

**ATILIM UNIVERSITY**  
**GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT**  
**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME**

**TURCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS DURING THE AK PARTY GOVERNMENTS:**

**2002-2015**

**Master's thesis**

**Daria Pakhomova**

**Ankara - 2017**

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## ACCEPTION AND APPROVAL

This is to certify that this thesis titled "Turco-Russian Relations During the AK Party Governments: 2002-2015" prepared by Daria Pakhomova meets with the committee's approval unanimous/ by a majority vote as Master's Thesis in the field of International Relations following the successful defense of the thesis conducted in July 7, 2017.



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## ÖZ

[PAKHOMOVA, Daria] [AK parti döneminde Türkiye-Rusya ilişkileri: 2002-2015]  
[Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2017].

Türkiye ve Rusya, dünyanın önde gelen politik aktörleri arasındadır. Her iki ülke de önemli bir jeopolitik konumdadır. Ayrıca, birbirlerine komşulardır ve yüzyıllardır devam eden ikili ilişkiler geçmişine sahiplerdir. Türk-Rus ilişkilerinin istikrarlı bir şekilde gelişmediği gerçeğine rağmen, bugün Rus ve Türk politikacılar Rusya ile Türkiye arasındaki stratejik ortaklıktan söz ediyor. Her iki ülke, arasındaki bir rekabet unsuru ve bazı bölgesel sorunlarda anlaşmazlıkların olmasına rağmen, sonuçta siyasi yakınlaşmaya yol açan ekonomik bağların yoğunlaştırılması politikasını sürdürülüyor.

Türk-Rus ilişkilerinin en dinamik gelişimi AK Parti'nin iktidara gelmesi ile başladı. Bu dönemde Türk-Rus ilişkilerinin gelişimini göstermek için yazar, dostluk ve işbirliğinden gergin çatışmaya dönüşen 20. yüzyıldaki ikili ilişkilerin tarihsel arka planını analiz etti. Türkiye ile Rusya arasındaki yakınlaşma faktörlerini saptamak için ikili ilişkilerin siyasi ve ekonomik unsurunu araştırdı. Türkiye ile Rusya arasındaki kilit konusu olan enerji alanına özel önem veriyor. Rusya ile Türkiye'yi birbirine bağlayan petrol ve gaz koridorlarının kapsamlı bir analizini ve iki ülke arasındaki nükleer enerji alanında işbirliğinin potansiyelini değerlendiriyor. Buna ek olarak yazar, Rus-Türk askeri-teknik işbirliğinin gelişmesindeki önemi belirtiyor. Bu sanayi ikili işbirliğinin nispeten yeni bir alanı. Ülkelerin askeri sanayi alanındaki etkileşimi büyük bir potansiyele sahiptir ve iki ülke arasındaki karşılıklı güven artışını göstermektedir. Yazar, Rusya ile Türkiye arasındaki askeri teçhizat ticaretinin yanı sıra güvenlik alanındaki işbirliğini de anlatıyor.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Türk-Sovyet ilişkileri, Türk-Rus ilişkileri, enerji, askeri-teknik işbirliği, stratejik ortaklık.

## ABSTRACT

[PAKHOMOVA, Daria] [Turco-Russian relations during the AK party governments: 2002-2015] [M. A. Thesis, Ankara, 2017]

Turkey and Russia are among the world's leading political actors. Both countries occupy an important geopolitical position, are neighbors and have a centuries-old history of bilateral relations. Despite the fact that Turco-Russian relations have not always been developing steadily, today Russian and Turkish politicians are talking about the strategic partnership between Russia and Turkey. Despite the existence of an element of rivalry between the countries and the existence of disagreements on some regional problems, both countries continue the policy of intensification of economic ties, which, as a result, causes political rapprochement.

The most dynamic development of Turco-Russian relations began with the coming of the AK Party in power in Turkey. In order to show the progress of Turco-Russian relations in this period, the author analyzed the historical background of bilateral relations in the 20th century, the nature of which during the period was changing from friendship and cooperation to tense confrontation. In order to identify the factors of rapprochement between Turkey and Russia, the author in the research analyzed the political and economic component of bilateral relations. The author pays special attention to the sphere of energy, which is the key moment of cooperation between Turkey and Russia. The work contains a comprehensive analysis of the oil and gas corridors connecting Russia and Turkey, and also assesses the potential of cooperation between the two countries in the field of nuclear energy. In addition, the author pays special attention to the development of Russian-Turkish military-technical cooperation. This industry is a relatively new area of bilateral cooperation. The interaction of countries in the sphere of the military industry has great potential and indicates an increase in mutual trust between countries. The author describes the situation around the trade in military equipment between Russia and Turkey, as well as the co-operation of the two countries in the sphere of security.

