

**ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER PROGRAM**

BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA: DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS

Master Thesis

**By
Efe A. O. Ijoyah**

NAnkara, Turkey

2017

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
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
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
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
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
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Efe A. O. Ijoyah

ÖZET

[Ijoyah, Efe A.O.] [**Boko Haram in Nigeria: Domestic and Regional Dynamics**] [Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara [2017]

Bu tez, Boko Haram'ın durumu ve Nijerya'daki başarısı üzerine odaklanan nitel bir araştırmadır; araştırmacı, aşağıdakileri içeren geniş bir materyal yelpazesi kullanmıştır; Akademik kitaplar ve dergiler, araştırma raporları ve 1967'de Nijerya İç Savaşı sırasında görev yapan emekli bir ordu subayı ile yapılan röportaj. Bu tez dört bölüm halinde yapılandırılmıştır: Birinci bölüm araştırmanın kapsamını ve Nijerya hakkında genel bir bilgi; İkinci bölüm, Nijerya'nın tarihi ve politik arka planı üzerine odaklanmaktadır; Üçüncü bölüm, Boko Haram'ın arka planını ve faaliyetlerini kapsamakla beraber Ayrıca, Kuzey Nijerya'daki İslam tarihine de değinir; son bölüm ise araştırmanın bulguları ve sonucundan oluşmaktadır.

Bu araştırmanın bulgularından biri, Nijerya'daki İslami radikalleşmenin yeni bir olgu olmadığını gösterdi; Bununla birlikte, farklı noktalarda ve dönemlerde, Nijerya'daki İslami radikalleşme farklı fikir ve amaçlarla kendini göstermektedir. İkincisi, araştırmacı, Boko Haram meselesinin Nijerya sınırlarının ötesine geçtiğini ve bu nedenle bölgesel bir fenomen haline geldiğini ve artık yerli bir mesele olmadığını keşfetmiştir..

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kral Oni / Oba, Sarkin Müslümanları- Müslümanların Hükümdarı, Sarkin Sokoto-İslam Hükümetinin Lideri, Selefiler / Sufiler-İslamist gruplar, Sambisa- Sambisa, Nijerya'nın kuzey bölgesinde Borno eyaleti, Chibok - Borno Eyaleti-Nijerya'daki bir kasaba,

ABSTRACT

[Ijoyah, Efe A.O.] [**Boko Haram in Nigeria: Domestic and Regional Dynamics**] Ankara [2017]

This is a qualitative research which focuses on the case of Boko Haram and its success in Nigeria, the researcher used a wide range of materials including; academic books and journals, research reports and an interview with a retired military officer who served during the Nigerian Civil war in 1967. This paper is structured into four chapters: the first chapter gives the scope of the research, as well as a general overview of Nigeria; Chapter 2 focuses on the historical and political background of Nigeria; the third chapter, covers the background and activities of Boko Haram. It also looks at the history of Islam in Northern Nigeria; and the final chapter comprises of the findings and conclusion of the research.

One of the finding of this research showed that Islamic radicalization in Nigeria is not a new phenomenon; however, at different point and periods, Islamic radicalization in Nigeria manifests itself with different ideas and purpose. Secondly, the researcher discovered that the issue of Boko Haram transgresses beyond the borders of Nigeria and therefore becomes a regional phenomenon and no more a domestic issue.

Keywords: Oni/Oba –King, Sarkin Musulmi- Ruler of Muslims, Sarkin Sokoto- Ruler of Islamic Government, Salafis / Sufis- Islamic Sectarian Group, Sambisa – **Sambisa** is a **forest** game reserve **located** in Borno state northern region of Nigeria, Chibok – a town in Borno State- Nigeria,

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT PAGE

After a successful completion of the required duration of this program, today is set aside for writing my note of thanks, which also mark the finishing touches on my thesis. The past one and half years have been a period of intense learning for me, not only in international arena, but also on a personal level. This research grew out of my desire to understand the factors that contributed in the sophistication, sustenance and the expansion of Boko Haram beyond the boundaries of Nigeria, the role of domestic and regional politics in the insurgency and why is it difficult for the regional organization such as AU and ECOWAS to curb the activities of Boko Haram? Having, said that, I would like to reflect on the people who have contributed and supported me throughout the period of the research. But before then I would like to first thank the Almighty God for giving me the opportunity and making my dream come true. I want to also appreciate my Dean of Faculty, Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal and my supervisor Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali karasar for his technical guidance and useful criticisms, to my colleagues and head of department Mr Peter O. Opara in IPCR, Abuja –Nigeria, my course mates in Atilim University, Ankara- Turkey. Special thanks go to my husband, Innocent Ijoyah and sweet mother for her moral support.

Efe A. O. Ijoyah

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ABBREVIATION

AU:	African Union
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African states
MNJTF:	Multi-National Joint Task Force
JTF:	Joint Task Force
CAN:	Christian Association of Nigeria abbreviation
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
B.C:	Before Christ
WWII:	World War Two
A.D:	After Christ
NCNC:	National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon
NPC:	Northern Peoples' Congress
AG:	Action Group
UPGA:	United Progressive grand Alliance
NNPD:	Nigeria National Democratic Party
JUNTA:	seizing of power from legally constituted government by Military in a country
ANPP:	All Nigerian Peoples party
ISIS:	International
SSS:	State Security Service
AQIM:	Al Qaeda Islamic Maghreb
ITO:	International Terrorist Organization
FDI:	Foreign Direct Investment
HRW:	Human Right Watch
NASRDA:	National Space Research
MG:	Machine Gun

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1. Nigeria showing the various states and their categorization into the six geopolitical zones

Map 2. An ethnographical map of Nigeria showing the dominating ethnicity in each region

Map.3. Depicting the Sharia states in Nigeria (Credit: *World Watch Monitor*)

INTRODUCTION

The title of my thesis is “Boko Haram in Nigeria: Domestic and Regional Dynamics ” it is an important topic to write about because Nigeria is a country with great potential known for its natural and human resources which attracts foreign investments. Nigeria stand as a big market due to its population, but the emergence of Boko Haram has created instability, insecurity making it difficult for both local and foreign investment to thrive. The bulk of resources meant to development in the country had been channeled to ‘security matters’ leaving other sectors unattended to and this challenge is really crippling the economy. The activity of the group has also impacted on all facet of life in country. My thesis will concentrate on Boko Haram. I will try to understand its dynamics, composition, strategy and how is grown to affect other neighboring countries in the region. The main focus of the thesis is the domestic and regional dynamics that is involved in the evolution of the group.

This thesis is structured as follows: chapter one - gives the scope of the research, as well as a general overview of Nigeria; Chapter two - historical and political background of Nigeria; chapter three- background and activities of Boko Haram. It also looks at the history of Islam in Northern Nigeria; and the fourth chapter covers the findings and conclusion of the research, as well as a rich bibliography.

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Subject

With the emergence of Boko Haram, Nigerian government has lost lives and properties worth billions of dollars, in trying curb the menace, Nigeria has spent hugely on security alone leaving other sectors unattended to. Boko Haram aim to Islamize Northern Nigeria and make the country ungovernable, if its demand is not met, the group is strongly against ‘Western Education and civilization’. The group has been classified as terrorist due to its nature of operations which includes; suicide bombings within and across borders, abduction, robbery. Its activities have reign terror and fear on the society, its main targets are; civilians, Christians, Nigerian armed forces, Police, government personnel’s, Muslims, churches, students and foreign National ¹. Boko Haram activities have created and continue to have negative impacts on the civilians within the region who are the first hand victims of the group. The people in the Northern Nigeria have been affected greatly in every facet of their life, in the midst of these huge challenges, Boko Haram still expands in its activities making it a regional and international problem thereby extending beyond the borders of Nigeria.

1.2 Its Aim and Objectives

This research aimed at unraveling the domestic and regional dynamics in the case of Boko Haram and its activities. It provides a framework of study to understand the implications of the group’s activities not only at the domestic level but also at the regional level, the issue of Boko Haram is affected by both domestic dynamic and regional politics. The purpose of this research is to study the problem from both dimensions in order to understand how each perspective has affected the issue.

1.3 Research Questions

- What are the factors that contributed to the expansion of Boko Haram beyond domestic boundaries of Nigeria and how that has influenced the politics of the region?
- What factors have contributed to the sophistication of Boko Haram’s attacks?

¹ Salisu Shuaibu [et.al.](#), “The impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigeria National Security” *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Science*, Volume: 5, No: 6, 2015.

- Is Boko Haram merely motivated by radical religious ideology? What other factors serve as a motivation for the terrorist group?
- Are there any efforts by regional organization such as AU and ECOWAS in curbing the issue of Boko Haram?

1.4 Hypothesis

- Boko Haram receives aids from external terrorist groups which helps it in staging sophisticated attacks.
- Incompetence on the part of the Nigerian government has encouraged corruption and infiltration of the administration by Boko Haram leading to the broadening and success of Boko Haram.
- Factors such as unemployment and high level of poverty rates serve as motivations for the actions of the group.

1.5 Methodology

This research is a qualitative study that employs information from various resources. It is a case study of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Due to the nature of the thesis, the researcher will access to primary and secondary sources mainly from academic books and peer reviewed journals. Since the issue of Boko Haram is one that has also grabbed much attention in various organizations as a whole, reports from research institutions and think -thank are also used in the conducting of this research. In addition to, I conduct an interview with an ex-military who served during the civil war of Nigeria from 1967-1970. The researcher will read all the sources, collate and analyze them accordingly, findings derived from the analysis will provide a clear understanding and also answers the research questions and hypothesis stated above.

1.6 Limitations

Given that, the issue of Boko Haram is one that involves security and government intelligence, some documents involving classified details cannot be obtained from the government for the purpose of research, since doing so would expose the government's strategies to the opponent. This limitation might affect the information on how the government is working towards curbing the issue. A major detail that might affect the outcome of this research is the government's documents of the effects of the activities of the group on the individuals especially within the region. Government reports might not be the true reflection of some of the realities of

the Boko Haram case due to political interests. In attempt to look good in the eyes of voters, there is the possibility of the government underestimating (or understating) figures or data on how Boko Haram has affected some sector like the level of education in the region.

1.7 Brief overview of Boko Haram

Basically, the expansion of Boko Haram's atrocities casts a great doubt on the extent to which Nigeria's constitution is legitimate. Increasing Boko Haram activities begs the question of whether the Nigerian government can exercise its internal sovereignty. This terrorist group refers to itself as "Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad"² which is an Arabic language that translates into English as "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad"³. The name "Boko Haram" in itself is from the Hausa language which is popularly spoken in Northern Nigeria. "Boko" refers to Western education and Haram is a borrowed word from Arabic –perhaps due to historical trade and exposure with Arabs— which means forbidden (or a sin in terms of religion). This explains the motive of the group: it seeks to cast out western education from Nigeria and in turn establish an Islamic state. the leader of Boko Haram is Mohammed Yusuf also called Ustaz (teacher) Mohammed, he is from Yobe State which is located in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria, born January 29, 1970 and died in 2009 until his demise, he was spiritual leader, was blessed with 12 children and four wives, lived a luxurious lifestyle, had a secondary education and later acquired Quranic education and joined several Islamic movements in Nigeria, but couldn't stick to those groups for long as wasn't satisfied and finally he emerged as the leader of Ahlusunna wal'jama'ah hijra which was later changed to Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda' Awati Wal Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram (meaning western education and civilization are sinful and ungodly). In his quest to eradicate western education; Mohammed Yusuf confirms this in an interview with BBC news that "the present Western-style of education is mixed with issues that runs contrary to our beliefs in Islam"⁴. Even though some Northern States have implemented the Sharia law, Boko Haram sees it as inadequate because the laws are limited⁵.

² BBC, "Is Islamic State Shaping Boko Haram media?" Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31522469>

³ Daniel Agbibo, "Boko-Haram and the Global Jihad: Do Not Think Jihad is over. Rather Jihad has just begun", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Volume: 68, No: 4, 2014, p. 400.

⁴ Joe Boyle, "Nigeria's 'Taliban' Enigma", 2009, (Retrieved from) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8172270.stm> . accessed on 27 June 2016.

⁵ Stuart Elden, *The Geopolitics of Boko Haram and Nigeria's War on Terror*, 2014.

Over 100 hundred attacks had been carried since the year 2002 by this terror group, Boko Haram as succeeded in becoming the deadliest terrorist organization in Sub-Saharan Africa⁶. Attacks by this group encompasses almost every aspect of the society ranging from “police stations, military facilities, churches, schools, cell phone towers, beer halls, Media houses, the United Nations building, politicians, Muslim critics (especially clerics) and Christians”⁷. As of September 2014, it was reported that Boko Haram activities had cost a total of 13000 deaths,⁸ and displacement of more than 1.4 million people from their homes⁹. This figure might be underestimated, given that it emanated from Nigerian government. In all, the Boko Haram activities have affected over six million people, some of whom were killed or displaced¹⁰.

Boko Haram originated from Borno State, in the capital town Maiduguri in Northern Nigeria which is largely inhabited by the Hausa and Fulani people who are mostly Muslims. There are lots of contestation on the historical origins and traces of Boko Haram. Some researches such as Adesoji believe that the group came about as a result of ‘Maitatsine’ (Hausa word- “he who damns”) riots within the country in 1980s which created ethnic and religious tensions towards the end of the twentieth century¹¹. Elsewhere, the group is said to have originated from Muhammad Marwa, a controversial Islamic preacher from Cameroon born in 1927 in Maroua, who migrated to the Northern city of Kano in 1945. He was against the Nigeria state and his aim was to “purify the practice of Islam” which he thought had been distorted by the West, he died in 1980¹². However the general consensus within researchers is that the organization was officially formed in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf who set up a center, which served as both mosque and religious school for educating kids. Soon after, the purpose of the center was transformed into political ones where students from the school were recruited into terrorism. It is estimated that the group succeeded in recruiting as much as 280,000 fighters from

⁶ Datas collected by Ehwarieme and Umukoro (2015) shows about 110-114 attacks by Boko Haram between 2002 and 2015. See the appendix page of Ehwarieme & Umukoro (2015).

⁷ Agbiboa, “Boko Haram and the Global Jihad”, p. 400.

⁸ Premium Times News, (Retrieved from) <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/168686-boko-haram-has-killed-13000-nigerians-jonathan.html>

⁹ Sergie Mohammed Aly and Toni Johnson, “Boko Haram”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2011. (Retrieved from) <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739> . accessed date 27th June 2016.

¹⁰ William Ehwarieme and Nathaniel Umukoro, “Civil Society and Terrorism in Nigeria: A Study of the Boko Haram Crisis”, *International Journal on World Peace*, 2015.

¹¹ Abimbola Adesoji, “The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria”, *Africa Spectrum*, Volume: 45, No: 2, pp. 95-108.

¹² Ehwarieme and Umukoro, “Civil Society and Terrorism in Nigeria”, p. 29.

the neighboring countries such as Chad and Niger in the region¹³. Proliferation of Boko Haram radicalism started in 2009 after its leader of the group, Mohammed Yusuf was executed while in custody of the police. The events leading to his arrest started off as a resistance to a motorbike-helmet law by members of the group. The police resorted to a brutal way of dealing with the resistance which led to a death of about 700 to 1400 people¹⁴. In the aftermath of Yusuf's death, the group under Abubakar Shekau (deputy leader to the group's founder Mohammed Yusuf) went underground. For a short while, the police and army thought their operation had been successful. On the contrary, the group was reinforcing itself in order to come back with a stronger, more violent and organized means of attacking. After coming back, the group diversified its operations and resources by creating different bases in different part of the north. It then carried out prison break in Bauchi where an estimation of 700 inmates escaped. Local Government Institutions weren't the only victims as international institutions such the United Nations office has been a target, in the aftermath of the group's reformation. Series of bombing takes place in churches, mosques, political party offices, bus stations, etc. and the leadership of the group sends out word that it will only cooperate if the government releases arrested members of the group¹⁵.

1.8 Literature Review

Boko Haram has served as an area of research for both scholars and students of International Relations who seek to understand the dynamics of ethno-religious conflict. Research pertaining to this topic started more than a decade ago, however, majority of the research are due to the proliferation of Boko Haram activities in recent years. Most of the researches on the topic seem to look at the birth and growth of the group by examining at either the factors that led to the emergence of the group's radicalism and vandalism, or the contributive factors to its successful growth.

Agbibo, one of the leading scholars on the issue, wrote on the "systematic accounts of the emergence" of the group¹⁶. His study showed that radical islamism is not a new phenomenon

¹³ Sani Umar, "Between Boko Haram and the Joint Task Force: Assessing the Dilemma of Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights in Northern Nigeria", *Journal of African Law*, Volume: 59, No: 1, pp. 25-63.

¹⁴ Stuart Elden, *The Geopolitics of Boko Haram and Nigeria's War on Terror*, 2014.

¹⁵ Ehwareme & Umukoro.

¹⁶ Daniel Agbibo, "Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume: 37, pp. 41-67.

in post-independence Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf is merely a successor of previous radical leader such as Muhammad Marwa of Kano (who had migrated from Cameroon) and Sheik Abubabakar Mahmoud Gumi. Sheik Gumi's was a huge advocator of an Islamised Northern Region of Nigeria just as Boko Haram is today, he was born 1924, also an interpreter of Sharia legal system which made an central authority in the region Abu Bakr Mahmoud Gumi was from Gumi village - Sukoto, Nigeria, was educated Arabic and became a became an Islamic and Arabic tutor, relocated to Sudan where he studied diploma in Sharia Law. He never liked colonialism, he collaborated with Ahmadu Bello (the Nigerian leader) and they both established an institute for the promulgation of Islamic values in Northern Nigeria. Shortly after Nigeria's independence, Shaikh Gumi was made to lead Shari'a judiciary system, but in 1967, he rose to the position of a Grand Mufti. He joined several organizations both in Africa and beyond, he died in 1992¹⁷.

One peculiar thing about Agbiboa work is that it uses statistical data to observe the relationship between poverty plus underdevelopment and the rise in the group's violence. Even though the literature does not establish a clear link between underdevelopment and violence, the data seems to show a correlational relationship between the two, in the case of Nigeria. While poverty rates in the southern states have reduced for the past two decades, the northern states which happens to be the home of Boko Haram is experiencing a rather increasing rate of poverty.

Basing on the statistics of the socio-economic under(development) in the country, other researches, have contested that Boko Haram merely exploits from the corruption and unequal income distribution within the country. Due to the negative sentiments and anger towards the economic structure. For most of the Hausa people in Northern Nigeria, poverty and underdevelopment is associated to corruption by the people in government and administrative positions. As a point of example, the North has an illiteracy rate of about 80% which has even been made worse by the activities of the group. Boko Haram has been successfully in using religion as a mobilization tool against modernity which most of the northerners perceive as the tool used by leaders in oppressing them (Adesoji, 2010; Agbiboa, 2014b; Ehwarieme & Umukoro, 2015)¹⁸. This, among many other has also been established as factors that have facilitated the growth of the group and its activities.

