the use of the word “refugee” is understood as the person that entered the Turkish territory seeking protection, but it does not mean that the refugee status has been granted to the individual, since the Turkish government only concedes such status to the Europeans, applying the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol.

4.1. The Syrian Migration to Turkey

Historically, Turkey has been considered as a country of emigration, but this situation changed from 1980 when the country experienced a large number of asylum seekers escaping from important conflicts, and tensions coming from different countries (İçduygu, 2015; İçduygu & Diker, 2017). Among some of the examples, in 1988 a total of 60.000 refugees entered Turkey coming from Iraq after the chemical attack in Halabja, and in 1991 around 500.000 Kurdish asylum seekers settled in the snowy mountains in the border of Turkey and Iraq, but this number was reduced during the same year, until it stopped at 5.000 Iraqi-Kurdish nationals the same year in September (Myers, 2017). Likewise, between 1980 and 1996 Turkey received around 1.454 million Iranian asylum seekers escaping from the social discontent, economic difficulties, and repression product of the Iranian Revolution (Hakimzadeh, 2006), and equally important, in the 1990s, Turkey received waves of asylum seekers coming from the Balkans and the Caucasus, among which there were Muslim Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians, Pomarks, Kosovars, and Tatars (Myers, 2017).

In the 2000s regional instability in Afghanistan and Iraq generated almost 30.000 asylum seekers in Turkey, and in 2014 a total of 10.000 Iraqi asylum seekers were received as a result of the violence in their country (Myers, 2017). Furthermore, according to the official statistics, there are around 2000.000 Turkmenistan nationals living in Turkey, even though rights activists express that the actual number rounds

around 1.000.000 (Farooq, 2021), and Afghans represent about the 35% of the non-Syrian asylum seeker population in Turkey, with about 120.000 persons (Myers, 2017).

On the other hand, before the crisis started in 2011, not many Syrians considered Turkey as a country that welcomes refugees. According to the statistics provided by the Turkish government from 1995 until the beginning of the civil war only 635 asylum seekers came from Syria (Kirişci, 2014, p. 11).

The conflict that led to the Syrian refugee crisis began as a domino effect that took place in the regions of North Africa and the Middle East, when a pro-democratic movement arose in these countries that were mainly Muslim, leading to protests against the central governments. At this stage, the Syrians stood against the corruption of the authoritarian government of Bashar Assad (Hacioglu, 2018, p. 42). This struggle escalated rapidly creating a civil war between the central government and different rebel groups, ending in clashes that led 6.6 million of people to be internally displaced, and 5.6 more to become asylum seekers in the neighboring countries, which has been catalogued by the UNHCR as the worst refugee crisis of our time (Hacioglu, 2018, p. 3). At the beginning of this process, and due to the good relations of Turkey and Syria, the Turkish government tried to advise Bashar al-Assad, and was willing to serve as a mediator between the government, and the opposing parts, but unfortunately the regime answered with brutal repression on protestors, which made Ankara to step back, and adopt an anti-Assad position (Donelli, 2018, p. 2). Before the events of 2011, the close relations between both countries had ended in a mutual liberation of visa, which was important because, as soon as the violence began to increase, the Syrians could enter Turkey with their passports. Eventually, as the influx of asylum seekers increased, the Turkish government adopted an open-door policy (Cagaptay & Menekse, 2014; Kirişci, 2014).

At the beginning of the open-door policy the Turkish government allowed the Syrian nationals to settle in Temporary Accommodation Centers (TAC), known also as camps, with a capacity of 300.000 people that were managed by the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), where there was provision of services such as accommodation, education, health, social and religious services (Donelli, 2018, pp. 2-3). These camps were located especially in the bordering areas (Aras

&Duman, 2018; Kahraman, Orselli & Bayrakci, 2017) and even if they provided a good momentary solution to some of the asylum seekers, this measure seemed not to be enough as just the 8% of the refugee population were living in the 23 camps that were located in 10 cities near the Turkey-Syria border (İçduygu & Diker, 2017, pp. 14-15). The Turkish government became successful regarding the installation and administration of these camps, which were equipped with schools, medical centers, vocational programs, and recreational facilities, among many other services that led the International Crisis Group to qualify them as the “best camps ever seen”, and even The New York Times wrote an article titled “how to build the perfect camp for the refugees?” (Kirişci, 2014, pp. 14-15).

At this initial stage the influx of Syrians was not very big. The first wave of refugees brought only 15.000 persons in April 2011 to the tent cities installed in Hatay, and by the end of the month 5.000 people had already returned as the situation normalized, and by the end of the year there were only 8.000 persons (İçduygu, 2015, p. 7). The asylum seekers coming in this first wave were treated as “guest” (Mackreath & Sağnıç, 2017, p. 9), and at this point they had no status when referring to the law on immigration or the internal Turkish legislation (Sariteke, 2019, p. 271). Such status was established in October 2011, when the government extended “temporary protection”, providing a more official platform that gave access to the refugees to humanitarian services that are basic for any human being, such as health and shelter, also, Turkey committed itself to the application of the “non-refoulement” that is contained in the international law. Such protection was granted without a specific time limitation, and the content of this instrument was under the guard of the Ministry of Interior and was never revealed (Kirişci, 2014, pp. 14-15). Nonetheless, it is important to mention that this temporary protection was granted as a way of not conceding the refugee status in compliance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status Refugees, based on the fact that the convention has a geographical limitation that extends the refugee status to those migrants arriving from European countries, on the other hand, the Settlement Law of 1934, and its version of 2006 grants permanent residency and citizenship rights only to those with Turkish offspring and culture (Mackreath & Sağnık, 2017; Hacıoglu, 2018), furthermore, since the Syrians cannot be granted the refugee status because of the geographical limitation, they are not eligible for resettlement to a third country, but their cases can be heard by a

country that requests the resettlement (Hacioglu, 2018, p. 7). Fortunately, UNHCR has launched different appeals to different countries in order to obtain volunteers to resettlements (Kirişci, 2014, p. 19).

The number of displaced people as a result of the civil war in Syria has been the largest flow of people running from war since World War II (Loayza, Ulyssea, & Utsumi, 2018, p. 1). When everything began in 2011 Turkey became the main destination for the Syrian population escaping the crisis mainly because of the geographical proximity, but also because, in many cases, there were family ties with the other side of the border. Also, both countries share a common historical background that links them to the Ottoman Empire, and there are cultural, ethnic, and religious similarities that make them compatible, hence, attracting the immigration when the crisis exacerbated (Hacioglu, 2018, pp. 6-15). Consequently in 2012, after the failure of the ceasefire in Syria an average of 20.000 refugees started to arrive to Turkey monthly (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 60), subsequently, by the end of 2012, there were already more than 170.000 registered asylum seekers in Turkey, and the Turkish government began building additional tents in the southern cities of Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, and Mardin (İçduygu, 2015; Donelli, 2018), which are considered to be neither central, nor marginal, and they are characterized by being ethnically mixed, consisting of Turkish, Arab, Kurdish, Alawite, and Sunni residents, accounting for about 7.9% of the total population of the country, and contributing to more than 5% of Turkey's economic output (Cagaptay & Menekse, 2014, p. 3). At this point, these provinces started to be hosts to the refugee population that was not only in the camps, but also in the cities with an estimate of 70.000 Syrians by December 2012 (UNHCR, 2013, p. 213).

In 2013, as a part of the renewal of the legislation regarding the ongoing accession process of Turkey to the European Union, it was promulgated the Law No 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), which provided the Syrians with a new and unique status defined by a temporary protection. This law allows the Syrians that enter the Turkish territory to remain in the country, and provided work authorization, access to education and healthcare, and the possibility of acquiring immovable property (Mackreath & Sağnıç, 2017; Hacioglu, 2018). On the other hand, by the end of 2013, Turkey started to look for cooperation with international organizations such as UNHCR, and requested contributions from the UN programs,

as the country understood that the burden was very high to be carrying it all alone (Donelli, 2018, pp. 2-3). The previous was done in alignment with the immigration peak of the first half of 2013, when the average of people arriving to the country was of 40.000 per month (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, pp. 60-62).

In 2014 the Turkish government funded the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), as it was stipulated in the Article No. 3 of the LFIP, which contrasted with the fact that, by the end of the same year, Turkey became the first refugee-hosting country with a refugee population of 1.5 million (İçduygu & Diker, 2017, pp. 14-16). At this point the average arrival was of 55.000 persons per month, motivated by the increase of violence in Syria and Iraq, caused by the radical groups Islamic State in Syria, and the Levant in Iraq, which occupied territories in these two countries (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, pp. 60-62). In 2015 the number of refugees increased quickly because of the occupation of North Syria by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (İçduygu, 2015, p. 3), reaching 1.7 millions of people by the mid-March (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, pp. 60-62). At this point the immigration showed that the Syrian refugees represented an important economic actor in Turkey by providing an important workforce and because of their entrepreneurial skills, which are shown by the foundation of 1599 new companies in 2015, in contrast with the small number of 157 established in 2012 (Esen & Binatli, 2017, p. 1). The same year Turkey and the European Union launched the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. Such project establishes that the European Union will accept within its territory the resettlement of one Syrian citizen living in Turkey, with the compromise that Turkey will receive one deported Syrian that has attempted to enter Europe illegally (Mackreath & Sağnıç, 2017, pp. 9-10). In return, Turkey would receive financial aid for the administration of the refugees within the Turkish territory, and the liberation of the EU visa to the Turkish citizens. Unfortunately, up to the date, this agreement has only served as a mechanism to protect the European countries from an irregular immigration of Syrian nationals (Aras & Duman, 2018, pp. 1-2). This agreement was launched especially in 2015 considering that the number of migrants arriving to Europe jumped from 138.000 in 2014, to almost 500.000 in the late 2015, and it was a period when refugees suffered a lot in the European borders, and many lives were lost in the sea (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, pp. 60-62).