**Key words:** Turco-Soviet relations, Turco-Russian relations, energetic, military-technical cooperation, strategic partnership.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ÖZ</b> .....	<b>i</b>
<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	<b>ii</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>LIST OF MAPS</b> .....	<b>v</b>
<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</b> .....	<b>vi</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>1</b>

### CHAPTER ONE

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

<b>1.1. Turkey and Russia in World War I</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>1.2. Relations During Turkish War of Liberation</b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>1.3. USSR and Republic of Turkey</b> .....	<b>14</b>
1.3.1. WWII and Turco-Russian Relations .....	15
1.3.2. Soviet Demands from Turkey .....	17
<b>1.4. USSR and Republic of Turkey: Post-WWII period</b> .....	<b>18</b>
1.4.1. The U.S. Missiles and Spy Aircraft on Turkish Soil.....	19
1.4.2. Rapprochement and Second Spring in the Relations .....	22
1.4.3. Natural Gas Impact on Trade .....	26
1.4.4. Military Cooperation under the Shadow of Chechen War .....	28

**CHAPTER TWO****TURCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS DURING THE AK PARTY GOVERNMENTS  
2002-2015**

<b>2.1. POLITICAL RELATIONS.....</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>2.2. TURCO-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS UNDER AK PARTY .....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>2.3. TURCO-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN ENERGY SPHERE.....</b>	<b>43</b>
2.3.1. Turkey and oil transportation corridors of Russia.....	43
2.3.2. Blue Stream project.....	47
2.3.3. Turkish Stream.....	51
2.3.4. Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant.....	55
<b>2.4. RUSSIAN-TURKISH MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION.....</b>	<b>60</b>
2.4.1. Attack Helicopters Tender .....	61
2.4.2. Air Defense Systems Tenders .....	63
2.4.3. Other Military Technical Cooperation Issues .....	65
2.4.3. Black Sea Security Cooperation .....	68
<b>CONCLUSIONS .....</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>ANNEXES .....</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>CURRICULUM VITAE.....</b>	<b>102</b>

## LIST OF MAPS

Map I. Map of the Kiyıköy-Ibrikbaba oil pipeline. Page number 41

Map II. Map of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline. Page number 42

Map III. Map of the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Page number 43

Map IV. Map of the Blue Stream gas pipeline. Page number 45

Map V. Map of the South Stream gas pipeline project. Page number 49

Map VI. Map of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline project. Page number 50

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

EU: European Union

HLCC: High-level Cooperation Council

IDEF: International Defense Industry Fair

MRAWS: Medium Range Anti-Tank Weapon System

NPP: Nuclear Power Plant

PKK: The Kurdistan Workers' Party

RF: Russian Federation

TBMM: Türk Büyük Millet Meclisi ( Grand National Assembly of Turkey)

T-LORAMIDS: Turkish Long Range Air and Missile Defense System

USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WW1: World War I

WW2: World War II

## INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there is a significant increase in political, economic, and cultural ties between Russia and Turkey. There is a rapprochement between the military and political interests of two countries, their political dialogue intensified. Relations between Russia and Turkey have more than five hundred years of history. During this time, their relations got through many changes - in the times of the Ottoman and Russian empires the relations between states were characterized by a period of wars and rivalry, then after the First World War, the countries first became partners. The development of relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Union, the new geopolitical realities caused by the Second World War, the beginning of the economic rapprochement after the gas agreement of 1984, the collapse of the USSR - all of these brought Turkey and Russia to a new stage of multifaceted cooperation. It is can't be ignored that that in the current political climate there are some disagreements on a number of world and regional issues between Russia and Turkey. And today one of the most acute and discussed issues is the policy of Turkey and Russia in relation to the conflict in Syria. Nevertheless, despite the influence of these political disagreements, bilateral Turco-Russian relations continue to develop in a positive vector. In this work the author has concentrated her attention on those areas that contribute to the rapprochement of the two countries. In this regard, it seems needed to review the development of political, economic, cultural relations between the two countries at the present stage and analyze its role in politics, economy and culture of Turkey and Russia in XXI century.