¹⁷ KFIP, "Shaikh Abu Bakr Mahmoud Gumi", (Retrieved from) <http://kfip.org/shaikh-abu-bakr-mahmoud-gumi/> (accessed date- 17 Oct 2016).

¹⁸ Abimbola Adesoji, "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria", pp. 95-108, see also

Similar research in line with poverty and economic conditions argue that Boko Haram is no more than a radical extremist group, hence a nomenclature problem. Contrary to most studies that have tagged Boko Haram as a religious movement, Deckard, Barkindo, & Jacobson conducted a study that showed no correlation between between religiosity and radicalism¹⁹. Their research showed that Boko Haram is an radical extremist group that represents an ideology and not religious belief. Using a survey taken in 2012 and 2013, they arrived on a conclusion that high level of religiosity does not necessarily cause a supportive opinion of radicalism or violence. Similarly, Adegbulu observed that the action of some Boko Haram leaders depicted nothing related to Islam²⁰. The previous leader, Muhammad Yusuf lived in luxury, and had his kids enrolled in high quality education schools, while at the same time hypocritically fighting western education. Adegbulu therefore argues that Terrorism in Nigeria is a result of poverty coupled with bad governance.

Post-independence Nigeria has been a very polarised one in which various ethnic and religious groups are struggling for dominance and power. Given this polarization, it has been easier for Boko Haram to use it as a strategy for recruiting. Boko Haram's success has partially been attributed to the division within the country, and therefore makes it easier for the group to convince and sell its ideas to those who would listen²¹. Several researches also attributed the success to the internal and external supports for the group. On the domestic front, it receives domestic support from the rich and people in higher positions. Its member include "lecturers, bankers, political elites" and many other influential people^{22 23 24}. On the international front, the general argument in the literature is that Al Qaeda has been the main supporter of the group^{25 26}. Furthermore, Adesoji argues that a worldwide rise in the ideology of "islamic fundamentalism"

¹⁹ Natalie Delia Deckard, Barkindo Atta & David Jacobson, "Religiosity and Rebellion in Nigeria: Considering Boko Haram in the Radical Tradition", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume: 38, No: 7, pp. 510-528.

²⁰ Femi Adegbulu, "Boko Haram: The Emergence of a Terrorist Sect in Nigeria 2009-2013", *African Identities*, Volume: 11, No: 3, 2013, pp. 260-273.

²¹ Adesoji, "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria", pp. 95-108.

²² Ibid.

²³ Elden, "The Geopolitics of Boko Haram and Nigeria's War on Terror", pp. 414-425.

²⁴ Agbiboa, "Peace at Daggers", pp. 41-67.

²⁵ Agbiboa, "Boko Haram and the Global Jihad", pp. 400-417.

²⁶ Adesoji, "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria", pp. 95-108.

also served as a reason for a violent Boko Haram²⁷. Timeline of attacks by the group indicates bank robbery as a common routine which has been argued as one of its financial sources²⁸.

Another international perspective is presented in Comolli's paper²⁹. Comolli looks beyond the borders of Nigeria to examine the role of neighbouring countries in the crisis. Three main countries— Cameroon, Chad and Niger—have had significant roles in the crisis. A weak border allows Boko Haram to smuggle both weapons and fighters from these countries. Hence Comolli concludes that Nigeria would need to cooperate with the neighbouring governments in order to solve this crisis.

Eke's research on the other hand, puts majority of the blame on the government's security strategies. The government under-estimated Boko Haram and regarded it as a minor group which will fade off with time, as it wasn't as established as terrorist organization. Furthermore, even with a security budget of more than 5 billion dollars, Boko Haram has not been defeated due to "fiscal mismanagement within the army, the refusal to procure modern military equipment and the failure to advance its capacity to gather valuable intelligence". Eke sums up his whole argument by explaining that the "government wrongly perceived" Boko Haram's threat³⁰. Using a survey they conducted with academics, journalists, security operatives and politicians, Aghedo & Osumah arrive at a similar conclusion that Boko Haram reached its peak due to government failure and weak institutions³¹.

A few other researches deviate from the traditional pattern of studying the birth, growth, and the structure of the group's activities. Recent research by Ehwarieme & Umukoro explored the relation between the civil societies and Boko Haram. Their research focused on how Civil societies, mainly the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), has helped prevented escalation of the crisis. Even though Churches have been target of most Boko Haram attacks, CAN has only responded in a peaceful and calmly manner. It has asked its members to avoid using violence as the society tries to plead to the government for support. The Christian youths have also played a role by helping some muslims with water and in some cases a place to worship. One important aspect of their research is that they gathered data from different sources to create a timeline of

²⁷ Ibid, p. 95.

²⁸ Ehwarieme & Umukoro, p. 40-48.

²⁹ Virginia Comolli, "The Regional Problem of Boko Haram", *Survival*, Volume: 57, No. 4, 2015, pp. 109-117.

³⁰ Surulola James Eke, "How and Why Boko Haram Blossomed: Examining the Fatal Consequences of Treating a Purposive Terrorist Organization as Less so", *Defense & Security Analysis*, Volume: 31, No: 4, 2015, pp. 319-320.

³¹ Iro Aghedo & Oarhe Osumah, "The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond", *Third World Quarterly*, Volume: 33, No: 5, 2012, pp. 853-856.

almost all Boko Haram activities since 2002. This helps to understand a general overview of the group and its activities³².

However, a similar studies by Onapajo & Usman found a different results. They examine the influence of Boko Haram on the current relations between Muslims and Christians in the country. According to their study, Boko Haram through its strategies has created a sense of enmity between the two. While the Christians see Boko Haram as a strategy used by the Muslims to dominate the North, the Muslims see Boko Haram as a creation of the church to destroy muslims and put the North in chaos. The study, however, shows that Boko Haram is indeed an enemy to both groups since both have been victims of Boko Haram attacks³³.

Sampson also deviates from the mainstream line of research by looking at how human rights agreements can be used in helping, prevent abuse of innocent citizens. The research focused on how the Joint Task Force (JTF) which is the counter-terrorist body of Nigeria has resulted in the violation of rights of the individuals. Sampson argues that Nigeria needs to domesticate its human rights treaties in order to solve this problem³⁴.

As can be seen, most of the literature on the issue of Boko Haram has been on the structure and evolution of the group. The literature is rich in aspects such as the conditions under which the group grew up and developed. Another successful thing by the already done literature is that it has captured a timeline of all previous Boko Haram activities which provides a data for future studies.

However, only a few researches provided an insight on how conditions of the regional environment has affected the group, and similarly the implications of the group's activities on the regional environment³⁵³⁶. Earlier research by Oyewole tried to capture a part of the domestic implications, but only succeeded in examining the issue from the perspective of the Nigerian government and its army. It examines the failure of the military to curb the issue in the short run, and then suggests other possible measures to help counter the group³⁷.

³² Ehwarieme & Umukoro, pp. 25-48.

³³ Hakeem Onapajo & Abubakar Usman, "Fueling the Flames: Boko Haram and Deteriorating Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Volume: 35, No: 1, p. 106-122.

³⁴ Sampson, "Between Boko Haram and the Joint Task Force: Assessing the Dilemma of Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights in Northern Nigeria", *Journal of African Law*, 2015, Volume: 59, No: 1, pp. 25-63.

³⁵ Adesoji, pp. 95-108.

³⁶ Agbiboa, "Boko-Haram and the Global Jihad", pp. 400-417.

³⁷ Samuel Oyewole, "Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria's War on Terror", *Defense and Security Analysis*, Volume: 29, No: 3, 2013, pp. 253-262.

1.9 Gap in Literature

These trend of research has created a gap in the literature which my research aims to unravel. There is a few research that deals with the perspectives of International and regional politics. The problem of Boko Haram has outgrown the boundaries of Nigeria, and hence should not be treated only as a matter of domestic politics. It has extended into a regional problem by posing as a threat to neighbouring countries in West Africa. Also, evidence of alliance with global terrorist groups elevates it to the international level. Hence, there is the need to study the global factors that are in play. This includes the efforts by regional organizations and the response of Nigerian government towards these efforts. Much emphasis has been given to how the organization has risen to power, given the government's incompetence and the international support that the group had received. Some researches has managed to capture the international and regional dynamics, other focused on the domestic aspect: Agbiboa mentioned of the "psychological impact" created by Boko Haram on the public³⁸: a more intensive and recent study by Jacob et. al incorporated interviews with survivors and displaced citizens of Northern Nigeria who now reside in camps. The study showed some of effects Boko Haram on the social lives of the people. It seeked to understand the emotional trauma that the victims are going through.³⁹.

Studies concerning the case of Boko Haram falls within the framework of either domestic or external politics respectively. Gap has been created in terms of understanding how the domestic factors affect the external environment, and how the regional dynamics affect the domestic aspects of Boko Haram. Studying the issue from only a domestic perspective runs the research at risk of ignoring important regional factors playing a role. Similarly, focusing only on regional level would not be enough to adequately examine the case. this is because domestic factor affect regional factors, and so, do the regional factors affect the domestic dynamics in the case of Boko Haram. This literature lacks in this sense, to explain how both perspectives are interrelated .

³⁸ Daniel Agbiboa, "Spoiling Domestic Terrorism? Boko Haram and State Response", *Peace Review*, Volume: 25, No: 3, p. 435.

³⁹ Jacob Udo, Maire Abia-Bassey, Emily Nkanga and Abdulahi Aliyu al, "Narratives of Displacement: Conversations with Boko Haram Displaced Persons in Northeast Nigeria", *Contemporary French and Francophone Studies*, Volume: 20, No: 2, 2016, pp. 176-190.

1.10 What Does this Research Hope to Offer

It is necessary to understand the implications of Boko Haram in terms of both domestic and regional politics. To better understand this issue, there is need to study how the regional politics are related to the domestic politics in Nigeria, thereby affecting the issue of Boko Haram. It goes without saying that Boko Haram has created internal transformations within Nigeria and this has been confirmed by various academic studies. The research examines how Boko Haram affects the neighbours of Nigeria and how the neighbouring countries have responded to the problem. Similarly, it also explores how the response of the regional environment affects domestic dynamics. The research examines how Boko Haram affects the neighbours of Nigeria and how the neighbouring countries have responded to the problem.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NIGERIA AND ITS NORTH-EASTERN REGION

2.1. Historical Background of Nigeria

Once a colony of the Great Britain, Nigeria now stands tall as the largest economy in Africa, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of about 481.066 billion USD⁴⁰. This economic transformation can be attributed to its large population size of over 170 million which serves as both a large market and a source of labor, and its rich deposit of minerals such Oil and gas, gold, diamond, lead, limestone, coal, iron, uranium, phosphate, and limestone. These minerals are spread across the country with various regions having different shares and proportion. However, Oil and Gas tops all other minerals as it accounts for more than 90% of Nigeria's total export⁴¹. The major turn in economy was in the year 1973, when OPEC oil-price escalated leading to a boom in revenues obtained from oil.

Present day Nigeria is located in West Africa region—surrounded by Niger on the north, Chad on the northeast, Benin on the West, Cameroon on the East and the Gulf of Guinea on the South— Until the arrival of the colonial masters, the territory were controlled by various chief, kings such as Borno Empire, Sokoto Empire, Nok Empire, Ife Empire, Benin Empire, the Nri Kingdom and Oyo Kingdom”⁴². The first major external civilization that influenced Nigeria was the Islamic civilization mainly from North Africa. The Hausa and Fulani people from the Northern part of present day Nigeria traded with the people from North Africa. The trade known as Trans-Saharan trade resulted in Islamization of Northern Nigerian, an occurrence which eventually led to the establishment of a caliphate in the early nineteenth century.

Even though, contact with Europe and the Western world started in the mid fifteenth century, Christianity only began to gain grounds towards the mid-19th century. Contact with these foreign civilizations were solely based on trade, more specifically, slave trade. This is a practice that had been going on within the continent between various empires even before the arrival of Europeans⁴³.

⁴⁰ The World Bank report, retrieved from <http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria> accessed date- 31st March 2017.

⁴¹ OPEC, “Nigeria Facts and Figures” Retrieved from http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm , accessed date 25th September 2016.

⁴² Sam Momah, Nigeria Beyond Divorce: Amalgamation in Perspective, Ibadan, 2013, p. 4.

⁴³ Toyin Falola, A History of Nigeria, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 10.

The abolishment of Slavery resulted in a different course of action for the Europeans who still had interest in the region due to its richness in raw materials. Only that, this time they needed much control which steered up its action towards colonial and control seeking method. Given Nigeria's historical background of the existence of various tribal groups and religions, it however should be noted that until the arrival of the British, there existed a peaceful relationship between the people in terms of ethnicity and religion. The formation of modern day Nigeria was neither done for the convenience of Nigerians nor for the tribal and ethnic groups within the country. Rather, Nigeria was indeed created for the convenience of the British, who were then the colonial masters, to make their ruling easier and more controllable. Britain upon successfully conquering various regions of present day Nigeria saw the need to amalgamate all these small regions without considering the consequences⁴⁴.

Britain joined all its territories officially to form present day Nigeria in the year 1914. Until this year, the territories were mostly protectorates of conquered kingdoms under the British Empire⁴⁵. Other scholars on Nigerian history do argue that indeed the birth of Nigeria was official in 1914, the whole process started in 1861 with "British annexation of Lagos as a royal colony"⁴⁶. The country was divided into three major regions: the Northern, the Southern and the Eastern. The Southern region occupied by the Yoruba people which was very important region for the colonial masters due to its richness in agricultural products such as cocoa, given that the export was priority for the British and the south being close to the sea, Western influence was more apparent there as it can be observed that formal education grew relatively "faster in the south than in the north"⁴⁷. The Eastern region, inhabited by the Igbo people was also important for the British, because the region traded in palm oil which was used for greasing machines. Towards the North, around the Kano, Jigawa, Kaduna, Sokoto and other states were predominantly occupied by the Hausa-Fulani, people who were mainly Muslims. Acquisition of the Northern region had little to do with British trade but more with its strategic reasons, also Britain's rivalry with French led to British expansionist policy. Another reason was that the

⁴⁴ Sam Momah, *Nigeria Beyond Divorce: Amalgamation in Perspective*.

⁴⁵ Toyin Falola, *A History of Nigeria*. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

⁴⁶ Momah, p. 3.

⁴⁷ Falola, p. 10.

Sokoto Empire still practiced slavery after its abolishment and Britain had to intervene to end this practice⁴⁸.

Literature on the history of Nigeria has treated the country as if it were one big entity with a common feature. Holmes in his book, referred to the country as the “Giant of Africa” due to its population and economy⁴⁹. In some news channels, Nigeria was predicted to be “an emerging African Power”. Without proper tackling of the current issues of Boko Haram, it becomes tough to imagine that a country torn within itself by ethnicity and religion is capable of developing into a regional power, and even if it miraculously does, it begs the question of how long it can sustain that power. This argument cannot be dismissed completely in the sense that Nigeria is indeed the “Giant of Africa” and considered the largest economy in the continent and population-wise, it is currently the 7th in the world. In terms of socio-economic structure however, Nigeria is no more than a body consisting of tiny bits of separate groups being forced to coexist with one another.

The first of October 1960 went down in Nigerian history as one of its biggest day, if not the biggest, as it achieved independence from Britain. Nigeria, a country created and named by British governor and his wife, had resisted the colonial rule since the early 20th century^{50 51}. Even though Governor Lord Lugard had succeeded in joining various regions during his rule, serious consequences of some of his policies are seen today in Nigerian politics. In the aftermath of the amalgamation, “the two protectorates [north and the south] never really interacted effectively as one country till 1946” when the sentiments for a national independence reached the peak. The two regions basically came together as a result of convergence of interest. It is therefore not surprising to see that these two regions have so many differences today. As a point of example, there currently exist three different set of laws in the country today. This dynamic however isn’t something peculiar to Nigeria. In fact, it has been argued that one legacy of

⁴⁸ Momah, Nigeria beyond Divorce, 2015.

⁴⁹ Peter Holmes, Nigeria: Giant of Africa, National Oil and Chemical Marketing Co. of Nigeria, 1987.

⁵⁰ Nigeria was first named by Flora Shaw whose husband Sir Frederick Lugard amalgamated and governed the country under the authority of Her Majesty, the Queen of England. See Sam Momah (2015) “Nigeria Beyond Divorce.”

⁵¹ Nationalists and freedom movements are reported to have begun from 1914. These movements consisted of both locals and freed slaves. Prominent names include Dr. Africanus Horton, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe etc.

colonization in Africa is the “plurality of laws in the legal systems of most of the formal colonies”⁵².

Being a country with a federal state system makes it even more complicated. There is the English law, also referred to as the common law, the Islamic law which is also known as the Sharia law and then the customary law. Most part of the English law serves as the common law of the country and applicable anywhere within the country’s territories. The Islamic law and the customary law, on the other hand, apply to specific areas: the Northern part mainly uses the Islamic law while the customary laws are employed by mostly the Southern states. But in both cases, the Islamic law and the customary laws only apply with the backing of the constitution, thus they are limited.

2.1.1. Demography

Nigeria is democratically governed by a constitution and the leadership of the country rest on the shoulders of the president, it is made up of six geo-political zones namely (South-West, South-south, South-East, North -West, North-Central, and North –East) and further divided into 36 states with Abuja as Federal Capital Territory in the center, it has parliament with two houses, the Upper House –Senate with 109 seats shared among the 36 states, Lower House having 360 seats, members are usually elected to serve four-year terms. It is worthy to note that Nigeria has third Arm of Government called, the Judiciary, this arm is divided into two Supreme Court;(the legal system based on English common / traditional law and Sharia law practiced in the northern states.

Nigeria is continentally located in Africa, in terms of size, it is said to be the biggest in West Africa. It is a member of both African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),’ it is bordering gulf of Guinea between Republic of Benin and Cameroon, also with Chad and Niger⁵³, it has a population of over 174 million people, Women accounting for 49.5 percent and men is 50.5 percent⁵⁴ with different Climate condition which varies; in the South it is equatorial while in the center it is tropical and in the North it, arid ⁵⁵.

⁵² Mamman Lawan, “Islamic Law and Legal Hybridity in Nigeria”, *Journal of African Law*, Volume: 58, No: 2, 2013, p. 303

⁵³ Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html> , accessed date on 9 August 2016

⁵⁴ National Bureau of Statistics, 2014. *Demographic Statistics Bulletin*, ed., Yemi Kale.

⁵⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html> , on 9 August 2016

Nigeria is diverse in terms of ethnicity with 250 ethnic groups, and has 520 languages, though English is the official language of communication, out of the 520 languages mentioned above, only three is officially recognized by the government, these includes; Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo, and the Yoruba. The Hausa-Fulani are predominant in the north and accounts for two-thirds population of the country, the Yoruba are located in the southwest with 21% of the population, The Igbo are the largest ethnic group in the southeast of Nigeria with 18% population and are predominantly catholic. It has two major religions namely, Islam and Christianity with dominant Muslims of about 50% in the North and dominant Christians (40%) in the South. indigenous beliefs 10%⁵⁶.