On January 2016 the government passed a law that granted work permits to all the Syrians that completed their registration in Turkey (Mackreath & Sağrıç, 2017, p. 7), as a way of helping them to become economically independent, which in return would positively affect the Turkish economy (Carpio, Seker, & Yener, 2018, p. 10), and at this point they became more dispersed around the country (Esen & Binatli, 2017, p. 1). This year Turkey reached a number of 2.8 million refugees, becoming the largest host country in the world (Kahraman, Orselli, & Bayrakcim 2017; Loayza, Ulysea, & Utsumi, 2018), and according to the UNHCR, by the end of 2016, the number of people forced to leave their country went up to 65.6 million, which is the greatest number ever seen. This was a product of the Syrian civil war that, up to this point, had left 8 million Syrians that were internally displaced, and 5.1 million more that had left the country (Esen & Binatli, 2017, p. 1).

In May 2017, according to the DGMM, there were already more than 3 million of Syrian refugees in Turkey, (İçduygu & Diker, 2017, pp. 14-15). This led to thinking that this situation was not momentary, and that Syrians would not go within a few months, as it was thought at the beginning (Mackreath & Sağrıç, 2017, pp. 9-10). On the other hand, with the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement, signed on March 2016, the government's approach started shifting from "crisis management" towards "sustainable integration", and the policy discussion started to change from temporary solutions to harmonization, which would lead to empowerment, integration, and ultimately, self-sufficiency of the refugees in Turkey (Kadkoy, 2017).

In 2020 the Covid-19 epidemic that was first identified in Wuhan, China, stroke the whole world. Turkey applied many measures to reduce the widespread of the virus like closing schools, curfews, closing non-essential shops, among others. By this point there were only 7 temporary accommodation centers, where only 2% of the refugee population lived, while the rest of the 3.5 million people were living in urban and rural areas (RELIEF International, 2020, p. 2). This situation poses a big challenge for the refugee population because of their limited access to formal employment and public services, also, the measures taken by the government have especially affected the informal sector, where refugees are normally employed. In the report presented by the Emergency Social Safety Net (2020), it was found that 69% of the household reported employment loss, 78% faced an increase in expenses, 31%

of the children had problems to access the online education programs, and 61% mentioned to have a decrease in the possibility to access hospitals. Fortunately, 81% do not face any inconvenient to access markets, and 96% of the households reported to have no difficulties in the use of the Kızılay debit card (Emergency Social Safety Nest (ESSN), 2020), which is a system that provides financial support to more than 1.3 million of refugees. This program was funded in 2016 by the European Commission and was initiated by the Turkish Red Crescent and the World Food Program, in the context of harmonization (Arik, 2018).

Turkey has been seen as a role model regarding migration management, and it is important to highlight the big monetary efforts that the country has done in order to provide comfort to the refugees (Sariteke, 2019, p. 270), so far the country has spent more than \$ 40 billion of its own budget for providing humanitarian assistance to the Syrian population (Simsek, 2021).

4.2. Legal Background

The influx of migrants pushed the country to generate new regulations regarding foreign immigration. But before these events, the main law that ruled was the 1934 Settlement Law, which favored the immigration of people of Turkish descent and culture, which remained as a key feature in the internal legal framework for decades (İçduygu, 2015, p. 4). The next important legal framework was the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, which Turkey ratified, and the Additional Protocol of 1967 (Donelli, 2018, p. 4), both of which provided a framework for conceding the refugee status to the European asylum seekers, and Turkey is the only country that still maintains those geographic limitations granting the refugee status only to people coming from Europe (Girgin & Cebeci, 2017; Hacıoglu, 2018).

By the most part of the 20th century Turkey received refugees escaping persecution coming from the Balkans, which were the former Ottoman lands. This situation continued even after the end of the Cold War, when in 1991, the country granted temporary protection to about 500.000 Iraqi Kurds running away from Saddam Hussein's regime (Cagaptay & Menekse, 2014, p. 8). This fact led Turkey to reconsider its system of asylum, launching in 1994 the Regulation on Asylum, which still maintained the geographical limitation of the Convention of 1951 (İçduygu,

2015, p. 5). Then, in 2003 there was a positive shift in the migration policies, due to the accession negotiations of Turkey to the European Union, which led to new laws and regulations such as the Law on Work Permits for Foreigners (LWPF), that facilitates the access to the job market to the foreigners (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 62), and shows a more welcoming attitude towards the migrant labor force, but unfortunately the law did not provide any framework regarding the refugees and asylum seekers (İçduygu, 2015, p. 6).

In 2011 Turkey experienced a mass flow of Syrians, and the number increased with the years forcing the government to rethink the legal framework regarding the protection of asylum seekers (İçduygu, 2015, p. 6). For this reason, in 2013 the Parliament adopted the LFIP No. 6458, which provided a framework for treating the asylum seekers and irregular migrants, in accordance to the international law, and provided an efficient and modern management system aligned with the European standards (İçduygu, 2015, p. 6), and it was aimed at extending protection to all the Syrians and Palestinians, as well as to stateless persons coming from Syria (Donelli, 2018, p. 4).

The law 6458 defined “temporary protection” as a status granted to the foreigners that have been forced to leave their country, and cannot return, and arrived to Turkey looking for temporary protection, due to the emergency. This law is characterized by providing an open-door policy, the principle of non-refoulement, and provides instructions regarding the registration with the Turkish authorities, and support in the camps, but it precludes permanent settlement in the Country (Donelli, 2018, p. 4). On the other hand, this law created the DGMM, under the Ministry of Interior, which is a specialized institution in charge of creating and implementing laws on migration (Cagaptay & Menekse, 2014, p. 8), and introduces the duties of the DGMM related to the mutual harmonization, with the purpose of providing the foreigners with the necessary knowledge and skills to be independent in all the areas of social life without the need of a third person (Hacioglu, 2018, p. 16). Furthermore, within the framework of the law 6458, and by means of its article 91, on October 13, 2014, it was launched the decision of the Council of Ministers No. 214/6883, named “Temporary Protection Regulation” (Directorate General of Migration Management, 2019), out of which the most important aspects are:

The article 1 defines the objective of the regulation and determines the procedures and principles to be applied for those foreigners that had to leave their country seeking urgent and temporary protection that are regulated by the LFIP 6458. The Article 5 clarifies that there will not be any punishment for the illegal entrance or stay in the Turkish territory, provided that they are identified at the moment of entry by the competent units, or that the foreigner approaches these units within a reasonable time period to register, nonetheless, an administrative fine shall be imposed on those who fall outside the scope of this article, if the person does not have a valid reason. The Article 6 establishes the non-refoulement policy explaining that the persons under the scope of this law shall not be returned to a place where they could be victims of torture, inhuman or degrading punishment, or where their life is in danger because of their race, nationality or opinion (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014, pp. 1-2).

The Article 7 dictates that the Temporary Protection is applied to foreigners forced to emigrate in mass, and the Article 8 establishes the reasons why a foreigner could be denied the Temporary Protection based on the Convention of 1951, and the Protocol of 1967. These reasons are: the person has committed cruel acts outside of Turkey for any reason; he or she has been a part, or incited the commission of crimes; he or she took part in armed conflicts in the country of origin, and did not cease permanently those activities. It also denies protection to those who have been identified as executors or planners to commit terrorism; those who pose a danger to the national security, public order or security of the country; those escaping punishment for a crime that would give imprisonment sentence, if committed in Turkey; and those who have been convicted by the international courts for crimes against humanity (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014, p. 3).

The Article 10 provides the Council of Ministers with authorization to determine the persons to be covered by the temporary protection, the effective date and duration, the conditions for extending and ending the protection, and deciding if the protection will be implemented in the whole territory or just in a specific region. The Article 12 explains the situations by which the temporary protection shall be terminated, being those leaving Turkey on their own will, availing himself or herself of the protection of another country, getting resettled, and in the eventuality of death. In case a person that used to have temporary protection wishes to regain the rights,

the Directorate General will analyze and decide on every case individually. The Article 14 establishes that, after the end of the temporary protection, the persons may return to their homeland, after an assessment of the Directorate General of the situation of their country (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014, pp. 4-5).

The Article 15 explains that the temporary protection may be restricted or suspended, temporarily or definitely by the Council of Ministers in case of a threat to the national security, public order, public security, or health. Also, the Article 19 instructs that the Directorate General shall conduct the identification and registration procedures of the foreigners that seek temporary protection, and the Article 20 dictates that emergency health services shall be provided as a priority to the foreigners. The Article 21 and 22 establish the process regarding the registration of the foreigners, which shall be done with confidentiality. It also lists the necessary data to be collected for identifying properly the foreigner, such as fingerprints, photographs, etc., and it mandates the provision of a temporary protection identification document (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014, p. 7).

The Article 23 lists the proceeding referring to the accommodation centers managed by AFAD, and the Article 25 explains that the temporary protection identification document grants the right to stay in the country, but is not considered to be a residence permit, so it does not count as a tool to concede long term residence permits or citizenship. On the other side, the Article 26 explains that the foreigners that are under the temporary protection are provided with services such as health, education, social assistance, access to the labor market, interpretation, and similar services. The Article 27 establishes that health services must be provided by the Ministry of Health inside or outside the temporary accommodation centers, there will be health centers equipped and available, and patient contribution shall not be taken from the person under temporary protection for primary and emergency health services (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014, pp. 9-10).

The Article 28 contains the relevant instructions regarding education. For this purpose, the Ministry of National Education will provide education activities inside and outside the camps and will provide the services according to the age of the child. Also, according to the demand, there will be provision for all ages of language education, vocational courses, skills trainings, etc. and the procedures and principles

for undergraduate, masters and doctorate degrees will be determined by the Presidency of Council of Higher Education, as well as this institution will be in charge of the validation and equivalence of the documents presented. The Article 29 dictates the parameters to have access to the labour market, indicating that the foreigner must apply to obtain a work permit to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, in the sectors, professions and geographical areas, in accordance with the determinations of the Council of Ministers, and the Article 30 talks about the provision of social assistance (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014, pp. 10-12).

The Article 33 establishes that the foreigners under temporary protection are in the obligation of complying with the laws and administrative requirements, otherwise administrative sanctions and criminal proceeding may be carried for those who fail to meet the terms. The foreigners under temporary protection are obliged to: reside in the province, TAC, or place determined by the governorate; comply with the notification times established by the governorate; and to notify any change of address, income, acquisition of movable and immovable property, changes of identity information such as marital status, birth, or death. The non-compliance of this article may carry legal sanctions (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014, pp. 12-13).