The main research questions of the work are “How the relations of Turkey and Russia have changed during the AK party government” and “What the main factors of these changes are”.

In order to answer these questions the author sets the following tasks:

- to investigate the relationship between Russia and Turkey in the context of the transition from the period of empires to the period of the republics

- to evaluate the impact of geopolitical realities caused by the Second World War on the formation of the foreign policy line of the two countries
- to observe the influence of the Cold War on Soviet-Turkish relations
- to analyze the changes in Russian-Turkish relations caused by the collapse of the USSR
- to detect the main factors of the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia in the post-Soviet period
- to describe the impact of the economy and energy on the development of bilateral relations
- to analyze the development of military-technical cooperation between the two countries
- to show the establishment and development of multilateral ties between Russia and Turkey in the new political environment

The hypothesis of paper is the statement that during the AKP government, Russian-Turkish relations are experiencing the period of closest rapprochement, caused by the intensification of the bilateral economic dependence and the desire of the states' leaders to bring Russian-Turkish relations to the level of a multifaceted strategic partnership. The development of relations between Russia and Turkey meets the national interests of both states. In the context of the new political realities, Turkey's foreign policy has become more independent from the influence of European countries and the United States, which makes it possible to regard Russia as a strategic ally.

This research is based upon analytical and descriptive methodology. During the research, the author describes the current tendencies of Russian-Turkish relations taking into account their historical background. The analysis is based on research of traditional branches of cooperation between Russia and Turkey, such as economics and energy, in particular the creation and implementation of such large projects as the Akkuyu NPP and the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, as well as the new industries, in particular military-technical cooperation. The advantage of this research is the author's ability to analyze sources and literature in three languages - English, Russian and Turkish, which allows to compare the positions of both Russian and Turkish researchers and to make an objective view of the object of research.

In the process of the research, the author analyzed a large number of quality sources and literature in English, Turkish and Russian languages. The factual ground of the second chapter of the work, devoted to the historical background of Russian-Turkish relations, is based on the data of books of Russian and Turkish authors. But it is important to note that some of the fundamental historical publications written during the Cold War period have ideological overtones. In order to avoid assessing Turkish-Russian relations through the prism of ideological stereotypes, in the description of this period the author tried to rely on primary sources, namely the foreign policy documents, agreements and resolutions, the correspondence between politicians, as well as newspaper publications relating to the period under review.

During the working on the third chapter, the author faced up with the lack of fundamental works on the modern Russian-Turkish relations, caused by the fact that this topic is new and continued. Thus, the source base of the third chapter was articles and reports of mainly Russian and Turkish researchers. Among the used sources, the author would like to highlight the archive of the Russian Institute of the Middle East (Institut Blizhnego vostoka), which presents a large number of analytical articles by leading Russian researchers. Access to the archive of this institute can be obtained through the Internet, which greatly simplifies the work of the researcher. Another large Russian Internet library is Cyberleninka, which presents the archives of academic publications such as “Afrika i Azia segodnya”(Africa and Asia Today), “Tsentralnaya Azia i Kavkaz”(Central Asia and the Caucasus), “Gumanitarniy vector” (Humanitarian Vector) and others. Among the Turkish Internet sources, a large number of analytical articles are provided by such analytic centers as TÜRAM, Bilgesam, SETA and Stradigma.

Among the Internet sources it is worth to mention the official websites of government agencies, in particular the website of the Russian president, the site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the website of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, the website of the Federal State Statistics Service of Russia, the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and relevant sites of Turkish departments. Also worth noting are sites of “Gazprom”, the website of the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom, the website of the Russian export center and the Rosoboronexport website.

Among the media sources, the author analyzed a wide range of articles from such news centers as RIA Novosti, Vzgljad, Vesti Ekonomika, Voennoye obozrenie, RBK, and also Anadolu Ajansi, Akis, Hurriyet, Turk Haber Ajansi and others.