The country is blessed with deposits of natural resources such as petroleum, oil /, Rubber, Tin, Iron, Ore, Coal, Lead, Zinc, limestone and natural gas, niobium, petroleum, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc etc,⁵⁷. Internationally, is rated the sixth largest oil producing country.

2.1.2. Nigeria and Religion

Religion in recent years has played a great role in Nigeria, not only has it been center of attraction for the citizens of the country, but also a debate in the modern literature and media. Nigeria is a country with many religions, but official and approved religions are Islam, Christianity, and traditional (which is the default indigenous religion), for the purpose of this study, I will limit my scope to Islam and Christianity and how its arrival has affected the traditional religion. The scope is limited to two religions because it is more related to my topic under study. Having said that, It is worthy to note that Prior to the arrival of these two religion (Islam and Christianity), Nigeria had always had an indigenous religion known as African Tradition which the people practiced⁵⁸.

Clearly, Islamic religion came to Nigeria through Bornu State in the Northern region about five to six hundred (500 or 600) years before Christianity arrived, during that period, only the city dwellers propagated Islam and was mainly patronized by some elites for different reasons

⁵⁶ Nigeria Demography Profile 2016, Mundi, Retrieved from http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profile.html, accessed date -12 August 2016

⁵⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>, accessed date 9 August 2016

⁵⁸ Rimamsikwe Habila, Kitause Hilary, Chukwuka Achunike. "Religion in Nigeria from 1900-2013", *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, Volume: 3, No: 18, 2013, pp. 46-53.

such as political, economic and social. The arrival Uthman Dan Fodio's Jihadist contributed to the spread of Islam to the whole Northern region, with passage time the spread of Islam became militant as wasn't compatible with the Traditional Religion System and its tributes. Consequently, they began the process of elimination and eradication of anything associated to paganism, customs/tradition also unbeliever and infidels were forcefully converted by Jihadist and not through peaceful preaching. In other words militant power of Jihadist were adopted to convert people of different belief into Islam as it gained territories, popularity and increased in size throughout the North⁵⁹.

Conversely, Christianity was first introduced in Nigeria in the fifteenth century through the invitation of Portuguese Roman Catholic Mission with the help of some leaders of Benin kingdom in the southern part of Nigeria, though it wasn't successful because the locals couldn't renounce their indigenous religion. Several other attempts were made with no much success, until the arrival of British imperialists, Christianity blossom and opened ways to missionaries in the south and eastern part of Nigeria. Furthermore, all effort to introduce Christian missionaries to the Muslims in the North faced a lot of resistance and set back as was seen to be pro- British Imperialists, though few pockets of traditionalists became converts of the missionaries, but with the increase of trading between the Europeans and the leaders of the North, Christianity became solidified. Today, some part of north Nigeria has minority as Christians⁶⁰.

Consequently, the encounter of indigenous traditional religion with the foreign religions created some kind of rift, because the advocates of both foreign religions saw the indigenous traditional religion and its customs as ungodly and needed to be eradicate and abolished, the traditional religion on the other hand felt striped of their age long customs, but as time went by, both the indigenous and the foreign religion came to an understanding and influenced each other respectively.

Subsequently, Islam and Christianity successfully spread all over the country, its presence has no doubt brought about fundamentalism, growth in modern education, science and technology which was very limited in the twentieth century. As Nigeria counts her blessings, so is tension and crisis been generated, in addition to the problem, majority of the traditionalist who accepted these religions were either categorized as Muslims or Christians through the policies of

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Ibid

the imperialists, soon after, they became instrumental to the expansion of Islam over Christianity⁶¹.

Clearly, the challenges brought forward by the introduction of both religion has affected Nigeria enormously in various sphere of life, particularly in the relationship that exist between Muslims and Christians in the country, as a result religious intolerant between ethnic groups has gave rise to ethnic radicalization like Boko Haram.

2.2. Nigeria and West Africa before Modern Times (Before 1800)

The first creature that lived in the area under study can be traced back to ten thousand years ago, when fossil skeleton with negroid features was first discovered in Iwo Elero in western Nigeria which proved antiquity of habitation in the region. Subsequently items such as stone tools evidenced human settlement, 2,000 years ago. Some industries were established during in the savanna from 4th millennium B.C., later agricultural grain farmers emerged in these communities⁶². with regard to the south, relied on hunting and gathering, which subsequently opened doors to subsistence farming at the periphery area of the forest first millennium B.C. and later cultivation of food such as tuber (yam) emerged.. other materials such stone, ax heads were gotten from the north and used to clear the forest in order to pave way for agricultural development, the oldest and primitive iron-smelting (metal working) furnaces is traced to Taruga dated back to the 4th century B.C. in West Africa, In the 2nd century BC activities in the kainji Dam showed that iron materials were produced, this feat was not in connection with bronze production , research showed that the awareness of Iron Age came into existed long before the introduction of metallurgy in savanna. The iron material was used for different purposes; for the south it was mainly for grass and forest cutting while in the north, it was used in drilling the earth in search of water and other things for agricultural purposes⁶³.

Accordingly, the earliest culture of the present day Nigeria was trace to the Nok people. They were expertise and known for their production of artifacts and irons in collaboration with Taruga, they gained popularity artifact throughout Niger and Benue rivers on the Jos Plateau in 4th century B.C. (400 years BC) & the 2nd century A.D (200 years). After the Nok culture particularly in first millennium A.D. much information was not given as to the culture that took

⁶¹ Rimamsikwe Habila, Kitause Hilary, Chukwuka Achunike. "Religion in Nigeria from 1900-2013", *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, Volume: 3, No: 18, 2013, pp. 46-53.

⁶² Helen Chapin Metz, "A Country Study. Washington DC", GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991, p.4.

⁶³ Ibid.

over from Nok control of the area, only few activities showed that iron smelting took place on Dala Hill in Kano between 600 and 700 A.D. From the start of 2nd millennium A.D, we were told that trade sprang up in the north-south area which emanated from Sahara in North Africa with savanna ethnic group, the items that was exchanged during the trade included; brass rods, coral, fabrics, ivory, glass beads, weapons, salt, etc⁶⁴.

2.2.1. Nigeria States Before 1800

The territory known as Nigeria today were kingdoms and traditional ethnic groups or nations ruled by chiefs, royal kings, these major groups includes Hausa and Nupe, Edo Kingdom of Benin, the northern kingdoms of the savanna, the Yoruba in the south-west, and the Igbo in the southeast which can be dated before 1500

Other region like West and south of Lake Chad were conquered by Kanem Empire located in the north- east of Lake Chad. Borno, the Yoruba Kingdoms and Benin, were located in the west bank of the Niger having combination of migrants with different origin⁶⁵.

The Yoruba's lived on agricultural production and had a system of inheritance for control of conquered territories, but from about the eleventh century A.D., some kind transformation took place where citizens became subjects under a dynasty chieftain, eventually the system brought about an civilized political and social lifestyle conforming to the standard of art, like the terra-cotta and ivory sculpture and metal cast production⁶⁶.

Some materials like the copper in form of brass and bronze, tin, and Zinc used for their arts were imported from the North Africa, Sahara and northern Nigeria. The Yoruba believed in deity called Olorun (God) and other smaller deities who were human initially, but vast in performing some mystical tasks. A very good example was Oduduwa, (which means creator of the earth and the ancestor of the Yoruba kings). Oduduwa's sons were made priest -kings in other cities, where they ruled and controlled the cult rituals. The city called, Ife was the hub their religious cults which was practiced in accordance with Kings (oni) benefits. Ife was made the center for trading of the West with the north. The king sustained his court through the duties placed on trade, and other tithes which were paid to him directly as their leader.

The kingdom had several clan grouped into various dynasty from which succession of the kingship (oni) was carried out in a rotational manner, after the position of Oni there existed other

⁶⁴ Helen Chapin Metz, "A Country Study. Washington DC", GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991, p.4.

⁶⁵ Helen Chapin Metz, "A Country Study. Washington DC", pp. 6-9.

⁶⁶ Ibid

members of the appointed according to hierarchy called; town chiefs, the heads of dependencies and official of the palace (who were spokesmen) These officials were appointed from the members of clans which had some kind of right to the office. The duty of the royal dynasty Members of the royal dynasty was to ruled dependencies, their sons and other palace officials carried out duties like, bodyguards to the oni, and judges⁶⁷.

Back in 15th century, Benin and Oyo kingdom had more political and economic powers than, till its collapse, Ife didn't change its religious status as the center religions oni of Ife was recognized, highly respected as an important root of the Yoruba existence all over the region including the Benin Kingdom the system of governance that took place in Ife became role model to other kingdoms like the Oyo in order to amass power the head of Oyo dynasty took control smaller towns, villages and states and adopted a name called Alafin (king). The kingdom was governed by a constitutional monarchy where government functions rest with basorun (prime minister). Oyo kingdom is found in the savanna located in the north of Ife distance of about 170 kilometers, and area in question covers an area of about 100 kilometers northwards of the current day Oyo. The kingdom had a very strong defense in terms of military and became a hegemon over other smaller kingdoms like Borgu and Nape Kingdoms⁶⁸. With regard s to trade, Oyo kingdom established trade routes leading to the North but from the 11th century onwards, agricultural system was created in the eastern part of Ife with Edo-speaking ethnic groups inhabiting the territory under the supervision of Ife which got it independent from Ife in the 15th century and established its own trading line, it tries to cut itself entirely from the interference of Ife⁶⁹.

With regards to Benin kingdom, religious and Political powers rest on the shoulders of the oba (king) because they believed that the Oba actually descended from Ife dynasty. Benin kingdom had 6 councils of advisers to the oba who also nominated his successor. The administration of other cities rest with sixty trade guilds selected from clans loyal to the oba, while the Oba governs and preside over the court. Benin kingdom established a unique leadership system of the administration of the extended territories⁷⁰.

⁶⁷ Helen Chapin Metz, "A Country Study. Washington DC", pp. 6-9.

⁶⁸ Helen Chapin Metz, "A Country Study. Washington DC", pp. 6-9.

⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰ Ibid

Towards the end of 15th century, the kingdom encountered the Portuguese and at the peak its reign, Benin kingdom expanded its territories to other parts around the region, like southeastern and a few population of Igbo on the west bank of the Niger, these territories were ruled by selected royal family.

From history, it showed that Benin and Yoruba interrelated to each other during the 1500 and beyond⁷¹.



Fig 1. Map of Nigeria showing the various states and their categorization into the six geopolitical zones⁷².

⁷¹ Helen Chapin Metz, "A Country Study. Washington DC", pp. 6-9.

⁷² Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/figure/51795009_fig1_Fig-1-Map-of-Nigeria-showing-the-six-geopolitical-zones-For-interpretation-of-the

2.2.1.1. *Igbo Nation*

Unlike other region, the Igbos region didn't have a unity or structured system of governance like king or chief for control of peoples rather it had some kind of fragmented villages based on ancestral lineage which didn't give room for the division of people according to their social class, leadership is sought based on great sapience, sound judgment and age of the candidate, the Igbos rely on self-sufficiency farming for the purpose of feeding themselves and their families. Ownership of land showed how rich an individual is and are also very good in fabrication, buying and selling of goods and services, the region is highly populated.

The Igbos used neutral and third party to resolve conflicts in villages, With regards to gods, the Igbos had several gods which are interconnected with each other but they believed and maintain equality among all humans in the communities. They had some kind of idols, oracles, deity as well as worshipers who were dedicated to gods in their communities⁷³. The Igbos was greatly influenced by the Benin and Yoruba region in institutionalizing of political system.

2.2.1.2. *The Kingdoms of Northern Savanna*

Unlike the Igbos, the northern communities were properly structured, but due to some natural disaster most of the inhabitants were fragmented during the 3rd millennium B.C. due to the problem, Trans-Saharan trading lines were opened to the western Sudan and the Mediterranean, which brought about communication with the outside world and influence on the cultural system up to the tail of 19th century. Through this trading line, Islam came to the West Africa after the 9th century. During that time, only a single line of dynastic states system existed in addition were some other Hausa states spread all over the present Sudan. The strongest states among them were Gao, Kanem and Ghana, located outside the shores of present Nigeria, but though had some level of influence on the Northern Nigerian savanna⁷⁴.

Gradually, some of these began to decline starting from Ghana and was taken over by Mali in the 19th century and eventually established western Sudan under its imperial rule in the 13th century. As regards to Gao state, an empire called Songhai emerged but was still under the control of Mali until the tail end of 15th century when Songhai (Gao) obtained its independence. Prior to 1500, savanna states of Nigeria had culturally and economically influenced by western empires with the spread of Islam and trade it became very glaring in the 16th during this time half

⁷³ Helen Chapin Metz, "A Country Study. Washington DC", p. 9.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 10.

of the Northern Nigeria swear allegiance to Songhai empire while the other half rather pay their respect to another empire in Borno- East which was rival to Songhai⁷⁵.

With regard to the 3rd strongest state (kanem), history showed that Borno had some link with Kanem and had over time developed into an imperial status within Lake Chad basin. Kanem through its expansionist policy invaded other territories and finally conquered Borno. Basically, the kanem had a dynasty called Sayfawa (which emanated from pastoralists), a constitutional monarchy with leader called Mai (king) of Kanem, the Mai and his followers subsequently became converts of Islam. As result of the introduction of Islam, some existing institutions in the state were either maintained or replaced and others, properly positioned for better performance⁷⁶.

The king (mai) was always protected by a group slave- soldiers called abid also with unprofessional army which helps to expand Kanem's powers and leadership to Borno (towards the shores of Lake Chad). A traditional system of governance was adopted where an heir to the throne rule while undergoing induction training, but during the 14th century conflict broke out within the dynasty where the king and members of his court took refuge in Borno, while in Borno, an ethnic group called Kanuri emerged and with time civil war broke out which disrupted Kanem empire leading to the independence of Borno in 14th century, After their independence, Borno began salt /livestock trading lines with trans-Sudanic slave and desert trade, in a bid to secure itself, Borno entered into war with Kanem. Subsequently, the Islamic worship centers and court in Borno was graciously patronized by learned kings which eventually became so popular as a center for Islamic cultural and learning outlet.

With passage of time, some Hausa states like Kano, Katsina, and Gobir emerged and had metamorphosed into town-like structure and were very good at manufacturing. Basically, Hausa leadership came from "founding hero" known as Bayinjida, (of Middle Eastern origin), which became their sarki king of Daura, his children later created other Hausa towns called Hausa bakwai (Hausa seven). The Hausa state, were linked with Sudanic kingdoms and has over time benefited from Sudanic kingdom. A system was put in place to check the power politics among the Hausa states in order to avoid dominance over the other states and this gave each state equal

⁷⁵ Helen Chapin Metz, "A Country Study. Washington DC", p. 10.

⁷⁶ Ibid

chance to take leading role at different times. The Hausa states were mandated to pay tribute to empires like Songhai, Kanem-Borno etc⁷⁷.

The Hausa states had a trading organization where elected executive were given mandate to collect taxes from members which was given to the king (sarki) as a respect to the crown in exchange for safety and security of the organization. Basically, the Hausa-land received Islam through the caravan routes, but gradual expanded to the countryside, where traditional religion had more influence. Even with the introduction of Islam, some traditional practices were still maintained by the Hausa kings. However, only states like Katsina and Kano out of the Hausa states completely changed its tradition for Islamic culture⁷⁸.

Another group which also existed in that region is the Fulbe pastoralists known as Fulani, They came to Hausa country in the 13th century, and began to rear cattle, sheep, and goats in Borno simultaneously. This group of people (Fulani) came all the way from the Senegal River valley where they learnt the rudiment of livestock business from their ancestors during certain period of the year, they travel from North to south and vice versa in search of water and grazing for their cattle, their initial point of contact was Mali and then to Songhai empires where they finally gained access to Borno and Hausa territory.

It is worthy to note that a huge population of the Fulani tribe became Muslims way back 11th century in Senegal and a segment of these group settled among the Hausas where they created a click of very important personnel and made themselves highly important to everyone including the king of Hausa who later appointed most of them to leadership position in his administration. Subsequently, the second group of the Fulani tribe had their focus on something else, rather than being a Muslims or settle in a location, they preferred to nomadic lifestyle, moving round the globe in search of water and pastures for their herds⁷⁹.

2.3. Status of Nigeria during the British Rule (1800-1960)

Nigeria is located in West Africa, a former colony of Britain; it is multiethnic in nature with diversity in language, culture, ethnic and religion, comprising of two religion; Islam, Christianity and other traditional religion⁸⁰, the North is predominantly Muslims and the south is populated with Christians has 36 states. Nigeria was a product of two regions, Northern and

⁷⁷ Helen Chapin Metz, "A Country Study. Washington DC", p. 10.

⁷⁸ Helen Chapin Metz, "A Country Study. Washington DC", pp. 6-9

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 10.

⁸⁰ Adamolekun Taiye, "A Historical Perspective in the Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria since 1914", *Journal of Arts and Humanities*, Volume: 2, No: 5, 2013, pp. 59-66.

Southern protectorates. In other words the present Nigeria came into existence as a result of the “British amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914 by Sir Fredric Lord Lugard”. Britain came as traders to the protectorates in 19th century and gradually became colonial masters⁸¹.

Clearly, Europeans first came the present Nigeria in 1500s for the purpose of trading their finished goods, weapons and alcohol in exchange for slaves, when slavery ended in 1850s Christian missionaries began to spread gospel and succeeded in converting the people particularly from southeast region, but the missionary were not fully accepted in the dominated Muslims communities of the North.

With passage of time, especially in 1860s trading between Nigeria and British grew tremendously due its high demand raw materials, but the control of the trade was under the English and gradually they took control Sokoto Caliphate. Accordingly, Europeans decided in 1885 to shared Africa continent within themselves and allocated boundaries on the territories under their control irrespective of division effects on families located around the artificial borders. Conversely, Britain brought together her two protectorates the North and South to form what is called Nigerian today, in order to gain absolute control British adopted a system of administration called ‘indirect rule’, a policy where the traditional rulers were allowed to continue to govern his people with Britain as the overall head, while allowing the northern region retain its original way of life (culture, religion and language) , British on the other hand failed to give similar freedom to southern region⁸².

During the decolonization period particularly after WWII the wave of nationalism began gain momentum in Africa as a result most colonies started to seek for independence. As the pressure for independence increased, Britain established a federal state with center government and three regional governments for Igbo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba respectively. Thereafter, political parties were formed, election held with emergence of Tafawa Balewa as prime minister, Nnamdi Azikwe as governor general and Nigeria got its independence in 1960 but was made to remain under the control of commonwealth headed by Queen Elisabeth II for a during of 3 years, within this period Nigeria wrote a new constitution and in 1963 it became a republic⁸³.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² BRIA, Nigeria after 50 years still struggling to be independent ,*Constitutional Right Foundation*, Volume: 26, No.1, 2010.