The Articles 37 and 38 explain that the coordination of the temporary accommodation centers are under the responsibility of AFAD, who may decide the establishment or ceasing of functioning, upon receiving opinions from the Ministry of Interior and other relevant public institutions and organizations. It also explains that the services to be provided in the camps are food, accommodation, health, social assistance, education, etc. The Article 42 describes the procedure for the voluntary repatriation and departure to a third country. Under this article the government will provide the necessary facilitation according to the resources available, and the Directorate General may plan voluntary repatriation campaigns and programs, in coordination with the relevant country, or with public institutions and international organizations, in order to provide assistance with the process (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014, p. 14).

The Article 46 explains that the Ministry of Interior may cooperate with national and international organizations, and with institutions regarding the

compliance of this law. Also, in the Article 47 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey may call upon other states or international organizations for support and burden sharing, after receiving the opinion of other public institutions and organizations, in order to ensure the provision of the services to the people under temporary protection. Finally, in the provisional article, it is established that this law covers all the people coming from Syria that entered the Turkish territory as a mass influx, or individually, looking for temporary protection due to the events that have taken place in the Syrian republic since 28 April 2011 (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014, pp. 18-19).

For complying with the temporary protection regulation, the person first shall pre-register. The preregistration documents allow the applicant to remain legally in Turkey and have access to emergency health care services for free. After this, if the person is found eligible for temporary protection, he or she has to approach the Provincial Directorate of Migration Management in order to complete the registration, and obtain a Temporary Protection Identity Card. This card grants access to all the services described in this sub-heading, and allows the person to enter into contracts, such as rent and services (Refugee Rights Turkey; Refugee Solidarity Network; Dutch Council for Refugees; US Department of State, Bureau of Population Refugees, and Migration, 2017, pp. 4-5).

If the foreigner entered Turkey illegally and desires to be resettled, he or she will need an exit permission, which is obtainable only if registered. On the other hand, being registered does not mean that the person has to live in the camps, but he or she can only benefit from the rights and services provided by the province where the registration has been completed. On the other hand, the person under temporary protection has the right to request familiar reunification for a spouse, minor children, or dependent children of any age (Refugee Rights Turkey; Refugee Solidarity Network; Dutch Council for Refugees; US Department of State, Bureau of Population Refugees, and Migration, 2017, p. 7).

It is important to mention that attempting to leave Turkey illegally is one of the grounds for deportation, and the person may be detained, but it is also important to highlight that there is applicable legislation that prevents Turkey from deporting people under temporary protection, based on the principle of no-refoulement. As for the refugee children born in Turkey, they are also required to be registered in the

Provincial Directorate of Migration Management where the parents are registered in order to obtain a temporary protection ID card. Such registration does not confer Turkish citizenship to the child nor to the parents. (Refugee Rights Turkey; Refugee Solidarity Network; Dutch Council for Refugees; US Department of State, Bureau of Population Refugees, and Migration, 2017, p. 13).

In January 2016 the government launched the Regulation on Work Permits for Foreigners under Temporary Protection, with the purpose of facilitating the Syrians' access to the formal labour market. This law has some important components such as: the employer has to apply online; the worker cannot be paid less than the minimum wage; and the number of Syrians cannot exceed the 10% of the total of employees in the company. On the other hand, if the refugee works independently, then he or she can make the application by himself/herself. Following the previous regulation, the International Labour Force Law (ILFL) No. 6735 was passed on July 2016, and covers all the migrants. This law seeks to attract foreigners with high qualifications that may contribute to the Turkish economy, and it contains the regulation for obtaining long term residence permits that grants all rights of a citizen, except for voting, standing for election, applying to public service, and frees the person from military duties (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, pp. 63-64).

4.2.1 Access to health

The World Health Organization (WHO) describes health as a basic human right, and Turkey, in accordance, sustains that it is vital to improve the health of the refugees. For this reason, the government instructed that all the refugees that are under temporary protection from April 2011, should benefit from health services, which will be carried by the responsible Ministries, in coordination with AFAD (Akbulut, Goktas, & Kutlu, 2018, p. 2) The 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation provided a wider framework that facilitates the access to the health services (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 6), in fact, AFAD issued the Regulation for Carrying out the Services Regarding Foreigners under Temporary Protection on December 2014, and the Ministry of Health (MoH) updated in 2015 the Regulation of the Principles Regarding the Health Services to be provided to the population under Temporary Protection. In accordance with the before-mentioned regulations, all the persons under temporary protection that are registered would have free access to emergency

health services, primary health services, and hospital services, also they would be granted access to health services provided by the “insurance package” regarding social health insurance that is also offered to Turkish citizens (Akbulut, Goktas, & Kutlu, 2018, p. 2). On the other hand, those who are not registered with the DGMM, will only benefit from the emergency services and primary health services (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 67)

It is important to mention that many campaigns of vaccination have been launched aiming to prevent the propagation of virus and diseases among the refugee population. Such programs have been financed by the government, and have proven to be mainly successful, however the Turkish Medical Association reports that there are problems for providing services to the refugees outside of the camps regarding overworked personnel, absence of specialized medical services, and language barriers (Kirişci, 2014, p. 29). The government and the international organizations are trying to cope with such problems, for instance, Syrian medical staff is getting approved by the Ministry of Health in order for them to work in the migrant health centers that are established by the MoH, and that provides different services to the refugees under temporary protection. These services are coordinated with joint efforts of government and international organizations such as the WHO, who along with the MoH is in charge of organizing training and workshops covering issues related to the refugees. Another important organization is the IOM, and different NGOS such as International Blue Crescent, Doctors Worldwide Turkey, Syria Social Gathering, among others (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 68).

At the beginning the main problem that arose regarding health was related to the access: the government made all the hospital accessible to the refugees and provided funding, nonetheless, the problems presented were related to the overcrowd population, especially in the bordering areas. Also, in some cases there was a lack of awareness of the circulars published by AFAD, where it was established that the health coverage was extended to the Syrian Refugees (Kirişci, 2014, p. 28), fortunately, with the pass of time those problem were overcome and the refugees have been benefiting from the health services, just as the nationals with general insurance do. Additionally, the health personnel is well informed about the regulation, and the language problems are easily solved by the translators free of charge (Akbulut, Goktas, & Kutlu, 2018, p. 2), correspondingly, if a refugee wants to

benefit from health services in another city, rather than the one where he or she is registered, this person needs to submit a petition to the PDMM, and if granted permission, the refugee can request a traveling permission that is usually conceded for a period of 15 days (Refugee Rights Turkey; Refugee Solidarity Network; Dutch Council for Refugees; US Department of State, Bureau of Population Refugees, and Migration, 2017).

Finally, as a prevention measure regarding the Covid-19, the MoH, and the WHO, created a website on Covid-19 for the refugees, which is in Arabic and has as an objective to inform the refugee population about the transmission routes and the ways to prevent and protect themselves from the virus. On the other hand, both institutions also prepared Covid-19 related information that was distributed via leaflets, mobile phone communication, and media, and many other NGOs, and International non-governmental institutions (INGO), have published relevant information (Özvarış, et al., 2020, pp. 2-4). Also, there was direct support from INGOs and NGOs, for instance UNHCR Turkey initiated an emergency cash assistance that covered 74.400 households, reaching about 372.650 people, and distributed materials as well for the prevention of the propagation of the virus (UNHCR Turkey, 2020). Lastly, as an important measure taken by the government of Turkey, the diagnose and treatment of the virus has been classified as an emergency condition, for this reason all the Syrian population is covered by the health provision, even if they are not registered in the PDMM (Özvarış, et al., 2020, p. 4).

4.2.2. Access to education

The main financial burden regarding education is being carried by the Republic of Turkey, which is responsible for the budgeting and planning. There are other International contributors such as UNICEF, the European Union, UNHCR, among others, that contribute to the budgeting, but according to the Ministry of National Education (MoNE), the international funding only covers 10 % of the expenses needed for the education of the Syrian population (Hacioglu, 2018, pp. 23-25). When analyzing the situation of education for the children refugees, it can be seen that up to 2018, within the country there were 973.200 children of school-age, and only 610.278 were enrolled within the Turkish national educational system or

Temporary Education Centers TEC, during 2017 and 2018 (Kolcu, 2018, p. 1).

It is important to mention that the law regarding education in Turkey states that all the children have the right to benefit from a free basic education that goes until 12th grade, no matter if the child is a national or a foreigner (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 65). On the other hand, Turkey is a signee of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which establishes that all children must be granted access to education, no matter their nationality (Kirişci, 2014, p. 23). In compliance with this, MoNE expedited in 2014 the Circular 2014/21 on Educational Services for Foreigners, which allowed Syrian children the possibility to enroll in schools using a foreign identification, regardless of whether or not they had a residence permit (Hacioglu, 2018, pp. 23-25). This circular also provided a framework for ensuring the coordination between the international organizations, the civil society and the public institutions in order to provide the educational services to the refugees, which eliminated many of the problems that the children and their parents were having at the time of the enrollment (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 66). Likewise, in 2016 MoNE founded a department in charge of regulating the planning and coordination of the Syrian Education, and created a system called Higher Education and Foreign Affairs Department (YOBIS) in order to keep a track of the enrollment, absence, and progress of the Syrian students (Hacioglu, 2018, p. 24).

At the very beginning the refugee issue was seen as a temporary one, that is why it was decided to implement a curriculum in Arabic, with some adaptations that included removing the exaltation of Bashar al-Assad and his regime, and excluding negative elements of the Ottoman Empire (Kirişci, 2014, pp. 23-24). Such a curriculum was to be taught in the Temporary Education Centers (TEC), which operations were formalized inside and outside the camps by the MoNE, by means of the circular 2014/21, and had as an objective preventing the children population from falling behind in their education so that they would not experience a deep educational gap when they returned to their country (Hacioglu, 2018, pp. 23-25). On the other hand, it was important to establish such centers due to the fact that the children faced many difficulties in public schools because of the language barrier, and it was an important tool for providing Turkish language lessons, vocational training, and organizing social and cultural activities. This platform also allowed civil society and international organizations to cooperate, in order to meet the needs of the child

refugee population (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, pp. 65-66). It is important to mention that this program also presented some challenges regarding infrastructure, lack of material, and transportation issues, since many of the TECS are located far from the city center (Hacıoğlu, 2018, p. 27), and some of them were not accredited by the government because of the lack of quality of the education provided (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, pp. 65-66).