The analysis of modern Russian-Turkish relations is impossible without taking into account their historical background. With this purpose, the author considers the time period from the First World War until the collapse of the Soviet Union, including the first decade of the post-Soviet period. The main time period of the research is the AK party's government period until the shoot down of the Russian SU-24 airplane in November 2015, which significantly changed Russian-Turkish relations. The work is divided into chapters respectively. For a more clear description of Russian-Turkish relations, the second chapter is divided into several subsections - the period of the First World War, the period of the Turkish War of Independence, the relations of the USSR and the Republic of Turkey to the events of World War II, the postwar period. In the third chapter, the author moved away from the temporary division and singled out subsections according to the spheres of Russian-Turkish cooperation, namely the political sphere, the economic sphere and the military-technical sphere. The author's choice of these industries is determined by the greatest importance and degree of study of these topics. The final chapter will be followed by a comprehensive conclusion.

## CHAPTER ONE

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

#### 1.1. Turkey and Russia in World War I

The First World War and its following events resulted in big changes in the world political map. Sometime the biggest and the most powerful empires - Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire both fell into the period of civil wars and struggle for preservation on their national independence. The situation in these two states was different – Russia was immersed in the fire of Bolshevik revolution and further civil war; the Ottoman Empire faced up with the huge foreign intervention, threatened to its national sovereignty. But as a result – both states ceased to exist as empires and two new countries came to the picture – the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey. The coming to power of new forces and the changing of political regimes in both states, the establishment of a new world order after the First World War made Turkey and Soviets open a new page in their relations.

During the First World War Ottoman Empire and Russia acted within the framework of two opposite blocks – the Triple Alliance (formed by Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) and the Triple Entente (Russia, France and the United Kingdom). From the 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1914 Ottoman Empire and Russia officially was in the status of war.<sup>1</sup>

The military-strategic plan of Enver Pasha envisaged two strategic directions: 1. To the Caucasus against Russia 2. Towards the Suez Canal against England and Egypt. Such a plan was supposed to ensure the entrance to the war of the Islamic world of Russia, Africa, and the future participation of Iran, Afghanistan and the Muslim provinces of India in the war on the Turkish side. Germany supported pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideas of Ottoman Empire and in the case of the win it promised the correction of the borders of the Ottoman Empire the way it directly touched the Russian territories, inhabited by the Turks<sup>2</sup>.

In November 1914, the Russian army crossed the Turkish border on the Erzurum direction where it faced up with the Turkish resistance. It forced Russian

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<sup>1</sup> Korsun, N.G. *Pervaya mirovaya voina I kavkazski front*. - Moscow: Military Publishing House of the USSR, 1946. - 98 p.

<sup>2</sup> Pereslegin, S. *Pervaya Mirovaya. Voyna mezhdou Realnostyami*, - Yauza, Moskva, 2016. 610 p

army to proceed to defense. As a result of advance of Turkish troops city of Artvin was captured. With the assistance of the Adzharians, who rebelled against the Russian authorities, almost the whole Batumi region passed under the control of the Turkish army and kept being controlled until the beginning of January 1915, when it was returned by the Russian troops. In December 1914 - January 1915, during the Sarikamış operation, the Russian Caucasian army stopped the Turkish army's advance on Kars<sup>3</sup>.

In February-April 1915, the Russian and Turkish armies were reformed and military actions turned into the local battles. By the end of March, the Russian army had cleared the territory of southern Adzharia and the Batumi region from the Turkish troops.

The Turkish army sought to involve Persia and Afghanistan in an open campaign against Russia and Britain and also to get Russian army out of the Baku oil-bearing region. To prevent such a development, on October 30, the Hamadan operation under the command of general Yudenich was carried out. As a result, by the end of December pro-Turkish armed detachments were defeated and the territory of Northern Persia passed under the control of the Russian army. So, the Russian troops managed to prevent the entry of Persia into the war on the side of the Triple Alliance<sup>4</sup>.

During the 1916, the actions of the Russian army were focused on two main directions: Erzurum-Trabzon, and further advance to the west, deep into the Ottoman Empire. As a result of military actions Russian or Turkish armies alternately got the advantage. Russian troops managed to advance on some territories, but the same time on others they lost their positions. The military actions continued until August 29, when snow fell in the mountains and the cold forced the opponents to cease hostilities. In the whole, the 1916 campaign's results on the Caucasian front surpassed the expectations of the Russian command. Russian troops advanced deep into Turkey, seizing the most important and largest cities - Erzurum, Trabzon, Van, Erzincan and Bitlis<sup>5</sup>.

The territories of Western Turkey occupied by Russian army were divided into the military administrative and were directly subordinated to the main command

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<sup>3</sup> Maslovsky, Y.B. *Voina na Kavkaze, 1914—1917 years*. — Moscow: Veche, 2015. — P. 116 —544.