⁸³ Ibid

2.4. Political history from independence on

The region called Nigeria today has undergone various changes overtime ranging from political turmoil to ethno –religion tension which has really affected Nigeria negatively even till date, as a result, the experience of Nigeria can never be divorced from the legacy left behind by the colonial masters, these effects can easily be mirrored in the political structure of Nigeria today.

Prior to independent, three political parties were formed to control each the regions thereby leading to elections, these political parties include the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) from the Eastern Region (Igbo) led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) had control of the Northern Region (Hausa-Fulani) also led by Ahmadu Bello and the Action Group (AG) in the Western Region (Yoruba), led by Obafemi Awolowo. At the end of election, no winner emerged from the election. Consequently, NPC party amalgamated with the NCNC to form a government, when independent year (1960) rolled in, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was nominated by the amalgamated party as Prime Minister, and Nnamdi Azikiwe as Governor-General⁸⁴.

Subsequently, Nigeria became a Republic in 1963 and as a follow up, Nnamdi Azikiwe (governor) was elevated to be President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, while Tafawa Balewa kept his position as Prime Minister. Everything seemed fine, when problem suddenly arose after a nationwide population census in 1963 as the Igbos from the eastern region felt that the population of Hausa-Fulani (Northern region) was over blotted beyond proportion to give the Northern more representation in the federal parliament than it should be, as a result, the amalgamated party disintegrated, the NCNC joined force with another party (Action Group) founded by Obafemi Awolowo, the both parties came together and form a party called the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) on the other hand, NPC led a coalition with Akintola's faction of the old AG to form the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP).

In January 1966, some Igbo extracts in the military from the Eastern region led coup d'etat to overthrow the government due to dissatisfaction of the leadership. In the process Tafawa Balewa, Bello, Akintola, and some senior officers were killed. Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi took over power as a military head of government, on assumption of office he promised to conduct

⁸⁴ Crawfordworld, "Political History of Nigeria", Retrieved from <http://www.crawfordsworld.com/rob/apcg/Nigeria/Unit4NigeriaHistory.html> , accessed date - September 15, 2016.

democratic election, eliminate corruption and violence but could not keep those promises; instead he suspended the constitution and dissolved legislative body, banned political parties, imprisoned Obafemi Awolowo, and formed a centralized Federal Military Government⁸⁵. Another coup was staged led by some military officers from North. During the coup, Aguiyi-Ironsi and many other Igbo officials were killed, and then a northerner called *Yakubu "Jack" Gowon* (a Christian) was nominated to take over power, his regime brought back Federalism and split the existing four regions to 12 states in 1967. His actions were not welcomed by Igbos, and hence led to declaration of independence by Igbos and a subsequent civil war⁸⁶.

After the civil war, Gowon's government couldn't do anything about the establishment of civilian rule and subsequently a military coup took place, though Gowon wasn't killed but a new leader emerged called Murtala Muhammed. Murtala promised the continuation of the federal system with constitutional laws guaranteeing fundamental human rights, democratic participation, and civilian rule. He failed to carry out those reforms due to an unsuccessful coup taking place again in 1976 by Buka Dimka. He died as a result of the coup⁸⁷. Olusegun Obasanjo was appointed to replace him. Obasanjo promised to continue Murtala's policies. Two years later, exactly 1978, a new constitution was written, election were held thereafter and Shehu Shagari came to power as a democratically elected president. He won a second term in 1983 but was contested in court. Another coup occurred in 1983, Shagari was arrested and placed under house arrest, a senior military officer, Muhammadu Buhari took over. On assumption to office he promised to revive the economy, and to return the nation to civilian rule, but couldn't actualize it, rather he restricted freedom of the Press, suppressed critics of the government including politicians and labor organizations⁸⁸.

His government was later toppled by his chief of army staff, Ibrahim Babangida, on assumption of office he released some prisoners, but during his reign, people were imprisoned again for political offenses. In April of 1986, a failed coup was carried by Mamman Vatsa and he was executed, thereafter, another failed coup followed it in 1990 by Gideon Orkar⁸⁹. In response

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Crawfordworld, "Political History of Nigeria", Retrieved from <http://www.crawfordsworld.com/rob/apcg/Nigeria/Unit4NigeriaHistory.html> , accessed date - September 15, 2016.

⁸⁷Ibid

⁸⁸ Crawfordworld, "Political History of Nigeria", Retrieved from <http://www.crawfordsworld.com/rob/apcg/Nigeria/Unit4NigeriaHistory.html> (accessed date September 15, 2016.

⁸⁹ Ibid

to the tension, coup and counter coup, a new constitution was written same year stipulating commencement of democratic government in 1993⁹⁰.

The Interim government was cut short after 3 months by a senior military general, Sani Abacha in November 17, 1993. On assumption of office, Sani Abacha promised to return the country to civilian rule. But didn't keep his promise, rather he dissolved all electoral institutions, terminated all national and state assemblies, closed independent publications, banned all political activity, and suspended the constitution. Amidst the chaos, Abacha announced a three-year program of transition to civilian rule. In the midst the transition a failed coup was staged led by Lawan Gwadaben. In 1995, but the masterminds were arrested and sentenced together with Olusegun Obasanjo and Shehu Musa Yar'Adua for 25 years.

This sanction affected Nigeria economy, and Abacha tried to remedy the situation by getting involved in peace process in the Liberia's 7-year civil war, and Nigeria troops to Sierra Leone to restore the democratically elected government. With Abacha's involvement in restoring peace and democracy government in Sierra Leone, Nigerians citizens felt relieved, but yet the situation in Nigeria didn't change. Consequently, a failed coup was carried out In 1997, led by Oladipo Diya, he was later arrested and imprisoned.

In trying to douse the tension in the country, Abacha initiated plans for democratic elections in 1998 and nominated himself as a candidate for the presidency, oppositions suspected that he wasn't ready to step down, as a result demonstrations and riots broke out and many people died in the process. Unfortunately, Sani Abacha died while in power in June 1998⁹¹.

After his death, the next most senior military General, Abdulsalam Abubakar was appointed as head of state, on assumption of office, he established transition program to led Nigeria to democratic rule which was slated for 1999. As a follow up Olusegun Obasanjo who was imprisoned earlier during Abacha's regime in connection with a failed against the government was released from prison by General Abdulsalam Abubakar, and subsequently encouraged to run for presidential election, after a series of primaries, Obasanjo emerged winner as a new democratically elected president and inaugurated as the new civilian president on May 29, 1999, he ruled 2-term of 8 years.

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ Ibid

2.4.1. Civil War (1967-1970)

The Nigeria civil war started on 6th of July 1967 and ended in 1970, approximately 3years. In discussing this issue one may not be able to divorce the role played by colonial masters. Nigeria was not created based on nationhood, where people of like minds come together to form their nation, as the case for 13 colonies which became USA today. Rather, it was formed based on the convenience and interests of the colonizers⁹².

Basically, the civil war begun as a response to the structural imbalances of pre-independence and post-independence tension accompanied with various degrees of factors particularly the military coups d'état of January and July 1966, other includes regional election crisis in 1965 like the Federal Elections of 1964, the persecution of Igbos (Eastern citizens) living in Northern Nigeria between May to September 1966, these issue together with unequal distribution of power in the country led to crisis⁹³.

In other words, military and political power and dominance by a segment of Nigeria over the others actually led to tension and suspicion within different facets of the country and finally metamorphosed into Coup and counter Coup which destroyed the political settings and the trust that existed within the various ethnic groups⁹⁴.

In the bid to quench the crisis, Nigeria was further divided into 12 states as oppose to original 3 regions that existed, this action was offensive to former Eastern Region under Lt. Col. Ojukwu, who saw it as an act of the creation of states by decree "without consultation" therefore in May 30th 1967, he declared the secession of state of Biafra. All effort by Nigeria Government to negotiate and resolve the crisis was death locked, and so the military in an all-out war forced their way to Eastern region, just as the leadership and the people of the east were equally not ready surrender, leading to the outbreak of the war on 6th July 1967 during which millions of people died including military and civilians with the Nigeria military having upper hand over the secessionist .the leader of Biafra seeing the defeat basically fled the country to Cote D'Ivoire in

⁹² Abubakar A. Atofarati, "The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies and Lessons Learnt", US Marine Command Staff College, 1992, pp. 2-3.

⁹³ Falode Adewunmi James, "The NigeriaCivil War, 1967-1970: A Revolution?" *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Volume: 5, No: 3, 2011, p. 120.

⁹⁴ Abubakar A. Atofarati "The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies and Lessons Learnt", pp. 2-3.

January 10th 1970 and in the same month of the same year, exactly 14th/01/70 the rest of Biafra fighters laid down their weapon in surrender leading to the end of the war in January 14th 1970⁹⁵.

2.4.1.1. Creation of North-Eastern states of Nigeria

The North –Eastern states, formerly known as the administrative unit under the old Northern Region was established in 1967 with capital in Maiduguri, it was further divided in 1976 to form into three main states; namely Bauchi, Borno and Gongola, others states like Adamawa, Yobe and Taraba (all in 1991) and Gombe (1996) were carved out from the three states mentioned above . Presently, only six states are officially recognized, these include Bauchi, Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Gombe and Taraba. All these smaller states emerged from the North East state due to the yearning of the minority ethnic groups seeking constitutional recognition, proper representation in government and effective allocation of resources, in order accommodate this agitation, more states were carved out from the North East⁹⁶.

Until 1976 the North Eastern state was ruled by military heads under the regime of General Yakubu Gowon (the then head of state), but from 1976 the North Eastern state was dissolved and three successor states emerged as mentioned above, the successor states were governed by military heads until 1999 when democratic elected government was put in place and the military heads were replaced by elected civilian governors till date⁹⁷.

2.4.2. Military Junta and Rule (1970-1999)

Nigerian military Juntas can be classified into two categories with the first running from 1966-1979 and the second from 1983 to 1998 which is totally 32 years. Before we go further , it is important to understand the word JUNTA, according the advance dictionary, it's a borrowed word from Spanish, which means a percentage of a group people especially military seizing power through a coup d'état from an existing and legally constituted government in power of a country. For purpose of clarity, I shall discuss the two Junta categories separately, with the first from 1966- 1979.

⁹⁵ Ryan Hurst, "Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970)", University of Washington, retrieved from <http://www.blackpast.org/gah/nigerian-civil-war-1967-1970> accessed 27th Nov, 2016.

⁹⁶ Oluwatosin Babalola, "History Of State Creation In Nigeria", p. 2.

⁹⁷ Ibid, See Appendix

2.4.2.1. First Junta

Exactly 1960 when Nigeria got her independence, Britain the colonial masters appointed Abubakar Balewa as Prime Minister, and Nnamdi Azikiwe as Governor-General. Soon after independence in 1962 Nigeria became a Republic, Nnamdi Azikiwe was elevated from governor general to President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Tafawa Balewa maintained his post as Prime Minister. However, some problem aroused during the 1963 population census, the Igbo felt that the population of Hausa-Fulani was over blotted beyond proportion to give the Northern region more representation in the federal parliament⁹⁸.

This unsettled grievance was not resolved until 1966 when the initial military junta started preceded a coup led by Major Nzeogwu in 15 January 1966 which over threw an existing and legally constitute government of Prime Minister Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. There after Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi took over as the Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, seven months July later the same year his government was toppled through a coup and killed in the process, General Yakubu Gowon succeeded him after the coup and ruled as the Head of State and Commander – in- Chief of the Armed forces for 9 years, during his leadership Nigeria went into civil from 1967-1970 because northerners (Hausas) felt they more men than the Southerners (Igbos) in the first coup led by Major Nzeogwu . However, Yakubu Gowon government was toppled by some military righties who preferred civil rule which ushered in Brigadier (later General) Murtala Mohammed as the Head of State and Commander – in- Chief of the Armed forces in 29 of July 1975, one year into rule a failed coup broke out and he was assassinated in the process paving way for his chief of staff, General Olusegun Obasanjo as the new the Head of State, who ruled from 1975 until 1979 when he handed over power to an elected civilian government headed by Shehu Shagari in October 1st 1979, this which ended the first Junta and ushered in the second republic⁹⁹.

2.4.2.2. Second Nigeria Military Junta from 1983 to 1998

The second republic lasted for 4 years (1979- 1983), but came to end with a junta, bringing the presence again, this time by General Mohammed Buhari basing his reason for intervention on indiscipline and corruption in the civil government, though no any casualty was

⁹⁸ Crawfordworld, "Political History of Nigeria", (Retrieved from) <http://www.crawfordsworld.com/rob/apcg/Nigeria/Unit4NigeriaHistory.html>

⁹⁹ Olusoji George, Seyi Shadare, Oluwakemi Owoyemi, "Military Interventions in the Nigerian Politics: 'A Timed Bomb' Waiting to Explode? The Avowal of New Management Elites", *International Journal of Business, Humanities and Technology*, Volume: 2, No: 5, 2012.

recorded but his policies were very strict and not favorable to the citizens, two years later Buhari's government was toppled through a coup in August 27th 1985, Which ushered in General Babangida as President and Commander- in- Chief of the Armed Forces as against the previous titled known as Head of State. His government is promised to bring Nigeria to civilian rule, he repelled and replaced some hard policies including the return of human rights that was dissolved by his predecessor. He tried make himself an autocratic leader with absolute power that Nigeria were already tired of his rule and wanted democratic government in place, after much pressure he gave in election were conducted result cancelled and re –conducted, Moshood Abiola was declared the winner, but result was annulled on the account that it wasn't credible. In the demonstration, more than 100 people were killed; human right and pro- democracy activist arrested and imprisoned opposition newspapers were shut down. "Internal and external pressure mounted, and finally on August 27, 1993, Babangida resigned, an interim government took over headed by Ernest Shonekan, who was a Christian, civilian and from the West¹⁰⁰. The interim government was overthrown by General Abacha (who was the chief of army staff during Babangida regime). Abacha ruled from 17 November 1993, who later died on 8 June 1998.

He restored the human rights that was taken away by General Buhari's regime, but set up an original kind of military autocracy. After the annulment of the most peaceful elections in the history of Nigeria, he (Babangida) handed over to Ernest Shonekan-a civilian- who was overthrown by General Abacha on 17 November 1993 to 1998, in his regime Nigeria made a new constitution in 1998 which was to be the third Nigeria republic which didn't see light of the day as it wasn't implemented and finally Abacha died in power same year June 8th 1998. After his demise the most senior General, Abdulsalami Abubakar was appointed as head of state, on assumption of office Abubakar commenced a return of civil rule (democratic rule), bailed out some prisoner of junta (including Olusegun Obasanjo) , repelled harsh policies, gave room for inauguration of political parties, conducted free and fair election and finally Olusegun Obasanjo (ex-military general) emerged as winner in 1999 Presidential election which the brought the second junta to an end and ushered the forth republic¹⁰¹.

¹⁰⁰ Crawfordworld, "Political History of Nigeria", (Retrieved from) <http://www.crawfordsworld.com/rob/apcg/Nigeria/Unit4NigeriaHistory.html>

¹⁰¹ Olusoji George, Seyi Shadare, Oluwakemi Owoyemi, "Military Interventions in the Nigerian Politics: 'A Timed Bomb' Waiting to Explode? The Avowal of New Management Elites".

2.5. Democratization and Contemporary Politics of Nigeria

The discussion of democratization and contemporary politics of Nigeria from 1999 cannot be complete without a mention of previous attempts in instituting democracy in Nigeria, haven said that, it is worthy to note that three years after its independence, Nigeria became first republic in 1963, had an elected government in place, but couldn't stand the taste of time as it was overthrown three years later in a bloody coup. The second attempt was in 1979 when power was handed over to an elected civilian government which was came to abrupt end 4 years later with a Junta. The third attempt was in 1999 when the pressure on the military got to peak and finally democracy took a root in Nigeria, political parties inaugurated, democratic election conducted and Olusegun Obasanjo emerged president (retired general and former military ruler), under the umbrella of People's Democratic Party. Even with discrepancies, Nigerians received and accepted the results with open heart as they were so weary of military rule¹⁰².

At the end of his first tenure of 4 years, another round of election were held in 2003, the incumbent was re-elected as President but not without election violence and fraud. On assumption of office for the 4 year term, corruption among the government official, civilian and politicians increased tremendously.

While in power, the problem of sharing oil revenue came to the fore particularly from the south-south ethnic minority also known as Niger Delta, this region house the country's oil wells and represents the mainstay of Nigeria economy. The minorities living in the Niger Delta felt unsatisfied over the oil spill, pollution and degradation of their land by the oil companies (Chevron, shell etc.) as a result their main source of income (farming and fishing) had been destroyed, in addition to their complaint was that the region produces huge revenues yet no infrastructure and development in return, but still remain backward¹⁰³.

Consequently, the people began to stage peaceful protest against the oil companies and the government, requesting for a cleanup of oil spillage on their land, need for basic infrastructure (like medical, water) and above all, equal share of generated revenue. Peaceful protest turns violent as couldn't yield desire goal, some of the devices taken by the group includes kidnapping and killing of oil expatriates, vandalisation of pipelines in order to sabotage and syphoned oil as

¹⁰² Bill of Rights in Action, "Nigeria after 50 years still Struggling to be a Democracy", Constitutional Rights Foundation, Volume: 26, No: 1, 2010.

¹⁰³ Bill of Rights in Action, "Nigeria after 50 years still Struggling to be a Democracy", Constitutional Rights Foundation, Volume: 26, No: 1, 2010.

much as 15% of daily production, with passage of time, several groups of militants sprang up in the name of fighting for resource control of the region, as a result there were always in constant clashes between the Nigeria military and the militants¹⁰⁴.

Having mentioned that, it is worthy to note that the political structure of Nigeria in the post- colonial period brought about division among the ethnic groups which gave rise to power struggle between the northern and the southern regions till date. As a follow up, a kind of agreement was put in place where the presidential position (power) was to be rotated between the north and the south, an arrangement that favored only the majority ethnic groups, the Hausa - fulanis and the Yorubas, leaving out the minority groups within the regions. Eventually, when power got the North in 2007 under the umbrella of People's Democratic Party, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua emerged winner with his running mate Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, (a Christian from minority group) in the South-South, three years into his tenure, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua died in power in 2010 paving way for Goodluck to complete up that tenure, based on the agreement mentioned above, the vice president was to hand over power to the North, rather Goodluck contested in the next round of election and won¹⁰⁵. This event wasn't welcomed by the North because it was seen as a distortion of their political party arrangement and that brought frustration among the Northern politicians which eventually created tension, having realized that power had shifted hands to minority group, decided to pull their support behind Boko Haram to delegitimize the administration of the last dispensation and make it unpopular, between 2011 to 2015, that explains why the activity of Boko Haram got to the climax during Goodluck government as he couldn't govern smoothly due to frequent crisis and so in the next round of election, President Goodluck was voted out of office paving a way for Alhaji Mohammed Buhari (a retired military general and former head of state in 1983 and a Muslim) from the North who is in power up till date¹⁰⁶.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁵ Crawfordworld, "Political History of Nigeria", (Retrieved from) <http://www.crawfordworld.com/rob/apcg/Nigeria/Unit4NigeriaHistory.html> accessed date- September 15, 2016.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid ,see also

Bill of Rights in Action, "Nigeria after 50 years still Struggling to be a Democracy", Constitutional Rights Foundation, Volume: 26, No: 1, 2010.