With the passing of time, it became clear that the refugee situation was not going to fade away in the short term, that is why, even if the policies were focused on temporary measures that were in compliance with the geographical limitation clause of the 1951 Convention on Refugees, the general thinking started to switch towards an integration policy (Hacıoğlu, 2018, p. 15). This implied a challenge for the government, especially in the big cities and in the bordering areas where Syrians did not feel the need to learn Turkish, as they created their own environment where they have their cultural, social, economic, and psychological needs met through their own group, alienating and preventing themselves from integrating to the society (Sariteke, 2019, p. 273). The language barrier not only created a distance between the students and the teachers, it also prevented the parents from attending to school meetings, and caused that some students decided to leave the schools because of their struggle at the time of understanding the lessons, and the discrimination from other students and teachers because of the cultural differences and language (Hacıoğlu, 2018, p. 26).

In order to cope with the integration and language issue, in 2016 the government decided to close the TECS within 3 years, in order to integrate the Syrian children into the Turkish education system (Kolcu, 2018, p. 2). In alignment with this, on October 3, 2016, the MoNE launched the “Project on Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into the Turkish Education System (PIKTES)”, which started its second base in December 2018, and was in operation until December 2021 (Ministry of Education of Turkey, 2016). The objective of the program was mainly to integrate the children into the Turkish educational system, to increase the quality of the education provided, and the acquisition of the Turkish language, which is currently done through language courses, tutorial classes, support to the students through materials, transportation aid, and support to teacher training and wages (Hacıoğlu, 2018, p. 25). On the other hand, for coping with the language problem, many NGO, INGO, and even the government have provided solutions. A clear

example is the execution of a project financed by the European Union, and implemented through the MoNE and the UNHCR, which provides Turkish courses and technical vocation training to Syrians under Temporary Protection in the cities of Kayseri, Konya and Ankara (Eminoğlu, 2020), also, as 2018, the government has granted 20.000 scholarships to Syrian students through the government direction of the Turks Abroad and Related Communities YTB (Erdine, 2018), providing the students with one year of intensive Turkish lessons helping them not only with their career expectations, but also with their integration in society.

4.2.3. Access to work

At the beginning Syrian refugees did not receive work permits, which started to happen after 2016, for this reason, this population entered into the informal labor market engaging in labor-intensive, low-paid jobs in sectors of big demand of informal force, such as construction and agriculture (Loayza, Ulysea, & Utsumi, 2018, p. 5). The Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection, issued on January 2016 by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, aimed at facilitating the access to the job market to the Syrians, not exceeding the 10% of the total personnel number in every firm, which was qualified by the UNHCR Turkey as an important step, considering that it was the first time that such a big group of refugees was granted the right to access to the formal job market (İçduygu & Diker, 2017, p. 18).

It is important to mention that also NGOs and INGOs have been providing assistance to the refugees for accessing the labour market, and learning how to generate their own income. With this respect, the Ministry of Labor (MoLSS), along with the Turkish Public Employment Services (ISKUR), the World Bank, and the European Union are working together in projects directed to address the supply and demand challenges in order to assist the refugees in getting to know the labor market. These plans are expected to be executed from 2018 until 2021. Also, ISKUR has been instructed to help the refugee population to enter the formal market, due to its experience providing employment (Carpio, Seker, & Yener, 2018, p. 11). One of the programs that benefit the refugee population the most is the “Employment Support Project for Syrians under Temporary Protection and Turkish Citizens”, to be implemented by the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services and ISKUR. This

plan was approved in 2018 and was active until December 31, 2021, with a total cost of USD \$48.18 million (The World Bank, 2021). This program provided refugees with skills and language training, job counseling, and job placement services, with the purpose of increasing their resilience and self-reliance. The program also invested in job creation by providing benefits to the firms, in order for them to work with the refugees (The World Bank, 2021). On the other hand, the government launched a social entrepreneurship project that aims at implementing and developing a sustainable business model especially for self-employed women (Carpio, Seker, & Yener, 2018, p. 11).

According to the UNHCR Turkey, the refugee population can be classified in 5 groups: first, there are the entrepreneurs, secondly; the micro-entrepreneurs, thirdly; there are the professionals, fourthly; farmers, and lastly, the unemployed population (İçduygu & Diker, 2017, p. 23). The vast majority of this population lives in bordering cities such as Kilis, Hatay, and Sanliurfa, where the unemployment rates are higher (Sariteke, 2019, p. 274). Another important aspect of these areas, and a problem that covers almost all the Syrian population is the informal nature of the labour market. In the first place, there is a clear misinformation on the Syrian side regarding the regulation and legislation for accessing the labor market, which ends up in many cases of precarious wages and extreme working conditions (Aras & Duman, 2018, p. 9). On the other side, there are the refugees that prefer to continue operating in the informal market because that gives them a competitive value, and this is more attractive for the employers (İçduygu & Diker, 2017, p. 22). Considering that, if the latter operates in the informal sector, then the firm can evade taxes and regulations generating revenue, which pushes the goods prices down (Loayza, Ulysea, & Utsumi, 2018, p. 10). On the other hand, the employers do not want to apply for working permits because they would have to pay for the bureaucratic operation, and they would also have to pay at least the minimum salary to the worker and start contributing to the social insurance (Aras & Duman, 2018, p. 9).

The main reason for the Syrians to be compelled to work especially in the informal sector is because of their illiteracy and lack of training. The majority of them are coming from rural areas, and due to their low level of education, they automatically start looking for jobs in this sector, which exposes them to exploitation, and to work under unsafe and unhealthy conditions (İçduygu & Diker,

2017, p. 23). Also, in the provinces close to the Turkish frontier, before the war started, the educational attainment of the Syrians was lower compared to their Turkish peers. Around 40% of the Syrians from Lattakia were educated to at least secondary level, compared to the 20 % of the people from Aleppo and Idleb, and these figures had a tendency to decrease in other areas of Syria, while in Turkey 45% of the population has completed at least the secondary level of education (Carpio, Seker, & Yener, 2018, p. 11). Another important aspect is that the refugees in the informal market have a tendency to offer working services for a lower price than their Turkish peers, which has created a large job displacement among the locals (Donelli 2018; Kirişçi 2014), and on the other hand, it had a positive effect on the formal market, since it generated more job opportunities for the Turkish nationals (Girgin & Cebeci, 2017, p. 1066).

The vast majority of workers in the informal market are employed in small size firms with no more than 10 employees, while the formal workers are normally employed in firms of 50 employees or more. It was also discovered that nearly half of the informal workers are self-employed (Loayza, Ulysea, & Utsumi, 2018, pp. 7-8), and the refugees' working force is valuable for the firms and for the economy, considering that, as expressed by the employers, it is difficult to find people to work in unskilled jobs, since the Turkish citizens are often searching for a desk job, and the Syrians offer their services at very low rates (Sariteke, 2019, p. 274). Normally, the refugees search for job opportunities in restaurants, textile factories, clothing stores, agriculture sites and construction, earning less than the minimum wage, which gives them just enough to cover their living expenses and maybe send some back home (Cagaptay & Menekse, 2014, p. 10). Another important issue that demotivates the refugees to seek for a formal job is the fact that, once they get employed in the formal sector, they will automatically lose the social assistance provided through cash support from the European Union. On the other hand, the place where the refugee is registered determines where he or she can search for job opportunities in the formal market, while they prefer to move to cities like Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, etc. where the job opportunities are more promising than the ones offered in their place of registration (Carpio, Seker, & Yener, 2018, p. 11).

Another important issue regards the increase of child labor in the informal market. According to The Labour Act of Turkey Nr.4857, it is illegal to employ

children that are under the age of 14 for carrying out jobs that do not hinder their physical, mental, and psychological development (Tuncay, 2009, p. 2). Unfortunately, such law is not always applied, and the Syrians found this loop to use their children in order to generate an additional needed income exposing them to harsh conditions and deprivation of rights (Aras & Duman, 2018, p. 9). The 50% of these children are normally employed in the textile sector, followed by 29% working in the service sector, and 18% in industrial production (İçduygu & Diker, 2017, p. 25). As a way to prevent this issue, the NGOs Human Dialogue (HD), and Concern World Wide (CWW) provide financial support for compensating the income that the children may generate, and allow them to keep studying, also, they offer livelihood projects and training sessions for adults in various sectors, in order to capacitate them to find a job (Aras & Duman, 2018, p. 10). Other entities offering cash assistance are the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, and the Emergency Social Safety Net, which expect to contribute to keep children in the schools (İçduygu & Diker, 2017, p. 26).

A final and important matter regarding the working situation of the Syrians in Turkey is about the entrepreneurship. The Syrians have become the largest group of entrepreneurs in Turkey, which passed from 81 businesses opened in 2011 to 1599 in 2015, and these figures might be bigger in the informal sector (Karasapan, 2016). The main sectors that received Syrian investment were trade, construction, restaurants, real state, textile, transportation, travel, and food related industries (İçduygu & Diker, 2017, p. 27). The formal entrepreneurs are investors and business owners with strong connections in the Middle East, which has facilitated the distribution of Turkish products along the region and have mobilized billions of dollars to Europe using banks in Greece and Cyprus (Donelli, 2018, p. 5). For the self-employed natives, the formal Syrian entrepreneurs are offered unfair governmental applications like tax exemptions, among others, taking into consideration that the Syrians have the possibility to offer the same goods for lower prices, which poses a threat for the local firms (Girgin & Cebeci, 2017, p. 1069), but it is undeniable the positive effect on economy that these firms have in the places where they are located (İçduygu & Diker, 2017, p. 28). On the other hand, there is the informal entrepreneur whose negative effect on the market might be even more dangerous for the native peers, especially in the southern cities. For instance, in

Mersin 1.250 Turkish shops had to close over a period of 3 months in 2016. The Turkish government has tried to alleviate this situation by facilitating the registration processes for the entrepreneurs in order to avoid losses in revenues product of the informality (Bariscil, Hussein, & Yavuzaslan, 2017, p. 5).