<sup>4</sup> Korsun, N.G. *Pervaya mirovaya voina I kavkazski front*. - Moscow: Military Publishing House of the USSR, 1946. - 98 p.

<sup>5</sup> Kersnovsky, A.A. *Istoria Russkoy armii*. – Moscow: - Eksmo, 2006. — B. 2. — P. 299.

of the Caucasian army. There was an ethnic cleansing launched against Muslims by Russian soldiers who considered the Turks and Kurds barbarians. As a result, in the valley of the Çoruh River, 45,000 civilians were cut out<sup>6</sup>.

The winter of 1917 was very harsh, that caused the positional calm in the Caucasian front. The February Revolution of 1917 led to chaos and fermentation in the troops of the Caucasian Front. During 1917, the Russian army gradually disintegrated, and by the end of the year the Caucasus Front was completely devastated. On December 5, 1917, the so-called Erzincan armistice was concluded between the Russian and Turkish armies, which led to a mass retreat of Russian troops from Western (Turkish) Armenia to the territory of Russia. As we're talking about the fermentation of Caucasian army we need to say that the situation in the Russian Black Sea fleet was similar.

That's why the Bolsheviks decided to conclude a truce on the sea even before the signing of the temporary peace. To this end, the negotiations with German Vice Admiral Kompan and Turkish Rear Admiral Arif Paşa began in Odessa and on December 15, 1917 the truce was concluded.<sup>7</sup>

The following agreements concerning the Black Sea were reached: the attacks from the sea and air on all seas, flights over ports and coasts, as well as through demarcation lines were banned. The demarcation lines on the Black Sea pass from the Olinka lighthouse to Cape Hieros. Trade and commercial navigation on the Black Sea was declared free<sup>8</sup>.

Despite of the truces, the fighting between the sides wasn't stopped. The Turkish progress to Caucasus region went on, and Germany became worry about the possibility of getting the oil-productive regions of Azerbaijan by Turkey. That's why it became to participate actively in the intervention.

It is important to understand that during the period of time we are talking about Soviet Russia was in the deep chaos of civil war. Except the new Bolshevik government, there were other forces – so called “white movement” which supported the former government and the tsar, and the Mensheviks, which also were establishing their governments over the different territories.

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<sup>6</sup> Gerwarth, D. R., John Horne. *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe After the Great War*. – OUP UK, 2012 - P. 177-178.

<sup>7</sup> Caroline Finkel, *Istoriya Osmanskoy imperii. Videnie Osmana*, -AST, 2014,- 1190 p.

<sup>8</sup> Shyrokorad, A. B. *Rossia I Turtsia*. – Moscow: Veche, 2016 – 416 p.

The former government had its commitments to the Triple Entente alliance to continue the war, but the new Bolshevik government was in the decision to withdraw from the war and to strengthen their positions within the country. It should be said that at that time the most part of Russian population was very exhausted and also was willing to quit from the world war. As a result in March, 1918 the new government of Soviet Russia and the States of the Triple Alliance signed a Brest-Litovsk Treaty. The treaty was very humiliating as it cost Russia the billions of reparations and the lost of huge territories (in particular Turkey could claim for Kars, Ardahan and Batumi regions), but it ended Russian participation in the First World War.<sup>9</sup>

During this period Turkish and German forces successfully advanced into the Transcaucasia region. The German troops entered the Tbilisi (Georgia) and the Turkish troops was in Baku (Azerbaijan)<sup>10</sup>. In April, 1918, the two states signed a secret agreement concerning their sphere of interests in Caucasus. According to the agreement almost all the territory of Armenia and the south-west of Georgia would go to Turkey, and the rest of Transcaucasia - to Germany. Nevertheless, the failure of Central Powers in the war crossed out their plans. In October, 1918, Turkey had to sign the Armistice of Mudros that actually was a capitulation of Turkey.<sup>11</sup>

The treaty provided for the opening of the Black Sea straits for the Entente, and all the military-economic and strategic centers of the country were subject to the Entente countries' occupation. Also the treaty involved the demobilization of the entire Turkish army. Thus, the Straits area and a number of strategic points of Turkey were occupied by Allied forces. The sovereignty of the country as well as its very existence was under the real threat. The world war was over, but for Turkey the war was just beginning.