CHAPTER THREE

A BACKGROUND OF MUSLIMS AND THEIR POLITICS IN NIGERIA-

Like many other African states, Nigerians were predominantly involved in traditional religions which rely mostly on smaller gods and ancestors, even before the arrival of both Christianity and Islam. Centuries after the arrival of these two main religions, these traditional religions started dying out. Their significance has now turned into a symbolic cultural belief often represented in movies. Various sources give different values for the exact number or percentage of the Nigerian population that make up Christians and Muslims in the country. Data obtained from PEW Research Center which is one of the most reliable sources which indicate that as of the year 2010, Christians made up 49.9% of the total population, while Muslims constituted of about 48.8%. Taking into consideration the birth rate and other relevant factors, the percentage of Muslims is expected to increase to approximately 51.1% by 2020 and 58.5% by the year 2050, while the percentage of Christians is expected to drop¹⁰⁷.

With that mentioned, it is worth noting that Islam in present day Nigeria dates as back as the 11th and 12th centuries¹⁰⁸. Islam crawled its way into Northern Nigeria through trading with merchants from North Africa and the Middle East¹⁰⁹. A more recent history of Islam in Nigeria, which is probably the most engrained history in the minds of students and scholars alike, is the Sokoto Caliphate of the 19th century. It is the last caliphate to have existed in Nigeria. The caliphate stretched across a vast land of over 1500 miles was founded and led by Othman Dan Fodio. In Badejogbin article, Fodio was described as a “Fulani Muslim scholar, reformer, jihadist and statesman”¹¹⁰. The Caliphate which had been founded in 1804 eventually came to end in 1903 after Britain’s decision to merge the Northern part of Nigeria to the South and the West. The main motive behind Dan Fodio’s establishment of a Caliphate was to build a moral society based on of Islam rules. He believed that the social, economic and political problem of the

¹⁰⁷ PEW Research Center. 2015. “Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050.” Retrieved from http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/2010/percent/Sub-Saharan_Africa/., accessed date 19th December 2016.

¹⁰⁸ Harvard Divinity School. “Islam in Nigeria”, Religious Literacy Project. Retrieved from <http://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/islam-nigeria>, accessed date -15th December 2016.

¹⁰⁹ Abiodun Alao, "Islamic Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Nigeria", *Conflict, Security & Development*, Volume: 13 No: 2, 2013, p. 128.

¹¹⁰ Oluwatoyin Badejogbin, "Boko Haram: An Enquiry Into the Socio-Political Context of Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Response", *Law, Democracy & Development*, Volume: 17, 2013, p. 231.

northern states was a result of the decaying morality in the society. For Dan Fodio, there was only one solution to the corruption and greed and that was jihad¹¹¹. He led a successful political revolution which made him the first Caliph of the last Caliphate to have existed in current day Northern Nigeria.

It should be noted that as of this time, there existed no state of Nigeria. Nigeria as a country was a creation by the colonial rulers for the purpose of convenient administration and ruling. As the existence of a Caliphate was nowhere close to the interest of imperial Britain, it resorted to coercion. After series of coercive encounters, the Sokoto Caliphate fell in 1903, hence making the region a British protectorate¹¹². Over a century after the collapse of the Caliphate, the King of Sokoto emerged, goes by the title “*Sarkin Musulmi*” which translates as Ruler of Muslims. This in recent time, caused a reaction from Mohammed Yusuf—the founder of Boko Haram, who pointed out that the King rather go by “*Sarkin Sokoto*” as he does not rule by Islamic governance¹¹³.

Northern Nigeria under British rule had a different system from the other parts of Nigeria. The northerners unwilling to easily part with their Islamic legacies opposed Christianity and western ideals. The colonial masters therefore granted the north a sort self-rule to some extent in order to gain their cooperation. As a result, Britain “allowed the political institutions of the Caliphate to continue to regulate native affairs”¹¹⁴. This dynamics in the British rule has been argued to contribute to a further rift among religious groups. Badejogbin expands his argument further by ascertaining that the “colonial policy made religious identity and ethno-regional divisions in Nigeria to correspond” since in the eyes of the other regions, the ‘favorable treatment’ was not just a favor to the Muslims but also to the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups. Hence, while the reforms of 1947 created “ethno-regional divisions”, it also created a new “ethno-regional political identities”¹¹⁵. This is due to the fact that the north consisted of [and still does]

¹¹¹ Zacharias P. Pieri, and Jacob Zenn, "The Boko Haram Paradox: Ethnicity, Religion, and Historical Memory in Pursuit of a Caliphate." *African Security*, Volume: 17, No: 1, 2016, p. 74.

¹¹² Oluwatoyin Badejogbin, "Boko Haram: An Enquiry Into the Socio-Political Context of Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Response", *Law, Democracy & Development*, Volume: 17, 2013, p. 231.

¹¹³ Zacharias P. Pieri, and Jacob Zenn, "The Boko Haram Paradox", p. 76.

¹¹⁴ Oluwatoyin Badejogbin, "Boko Haram: An Enquiry Into the Socio-Political Context", p. 232.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 232-233.

mostly, but not exclusively, Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups, while the Yorubas dominate the South-West and the Igbos dominate the South- East¹¹⁶.




Fig. 2. An ethnographical map of Nigeria showing the dominating ethnicity in each region.¹¹⁷

From this period onwards, politics in Nigeria became a sort of a rivalry between three main political parties in the three regions, with the north represented by the Northern People's Party (NPC) referred to as *Jamiyya Mutanen Arewa* in the Hausa language. Each of the various parties controls their respective regions. However, the northern region was led by Amadu Bello but sought to dominate the national government. Amadu Bello's desire was due to the fact that the north is made up 55% of the whole country. Naturally, the premiers of the other two regions

¹¹⁶ Abiodun Alao, "Islamic Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Nigeria", *Conflict, Security & Development*, Volume: 13 No: 2, 2013, p. 129.

¹¹⁷ Retrieved from <http://dailymail.com.ng/photos-maps-36-states-nigeria-showing-local-governmentstribes-languagesphotos-maps-36-states-nigeria-local-governments/>

opposed, and provided a counter proposal suggesting a “centralized commonwealth of Nigeria consisting of eight geographical protectorates”¹¹⁸. However, this proposal was not implemented; hence, the country remained as three regions each led by their respective parties until Nigeria gained her independence in 1960.

Nigeria experienced its first coup in 1966. The leaders of “Igbo Christian extraction” suspected that the North intended to gain national control and dominance, masterminded the coup. The event which turned out to be bloody coup resulted to the death of many leaders of the NPC. This motivated a counter coup by the northerners in July of the same year, and continued throughout the history of post-independence Nigeria until the last one in 1993.

In the infant stage of a new democratic period for Nigeria, the North (specifically the politicians) having lost significant national power came up with a new strategy—the Shari’a system. Olusegun Obasanjo, a southern Christian, had won the 1999 elections and the North sensing a power shift came up with this strategy to maintain some influence. The shari’a system uses religious scriptures and laws drawn from Islam to govern the land, for example, offenders are made to face penalties as described in the scriptures. Ahmed Sani Yerima initiated this system when he got elected as the governor of Zamfara state in 1999¹¹⁹. In a period of three years after its introduction in Zamfara State, eleven more states in the north adopted this system tallying to twelve¹²⁰. Badejogbin argues that the northern politicians in reaction to dissatisfaction of loss of control resorted to this as a strategy by “using religion to rally Muslim votes in the region”¹²¹. The use of religion to create or construct a political identity for political or social interests of leaders in Nigeria is not a new phenomenon. The major difference in the contemporary use of religion lie in the method adopted. Boko Haram differs in this sense, as it uses “extremism” and “violence” as a strategy to achieve its goals¹²². Several researches related to the emergence of the Shari’a law in Nigeria have partly attributed its success to the support of Salafis. Salafis is an Islamic sectarian group, whose leaders usually advocate a “literal interpretation and application of Islamic scriptures”¹²³. Interestingly, some leaders of the Sufi

¹¹⁸ Oluwatoyin Badejogbin, "Boko Haram: An Enquiry Into the Socio-Political Context", p. 233.

¹¹⁹ Alex Thurston, "Muslim Politics and Shari'a in Kano State, Northern Nigeria", *African Affairs*, Volume: 114, No: 454, 2014, p.34.

¹²⁰ Abiodun Alao, "Islamic Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Nigeria", p.134.

¹²¹ Oluwatoyin Badejogbin, "Boko Haram: An Enquiry Into the Socio-Political Context", p. 235.

¹²² Ibid 237.

¹²³ Alex Thurston, "Muslim Politics and Shari'a in Kano State, Northern Nigeria", *African Affairs*, Volume: 114, No: 454, 2014, p.32.

sects, which are seen as ideological opponents of Salafism, also supported the idea of Shari'a. The northern states used the Sharia system to "compensate for their political decline" after Obasanjo became the president¹²⁴. At the end of two terms of eight-years of President Obasanjo, Umaru Yar'Adua, a governor from the northern state of Katsina won the elections and became the next president of the federal state of Nigeria. He died in office and constitutionally, the vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, took over. The North wasn't happy due to the fact that he was from a minority group in the southern state of Bayelsa. It has been argued in the literature that Boko Haram worsened its activities during this time in order to frustrate the Jonathan's administration to make it look weak. After a term in office, Jonathan lost the elections paving the way for yet again a former military head of date, Muhammadu Buhari, who currently in power until the next elections in 2019.

The emergence of the Sharia system and Boko Haram represent the last two phases of Islamic extremism in Nigeria. Before the phases mentioned above, there existed two other phases in post-independent Nigeria. The first phase was characterized by sectarian differences among Muslims. Allegedly, the government was also involved by exploiting the differences among different groups to rally it behind itself for votes. Approximately 4000 people lost their lives as a result of radicalism in this phase. This era between 1970s and 1980s saw the coming of Mohammed Marwa from Cameroon. The second phase was inspired by an external revolution in the Islamic world—the Iranian revolution. The Iranian revolution is famous for impacting other majority Muslim countries and Nigeria was no different. In the case of Nigeria, there was the involvement of both Sunni and Shiites leading to sectarian rivalry. Intra-Islamic rivalries seem to be a trend that runs across almost all phases¹²⁵.

Fig. 3. Map depicting the Shari'a states in Nigeria (Credit: *World Watch Monitor*)¹²⁶.

¹²⁴ Oluwatoyin Badejogbin, "Boko Haram: An Enquiry Into the Socio-Political Context", p.243.

¹²⁵ Abiodun Alao, "Islamic Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Nigeria", pp. 132-134.

¹²⁶ <https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2016/06/nigeria-considers-giving-islamic-appeals-courts-authority-to-take-criminal-cases/>




Fig.3. Map depicting the Shari'a states in Nigeria (Credit: *World Watch Monitor*)¹²⁷.

3.1. Boko Haram Organization

In the literature, Boko Haram is usually treated as a unitary actor, that is to say, it acts and makes decisions in unison. In fact, it is reasonable to think so, given the number of successful attacks it has been able to launch. While this may not be easily dismissible, it is worth to understand the structure of the organization in order to construct an argument about whether or not it indeed is a unitary actor.

3.1.1. The Leadership

As mentioned previously, the originator of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was the first leader of the organization until his execution in police custody in 2009. The killing of Mohammed Yusuf led to a vendetta under the new leadership who vowed to

¹²⁷ <https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2016/06/nigeria-considers-giving-islamic-appeals-courts-authority-to-take-criminal-cases/>

avenge the death of their leader¹²⁸. There is very little information about the important figures and leaders during the leadership of Yusuf. One important figure was Alhaji Buji Foi, who was one of the main financier of the group during its infant stage¹²⁹. He was also the national secretary of the organization. The interesting thing about Foi was that he served as the first commissioner of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Borno state. He was put in office by Gov. Ali Sheriff (the governor of Borno at that time) who had made a deal with Mohammed Yusuf in exchange for Yusuf's help, in his quest to become the governor of the state¹³⁰. This implies that even in its infant stages, Boko Haram leaders were successful in infiltrating the government.

Abubakar Shekau became Boko Haram's next leader after Yusuf. During his era, Boko Haram became more violent with the passing of time. The methods employed by Shekau ranged from assassination, kidnapping, and massacre mostly in hundreds and thousands. In fact, one of the first actions of Shekau was declaring war on the governors in the northern region¹³¹.

Over the years, Boko Haram has been very successful at hiding the identity of its members and leaders. While, it is known that the group has government officials that work and support them financially, little is known of the identities of these infiltrators. Contrary to what one may expect, Boko Haram is not unified in terms of its purposes and objectives. Its "organizational structure is often described as diffuse,(increasingly since the death of Yusuf)"¹³². Experts predicted that the organization was running at a risk of fracturing due to difference of opinions on what methods and tactics should be used to achieve its goals. In 2012, a splinter group by name Ansaru emerged from Boko Haram. In Ansaru's speeches, they made it clear that they did not approve of Shekau's tactics. For them, it was wrong to kill Muslims who did not agree with them. Instead, Ansaru's main targets were foreigners within the country. Another cited reason of tension in the group's leadership is that "some Boko Haram leaders appear focused on building ties

¹²⁸ Oluwatoyin Badejogbin, "Boko Haram: An Enquiry Into the Socio-Political Context of Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Response", p. 231.

¹²⁹ Hakeem Onapajo, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", p.30.

¹³⁰ <http://www.nairaland.com/1877736/bombshell-bokoharam-sponsor-exposed>

¹³¹ Hakeem Onapajo, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", *African Security Review*, Volume: 21, No:3, 2012, p. 30.

¹³² Lauren Ploch Blanchard, "Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions", p. 147.

with “core” Al Qaeda and affiliated groups and pursuing a transnational agenda, while others remain focused exclusively on a domestic insurgency”¹³³.

In August 2016, an interesting thing happened. Abu Musab al-Barnawi who was the spokesperson of Boko Haram was announced as the new leader of the organization by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which Boko Haram had sworn allegiance to in the previous year. Shekau came out to denounce ISIS’s declaration of a change in leadership. He further accused al-Barnawi as trying to stage a coup to oust him. Interestingly, he refrained from attacking the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Instead, he said that he believed that “al-Baghdadi had been tricked”¹³⁴. The group got divided into two factions: some recognizing al-Barnawi as the new leader, and other members maintaining that Shekau remains the true leader. The decision of ISIS to switch leadership came following barbaric acts by Shekau that even ISIS could not tolerate. Child suicide bombers were used by the group in attacking other sectarian Muslims that did not approve of the group’s activities.

In addition to Shekau, there are few names that pop up on the list of key Boko Haram leaders, even though little information is known about most of these people. Among them is Mahamout Daoud who was allegedly the head of the splinter group (Ansarou), Daoud was apprehended and taken into police custody. Another name that pops up is Mamman Nur. He was the mastermind behind the UN Office bombing in Abuja in 2011. He is reportedly the third in command. Khalid al-Barnawi is a prominent member of both Boko Haram and Ansaru. Even though Ansaru is a splinter group, they maintained good relation and sometimes coordinate attacks together and Khalid al-Barnawi held high ranking position in both groups¹³⁵.

3.1.2. Relations with Al Qaeda and Islamic State

Boko Haram’s relation with external terrorist organizations started with an uncertain process. In the early years, governments and security agencies were not exactly sure about the extent to which the group had affiliations with global terrorist organizations. However the rate at which the group was growing in terms of funds and

¹³³ Lauren Ploch Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions”, p. 147.

¹³⁴ Yaroslav Trofimov, "Behind Boko Haram's Split: A Leader Too Radical for Islamic State", *The Wall Street Journal*, September 15. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-boko-haram-s-split-a-leader-too-radical-for-islamic-state-1473931827>, accessed on 9 January 2017.

¹³⁵ <http://www.counterextremism.com/threat/boko-haram>

attacks strongly suggested that it was benefitting from support of external actors. This grabbed global attention and created a fear that the group will turn even more deadly and difficult to fight. For instance, the European Union in 2010 expressed its concerns about the possibility of a Boko Haram-Al Qaeda operation. A year afterwards, Shekau released a video in which he openly expressed his support for Al Qaeda militants “in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, Libya, and Mali”¹³⁶. In the aftermath of Osama Bin Laden’s death in 2011, the documents found in his home indicated a communication with some leaders of Boko Haram¹³⁷. Since he took over, Shekau has had the aim of incorporating Boko Haram into the global jihad. He envisions that Boko Haram would become an important player in the global unit of jihadist groups. Consequently, he usually refers to global jihadists as “my brothers...” or “our brothers...” This helps create a sense of belongingness in the global jihad¹³⁸.

The latest evidence of affiliation with the global terrorism came in March 2015 when Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS. Few days afterwards, CNN reported that ISIS had released an audio message in which it accepted and recognized Boko Haram’s pledge. The allegiance was likely to affect benefits that Boko Haram got from Al Qaeda due to the rivalry between al-Qaeda and ISIS. However it also came with its own benefits likely better than it would have gotten from the Al Qaeda alliance. By this alliance, Boko Haram stood to benefit in terms of finance, weapons and resources, while ISIS benefitted in terms of “international legitimacy as a global caliphate.” Furthermore, Boko Haram got a more global acceptance¹³⁹.

3.2. What is Boko Haram? When and how it was established

For most people, Boko Haram only became a phenomenon since 2009. This is due to the fact that the intensity of its attacks increased from the year 2009 onwards thereby putting the terrorist group in the spotlight. However, the history of Boko Haram goes beyond that. Even though there appears to be a contentious argument on when exactly Boko Haram came into existence, the believe in the literature is that it was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf of

¹³⁶ Bill Roggio, "Boko Haram Emir praises Al Qaeda." *The Long War Journal*, November 30 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/boko_haram_emir_prai.php, Accessed 06 January 2017.

¹³⁷ *ibid*

¹³⁸ *Ibid*.

¹³⁹ <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/12/middleeast/isis-boko-haram/>

Yobe state in north Nigeria¹⁴⁰. It should be noted however that Islamic radicalization is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, hence the reason why some people associate Boko Haram's emergence with previous occurrences in history. Mohammed Yusuf started by meeting some students of University of Maiduguri in Borno state. These were students who were unhappy about the Western education system. Subsequently, Mohammed Yusuf was able to recruit them to join his crusade which given birth to Boko Haram. As a reaction to his unhappiness towards the Western education system, Yusuf set up a Madrasa (school) for Islamic teaching in the Borno region¹⁴¹. Yusuf may have started by recruiting the university students, but he certainly did not stop there. He widened his scope by having a diverse recruitment ranging from "unemployed youths, university undergraduates, and migrants from neighboring countries, few elites and their children"¹⁴². The context within which Boko Haram emerged served as a catalyst in recruiting youngsters. It came up at a time in which both the economy and socio-political structure of Nigeria is very weak. This indeed made it appealing to the unemployed youth to join¹⁴³.