4.2.4. Access to housing

At an initial stage, the Turkish government conceded the governance of the TACs to the AFAD, which initially answered to the Prime Ministry, but then it was assigned to the Ministry of Interior. Up to 2017, Turkey had spent around \$ 12 billion for the Syrian refugees, while the international actors contributed with \$ 512 million (Kahraman, Orselli, & Bayrakci, 2017, p. 38). Because of this, Turkey was considered to be the most generous country from 2013 to 2015, when considering the GDP per capita levels, according to the Global Humanitarian Aid Reports of Development Initiations Institutions at UN Geneva Office (Kahraman, Orselli, & Bayrakci, 2017, p. 38). It is also important to mention that at the very beginning the authorities thought that this would be a momentary situation, and that the Syrians would return home within months. For this reason the focus was on providing aid and assistance, and keeping the refugees in camps, nonetheless, at the start of 2014 almost half of the refugee population was outside of the camps, and by the end of the same year almost 4 out of 5 Syrians were living in cities and towns (İçduygu, 2015, p. 7).

One challenge for the government after the establishment of 22 camps in 3 years was to find resources and land to continue providing more of these facilities. Nonetheless, the characteristics of these places showed the good conditions provided by the government, such as supply of primary health services and vaccination campaigns. On the other hand, the government, in cooperation with the WFP, provided a well-functioning program for the refugee population, and on the other hand, the initial challenges found were related to the language barrier, the absence of specialized medical services, and overworked personnel (Kirişçi, 2014, pp. 26-29). It is important to mention that the WFP, and other programs started after AFAD requested international assistance in 2012, after realizing that the monetary burden that the Syrian refugees were generating was too big for Turkey to cover it all alone. At this point the WFP started, in cooperation with the Turkish Red Crescent and

AFAD, implementing a card system that was loaded with money (Kahraman, Orselli, & Bayrakci, 2017, p. 38). Until 2018 the Turkish Crescent had provided around 1.2 million debit cards, by means of which, the United Nations transferred some money, and then AFAD complemented it with additional aid every month, also wiring a special aid every trimester, in consideration to the family sizes and their special needs (Demirci, 2018). This system is still being provided to refugees both in and outside of camps.

In order to have a better and more efficient control of the camps Turkey has launched a system called the “Disaster Temporary City Management System (AFKEN)”, which facilitates the administrative work and actions of AFAD, allowing them to have a better control and management. On the other hand, the system provides instant reports regarding the camp capacity and proficiency; it allows the efficient execution of the storage, aid, and personnel management; and it provides a first of its kind framework for a more competent administrative response, and a standardized platform for controlling all the camps electronically (Kahraman, Orselli, & Bayrakci, 2017, p. 39).

At the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2011, the first group comprised of 252 people took refuge in a closed sports complex, soon after this, the first tent-city was funded in Yayladağı, Hatay, and progressively, the number reached to five camps in a short period of time during the same year. These camps are equipped with sports complexes, provision of tap-water system, clinics, schools, libraries, mosques, playgrounds for children, cleaning personnel, female security personnel, and health vehicles (Kahraman, Orselli & Bayrakci, 2017; Tas, 2019). By 2013, In Sanliurfa, 2 container cities named Harran and Suruç were built. At the beginning the Harran center was home to 12 thousand Syrians that lived in 2000 containers that were divided in 4 neighborhoods and counted on 2 social facilities, 2 worshipping places, volleyball, and basketball fields, 2 markets, and 3 schools with a capacity of 64 students each. Also, 211 teachers were hired, and a total of 4747 students started studying in these schools (Kahraman, Orselli, & Bayrakci, 2017, p. 40).

Between September and October 2014, the Suruç Container City accommodated 1600 asylum seekers coming from Kobani via the Murşitpinar border. This container city is the first ecological one in the area. It contains agricultural fields for the refugees, including an ultra-violet refinery infrastructure

that is applied for the sewage system. There are also 3 warehouses for storing medicine, food, and basic necessities (Kahraman, Orselli, & Bayrakci, 2017, p. 41). Gaziantep also installed 2 TACs in its village Nizip, next to the Euphrates River. One of them is a tent city, while the other one is a container city. Both of them had a capacity of 15.000 people, and it included facilities like mosques, community centers, gymnasiums, education centers, etc. The container cities are constituted by one-room container houses and buildings with the capacity of 4 people per unit (Hacioglu, 2018, p. 29).

In June 2018, the government conceded permission to the Embassy of Colombia to have a field observation of the Nizip Container City, providing the opportunity to corroborate firsthand the optimal conditions that the refugees had in the center, and giving the opportunity to informally approach and talk to the Syrians living there, and all of them expressed to be happy and comfortable. On the other hand, the city is endowed with markets, washing centers, hairdresser, schools, health attention units, libraries, computing centers, meetings rooms, and places where they could work and earn some money, like sewing rooms. See Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7, Figure 8.



Figure 4. Official visit to the Nizip refugee camp



Figure 5. Nizip refugee camp

Figure 6. Nizip refugee camp



Figure 7. Nizip refugee camp

Figure 8. Nizip refugee camp

For those refugees living in the camps that wish to renounce their right to be sheltered in the TACs and leave, they can do so after communicating their decision to the management, and with the promise of providing the new address to the relevant authorities within 20 days. The government is clear at warning those that wish to leave the facilities that there are no rent subsidies, social housing or any other sponsor regarding accommodation, so the refugee would have to rely on his or her own resources (Refugee Rights Turkey; Refugee Solidarity Network; Dutch Council for Refugees; US Department of State, Bureau of Population Refugees, and Migration, 2017, p. 9). Normally the refugees prefer to leave the camps or to stay directly outside once they enter the Turkish territory because they do not want to restrict their freedom (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 68).

The refugees that are not in the TACs are living in the towns and cities. At an initial point they were allowed to live outside the camps after they had completed their registration and received residence permits, then the situation in Syria started to

worsen by 2012, and the number of refugees outside the camps experienced a major increase, then by 2014 the 76 % of the Syrians were living outside the camps, where they had difficulties finding shelter, access to health, and food (Kirişci, 2014, p. 15). In addition, since finding affordable housing is difficult and families have limited resources, they tend to cluster around poor neighborhoods, and it is common to find some families living together in small houses under unhealthy conditions (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 68). As of April 2017, 90 % of the refugee population was staying in rented flats, or living with relatives across Turkey (Bariscil, Hussein, & Yavuzaslan, 2017, p. 2), furthermore, the refugees may apply for living in any province they prefer, but they are requested to register in the city they were assigned to reside, in order to have access to the public services (İçduygu, 2015, p. 68).

Local governments and some NGOs and INGOS have tried to provide solutions to alleviate the housing issues that the Syrians are facing. Nonetheless, these organizations found difficulties considering that an important part of the Syrians are not registered, and their needs have not been compiled in a systematic way (Kirişci, 2014, p. 26). Another issue is that the Syrians have created a push up effect on the rent prices in all the cities, due to the increase in the demand (Esen & Binatli, 2017, p. 2), which has led to locals finding it difficult to find affordable accommodation, and even some landlords forcing tenants to leave so that they could rent to Syrians at higher prices (Donelli, 2018, p. 5).

As a final note, it is important to mention that many institutions have positively evaluated the conditions of the camps for the refugees in Turkey. Just to mention some of them, the UN General Secretary's Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict, Leila Zerrougi visited the Container City in Kilis and expressed that the refugees are hosted above the standards, and the New York Times' author, Mac McClelland, after a visit to another camp in Kilis wrote an article titled "How to build a perfect refugee camp?" (Kahraman, Orselli, & Bayrakci, 2017, p. 41). On the other hand, it is important to mention that through the years, the local authorities have realized that the refugees are not going to return to Syria in the short run. For this reason, the government shifted towards a harmonization plan with the idea of incorporating the refugees to the Turkish society, and the first step of this plan aims at closing gradually the Temporary Education Centers and the Temporary Accommodation Centers, for relocating the refugees within the host communities, in

order to advance the process of harmonization (UNHCR Turkey, 2020).

4.2.5. Other important aspects

Taking into consideration the social aspects that come with the immigration, it is important to mention that women and girls who entered Turkey, alone or with their children, are in a position of vulnerability to verbal or sexual abuse, being kidnaped and being used in sexual exploitation, human trafficking, or being forced into a marriage with Turkish men. The latter is a practice that has become common in the border provinces of Turkey, where the minor girl is forced to marry (Donelli, 2018, p. 5). Mostly, the population forced to get married is represented by girls around 12 and 13 years old, and it brings negatives consequences since these girls are often denied economic opportunities and education, and they are isolated from their friends and families (Yıldız, 2017, p. 53). This situation has also been associated with child abuse, increased divorce, and polygamy, being the last a cause of tension since it is not legal in Turkey, and such situation generates stigma for both the mothers and the children born out of such unions, and a serious problem considering that these infants cannot be registered according to the law (Donelli, 2018, p. 5). On the other hand, another important aspect regarding the babies born in Turkey is that they are not eligible for Turkish citizenship, and it is not clear if one day the Syrian government will accept them as their own, or if they will remain stateless, as they currently are (Kirişci, 2014, p. 29). Furthermore, these births, in provinces with a high population of Syrian refugees such as Kilis, and Gaziantep, suggest the appearance of a new generation that will shift further the sectarian and ethnic balances of the region (Cagaptay & Menekse, 2014, p. 17). Another serious issue is that, in some cases, the refugees lack the economic capacity to survive, leading to some Syrians to beg for money in the streets, which has started a preoccupation regarding the civil security (Kirişci, 2014, p. 30).

From a security perspective there are some problems that may arise as a result of demographic and religious differences. The former is due to the mix of ethnicities, being those Turkish, Arab and Kurd, and the latter is because the majority of the Syrian refugees are Sunni, which changes the demographic composition of many of the border cities, creating political and social tensions between different groups of Syrians in the Turkish territory, awakening long-dormant sectarian tensions among

the Turkish community, and creating a sense of being a minority in their own land (Donelli, 2018, p. 6). On the other hand, the rise of ISIS did not only create problems in Syria but also in Turkey with the many deadly attacks that the country suffered (Demir & Yilmaz, 2020, p. 10). For this reason, there was a concern regarding the rise of militants among the Syrians, since the opposition groups are normally operating from the south of Turkey; a fact that Ankara has seen as a threat to national security, obligating the country to militarize the borders and avoid clusters of Syrians, by distributing them in different provinces of Turkey (Donelli, 2018, p. 6).