## **1.2. Relations During Turkish War of Liberation**

The results of the First World War put Turkey in a difficult situation. As the defeated side Turkey had to put up with all the demands set by the allied countries. The country was weakened not only by prolonged war, but also by numerous internal problems. The Ottoman government was not able to defend the national interests of the state, and the plans of the countries-winners on the partition of the Ottoman

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<sup>9</sup> Vsetskiy, N. *Istoriya russkoy revolyutsii*, - Moskva, 1997, 1160 p.

<sup>10</sup> After the capture of Baku, the Soviet government broke the Brest-Litovsk treaty in the part regarding to Turkey.

<sup>11</sup> Shirokorad ,A. *Vzlet i padenie Osmanskoy imperii* – Veche, 2012, 580 p

Empire threatened the sovereignty of the country. The intervention of the French, Italian, Greek and British troops, as well as the omission of the Ottoman government, provoked the emergence of a Turkish National movement. The leader of this movement was Mustafa Kemal.

One of the main goals of the national movement was to drive away foreign troops and to preserve the unity of the state. The country was in a state of war for its independence. Mustafa Kemal formed an alternative government in Ankara. As the Kemalist troops progressed successfully, the Ankara government gained its weight in the international arena. Nevertheless, the European powers recognized as official the government in Istanbul and all negotiations were conducted with it.

Despite the military successes, the Mustafa Kemal's army's resources were not enough to fight against the invaders. That's why Mustafa Kemal turned to the search for strategic allies.

On 26 of April, 1920, Mustafa Kemal sent to Moscow "the first proposal of the Great National Assembly of Turkey to the Soviet government." The proposal contained the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Ankara and the participation of Turkish nationalists in the "common struggle against imperialism." One of the first objects in this struggle would be the imperialist government of Armenia. In return, Mustafa Kemal asked for a help: an advance of five million pounds in gold, ammunition, weapons, medicines and food.

For the Kemalists, military and financial assistance from the Bolsheviks, as well as the coordination of the military strategy with Moscow, seemed to be an important factor in the victory over the foreign intervention.<sup>12</sup>

For the Soviet Union, the transformation of Anatolia into an English zone of influence was extremely unprofitable, so the possibility of cooperation with the Kemal government was greeted with great enthusiasm. At that time in Turkey there were other forces with also could be ready for a dialog with the Soviets - the Young Turk movement and the Turkish communists. However, the Soviet government realized that the firsts had lost its authority, and the seconds could create only chaos, but they were not able to really organize the fight against the intervention, so the Bolsheviks decided to support the Kemalists. In addition, the idea of a national struggle against imperialism was in full accord with their own ideology. The same

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<sup>12</sup> Artsruni, Vartkez. "K istorii Sovetsko-Turetskikh otnosheniy i druzhbyi Bolshevikov s Ataturkom.", - <http://noev-kovcheg.ru/mag/2015-10-11/5060.html> (a.d. 03.03.2017)

time, the Bolsheviks planned to create a positive image among the Muslim peoples of the Caucasus by supporting the Turkish National movement.<sup>13</sup>

It is important to say, that the struggle against imperialism for Turkey, was maybe even less important for Soviet Russia than the struggle for the countries of the Caucasian region. The Soviets targeted on the establishing their authority in the independent Republic of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. So the cooperation with the Turkish National movement could be an instrument in this question.

August 10, 1920 Sultan's government in Istanbul signed the Treaty of Sevres Peace. This treaty was imposed by European countries and almost deprived Turkey of the rights of a sovereign state. Under the terms of the treaty, all of Eastern Thrace except Istanbul and its surrounding areas was transferred to Greece, Izmir was transferred to it; Mosul departed England; Iskenderun and territories on the border with Syria – to France; Dodecanese Islands - to Italy. The zone of the Straits must be transformed into a special area under the supervision of the international commission. Central Anatolia remained to Turkey. Istanbul remained to Turkey in case of accepting all the terms of the treaty. In the east, it was planned to establish the Kurdistan state and to create a new borders with Armenia. Turkey had to recognize Syria, Iraq, Palestine, the Kingdom of the Hejaz and the British protectorate over Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (joint ownership) over the Sudan, the French protectorate over Morocco and Tunisia, and renounce Libya. Turkey had to recognize full financial control by the Entente, confirm the regime of surrender (the privileged position of foreigners). The Turkish army was to be disarmed<sup>14</sup>.