Boko Haram is known with several other names in the literature. Among the names its known with are "Yusufiyah"—which comes from Yusuf, the name of the founder, "Ahl as Sunna Wa al-Jama'a ala Minhaj as-Salaf (people of the way of the Prophet and the community of Muslims in line with the earliest generation)"¹⁴⁴. The Boko Haram nomenclature is derived from the Hausa language which is the most spoken language in north Nigeria where Boko Haram originates from. It translates in English as "Western education is sinful." The group on several occasions has come out to say western education is not the only thing that they are against. They rather carry the belief that Western culture and civilization as a whole is un-Islamic. Education is only a fraction of the whole civilization. It was therefore not surprising when Mohammed Yusuf came out to claim that some aspects of science are *haram* (sin) because it is not the right knowledge from Allah. In addition, he also said that some technologies are haram since it interrupts person's religiosity. The group sees itself as the defenders of Islamic religion which has been in deterioration due to western infiltration¹⁴⁵. It often reflects back on the last caliphate

¹⁴⁰ Hakeem Onapajo, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", *African Security Review*, Volume: 21, No:3, 2012, p.26.

¹⁴¹ Yunus Purcek, "The Impact of Ethno-Religious Conflict on Foreign Policy: Nigerian Case", *Turkish Journal of Politics*, Volume: 5, No: 1, 2014, p.6.

¹⁴² Hakeem Onapajo, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", p.27.

¹⁴³ Oluwatoyin Badejogbin, "Boko Haram: An Enquiry Into the Socio-Political Context", p. 228.

¹⁴⁴ Hakeem Onapajo, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", p.26.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 27.

established by Dan Fodio and uses the success of Dan Fodio to prove the argument that socio-political failure in northern Nigeria is a result of embracing western civilization and lifestyle¹⁴⁶.

There appears to be a debate on whether Boko Haram is a continuation of Islamic radicalism in Nigeria, thus an “unresolved continuum through history”, or whether it presents us with a new dynamic¹⁴⁷. Nevertheless, it can be argued that it indeed derives some of its narratives from history. It is not the first religious sect that has resorted to violence and terrorist act in the name of religion. In 1980, a sectarian group by the name Yan Tatsine orchestrated series of violent attacks which resulted in the deaths over 4000 people¹⁴⁸. Similar to Boko Haram, the Yan Tatsine sect was against western education. Islamic extremism therefore is not a new phenomenon in Nigerian politics¹⁴⁹. Due to this similarity, some researchers such as Adesoji have equated Boko Haram with Yan Tatsine in the name of Islamic revivalism¹⁵⁰. Onapajo & Uzodike criticize this view by putting forward the argument that Mohammed Marwa who was the head of the Yan Tatsine (also known as Maitatsine) claimed to be a prophet, hence contradicting to Islam¹⁵¹. Mohammed Marwa a Cameroonian preacher and scholar who immigrated to Nigeria in 1945 and settled in Kano, he was neither Shia nor Sunni Muslim, but has a different kind of ideology. He believed that Islam and its practices had been marred due to exposure to colonization and western civilization. In his preaching, Marwa advocated for coercive and confrontational measures which resulted to him being arrested on a number of occasions¹⁵². Boko Haram on the other hand differs, as it only employs religion to justify its violent behavior and purpose, thereby making it wrong to classify it as a revivalist group¹⁵³. Next inline on the list of Islamic extremists was Sheik Abubakar Gumi. Gumi is known for his rhetoric that a non-Muslim cannot be chosen to lead Muslims. In 1982, Gumi’s teachings resulted to violence in 1982 when eight churches were burnt down by Muslim extremists¹⁵⁴. In

¹⁴⁶ Oluwatoyin Badejogbin, "Boko Haram: An Enquiry Into the Socio-Political Context", p. 237.

¹⁴⁷ Abiodun Alao, "Islamic Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Nigeria", p. 128.

¹⁴⁸ Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, "Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume: 37, 2014, p. 50.

¹⁴⁹ Oluwatoyin Badejogbin, "Boko Haram: An Enquiry Into the Socio-Political Context", p. 227.

¹⁵⁰ Abimbola Adesoji, "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria", *Africa Spectrum*, Volume: 45, No:2, 2010, pp. 95-108.

¹⁵¹ Hakeem Onapajo, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", p.25.

¹⁵² William Ehwarieme and Nathaniel Umukoro, 2015. "Civil Society and Terrorism in Nigeria: A Study of the Boko Haram Crisis", *International Journal on World Peace*, Volume: 32, No:3, 2015, p. 29.

¹⁵³ Hakeem Onapajo, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", p.25.

¹⁵⁴ Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, "Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume: 37, 2014, p. 50.

general, five main causes of Islamic radicalization has been identified: prevention of the return of *Jahiliyya* (the era before emergence of Christianity or Islam), reaction to disrespect the prophet or the Quran, reaction to evangelism in Nigeria which came along with colonization and westernization, reaction to socio-economic and political differences, and finally reaction to mistreat of the Quran and the Prophet globally¹⁵⁵.

Given the above-mentioned origin of Boko Haram, the question that automatically comes to mind is what is the goal of Boko Haram? What does it hope to achieve? On an individual basis, this is a question of perspective due to the fact that different people joined for different purposes. As Badejogbin explains, it can be seen as either an “ideological movement” or a group motivated by “economic underdevelopment in Northern Nigeria”¹⁵⁶. Elsewhere, it has been argued that even though the group’s motivation is an intertwining of economic, political and religious purposes, the latter two triumphs over the religious ones¹⁵⁷. Some researchers on the other hand have argued that despite the traces of state failure and poverty, the main motivation of the group is deeply rooted in religious reasons¹⁵⁸. The question of which motivation is the strongest is still a debatable one. Nevertheless, the main goal that has been repeated by the leaders of the group is “the establishment of a socio-political system based on its conception of the traditional Islamic model.” That is a modern state system with institutions but administered with the ideology of the group—Islamic political system¹⁵⁹.

3.3. Boko Haram Activities (Until 2009)

As of 2014, Boko Haram related activities had resulted in a total number of over 4000 casualties and almost one third of a million people displaced¹⁶⁰. Statistically, Boko Haram activities only became worse in the aftermath of the 2009 uprisings which led to the death of over 700 people. But before then the activities of the group did not get global and media attention. This could be attributed to the fact that the intensity of those attacks was not high enough, or perhaps the post 9/11 activities going on in the Middle East drew the attention of the

¹⁵⁵ Abiodun Alao, "Islamic Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Nigeria", *Conflict, Security & Development*, Volume: 13, No: 2, 2013, p. 131.

¹⁵⁶ Oluwatoyin Badejogbin, "Boko Haram: An Enquiry Into the Socio-Political Context of Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Response", *Law, Democracy & Development*, Volume: 17, 2013, p. 228.

¹⁵⁷ Yunus Purcek, "The Impact of Ethno-Religious Conflict on Foreign Policy: Nigerian Case", p.7.

¹⁵⁸ Theo Brinkel and Soumia Ait-Hida, "Boko Haram and Jihad in Nigeria", *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, Volume: 40, No:2, 2012, p. 10.

¹⁵⁹ Hakeem Onapajo, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", p.28.

¹⁶⁰ Lauren Ploch Blanchard, "Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions", *Current Politics and Economics of Africa*, Volume: 7, No: 2, 2014, pp. 147-148.

media more. As for the intensity of the activity, it is argued that before 2009, the group had relatively low access to arms and weapons¹⁶¹.

Prior to 2009, the group carried out five main attacks, first recorded Boko Haram activity occurred in between 23rd to 31st December of 2003. This happened during the early phase of the group. As of this time, it used to be referred to as the “Nigerian Taliban”¹⁶². In this event, about 200 armed men attacked police stations in Geidam and Kanamma which are both in Yobe state. Even though Boko Haram lost 18 men in the attack, the group was successful in obtaining both weapons and vehicles from the police. Lots of policemen also lost their lives in the process¹⁶³.

A week after the raiding of the police station—January 7, 2003—by the 200 gunmen, Boko Haram encountered a combat in Borno state. The attack took place after an attempted raid of a police station in Damboa. A group of vigilantes from the local town successfully engaged Boko Haram which led to the death of seven Boko Haram members and the arrest of three Boko Haram men. The police was able to retrieve stolen AK-47 guns from the group¹⁶⁴. In June the same year, Boko Haram tried to rescue some of its imprisoned members but failed. This unsuccessful mission which took place in Yobe state resulted in the death of four other Boko Haram members¹⁶⁵.

The group staged a bigger attack on 23 September 2004. The attack took place in Gwoza and Bama of the Borno State. Once again, the group raided police stations in the towns and killed six people, four of whom were police men and two civilians. The attackers were tracked down by soldiers in a forest near the borders with Cameroon. The soldiers killed 28 Boko Haram men and the rest managed to escape to Cameroon¹⁶⁶. As if that was not enough the group came for revenge and another attack was carried out in less than a month afterwards. A convoy carrying policemen were intercepted by the group in Kalabalge near Lake Chad. Three police officers died on the spot while twelve other police officers who were captured in the process and got killed later¹⁶⁷.

¹⁶¹ Yunus Purcek. 2014. "The Impact of Ethno-Religious Conflict on Foreign Policy: Nigerian Case", 2014, p.6.

¹⁶² Ioannis Mantzikos, “Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks”, *Perspectives on terrorism*, Volume: 8, No: 6, 2014, p. 64.

¹⁶³ William Ehwareme and Nathaniel Umukoro, 2015. "Civil Society and Terrorism in Nigeria: A Study of the Boko Haram Crisis", *International Journal on World Peace*, Volume: 32, No:3, 2015,p. 40.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ioannis Mantzikos, “Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks”, *Perspectives on terrorism*, Volume: 8, No: 6, 2014, p. 64.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 64,

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

3.3.1. The 2009 Uprising

In July 2009, following the introduction of a new federal law that required motor riders to use protective crash helmets when riding, a serious uprising was ignited between Boko Haram and police officers when officers of the law tried to make sure this new law was obeyed. In an operation known as “Operation Flush”, the group faced a harsh and violent response from the government agency in charge of enforcing this law. According to Boko Haram, it refused to obey the law because it did not recognize the Nigerian government. The government had no legitimacy, and therefore could not make binding laws to Boko Haram members. The operation led to the death of 17 Boko Haram members, and therefore the group had to retreat to go and plan a response attack¹⁶⁸. After the hibernation period of the group, it came out more aggressive and confrontational. Several policemen and innocent civilians were killed and others wounded. The government responded by unleashing hellfire on the group and its leaders, sometimes going to the extent of targeting their family members. It became apparent that the government was following a hardline method with the group when it ordered military personnel to join the police in combatting the group. A total casualty of over 800 people was recorded. It was unfortunate however that many of the casualties were innocent civilians¹⁶⁹.

The outcome of this crisis arguably continues to live on till today. As a result of this crisis, the government arrested some important figures of the organization, the leader of the group—Mohammed Yusuf, including Alhaji Buji Foi who was the financier of the group at that time, and Alhaji Baa Fugu Mohammed (Mohammed Yusuf’s father in -law). The three figures died in police custody, allegedly executed in broad daylight by the police. This was a big blow to the group and it definitely was not ready to let it go. In a report, Aliyu Tishau (a prominent member of Boko Haram) made an analogy of what was yet to happen to Nigeria with that of Somalia, if the wishes of the group was not met by the government¹⁷⁰.

After the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the mantle of leadership was passed onto his deputy Abubakar Shekau. The new leadership went underground for a comeback. Shekau, who is the current leader, resorted to a more violent approach than his predecessor. He announced his intention of retaliation and seeking vengeance for the executed of its members. Boko Haram

¹⁶⁸ Hakeem Onapajo, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", pp. 29-30.

¹⁶⁹ Ioannis Mantzikos, “Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks”, *Perspectives on terrorism*, Volume: 8, No: 6, 2014, p. 64.

¹⁷⁰ Hakeem Onapajo, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", p. 30.

declared war on the governors in the northern region for killing its members. Promised retaliation and to make Nigeria ungovernable”¹⁷¹.

3.3.2. Prison Break in 2010

During the month of September 2010, Boko Haram became the news headline of many media houses in Nigeria. Two days after a Boko Haram member killed a retired assistant superintendent of police (ASP) on the 5th of September¹⁷²; the group staged a historical prison break which resulted to an escape of more than 700 inmates. 36 of the inmates returned to the prison according to their own wishes the next morning. Among the freed inmates, 150 were members of Boko Haram, who had been arrested previous year awaiting trial. The prison break took place at Bauchi prison where a soldier, a police officer and two civilians were killed. According to an eye witness, the attack was carried by about 50 men who were armed with machine guns and rifles¹⁷³.

The attack was staged “after the army announced that it was conducting joint patrols with police in Maiduguri, following several attacks which left 12 people death—including seven policemen—in the past month”¹⁷⁴. The army had resorted to the use of violent to counter Boko Haram and was not willing to back down. Boko Haram continued with series of attacks and assassinations after the prison break until January the following year. Among the prominent figures that were assassinated was Awana Ali Ngala who was the national vice-chairman of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)¹⁷⁵.

3.3.3. 2011 Activities and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Boko Haram attacks became sophisticated with the passing of time. Initially, the group use to plan only small scale attacks due to lack of access to arms and weaponry. With time however, Boko Haram attacks became more sophisticated and happened more often. By the year 2011, Northern Nigeria had become an unsafe zone on which assassinations had become other of

¹⁷¹ Ibid. p. 30.

¹⁷² Ioannis Mantzikos, “Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks”, *Perspectives on terrorism*, Volume: 8, No: 6, 2014, p. 64.

¹⁷³ David Smith, “More than 700 inmates Escape during an Attack on Nigerian prison”, *The Guardian*, September 8 2010, (Retrieved from) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/08/muslim-extremists-escape-nigeria-prison>, accessed 17th December 2016.

¹⁷⁴ BBC, “Boko Haram Attack Frees Hundreds of Prisoners”, September 8 2010, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11229740>, accessed 17th December 2010.

¹⁷⁵ Ioannis Mantzikos, “Boko Haam Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks”, *Perspectives on terrorism*, Volume: 8, No: 6, 2014, p. 65.

the day. Victims of Boko Haram in 2011 ranged from politicians, civilians, religious groups (mostly but not limited to Christians), local chiefs, police men, soldiers, and foreign missions. According to one literature, the number of attacks and assassinations (both unsuccessful ones) tallies to over 100. The frequency of the attacks could be attributed to the presidential elections that took place in April 2011. In this election, Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner and former vice-president (until the untimely death of Umaru Yar'Adua) emerged the winner. It is believed that Boko Haram increased its activities to weaken Jonathan's administration. Moreover, the group allegedly had the support of unhappy politicians who were bent to frustrate Jonathan's rule¹⁷⁶.

It is nearly impossible to capture the details of these attacks in this sub heading due to space. A general overview of the attacks will be given, and a detailed account of a few events would be mentioned. As early as 3 January 2011, first assassination of the year by Boko Haram happened. Series of assassinations of policemen, church leaders and Muslim clerics followed throughout the year. One of the biggest attacks happened in March when armed Boko Haram members invaded three villages, Dogo Nachawa, Zot and Tatsat. In this attack, over 200 innocent men of the villages were killed. One of the most active months of Boko Haram activities was May. In this month, two political figures were assassinated, a police station was raided, a bank was robbed and in Bauchi, there was a bombing in a market which killed 13 people and injured 40 other more¹⁷⁷.

Perhaps the most famous attack of 2011 that amassed media attention was the bombing of UN building on August 26th in Nigeria state capital, Abuja. The attack orchestrated by Mohammed Nur signifies the first "lethal attack" on a foreign mission. Death count was at least 20 people while around 80 people were left injured. Even though the attack might have brought Boko Haram into a global stage, statements by Boko Haram leaders shows that the main motive behind the attack was not about gaining a global attention. In a statement given by the group's spokesperson, he stated that "the U.N. attack was a retribution for the state's harsh security response against its members, referencing U.S. and international collaboration with the Nigerian security forces"¹⁷⁸. In a released video, the group referred to the United Nations as the "forum of

¹⁷⁶ Abiodun Alao, "Islamic Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Nigeria", p. 137.

¹⁷⁷ Ioannis Mantzikos, "Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks", p. 68.

¹⁷⁸ Lauren Ploch Blanchard, "Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions", p. 148.

evil”¹⁷⁹. The State Security Service (SSS) of Nigeria has been blamed for not being able to stop the attack due to lack of proper intelligence gathering. Mohammed Nur, the brain behind the whole attack, was arrested by the SSS prior the attack, but was later released. Also, some Imams in the northern region had earlier warned the government and law officers about incoming attacks, but unfortunately their warnings fell on deaf ears¹⁸⁰.

Few months after the bombing of the UN office, revelations about Boko Haram connections with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was released. Like Boko Haram, AQIM is an Islamist extremist terrorist organization that aims at establishing an Islamic state in Algeria. On 13th November 2011, the deputy foreign minister of Algeria came out and said that according to reports by their intelligence agency indicates “coordination between AQIM and Boko Haram”¹⁸¹. After the 2009 clash, it is believed that some members of Boko Haram may have escaped to the Sahel region where they had training from AQIM¹⁸². In addition to the training, Boko Haram was also given a media exposure by AQIM in order to sell its propaganda to the world¹⁸³. In a letter release to the public, signed by Mallam Sanni Umaru who became the acting leader of the group after the death of Mohammed Yusuf before Shekau took over, claimed;

That Boko Haram is an Islamic Revolution whose impact is not limited to Northern Nigeria, in fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria, and Boko Haram is just a version of the Al Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamized which is according to the wish of Allah¹⁸⁴.

The group’s alliance with other foreign terrorist groups affected US-Nigeria relations. With its association with AQIM, Boko Haram became an issue of threat to the

¹⁷⁹ Ioannis Mantzikos, “Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks”, p. 70.

¹⁸⁰ Hakeem Onapajo, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike, "Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria", p.32.

¹⁸¹ Ioannis Mantzikos, “Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks”, p. 71.

¹⁸² Lauren Ploch Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions”, pp. 146-147.

¹⁸³ Samuel Oyewole, “Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria’s war on terror”, *Defense and Security Analysis*, Volume: 29, No: 3, 2013, p. 257.

¹⁸⁴ “Boko Haram Resurrects and declares total Jihad” <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-ressurrects-declares-total-jihad/#>, accessed date 17th December 2016.

global world, more specifically for the US government. Even though the activities of the group did not really affect America's interest in Nigeria, the US government felt, Boko Haram relation with a global terrorist network made it potentially a threat to America. The US government, as way of combating the group, wanted to declare it as an International Terrorist Organization (ITO) but was pleaded not to do so by the Nigerian government. The repercussions of declaring it as an ITO was likely to affect Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and treatment of Nigerian's abroad. The American government put the decision on hold until 2013 when U.S went ahead and declared it as an ITO¹⁸⁵.