Another significant aspect to mention is related to the importance that Turkey acquired to the eyes of the European Union for handling the refugees issue, which culminated in a deal that provides Turkey with 6 billion euros by the end of 2018, the future lift of visa requirements for Turkish citizens, and the compromise of resettling one Syrian directly from Turkey, for each one that is returned after being apprehended trying to illegally entered the European Union (Wallis, 2020, p. 2). This deal has caused a rapprochement of the EU and Turkey after years of cooling, raising the latter's strategic importance in the eyes of the former, especially because of the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, which made the EU want to avoid the large-scale flow of refugees, and to eliminate the Daesh threat and terror that may be linked to the refugees (Donelli, 2018, pp. 6-7).

A final aspect is related to the perception of the Syrian in the eyes of the Turkish peers. The people with a low degree of education tend to see the immigration as competition, and thus, have a negative attitude towards the refugees. On the other hand, the more educated people find that positive impacts may arise, as there is an integration of the Syrians, which will happen once they learn the local language, facilitating the interaction of the two groups of people (Girgin & Cebeci, 2017, p. 1069). Furthermore, the fact that both societies share the same religion and have similar cultural manifestations may smooth a future integration into the Turkish society (Topal, Özer, & Dokuzlu, 2016, p. 52). According to the Turkish population, such similarities are in terms of religion, cuisine and even there is a regional resemblance since the Syrians and the Turks are considered as Middle Eastern and Mediterranean cultures. On the other hand, the host population makes an emphasis in the differences in history, language, and lifestyle of both societies (Girgin & Cebeci, 2017, p. 1069).

4.2.6. National and international assistance

At the beginning of the crisis the government was confident to have the financial muscle to cover the expenses generated by the refugees, nonetheless, with the pass of time, Turkey realized that the burden was too great, and that it needed to be shared in order to cover all the basic needs of the immigrants (Kirişci, 2014, p. 38). By that time Turkey asked the international community to provide assistance, and the response has helped at some degree easing the burdens. In this sub-heading there will be a mention to the most important national and international organizations that have been helping with the humanitarian crisis.

The Emergency Safety Net (ESSN), funded by the European Union, provides monthly monetary assistance of 155 TL, and additional quarterly tops-ups based on the family size to the refugees through a debit card that reaches more than 1.7 million of vulnerable refugees (IFRC Turkey, 2020, p. 2). This project is executed in partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the Turkish Red Crescent Society, and Turkish government institutions, and it is considered to be the biggest humanitarian program in the history of the European Union (The European Commission, 2021).

The Turkish Red Crescent has also responded to the crisis by providing temporary accommodation, through centers and urban settings, with the aim of addressing the emergency needs, the social cohesion, and the resilience. In 2017 it created a three-year plan in alliance with the IFRC, 14 more Red Cross, and Red Crescent National Societies, implementing the Regional Trust Fund for the Syrian Response (MADAD) through the European Union Regional Trust Fund (ETF). This program consists of 15 community centers to increase resilience and self-reliance, and to provide psychosocial and health support to the refugees. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, IFRC has been supporting the Turkish Red Crescent in order to produce and distribute protective equipment and hygiene items and has launched informative campaigns (IFRC Turkey, 2020, pp. 3-4). The Turkey Red Crescent and the IFRC are also partners to the ESSN's debit card program "Kızılay kart" that provides financial help to the refugees (Reliefweb, 2020).

The World Academy for Local Government and Democracy Foundation (WALD) has been serving as a bridge between local and international institutions

with the objective of improving the conditions of the refugees and their integration. WALD helps the local governments to develop democracy and human rights management of the refugees by strengthening their capacity, and focuses on projects aligned with the local democracy mandate related to social cohesion, economic inclusion, and social protection, such as: organizing events targeting Turkish and Syrian women and children to break down language barriers in order to assist in social cohesion, and providing consultancy service for psychological, legal and administrative issues, as well as legal advice on how to start businesses (Municipality of Gaziantep; UNDP, 2019, p. 15).

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is another international organization that is currently developing projects in Turkey for alleviating the situation. The UNDP is the co-lead of the Refugee and Resilience Response Plan (3RP), which aims at helping the refugee's harmonization and insertion in the socioeconomic lives of the hosting countries (3RP Syria crisis, 2021). The UNDP Syria Crisis Response Program was created to complement the humanitarian assistance in order to generate results that will have a lasting impact on the communities, the individuals and the local and national institutions providing services to them. On the other hand, within the framework of the 3RP, UNDP has been working in hand with the municipalities for broadening their resilience by helping them, not only to cope, but to recover and transform from the shocks that migration brings. UNDP has provided municipalities such as Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, and Sanliurfa with equipment such as firefighting and waste vehicles, which relieved the municipalities of that important issue, and allowed them to redirect the liberated budget to other important needs of the municipality (Municipality of Gaziantep; UNDP, 2019, p. 24). So far UNDP has spent over USD \$ 30 million on refugees with the support of MADAD, and the governments of Korea, Japan, Germany, the United States (United Nations Development Program , 2018).

The UNHCR is another important international organization that has been working closely with the Government of Turkey, public institutions, non-governmental organizations, United Nations agencies, private sector, and refugees themselves at local, provincial, and national level, on asylum and refugee matters, through promoting access and provision of protection, broadening the access to quality services, helping people with specific needs, promoting harmonization and

social cohesion, and working on obtaining durable solutions for the refugee population (Municipality of Gaziantep; UNDP, 2019, p. 28). As of 22nd June 2021, UNHCR has funded USD \$ 81.9 million, equivalent to the 23% out of the USD \$ 349.7 million requested for its operations in Turkey (United Nations Refugee Agency, 2021).

The mission of the IOM in Turkey is one of the biggest IOM's in the world, counting with more than 1.000 staff and with a head office in Ankara, and sub offices in Istanbul, Hatay, Gaziantep, Izmir and Sanliurfa. The IOM supports the refugee population and the host community by providing protection, shelter, livelihoods, transportation, community stabilization, basic needs, and community and municipal center services, also, the IOM works in close collaboration with the government to implement projects that will have a longer impact on the population such as labour integration, assistance programs, migration management, resettlement, border management, data collection and research on migrant movement (Municipality of Gaziantep; UNDP, 2019, p. 31). On the other hand, IOM is working together with the municipalities in order to launch projects directed to fostering greater social cohesion and harmonization, and implementation of health checks, preparation of traveling documents and cultural orientation for those refugees accepted for resettlement (Asylum Information Database AIDA, 2019).

On the national level, the Civil Society Organizations (CSO) have been of great help for alleviating the situation and improving the conditions of the refugee population, in places where the government could not reach, or did it so late. These organizations are found in those places with the bigger concentration of Syrians, in order to support them in every aspect they need (Kahraman, Orselli, & Bayrakci, 2017, pp. 17-18). These groups are divided in "needs based" and "rights based". The former is focused on providing assistance, such as shelter, food, healthcare and education, while the latter focuses on empowering the refugees for them to fulfill their legal rights and breaking the cycle of dispossession and poverty (Mackreath & Sađnıç, 2017, p. 12). During the emergency caused by the COVID-19, the CSOs used their budget allocations for providing cash assistance and basic need items and supported local administrations and municipalities with the distribution of assistance to the refugees (International Centre for Migration Policy Development ICMPD, 2020). These organizations are independent from the government, and they raise

their funds by fund-raising efforts that gives them the autonomy to spend the money on refugees as they see fit, also, talking about numbers, by 2016 there were 109.482 active associations, in contrast to 88.646 in 2011, having an important increase especially during 2013 and 2014 (Mackreath & Sađnıç, 2017, pp. 29-31). Such a big number of CSOs represent an important relief for the government, since it is an important number of organizations providing assistance with the funds they raise by themselves.

The national CSOs in Turkey are specialized in coordinating get-together events such as cooking, crafting and activities for children, as well as activities that create a space of interaction between the Syrian and the Turkish population to promote co-existence. They also organize language courses, campaigns for raising awareness of child marriage and women's rights, among others (Paker, 2019, pp. 12-15), but most of them do not want to increase their capacity because they do not want to expose themselves to the demands of the donors, and that is why they are not able to cooperate with INGOs. Nonetheless, this does not always happen, and in the case of an association between a CSO and an INGO, both of them present mutual benefits, which are reflected in the capacity development of the CSO, and the valuable knowledge exchange of the two organizations (International Centre for Migration Policy Development ICMPD, 2020, p. 4). On the other hand, the cooperation between the state and the CSOs has been increasing, especially through AFAD, since it is the face of the government regarding the humanitarian assistance. AFAD organizes monthly meetings with the CSOs in order to better communicate and avoid the duplication of work. AFAD has created a system that compiles the needs of the refugees and the stocks available, as reported by the different CSOs, and then matches both of them in order to generate a better distribution of the humanitarian aid (Mackreath & Sađnıç, 2017, pp. 53-54).

On the governmental side, it is important to remark the efforts of the Directorate General of Migration Management, AFAD, entities that have been in charge of the operations and policies regarding the refugee population in Turkey. Subsequently, it is imperative to mention the role of the municipalities for responding to the emergency. The municipalities have been working together with the national NGOs and INGOs in order to strengthen the resilience of all the actors involved, the harmonization of the refugees, and the provision of services as needed

by the refugees (Municipality of Gaziantep; UNDP, 2019, pp. 4-8). Regarding these matters, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan was launched in response to the Syrian crisis, which has allowed the different municipalities to attract funds for the different challenges that the immigration presents (Regional Refugee Resilience Plan 3RP , 2018, pp. 30-34).

Lastly, the government has expressed that the financial support received has been insufficient, and Turkey has carried the major part of the responsibilities (Kirişci, 2014, p. 41), by spending allegedly \$ 40 billion until 2020 (Simsek, 2021), while the international assistance promised has not been delivered in its totality, and the international community needs to fulfill the compromises in order for the refugees to have a better and dignifying quality of life (Sonmez, 2019).

CONCLUSION

It is important to consider the current cases of mass migration around the world in order to contrast them with the Colombian and Turkish experiences, and to understand that these two cases are not isolated but are rather a part of a complex international problem that is currently happening in different parts of the world. Every case has its own characteristics, but they share the same core: a mass deployment of people from their homeland, who are forced to leave to look for better opportunities, or to keep their physical integrity.