The Soviet Union was particularly concerned about articles of the treaty No. 88 and 89. According to the articles, Turkey declares that it recognizes Armenia as a free and independent State. Turkey and Armenia agree to submit to the arbitral award of the President of the United States of America, the delimitation of the border between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis and take his decision, as well as any measures that he may prescribe regarding

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<sup>13</sup> Mozzhuhin, Andrey. “Ankara smeetsya posledney”, - *Lenta*, - <https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/04/14/ankara/> (a.d. 03.03.2017)

<sup>14</sup> The Treaty of Sèvres, 1920/ Section I, Articles 1 – 260, [https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section\\_I\\_Articles\\_1\\_-\\_260](https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I_Articles_1_-_260) (a.d. 11.03.2017).

Armenia's access to the sea and the demilitarization of any Ottoman territory adjoining to the Armenian border<sup>15</sup>.

The signing by the Istanbul government such a treaty made the Soviet government even more interested in helping the National Government of Turkey, which did not recognize this treaty. So, in the fall of 1920, Ankara received about 200 kg of gold, as well as weapons and ammunition from Soviet Russia<sup>16</sup>.

As Mustafa Kemal got the support of the Soviet Union, his armies started an offensive against the Armenian lands. By November 7, 1920, Turkish troops occupied Yerevan. At the end of November Red Army troops entered Armenia and established the Soviet power<sup>17</sup>.

Also there were other factors that made Soviets cooperate with Ataturk.

In spite of the fact that Soviet power was already approved in Russia, separate centers of the White resistance still continued to exist. So, an important problem for the Soviet government was the army under the command of Wrangel. In April 1920, in alliance with Marshal Pilsudski, he launched an offensive against the Reds in the Crimea. At the same time, the remnants of the Black Navy were also under the control of Wrangel, and the soviet government feared that Wrangel could conclude an agreement with the Entente countries to protect the straits from the Turkish national army. These circumstances also influenced the decision of Soviets towards the cooperation with Ataturk<sup>18</sup>.

In this way, in the period of the war for independence in Turkey, Lenin and Ataturk became situational allies. In the face of a common danger, Ankara and Moscow were interested in each other, but a certain set of problems persisted between them.

First, the territorial problems that still existed urgently need to be mentioned, since the boundaries between Transcaucasia and Eastern Anatolia have not been resolved. Both the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks were interested in the clear delimitation, while each side did not want to sacrifice the territories.

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<sup>15</sup> The Treaty of Sèvres, 1920/ Section I, Articles 1 – 260, [https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section\\_I\\_Articles\\_1\\_-\\_260](https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I_Articles_1_-_260) (a.d. 11.03.2017).

<sup>16</sup> Shyrokorad, A. B. *Rossia i Turtsia*. – Moscow: Veche, 2016 – 416 p.

<sup>17</sup> Kazemzadeh, F. *The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921)*., - New York: Philosophical Library. 1951.

<sup>18</sup> Zarubin, A.G. *Bez pobeditelya. Istorija grazhdanskoy voyni v Krimu*. – 1<sup>st</sup> edition – Simferopol: Antikva, 2008. – 728 p.

Turkey, first of all, was concerned with its borders with Armenia and Georgia. Particularly, there was an issue of Gümürü, Van and Bitlis, which Moscow wanted to join to Armenia. It caused serious tension between Turkey and Russia. The second critical territorial issue concerning the Georgian-Turkish border. There problematic region was Batumi and the negotiations over the region continued on for months<sup>19</sup>.

As a result, a more balanced and rational point of view was accepted. On 16 March, 1921, The Treaty of Moscow or Treaty of Brotherhood was signed between the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) and Bolshevik Russia. According to the treaty, Turkey ceded to Batumi, which was part of *Misak-ı Milli* (the principle of preserving the national borders of Turkey) in exchange for Soviet support. In addition, the Kemalists needed to transfer troops to the west of Anatolia, that's why they were interested in an early end to the conflicts in the east borders. In turn, Moscow abandoned the majority of territorial claims in favor of Armenia. Gümürü departed to Armenia, and the question of Van and Bitlis was no longer raised<sup>20</sup>.

So, the clear definition of the borders with Anatolia allowed the Bolsheviks to stabilize the situation in the Caucasus and begin strengthening their positions in the region.

Another point of tension in Soviet-Turkish relations was the issue of military assistance to the forces of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia. As the Greek intervention was advancing to the west of Turkey, the Kemal government became more worried about this question. Also Ankara was worried about the fact that Soviet aid is supplied irregularly, "portioned", depends on the current situation, and also worried about the possibility of providing political pressure from Moscow through this aid<sup>21</sup>.