3.3.4. 2012 Activities and the State of Emergency

Boko Haram's plan of making Nigeria a land of terror and ungovernable country for President Jonathan's administration was materializing, as the group had intensified its atrocities in subsequent year, innocent civilians in both the North and the South became victims, its attack was not limited to the north alone but to other parts of the country as well. President Jonathan had to figure out a way to deal with atrocities if not for anything, for his popularity and approval rating.

On January 1, 2012, President Jonathan imposed a state of emergency in three states of Nigeria. The state of emergency was exercised in some towns of three northern states: Borno, Yobe, Niger and Plateau State, in central Nigeria. In addition to the state of emergency, the government ordered the closing of the borders of Chad and Niger¹⁸⁶. President Jonathan in the televised announcement of the state of emergency noted that "the temporary closure of [the] borders in the affected areas [was] only an interim measure designed to address the current security challenges"¹⁸⁷.

The state of emergency was employed following various atrocious attacks by the group on churches and other state buildings. On Christmas day, the 25th of December 2011, the group attacked a catholic church in a town called Madalla, not very far from the Nigeria capital, Abuja. This was a bomb attack which resulted in the death of about 42 church members. On the same day, another attack was attempted on another church in

¹⁸⁵ Yunus Purcek. 2014. "The Impact of Ethno-Religious Conflict on Foreign Policy: Nigerian Case", *Turkish Journal of Politics*, Volume: 5, No: 1, 2014, pp. 9-10.

¹⁸⁶ William Ehwareme and Nathaniel Umukoro, 2015. "Civil Society and Terrorism in Nigeria: A Study of the Boko Haram Crisis", *International Journal on World Peace*, Volume: 32, No:3, 2015, p. 44.

¹⁸⁷ "Boko Haram Attacks Prompt Nigeria State of Emergency", <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16373531>, accessed date -2nd January 2016.

Plateau state but was poorly executed, reducing the casualty to only one police man. The Nigeria's Secret Agency (SSS) also had a taste of Boko Haram bombing. A suicide bomber with a bomb strapped in his car set it off at the entrance of the agency resulting in the death of 3 officers. A broad day attack on a checkpoint in the state of Maiduguri also added up four Muslims to the tally of deaths¹⁸⁸.

Nevertheless, the announcement of the state of emergency did not necessarily stop the atrocious terrorist group from striking. As a matter of fact, the attack became frequent after the President Jonathan's decision. The month of January alone recorded 31 and 46 deaths in the hands of Boko Haram members¹⁸⁹. The deadliest attack of that month happened on the 20th of January where eight state buildings were targeted with a total of more than 20 bombs. However, the state of emergency was not without any benefit. It paid off towards the end of the month. On 28th January, the Joint-Task Force (JTF) tasked with combating Boko Haram captured 158 alleged members of the group in possession of hundreds of explosive devices disguised in canned packages¹⁹⁰. As usual, the group responded more violently and this went on throughout the year staging bombings upon bombings, and the JTF with some luck captured a few Boko Haram members.

3.3.5. 2014 Chibok kidnapping and Cameroon Attack

Perhaps Boko Haram's deadliest year was 2014. By mid-2014, the group emerged as the most politically violent group, topping the list of lethal groups in the world. With total count of 2,924 representing the number of people killed by Boko Haram, was more than that of Islamic State and Al-Shabaab combined who had 1,459 and 1,136 respectively. Boko Haram continued to grow in size, weapons and attacks. It had grown so big that its actions had a spillover effect in neighboring countries such as Cameroon and Chad¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁸ William Ehwarieme and Nathaniel Umukoro, 2015. "Civil Society and Terrorism in Nigeria: A Study of the Boko Haram Crisis", p. 43.

¹⁸⁹ William Ehwarieme and Nathaniel Umukoro, 2015. "Civil Society and Terrorism in Nigeria: A Study of the Boko Haram Crisis", *International Journal on World Peace*, Volume: 32, No:3, 2015, p. 44; Ioannis Mantzikos, "Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks", *Perspectives on terrorism*, Volume: 8 No:6, 2014, pp. 72-73.

¹⁹⁰ Ioannis Mantzikos, "Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks", p.74.

¹⁹¹ Ioannis Mantzikos, "Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks", p. 63.

There seemed to be a pattern and creativity in Boko Haram atrocities. Every year, the group manages to grab global attention by executing an attention seeking attack. As to whether or not it is a planned tactic to execute one big act each year since 2009 remains unknown. In the year 2014, among many other attacks, Boko Haram carried out one massive attack that grabbed the attention of global community. The attack was so strong and powerful enough to create a social media reaction dubbed #BringBackOurGirls.

It all started when over 200 men of Boko Haram invaded a dormitory full of female students preparing to write their final exams. The men abducted the girls from their schools and sneaked them away on the back of pickup trucks under the dark shades of the night. Due to Boko Haram activities in the region, many secondary schools in Borno state were closed temporary. The only one operating was the Chibok Government Girls Secondary School. Students from schools in Borno therefore had to join the secondary school in Chibok for their final exams. The dormitory of the school was therefore packed with over 200 girls who were preparing to write their national exams¹⁹².

The kidnap was carried by over two hundred armed Boko Haram men who engaged the outnumbered security officials in the small town of Chibok. Creating an atmosphere of fear from afar, the school girls could hear gunshots from their dormitories. So when one armed man wearing a uniform barged into the dormitory, claimed to be a police officer and told the girls to calm down so he could take them to safety, the girls obliged. It was upon taking them outside that the girls realized that he was a member of the terrorist group. Out of the over 300 girls that were in the dormitory that night, around 50 of them could manage to escape into the dark night while a remaining 276 were tolled into the dark forest of Sambisa forest which has been known for providing shelter for the group¹⁹³.

The attack could have been prevented, if the military backup had arrived earlier after a tip-off, informing them about the attack few hours before the attack. Chibok had only 15 military men securing it, and the nearest military base was an hour drive away. Unfortunately, the 15 military men couldn't receive back up as requested. Hours later,

¹⁹² Lauren Ploch Blanchard, "Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions", p. 149.

¹⁹³ Michelle Faul, "Nigerian Girl Describes Kidnap, Still Missing", the Huffington Post, May 6 2014, Accessed from <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20140506/af--anatomy-of-a-kidnapping-abridged/>, January 7 2017.

Boko Haram militants in their trucks ransacked the town and the 15 soldiers were no match for them¹⁹⁴. A month after the attack, Boko Haram released a video showing the kidnapped girls, dressed up in conservative Muslim dress. Shekau had threatened to give them away as slaves for some money, and the way to stop that was if the government would barter trade with its members in police custody for the girls¹⁹⁵. That was not the first time that Boko Haram had resorted to kidnapping as a means to getting leverage for negotiation, and it certainly was not the last time.

Throughout the year, Boko Haram continued with its normal routine of bombings, civilian and military attacks, assassinations and so on. Towards the end of the same year, the group went beyond the borders of Nigeria. It extended its activities to the northern part of Cameroon. In early October, Boko Haram launched a rocket on Amchide, a town in Far North region of Cameroon. A week afterwards—15 October 2014, armed Boko Haram militants invaded another town called Limani, according to civilians, the number of armed men were in hundreds whereas the Cameroonian military claimed the militants were almost a thousand. Boko Haram had carried the attack because it claimed that the locals in town had allegedly aided the arrest of its members. In the eyes of Boko Haram, the whole town had betrayed them and hence deserved punishment. The number of Cameroonian casualties was at least 38: 8 military men and the rest being civilians. Boko Haram suffered a greater number of casualties as hundreds of its members were killed. Cameroonians however suffered the most in this 24-hour long attack. By the time the attack ended, military bases were destroyed, houses were set ablaze, markets were raided, motor cycles were stolen and Amchide was left empty¹⁹⁶. In April the following year, Boko Haram carried a similar attack in another Cameroonian town called Bia.

3.3.6. 2015 Activities: Baga Massacre and West African Offensive

Three days into 2015, Boko Haram shocked Borno state with another sequel of massacre, this time bigger. The massacre lasted approximately five days, from 3rd to 7th January resulting in a death toll of thousands. Nigeria had been unwilling to allow the collaboration with neighboring countries in combatting Boko Haram even though there

¹⁹⁴ Michelle Faul, "Nigerian Girl Describes Kidnap, Still Missing", the Huffington Post, May 6 2014, Accessed from <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20140506/af--anatomy-of-a-kidnapping-abridged/>, January 7 2017.

¹⁹⁵ Lauren Ploch Blanchard, "Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions", p. 150.

¹⁹⁶ Amnesty International, "Human Rights Under Fire: Attacks and Violationz in Cameroon's Struggle with Boko Haram", London: Amnesty International Publications, 2015, p. 24.

exist a multinational formation comprising of the neighboring countries. The Joint Task Force (JTF) of Nigeria, working alone, had not been able to curb Boko Haram activities, sometimes the JTF committed huge blunders such as opening fire on innocent civilians. The formation known as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was formed in 1998 with the aim of fighting bandits that were taking over the borders of Chad, Cameroon and Niger. MNJTF therefore consists of those countries together with Nigeria. Due to the activities of Boko Haram in Baga which is very close to the borders, MNJTF's mandate was extended in 2012 to include the combat of Boko Haram¹⁹⁷. In 2014, the military capacity and responsibilities of the JTF was increased as well¹⁹⁸.

On January 3, before the massacre began, Boko members first attacked the MNJTF headquarters outside Baga. After conquering the military base, the militants continued their attack in Baga and nearby towns where they forcefully brought out the civilians and massacred them in cold blood. A total area sheltering 10,000 people was set on fire, leaving the survivors no other option but to flee. Some people manage to escape to Chad by crossing the Chad Lake which also claimed lot of lives. The massacre resulted to a death of over 2000 people according to a BBC report¹⁹⁹.

After the massacre—February 7 2015, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council met in search for solution to the Boko Haram attacks, in the process, MNJTF was modified and enacted properly. Until this period, Nigeria's security policy in dealing with the Boko Haram issue was characterized by the mindset that "there will be no foreign boots on the ground in Nigeria to combat Boko Haram"²⁰⁰. Though Nigeria decided to collaborate, it technically did not compromise on this ideology, that countries involved could only help combat Boko Haram from outside the territories of Nigeria. The newly modified MNJTF known as the West African Offensive had a total of 8,750 trained men from Nigeria, Chad Cameroon, Niger, and Benin. One of the major concerns in the international arena was the issue of human rights. Innocent civilians have become victims of the JTF, and therefore whether the West African Offensive would act in

¹⁹⁷ Lt. Col. Sagir Musa, "BAGA: Multinational Joint Task Forces, BHTs And Host Community", Sahara Reporters, 2013.

¹⁹⁸ Bill Roggio, 2015, "Boko Haram overruns Multinational Joint Task Force Base." *Long War Journal*, January 4 2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/01/boko_haram_overruns_1.php#ixzz3OGgsjjEN.

¹⁹⁹ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30728158>

²⁰⁰ Thérroux-Bénon, Lori-Anne, "The Fight Against Boko Haram Tangled up in Nigerian and Regional Politics", *Institute for Security Studies*, February 10 2015.

accordance to principles of morality and international law on human rights became a matter of concern to an international organization such as the Human Rights Watch²⁰¹.

It comes as surprise, even more so as a disappointment that despite the few modifications the West African Offensive did nothing to solve some of the ongoing crises. Unlike in the cases of Mali and Somalia where the AU formed a commission to fight ongoing internal problems with terrorist group, the West African Offensive was only tasked with preventing the expansion of Boko Haram. The issue of the kidnapped girls whose whereabouts was still unknown was not tackled. The effectiveness of the Offensive was also put to challenge after Boko Haram gained more control in Northern Nigeria. More people were displaced and had to seek refuge across the borders of Nigeria, in Chad. Boko Haram members began to infiltrate by posing themselves as refugees in order to enter Chad. Hence, the Offensive could not completely stop the expansion of Boko Haram atrocities into Chad²⁰². Nevertheless, the offensive has proven to be useful as it has been able to help the Nigerian government gain back lost territories.

Prior to the initiative of AU Peace and Security Council, it deserves to be mentioned that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—a regional organization in West Africa—had also tried its own initiatives to help solve the issue of terrorism in the region. In a 2011 meeting in Senegal, ECOWAS members agreed not to allow their states as a safe haven for terrorists. In addition, member states agreed to monitor and cease assets and belonging to terrorist organizations. Then came a bigger initiative in 2013 called the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism and Implementation Plan. Among the many objectives of the plan was to “promote and consolidate cooperation, coordination, harmonization and synergies in national counter-terrorism actions”. Maintaining the basic human rights of civilians in the acts of counter-terrorism was also one of the objectives of the plan²⁰³. This indeed signifies that regional organizations have not always played deaf ears to the escalating issue of terrorism in the region. The West African Offensive is the biggest initiative that gave more mandate to

²⁰¹ Human Rights Watch, “West Africa: Regional Boko Haram Offensive”, February 11 2015, Accessed from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/11/west-africa-regional-boko-haram-offensive>, accessed date 6th January 2017.

²⁰² Thérroux-Bénon, Lori-Anne, "The Fight Against Boko Haram Tangled up in Nigerian and Regional Politics", *Institute for Security Studies*, February 10 2015.

²⁰³ Ufiem Maurice Ogbonnaya, Kanayo Ogujiuba, and Nancy Stiegler, "Terrorism in Nigeria", *African Security Review*, Volume: 23, No:2, 2014, pp. 153-154.

the MNJTF, however it cannot be discounted that other regional organizations such as the ECOWAS in its own capacity had resorted to some mechanisms to help in dealing with the exacerbating issue of terrorism in West Africa.

3.3.7. The Baga Massacre and 2013 Activities

The year 2013 went down as one of the darkest years in contemporary Nigeria's history, or at least in the history of the northern state of Borno. Like the past few years, 2013 started, or perhaps continued, with the normal routine of Boko Haram attacks and bombings. However, the events of this year had various dynamics with unexpected occurrences, among which the Baga massacre was the biggest, most monstrous and most controversial. They also introduced attack on foreign personnel. In February, doctors from North Korea were assassinated in Yobe. Less than 10 days after this assassination, a French family was targeted. Boko Haram members abducted the family in Cameroonian territory close to the border from where they were sent to Nigeria. The abducted family was used as a bargaining chip with the government. It threatened to assassinate the family if arrested Boko Haram members were not released from police custody²⁰⁴.

On April 16, Baga was painted red with the blood of both the innocent and guilty alike due to an encounter between the JTF and Boko Haram members. Baga is a small town in Borno close to the borders of Nigeria with Cameroon and Chad. It serves as an army base for the JTF. It appears to be a strategic area for the JTF since its location helps it fight Boko Haram and at the same time control the porous borders of the region that Boko Haram has been taking advantage of. The incident began on the 16th of April when a soldier of the JTF patrol team was shot dead in a drinking pub. The JTF upon hearing the news of the dead comrade flooded the town with their men. Upon arrival, the military men opened fire on the townsmen killing whoever was in insight. According to survivors of the massacre, the incident went on till past midnight into the following day, as the military set houses ablaze²⁰⁵.

A review of the event by the military reported that the number of people who died in the incident was 36 and most of them were members of Boko Haram. However, reports released by various human right organizations indicate that the military had

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 77.

²⁰⁵ The National Human Rights Commission, "The Baga Incident and the Situation in North-East Nigeria: An Interim Assessment and Report." Abuja, 2013, pp. 17-18.

downplayed the figures and the extent of the destruction caused by the incident. For instance, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the surviving villagers said they counted 183 dead men and 2000 burned houses. HRW satellites indicated 2,275 completely destroyed houses and a few over hundred houses left in bad shape²⁰⁶. Quite interestingly, the National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA) in its report argued that analysis made with their software showed a contradiction with HRW's report. Using similar satellites data, NASRDA's conclusion was that the area could not have accommodated up to 2000 houses as reported by HRW²⁰⁷. The truth of the matter continues to be a controversial one. The locals of Baga have pointed fingers at the military as the one ones who carried out the massacre leading to almost 200 deaths. The military in response continuously denied that it had target civilians²⁰⁸.

3.4. Social and Political dynamics which support Boko Haram in Nigeria

Nigeria as a country consists of several diverse societies. With a changing social and political dynamics, it makes it difficult if not impossible, to determine one specific factor or reason for the success of Boko Haram. The question of why it has been able to survive for so long without being crushed by the government is as follows.

To begin with, the success of Boko Haram can be partly attributed to its successful infiltration of the government. Once Boko Haram got into the government, it became easier for it to assess classified information that it would not have attained otherwise. In fact, there are reported cases of government officials leading military men to an ambush, clearly the infiltrators in the government tip off the group about a military operation that is yet to happen. Boko Haram men upon having the details of the operation and ambush the military men even before the operation happens. In Jan 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan admittedly reported that there existed officials working for the terrorist organization in his government²⁰⁹.

²⁰⁶ Human Rights Watch, "Nigeria: Massive Destruction, Deaths From Military Raid", HRW, 2013, Accessed December 20, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/nigeria-massive-destruction-deaths-military-raid>.

²⁰⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Nigeria: Massive Destruction, Deaths From Military Raid", HRW, 2013, Accessed December 20, 2016, p. 19.

²⁰⁸ Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, "Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume: 37, 2014, p. 61.

²⁰⁹ <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/3360-boko-haram-has-infiltrated-my-government-says-jonathan.html>, accessed date 14th October 2016

Diversity and differences had played a significant role in the politics of the north and the rise of Boko Haram activities. As I have mentioned above in the literature and history of northern Nigeria, it had always received preferential treatment during the British rule. Northern Nigeria sees itself as once the powerful Kingdom that produced Nigeria's last Caliphate. After the conquered of the caliphate by the British, the region was unwilling to give up their religious identity. Major issue with this religious identity is that it got intertwined with ethnic identity, followed by a political identity. Majority of the northerners are of the Hausa or Fulani tribe, while the rest of Nigeria is dominated by the Igbos and the Yoruba. The preferential treatment given by the colonial rulers was automatically translated as a preferential treatment to Muslims-Hausa/Fulani people, thereby creating a rift as differences became even more, given birth to the struggle for power. Since, then politics of Nigeria has been characterized by a struggle for power between the north and the south. In a bid to create a balance, a sort of tradition was put in place whereby the presidential position was been alternated between the north and the south. The death of President Yar'Adua however disrupted that pattern and created more violence with the help of Boko Haram. Constitutionally, a President from the north was now replaced by a southerner. This created a frustration among politicians and by extension Boko Haram, hence explaining why the group aggravated its attacks. The era of the new President, Goodluck Jonathan, was the bloodiest and monstrous era of Boko Haram. It was bent on delegitimizing the administration of President Jonathan. It therefore came with a little surprise when President Jonathan was voted out after one term in office. Nigerians voted for an ex-military dictator instead as the citizens were desperate for change.