The Colombian case of the second half of the 20th century is deeply linked to the Syrian case, due to the fact that in both cases, the violence and the civil war represent the main issue that determined the emigration of these people. In the Colombian side it was the constant war between the guerillas against the military forces of the government, while in Syria the main issue is the struggle of power between the marginal groups against the central government. The same situation was seen in Africa where, as explained before, the decolonization had a lot to do with the current problems of the different countries that are in war in the continent. In this particular case, the nationalism led to the instauration of regimes that were manifested as monarchies or military dictatorship, and it ended with the polarization of many of these countries, which led to conflicts of power and to wars that forced millions of people to migrate.

The situation in Myanmar is different in the sense that the conflict originated as an ethnic struggle, deepened by the hatred of the central government towards these minorities, nonetheless, it shares with the African, Colombian and Syrian cases the violence that generated the mass migration, taking out of the equation the different reasons that led to the confrontations, the result is the same, and that is why it is an important aspect to consider when evaluating these cases.

The central concept of this thesis, the smart power, establishes that it is a mix between soft power, which is an attribute born out of the Neoliberal theory, and hard power. This particular approach may be used to explain the reactions of the countries affected by the immigration, in this sense, hard power is used by a country that wishes to protect itself from, what may be seen, a foreign menace that could negatively impact the well-being of the state. This means that the country is not

willing to accept the immigrants because of fear of the consequences that this will bring to their economic and social environment. For this reason, the state reinforces its security and displays it against the immigrants. In this case, the hard power manifests through the negative policies or attitudes that end up in deportations, incarceration, turning of boats, or even torture, as it has been documented in the previous chapters of this dissertation. Guinea is among these examples, since its president Lansana Conte instigated the Guinean nationals against the refugees claiming that they were supporting rebel groups. On its side, Malaysia is known by arresting and imprisoning the asylum seekers that landed in the country, treating them like illegal migrants. Also, Thailand, before 2004, provided refugees with camps near the Burma-Thai borders, nonetheless, all the asylum-seekers outside of these places were exposed to detention and unofficial deportations. On the other hand, there was a boat-turning crisis in the Andaman Sea that involved Malaysia and Thailand. Likewise, the European Union is not an alien to this kind of behavior. The European Union does not count on an integrated policy for migration and asylum, leaving to every country the quota selection, leading to the acceptance of a low quantity of refugees in many countries. Furthermore, authorities from different countries of the Union have shown hostility towards the refugees, like the Prime Minister of Hungary who expressed that the refugees were a threat to Europe's Christian identity, or the many negative news coming from the coasts of Greece, which shows a display of hard power towards refugees.

The Neoliberal theory explains that the current system is within a neoliberal globalized world, which explains the migration currents originated from the sending countries. In this sense, the lack of opportunities and the internal conflicts in these places oblige people to migrate in search of better opportunities, which explains the migration flows that are presented in this research. On the other hand, it is important to remember that soft power is an element that belongs to the Neoliberal theory. In this study, soft power would be represented by governments such as Bangladesh, Colombia, and Thailand after 2004, considering that these countries welcome the refugees and try to provide for them, as much as they can, and they are normally offering this assistance by using their own national treasury at a high cost. On the other hand, the true use of a smart power in refugee handling is manifested in countries such as Uganda and Turkey. Both of them display their smartness in

different ways: Uganda grants all the rights to refugees, encourages entrepreneurship, and provides refugees with lands, which allows the refugees to earn a living by themselves, which in return allows the country to save and make the refugee handling an easier experience. On its side, Turkey has used its geostrategic position to take in the refugee responsibility, and then use it as leverage in its relationship with the European Union in order to obtain some benefits. These two cases show how a state can play with the weapons and characteristics that they have at their disposal and turn them into positive outcomes that end up benefitting both, the country, and the refugees.

Another way of obtaining a smart strategy would be by merging both components. In this sense, the hard power tools could be used as a way of protecting, not only the national security, but also providing a safe environment to the refugees, and the soft power could be put into action through the country's self-assessment that will lead to the elaboration of smart policies aimed, not only at handling the refugees, but obtaining the best of this experience by generating positive impacts in the social and economic spheres. This way, the country will be able to know what components are to be offered, and how to cope with the difficulties that the refugee-handling may bring.

Another important aspect derives from the similitudes when comparing the results of the immigration in both Colombia and Turkey. Through the dissertation it can be seen that in both cases the refugees had problems at the beginning for accessing education due to a lack of information of the officials, but the situation was coped on both sides by the central government, and the help of some NGOs. In the Colombian case, the lack of documentation of the Venezuelan population created a serious problem for enrolling the young population in the education system, this problem was solved by the relaxation of the processes and the introduction of validation exams. On the other hand, in both cases, the low attendance to school was linked to the employment of minors, considering that the poverty levels of the families obligated them to use their children as a way of generating income for solving immediate needs. Again, in both cases, the government and NGOs have launched programs that aim at keeping the kids at school, nonetheless, it continues to be a preoccupying issue.

In both cases employment has suffered especially for those of a lower stratum. In both cases it is due to the illiteracy levels of the refugee population, which pushes the real wages down increasing competition and generating friction with the local workforce. On the other hand, the entrepreneurs have shown reluctance to hire directly because of the expenses and the bureaucratic process of obtaining a working permit. Such a situation has led to an increase in the informal market, and in both cases, it configures an opportunity for the entrepreneur to find and illegally hire cheaper workforce than the local one, which has led to an increase in the cases of exploitation. It is important to mention that in both cases it is not the government's fault that the informality continues to be an issue. Colombia has granted, through the ETPV the access to the labor market, and Turkey launched in 2016 the Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection. Nonetheless, in both Colombia and Turkey, the refugees have a misinformation about the legislation regarding employment, and even if they are well aware, they seek employment in the informal sector because it provides them with a competitive value, which is more attractive to the employers. Also, it is important to mention that in Colombia there was also a loss in the formal sector because many of the immigrants counted on a higher education level than the local population.

In both cases health was regulated in the same way. In both countries, the person that is not under temporary protection because he or she failed to register will only have free access to emergency health services, while the individual that has been registered properly will have access to the insurance package that is offered to the nationals of both countries. In both cases, the beginning marked a difficult period for accessing the services because of a lack of information of the officials, but with the time, the instructions were received and the population under temporary protection of both countries could effectively benefit from the services. In the case of Turkey, there was another issue to take into consideration, and that was the language barrier, especially in the bordering areas. Turkey effectively tackled down this problem by assigning translators to those hospitals that had a big concurrence of Syrians.

Another important aspect that both cases manifest is related to security. In Colombia, the vulnerability level of the immigrants has push them into thievery, begging, drug trafficking, and in many cases this population has been victim of

recruitment by the guerillas, and in both cases women are exposed to human trafficking, sexual exploitation, sexual abuse, gender-violence, etc. As for Turkey, refugees have been seen begging, and there are problems that appeared from the demographic and religious differences, there are concerns that there may be a rise of militants among the Syrians. This created a concern regarding the national security of Turkey, and for this reason the country decided to militarize the borders and distribute the Syrians in the different provinces of the country for avoiding clusters.

When the investigation for this dissertation started there were procedures and programs in Turkey's refugee experience that could be used by Colombia in order to enhance its policies. Nonetheless, as the investigation progressed, it emerged some important aspects in the Colombian experience that could be useful if applied in Turkey. For this reason, the research question was formulated as follows: "Are there any outcomes in Colombia and Turkey's refugees' policies and programs that could be shared in order to enhance each other's refugees handling experience?". The answer to this question appeared after comparing both cases, as the different policies applied in both sides were found.

The first difference is related to the way that Turkey handled the migration in the borderline cities through the implementation of camps. It deserves mentioning because the Turkish Government equipped the camps with schools, medical centers, vocational programs, and recreational facilities. This proved to be very helpful for the refugees and their immediate needs. Nonetheless, with the passing of time, Turkey realized that the civil war in Syria was most likely to continue for a long time, and it would be better to aim at a harmonization of this population, for this reason these camps started to gradually close. In Colombia the situation in the bordering cities is critical, and there are many immigrants that are living under precarious conditions, and the provision of camps could certainly help mitigating their needs. However, as explained before, this situation is likely to continue indefinitely, so I consider that the creation of some camps could be beneficial for helping refugees temporarily, and it is also beneficial because it may attract international assistance like the World Food Program, and the assistance it provided to the Turkish camps, but this would have to be complemented with a redistribution policy in order to avoid the saturation, not only in the camps, but in the borderline cities in general.

Turkey launched the redistribution of people under temporary protection as a way of avoiding clusters of Syrians in order to keep the national security at ease. This system is effective not only for reaching the goal of national security, but because, as it is mentioned in the Colombian chapter, a redistribution of the population could reduce the saturation in the labor market of the bordering cities, considering that the markets of the other cities may have the possibility to absorb this workforce. This way, the government could mitigate the lack of opportunities in the frontiers, and potentialize the benefits of the migratory flux in the whole country. In the Colombian part Bahar, Dooley, and Huang (2018) propose a “voluntary redistribution”, nonetheless, a more effective measure would be to follow the Turkish example by providing the person, or family group, the temporary protection and benefits in the place that the government seems fit, according to a state’s cautious and serious analysis of the different aspects of the receiving cities, such as offer and demand, social needs, infrastructure, etc. This is important because a voluntary program may not be as effective in the reallocation of the population, and it is important to minimize the concentration in the bordering cities considering that they are lagging areas in development, in comparison to the rest of the country, and there are other places that have a lot to offer to this population.

Another important aspect that Turkey could share with Colombia is related to the application of the Kızılay kart. A program started by the European Commission and the Turkish Red Crescent, that allows these entities, and others, such as the World Food Program and AFAD, to provide monetary assistance to the Syrians. This program is very important because it helps alleviating the basic needs of the Syrians, since the money may be used for paying rent or buying food, and it would prove to be very useful in Colombia, considering the hard conditions the Venezuelans are going through. Also, such an application could attract foreign aid since there would be an already implemented system to redirect incoming monetary funds.

The ETPV implemented by Colombia provided this dissertation with another important point that could be shared with Turkey in order to enhance its policies. The ETPV establishes that it has a validity of 10 years, and it will allow the Venezuelans to acquire the resident visa in case they decide to stay in the country. On its side, Turkey through its Temporary Protection Regulation, in its article 25, establishes that the temporary protection document grants the right to stay in the country, but is not

considered as a residence permit, nor does it count as a tool to concede long term residence permits or citizenship. It is important to aim at a naturalization of this population at a middle term because the situation in both Venezuela and Syria are not likely to be solved in the near future, and even if it did, it does not mean that this people desire to return to their country, especially after getting used to live in the places where they are currently settled. It is crucial for the countries that receive migration to understand that it is better to try to get an integration of the refugees, which will avoid social tensions. Also, Turkey started to use the term “harmonization” as a way of integrating the Syrians, while they keep their cultural identity, but it is important to understand that this harmonization, once completed, will make the refugees accept this place as their homes, and not allowing them to acquire a long term residence permit or citizenship means that they would have to eventually go back, and there will be new generations of Syrians born in Turkey that will feel like they are at home, and would not desire to return to a land where they had never been.

The before-mentioned aspect configures exactly the next point of policies to be shared that are seemed as relevant. The refugees that are currently living in Colombia and Turkey have been reproducing, and this new generation is growing up in a new territory with new customs, and in the case of the Syrians, with a new language. Regarding this matter, the government of Colombia decided to concede the Colombian citizenship to all the Venezuelan children born in Colombian soil after 19th of August 2015, with the aim of protecting these children and saving them from their statelessness. This policy is crucial, especially considering that this new generation will most probably feel identified as Colombian, rather than Venezuelan, and this act ratifies them the right to remain in the place they were born. On the Turkish side, the babies of the refugees born in Turkish soil are not eligible for citizenship, and they remain stateless as it is now known if the Syrian government will accept them as their own. So, if Turkey was to implement this system, this new generation would have a nation and a place they belong to, because, as said before, this situation may not finish any time soon, and even if it did, this population may not want to return, since they do not feel they belong to Syria. On a final note, it is relevant to mention that the main conclusion of this study elaborates on the fact that both Colombia and Turkey have a lot to learn from each other, considering that both

countries have had different significant experiences. On the other hand, a knowledge exchange would prove to be fruitful since it may result in the enhancement of each other's refugee policy, which, as a matter of fact, would result in benefiting the Syrians and Venezuelans under temporary protection.

GCPR

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. List of PIP permits

Table 1 – Taken from the Practical and Informative Booklet regarding the access to the rights that the foreign citizens have, and then translated by me. (PADF, FUPAD, PRM, OAS, Universidad del Rosario, p. 21)

TYPE OF PERMIT	CONDITIONS	SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS	VALIDITY TIME
PIP-1	The presence of the migrant has a particular importance for the Colombian State	The person that wishes to enter the territory shall present a passport, travel document or valid ID, according to the case, and with a current visa, when required	90 days
	The entering to the territory is done within the framework of cooperation agreements or treaties and international assistance		
	the purpose of the visit is to support, assist or cooperate in the implementation of the activities directed towards the peace		
PIP-2	The entering to the territory is with the purpose of attending academic programs that last no more than one semester	The person that wishes to enter the territory shall present a passport, travel document or valid ID, according to the case, and with a current visa, when required	90 days
	The entering to the country shall be in virtue of an academic exchange agreement or for doing student internships		
	The purpose is entering the territory through academic agreements as a teacher, researcher, or lecturer		
	The person to enter the territory will be trained in an art or a craft		
PIP-3	The purpose is to receive medical attention, services, or medical treatment in authorized institutions by the competent authorities	The person that wishes to enter the territory shall present a passport, travel document or valid ID, according to the case, and with a current visa, when required	90 days
PIP-4	The person needs to enter the territory in order to clarify his/her personal situation during a legal or administrative process	The person that wishes to enter the territory shall present a passport, travel document or valid ID, according to the case, and with a current visa, when required	90 days
PIP-5	The purpose of the entry is to enroll in touristic activities	The person that wishes to enter the territory shall present a passport, travel document or valid ID, according to the case, and with a current visa, when required	90 days, extendable to 90 additional days
PIP-6	The foreigner will attend an interview or will participate in a	The person that wishes to enter the territory shall	90 days

	<p>selection process</p> <p>The foreigner intends to participate in business or institutional trainings</p> <p>The foreigner will cover out coverage or journalistic activities</p>	<p>present a passport, travel document or valid ID, according to the case, and with a current visa, when required</p>	
PIP-7	<p>Foreigner that does not require a visa, and that on the opinion of the migratory authority adequately justifies the need of urgently entering the territory for providing technical or specialized assistance</p>	<p>The person that wishes to enter the territory shall present a passport, travel document or valid ID, according to the case, and with a current visa, when required</p> <p>The foreigner shall, in all the cases, present a communication of the Regional Director of Migration Colombia, authorizing the entering to the territory</p>	30 days
PIP-8	<p>The entering person, requiring or not visa, pretends to enter the territory as a crew member, or member of an international means of transport</p>	<p>The person that wishes to enter the territory shall present a passport, travel document or valid ID, according to the case, and with a current visa, when required</p> <p>The condition of crew member in maritime transit will be credited according to the General Declaration of Flight. Marine's book or Crew Members 'List, Terrestrial Crew Member Card, Permit for the Crew Members, and the list of passengers or credentials issued by the agency or the exploiter</p>	10 days
PIP-9	<p>The person requiring or not visa, in the opinion of the migratory or sanitary authority requires to enter the territory in need of urgent assistance in order to protect his/her life or personal integrity</p>	<p>The person that wishes to enter the territory shall present a passport, travel document or valid ID, according to the case, and with a current visa, when required</p>	10 days
PIP-10	<p>Migrants that may require or not visa, integrating touristic groups in maritime transit cruises, with the condition of arriving to the ports and leaving from it in the same cruise</p> <p>In this case the travelers are subject to the control of the migratory authority without this leading to a visa request, migratory card, or stamp of migratory seal for entry or exit in the passport or travel document</p>	<p>The condition of members of touristic groups in maritime transit is accredited according to the General Declaration of Flight. Marine's book or Crew Members' list, Terrestrial Crew Member Card, Permit for the Crew Members, and the list of passengers or credentials issued by the agency or the exploiter</p>	For the term of stay of the touristic cruise in the Colombian port

PIP-TT	Foreign citizen pretending to transit in the territory with the purpose of connecting or making a stopover in order to board any means of transportation	The person that wishes to enter the territory shall present a passport, travel document or valid ID, according to the case, and with a current visa, when required	It is granted for a term of 15 calendar days, and it is not extendable
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Appendix 2. Types of visas

Table – Types of visas: obtained from <https://thevisaproject.com/colombia-visa/>

VISA NAME	PURPOSE	VISA NAME	PURPOSE
M1 – Spouse Visa - old type of visa TP-10	For a foreigner who has married or is in a permanent relationship with a Colombian citizen.	M7- Expertise Visa - old type of visa TP-13	Have qualification or expertise to practice a profession independently.
M3 – Mercosur Visa - old type of visa TP-15	For citizens of Mercosur countries.	M8 -Religious Visa - old type of visa TP-5	A foreigner who is a religious worker or missionary, coming to Colombia to perform religious activities.
M4- Refugee Visa - old type of visa TP-9	For a foreigner to be admitted to Colombia as a refugee.	M9- Student Visa - old type of visa TP-3	Foreigners who want to pursue academic degrees in Colombia.
M5- Work Visa - old type of visa TP-4	Foreign nationals who want to legally work in Colombia.	M10 – Real Estate Investment Visa - old type of visa TP-7	For a foreigner who invests in real estate with an investment that's at least 350 times the minimum wage of Colombia.
M6 – Business Investment Visa - old type of visa TP-7	For a foreigner who invests at least 100 times the minimum wage of Colombia.	M11- Retirement/Pensioner/ Rentista Visa - old type of visa TP-7	<p>Foreigners who want to retire in Colombia and can show the means to do so. They must be able to show proof one of these two.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pension that's at least three times the minimum wage. 2. Income from investments that's at least 10 times the minimum wage.

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KEVIN AUGUSTO RAMIREZ BLANDÓN ATILIM UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME VENEZUELAN AND SYRIAN POPULATION UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN COLOMBIA AND TURKEY: POLICIES APPLIED IN EVERY PARTICULAR CASE THAT COULD ENHANCE ITS COUNTERPART'S REFUGEE EXPERIENCE Master's Thesis Kevin Augusto Ramirez Blandón ATILIM Ankara 2021 ATILIM UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME VENEZUELAN AND SYRIAN POPULATION UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN COLOMBIA AND TURKEY: POLICIES APPLIED IN EVERY PARTICULAR CASE THAT COULD ENHANCE ITS COUNTERPART'S REFUGEE EXPERIENCE Master's Thesis Kevin Augusto Ramirez Blandón Ankara 2021 | ABSTRACT VENEZUELAN AND SYRIAN POPULATION UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN COLOMBIA AND TURKEY: POLICIES APPLIED IN EVERY PARTICULAR CASE THAT COULD ENHANCE ITS COUNTERPART'S REFUGEE EXPERIENCE Ramirez Blandon, Kevin Augusto M.S., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Prof. Tüjba Gürçel November 2021, 138 pages This thesis is based on the smart theory of power of Joseph Niye and shows how the application of smart strategies could be valuable for obtaining benefits in the foreign policy, when properly using the tools at the disposal of the state. In this particular case, Turkey effectively used the refugees as a leverage tool against the European Union, in order to obtain advantages and agreements that profited not only the country, but also the refugee population. On the other hand, the main purpose of this study focuses on the policies and programs applied by Colombia and Turkey in order to respond to the refugee emergency,

RÉSUMÉ

Full Name: Kevin Augusto RAMIREZ BLANDON

Educational Status:

Degree	Major	University	Year
Undergraduate Degree	Bachelor in Languages and Literature	Universidad de Caldas, Colombia	2011
Master's Degree	Master's degree of Business Administration	Istanbul Bilgi University	2017
Master's degree	Master's degree of International Relations	Atilm University	2022

Work Experience:

Workplace	Position	Year
Embassy of Colombia in Ankara	Financial and Personnel Manager	2011 -

Foreign Languages:

Spanish (mother tongue)

English C1

Turkish C1

Russian B2

Italian B2

French B2

Date: (Date of Defense): 21.01.2022

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