Looking at the issue of Boko Haram from an economic perspective, poverty and high income inequality has played a major role in successful recruitments of members by the organization. Boko Haram emerged from the poorest region of Nigeria with majority of the people living under one dollar per day. States in the north record poverty ranging from 70 % to as bad as 95% in some states. This is definitely, a strong reason to motivate the emergence of a terrorist group or motivate a person to join. The issue of whether economy is a basis for formation of Boko Haram is a debatable one. What cannot be denied however is that, poverty is definitely one of the motivations that make the

organization appealing in the eyes of the youths. If not for any reason, it serves as a platform for the frustrated youth to get back at the corrupt leaders. Boko Haram has been successful in cultivating and exploiting this socio-economic dynamic.

From the perspective of International Politics, one of the many reasons why the issue of Boko Haram became a hard nut to crack was the issue of sovereignty. Governments are naturally unwilling to allow other states to intervene in its domestic affairs, and the Nigerian government was no different. As much as the Nigerian government was desperate to fight Boko Haram, it was unwilling to compromise and allow foreign forces to intervene in the northern states that were harboring Boko Haram members. This became evident when Nigerian government finally agreed to the West African Offensive—a modified version of the MNJTF. Even after agreeing to the offensive, it refused to allow members to deploy troops within the borders of Nigeria. It only allowed a restricted number of foreign soldiers, and limited their actions to control of border activities. Chadian, Niger and Cameroonian troops were largely tasked with dealing with smuggling of weapons through their borders to Nigeria. The issue of sovereignty continues to be a debatable one in inter-state politics.

Another reason why the Nigerian government has been unable to tackle the issue is corruption and misuse of finance within the government. There is no doubt that governments designated some money to fund the task force combatting Boko Haram. However, it is a pity to know that on several occasions, military fighters have ran from one on one fight with the terrorist group because their weapons were no match. This raises concerns about where government finances has been going to, and how Boko Haram fighters manage to get better weapons than the country's own military. There are two possible explanations to this particular situation. One, finances designated in the budget either does not make its way to the military due to corruption of government officials or the leaders of the military upon receiving the money take the money for their personal use. A second explanation from a different perspective is perhaps the involvement of government officials and entrepreneurs. It has been alleged time and again that some businessmen and statesmen are the one who sell weapons to the group, and that explains why the group is able to have access to modern weapons while the army continue to use relatively inferior weapons.

Lastly, Boko Haram has been able to live long by using a common strategy used by most terrorist organizations in the world, is mixing up with the civilians. Even though it is known that Boko Haram has a hideout which is the Sambisa forest, where the kidnapped girls were allegedly taken. However, most of the encounters between Boko Haram and the Nigerian army took place in towns where civilians live. By living among the civilians, it becomes nearly impossible to fight the group due to a high likelihood of mass civilian casualties. A strategy not only used by Boko Haram but other big terrorist groups such as ISIS. Terrorists do not own their exclusive territory to themselves, but government and the military has a legal moral obligation required to protect the lives of the innocent civilians. Boko Haram exploits this to its advantage, hence making it difficult for the government to fight it.

3.5. Boko Haram's Effects Regionally

Soon after Boko Haram came out of its hiding its attack became and sophisticated,, it went beyond the borders of Nigeria thereby making it not only an issue of domestic politics but rather a regional one. This was facilitated by the porous borders of the country. Neighbouring countries to Nigeria, thus, Chad, Cameroon and Niger have all been victims of attacks and suicide bombing since the group came back from its hiding.

This became more apparent when in October 2014, the group launched a rocket on the Cameroonian town of Amchide. Later that same week, Boko Haram launched an armed invasion in the Cameroonian town of Limani, where they were confronted by the Cameroonian military. The military unprepared for the attack claimed there were thousands of Boko Haram militants and they couldn't have possibly fought them all.

Another evidence of the imminent threat of Boko Haram can be found in the Lake Chad Basin. Since the emergence of the Boko Haram threat, the number of internally displaced people within the region has skyrocketed to a figure of 2.4 million while about 180,000 Nigerians dwell in the neighbouring countries as refugees. Hence, it is evidential that while the countries in the region have come together to help solve the issue, Boko Haram has also successfully instilled some level of instability in some small regions of the neighbouring countries.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSIONS

Boko Haram started as an issue of domestic affairs, and eventually the organization has turned out to be a regional, perhaps a global problem in a broader sense thereby capturing the attention of state leaders as well as scholars of International Relations. This thesis has been focused towards the atrocities and expansion of Boko Haram by gradually analyzing its stages of growth from its birth until recent years.

The main questions, which this thesis has attempted to solve, are:

- What are the factors that contributed to the expansion of Boko Haram beyond domestic boundaries of Nigeria and how that has influenced the politics of the region?
- What factors have contributed to the broadening of Boko Haram's attacks?
- Is Boko Haram merely motivated by radical religious ideology? What other factors serve as a motivation for the terrorist group?
- Are there any efforts by regional organization such as AU and ECOWAS in curbing the issue of Boko Haram?

This research has examined the historical background of Nigeria which is currently the largest economy of Africa as well as the continent's largest populated country. Nigeria's large economy is attributed to its richness in a vast variety of natural resources of which petroleum remains dominant. Historically, Nigeria has had interactions with outsiders even before the arrival of colonial masters from Europe. This interaction which was with traders mostly from Northern Africa has been noted as the origins of first arrival of Islam in Nigeria. Islamic religion was embraced by lots of the occupants of present day North Nigeria, centuries afterwards, colonization brought alongside yet another foreign religion which was embraced by mostly people in Southern and Eastern Nigeria.

In addition to the study of Nigeria's historical background, the history of Islam in Nigeria more specifically in the Northern part of the country was studied. This was done vis-à-vis the ethnic group of Hausa/Fulani. Studying Boko Haram required studying the historical background of both Islam and the tribal group because ethnicity and religion has become so much intertwined in the dynamics of Nigeria such that the few northerners who are not Muslims are

treated either as betrayers or outcasts. Similarly, people from the southern tribes who tend to be Muslims seem to be treated differently within their region. Other areas studied in this research includes; the Igbo Nation, the Kingdom of Northern Savannah.

More contemporary history such as the British colonial and post-colonial era was researched to give an insight on how it affected Nigeria's politics. A study on the transformation of a post-colonial Nigeria from a three regions division to a federal state consisting of 36 states also contributed to explaining how post-independence politics affects the current social dynamics in the country.

This research has revealed that the state of Nigeria was merely a creation of colonial masters as a mechanism to facilitate ruling and control of the territories. Hence, it is not surprising that Nigeria as a state consists of huge diversity in terms of culture, language, ethnic groups and even its politics. The implications and consequences of this system by the imperial British continue to affect interactions and present day politics of Nigeria.

In accordance to the literature and the history, Northern Nigeria was given favorable treatment in the early years of the 20th century as means of preventing them from resisting colonial rule. The last Islamic caliphate had fallen, but the Northerners were not ready to give up their Islamic legacy which resulted in them putting up resistance to the British. In attempt to tame down this resistance, the colonial masters who wanted an easy and trouble-free ruling gave the north a sort of autonomy. The North, hence, was ruled true indirect governance, and the rest of the country had the vice versa. This created a sort of segregation and even resulted to a blend of ethnicity and religion in the north.

Chapter three of this research unravels the origin of Boko Haram as well as the traces of Islamic radicalization in Nigeria. In addition, the chapter provides a timeline of major Boko Haram activities from its origin until recent years. Interestingly, this data revealed that Boko Haram activities increased massively during the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan. The terrorist group unhappy with a southerner as the leader of the country, wanted to frustrate his government and make it look incompetent in the eyes of the people by making the country ungovernable. The chapter also reveals the connections of Boko Haram with global terrorist units such as Al Qaeda in the Maghreb and ISIS.

As mentioned earlier, Nigeria is a federal state but gives each state some kind of autonomy in governing itself, though; the federal government reserves the authority in many

national issues. This research has shown how the northern politicians were able to exploit the weakness of the political structure in order to introduce a Shari'a law system.

4.1. Findings of the research

Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, but initially based its whole course on religious ideology. In fact, without indebt studies, it is easier for one to conclude that Boko Haram came about and continues to exist because of its belief in radical Islamic ideology. The finding of this research, challenge this line of thinking and presents a new perspective. This research shows that it is almost impossible to single out a factor as the underlying cause of Boko Haram. From the literal meaning of the name of the group, one is tempted to conclude that the group is motivated mainly by religious goals such as the establishment of a caliphate in Northern Nigeria. This research proves that while religious ideology plays a role in the group's purposes, it cannot be considered as the sole motivation for its activities. Economic factors have in fact proven to be of significant motivation as to why the group continues to exist. Even though Mohammed Yusuf—the founder—may have started the group with an ideological motive, recruits certainly joined with different motives. Northern part Nigeria records the highest poverty rate and therefore comes as no surprise that most youth in the region saw Boko Haram as a way to get back at corrupt politicians for whom they blame as the reason for their poverty.

Another important finding of this study is that Islamic radicalization is not a new phenomenon in the sociopolitical structure of Nigeria. Indeed various waves of radicalization inspired by Islamic motives happened in both pre-colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. It should be noted however that each era of radicalization indeed comes with its own goals and purposes. For instance, Othman Dan Fodio emerged in the early 19th century and created a Caliphate which eventually became the last caliphate of Northern Nigeria. Dan Fodio was a Muslim reformist and jihadist who believe in a society governed by Islamic rules. Here, there exist a similarity between Dan Fodio and Mohammed Yusuf of Boko Haram. The difference however is that for Dan Fodio, Islamic system or governance would be the solution to corruption and immorality. He however never condemned Western education as a sin, and his operations only remained in Northern Nigeria since the state of Nigeria was not even in existence as of that period. In 1980s, another radical Islamist group came into existence under the leadership of Mohammed Marwa, a Muslim scholar and an immigrant from Cameroon who arrived in the colonial years of Nigeria. Similar to Boko Haram, Marwa's radical group known as Yan Tatsine (aka Maitatsine)

embarked on a violent campaign that claimed the lives of 4000 people. Even though a radical group, Yan Tatsine varied in the sense that it was not only trying to bring back Islamic system ruling, but its leader Mohammed Marwa claimed himself a prophet and therefore aimed at bringing a new system of Islam in Nigeria. The current era of radicalization—Boko Haram—on the other hand, justifies its radicalization by claiming that it does so in the name of Islam. To sum up, this research has shown that even though radicalism may not be a foreign concept to Nigerians, indeed various past radical groups had different motives and agenda.

In addition to the above-mentioned findings, on a broader field of International Relations, a finding from this research seem to conform with the Realist concept of sovereignty, which has been widely acknowledged by several scholars as the means through which states show their power and independence. The colonial legacy of Nigeria undeniably continues to linger in its politics. Among the findings of this research is that the Nigerian government determined to keep its sovereignty has undermined the regional effort to counter Boko Haram. Even though the Nigerian government signed and agreed to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) which is an initiative by the regional organization, African Union (AU) to counter the spreading epidemic of Boko Haram, it refuses to allow foreign boots within the territories of the country. Instead, the contingent army of an approximately 8700 men provided by the foreign governments are restricted to securing the external borders of the country by ensuring that the terrorist group does not receive foreign supports. Clearly, the Nigerian government wants to fight Boko Haram, but on the other hand it lacks the willingness to allow foreign soldiers to operate within the country as it fears that an action like this undermines the sovereignty of the state. This research found that this dilemma indeed contributes to factors making it difficult to combat Boko Haram.

Another finding on the international level indicates that the success of Boko Haram can be attributed to its affiliations with international terrorist units. Evidence in this study indicates that Boko Haram initially had strong ties with Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) until their fall out recently. In the aftermath of a serious encounter in 2009 with the police, escapers who managed to leave the country found themselves in the Sahel region where they were trained by AQIM members. In 2016 however, evidence of the group's ties with ISIS affected its relations with AQIM. By declaring allegiance to ISIS, it became a part of the global terrorist units. Here also, the traces of realist mentality could be seen in the group's actions. It was watching out for its own interest, and hence realized that ISIS would serve as a more beneficial ally than their

counterpart in the Maghreb, thereby associating with ISIS at the expense of its relations with AQIM.

4.2. Conclusion

The problem of Boko Haram proves that as we move to a more globalized world, we equally run at a risk of globalizing world problems. It started as a domestic affair, but within a decade spread into a regional and global problem. Boko Haram has been able to carry successful attacks due to some incompetence on the part of the government. The group succeeded in becoming attractive in the eyes of the youth in the northern part of the country because of high poverty rates. In addition, the region has the highest rate of unemployment in the country. The government also has been unable to provide its army with proper resources and weapons to counter the insurgency due to massive corruption within the government which has hindered the little efforts made by the administration.

Boko Haram on the other hand has been able to exploit the dynamics of the Nigerian society to its own advantage. Nigeria is an exemplar case of how colonial rule has affected the social structure of most countries. The British colonial rule left a divisive Nigeria which created a sort of adversary between various ethnic groups in the country. This also created a new form of social identity which mixed up ethnic background with religion. Boko Haram has been successful in rallying the people in the north behind it by also making it a conflict between northerners, who are mostly Muslims and from Hausa-Fulani tribe and the south who are mostly Christians from the Igbo tribe.

While the factors that have contributed to Boko Haram's resilience have been highlighted, it should not be forgotten that the issue of Boko Haram cannot be simplified solely to one factor, but numerous such as religious, economy ideology etc. Even though the group has radical religious motivations, economic problems such as poverty and unemployment are layered around this motivation. Hence to have a better understanding, one needs to look at various possible factors to avoid biased conclusions.

The issue of Boko Haram is an ongoing one and continues to present new topics of study. Future studies developing on this research can focus on why the regional organization has been unsuccessful in being effective. This research touched on the point of the Nigerian government exercising its sovereignty by not allowing foreign soldiers. While this is a part explanation, further research is required to explore completely the other factors that render any effort from

ECOWAS or the African Union ineffective. Also, in light of recent developments in 2016, it has become evidential that ISIS has some sort of control on the leadership of Boko Haram. Future studies can focus on the extent to which Boko Haram leadership is independent, and what sort of control ISIS has over the group.

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Appendix

Telephone Interview with Joseph Jedafeta

Rtd Joseph Jedafeta, was a retired military officer who served as at the time of the civil war in the young cadet quarter. He fought on the side of the Federal troop against the Biafra. He is from Delta State in the South-South zone. Presently, he is based in his home town Otor-owhe, Delta State. The interview was done in order to get firsthand information about Nigeria civil war and the events that led to the war.

Overview of the interview

This interview was done over the telephone as I was not physically present in Nigeria, in other words I was Ankara –Turkey as at the time of interview and so was constraint to travel over to Nigeria for the interview, as a result I placed the call to Nigeria from Ankara to interview the subject on this day the 8th December, 2016, before the interview, a set of questions in form topics were carefully prepared in order to get concise response of his account of the Nigeria civil war, see below;

- What was the situation before the civil war? Check response in the findings
- How old were you, when the war started? – 24 years old
- What rank were you? –copra, due to my position I was given machine gun (MG I) to fight in the war
- Before the escalation of the war, was there any room for negotiation?- no because both parties refused to change their positions thereby making it difficult for negotiation
- What led to civil war? – detail in the findings
- What was the role of international community?

Findings

According to Mr. Joseph, the early warning signal indicating war actually started in 1966, in other words the environment of the country was already ripe and titling towards war, as series of killings in the country was gradually increasing in momentum.

Basically, before the independent of Nigeria in 1960, plans were on top gear by the British to hand over leadership to civilian government, eventually election were held and winner

couldn't emerge and so two civilians (Tafawa Balewa as prime minister from the northern region and Nnamdi Azikwe as governor general from eastern region), were appointed; to take the mantle of leadership but this arrangement was not welcome by Nigeria military because they had preferred to take the leadership of country. Six years after independent (1966), the military planned and agreed to topple the government by killing all the leadership of the civilian government irrespective of their state, as at that time the most senior military officer was Aguyi Ironsi from the Eastern region (Igbo). Eventually when the coup was over, all the politicians from Northern and western region in government including the Prime Minister were either executed or imprisoned just like Obafemi Awolowo (premier of the western region), all other Eastern politician were excepted in the killings

Mr. Joseph stated that, the most senior military officer (Aguyi Ironsi) at the time took over power as head of state, but few months after his swearing –in to office, he was assassinated while making a speech in Ibadan- Western region, after his death, the leadership of the country was meant to be given again to the next most senior military officer was Babatunde Ogundipe, but declined the offer on the basis of medical ground. The next general on line was Odumegun Ojukwu, traditionally he was to take over power as head of state, but was denied the position for a more junior rank military officer called Yakubu Gowon who was away in the diaspora for training at the time, but was horridly invited over to take over power as head of state. The decision that was not accepted by Ojukwu, because he felt cheated, robbed and striped of right of Igbos (Easterners), as the new head of state Gowon assumed office, he released some prisoners, the likes of Obafemi Awolowo, called general meeting, but Ojukwu boycotted the meeting for obvious reasons. In the midst of the tension, Ojukwu made a pronouncement informing the Easterners resident in other part of regions in Nigeria to return home, but upon the return of the Igbos, they were ambushed and killed by the Northerners in retaliation of the first coup led by the Igbos which left more northerners and westerners dead , it became so severe that Ojukwu was forced to declared the independence(break away) of the *Igbos* called *Biafra* in 1967,

The interviewee claimed that the main and immediate was due to the denial of General Odumegun Ojukwu (leader of the Eastern region) from being in power and the killings of the Igbos that actually triggered the war. Secondly, the power was shifted to a more junior rank officer, Yakubu Gowon (who was a Northerner) in response to that, Ojukwu declared the Republic of Igbos (Biafra), a declaration which was not accepted by the head of state (Yakubu

Gowon) claiming that Nigeria must remain one country not divided²¹⁰ this became a dispute between the leader of Biafra and the seating head of state, both parties refusing to negotiate.

Consequently, Ojukwu went ahead to declare a republic Biafra, stating that Eastern region is not an integral part of Nigeria and so must break away and took position for war, mounted Biafra flag from the Eastern region up to the present day Niger-Delta region called south- South today and as the Biafra rebel were advancing further, the Federal troop of the government attacked, suppressed and pushed them back into the east. In the ensuing battle, Federal troop over powered Biafra, because they had more sophisticated weaponry and had access to cut off food supplies meant for Biafra rebels and their families, as strategy by the government to reduce the strength and increase deaths rate of the rebels due hunger. On seeing great number of casualties of both rebel and their families, Ojukwu (the leader of the Biafra) fled the country leaving his deputy in-charge who later surrendered to the Federal troop out of fear in January, 1970. With regards to the role of international community, China and Israel were on the side of the Biafra while Russia and Britain pledged their support for the Nigeria Federal government both in terms of weapon and otherwise. Today, the fight for the Republic of Biafra is still on-going, but the method adopted has changed from the use of force to diplomatic and legal means.

²¹⁰ Interview with Joseph Jedafeta, Dec. 8th 2016.

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