Also, the Soviet aid was associated with an ideological problem that had two aspects. On the one hand, the Kemalists feared that in the wake of Russia's rise, the ideas of communism could be widely spread in Anatolia. On the other hand, they feared that this situation could be used by the Turkish Communists themselves to strengthen their influence.

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<sup>19</sup> *USSR's foreign policy documents* – Moscow – Gospolitizdat, 1958. Volume II. – the correspondence between Checherin G. V. and Ali Fuad.

<sup>20</sup> Text of the 1921 Soviet-Turkish Treaty on Friendship and Brotherhood, <http://www.genocide.ru/lib/treaties/19.htm> (a.d. 18.03.2017).

<sup>21</sup> Slykov, P. Interview to 'Lenta.ru' 14.04.2016, <https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/04/14/ankara/> (a.d. 11.03.2017).

Moscow, in turn, was worried about the security of the Black Sea, as well as the possibility of further use of weapons transferred to Turkey against Soviet Russia itself.

It should also be mentioned about Enver Pasha and his supporters, who were at that time in Batumi. The Ankara government was anxious that in case of failure of the Kemalists in the war with the intervention, Enver Pasha could be supported by Russia and would again have the opportunity to spread his power in Anatolia. However, after the victory of the Kemalists in the battle of Sakarya, this scenario became irrelevant.

By August 1922, Anatolia was completely cleared of the Greek army and in December 11, 1922 in the city of Mudanya was concluded a treaty: the withdrawal of foreign troops from Eastern Thrace in exchange for the possibility of the Entente country to hold its troops in the zone of the straits until the signing of a peace treaty.

Unable to win on the battlefields, the Entente decided to win a diplomatic negotiation. In the autumn of 1922, England and France offered to hold a conference in Lausanne. The United Kingdom, Italy, Italy, Greece, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatia and the Slovenes participated in the Lausanne conference, while Soviet Russia and Bulgaria took part just in the discussion of the Black Sea straits.

Soviet Russia, first of all, was interested in the question its southern borders, as well as the security of the Black Sea straits, the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea. The USSR expected to speak at the Lausanne Conference as a "united front" with Turkey, but after the victory in the War of Independence, the Kemalists felt more confident than before and did not need the Russian aid so much. In addition, Ankara feared that by supporting the Bolsheviks at the conference, it could harm their own interests. As a result, Turkey did not become an ally of the USSR at the Lausanne conference. Turkey saw the growing "Bolshevik threat" and tried to find its balance.

Thus, during the negotiations, in the question of the Straits, the English version was adopted - the free passage to trade ships of all countries in peace and war times. The Soviet delegation did not agree with this project and did not ratify the Lausanne Treaty. Nevertheless, the main goal of the Bolsheviks was reached: England was not admitted to Anatolia.

As for Turkey, despite a number of compromises and concessions, the Lausanne Treaty is a major victory for the Turks - the Entente countries are recognized as sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Turkey.

Turkish-Soviet cooperation at the stage of the war for independence became a vivid example of the rational policy of the two states. Despite the difference in political views, the leaders of the two states were guided by the national interests of their countries and took pragmatic decisions. It caused the Soviet-Turkish relations to reach a new level of cooperation.

### **1.3. USSR and Republic of Turkey**

After the Lausanne conference, relations between the USSR and Turkey did not decline and remained fairly stable until the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1938.

In December 1925, USSR and Turkey signed a treaty on non-aggression and neutrality. Also the development of Russian-Turkish military cooperation started - in 1935 Turkey began to buy heavy armament from the Soviets. Thus, 67 T-26 tanks and 60 medium armored cars BA-10 were purchased. This heavy armament formed the first armored warfare unit of the Turkish army<sup>22</sup>.

Cooperation also continued at the international level. In June-July 1936, a conference on the revision of the Lausanne Convention on Straits was held in Montreaux. The Montreaux Conference was convened at the request of Turkey. It ended with the signing of a new convention on the regime of the Straits.

The Convention confirmed the principle of the right of free passage and navigation of the Straits and declared free passage through the straits of merchant ships of all countries in peacetime. The Convention provided for a sharp demarcation for the passage of military courts of the Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers. Thus, the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers in peacetime was declared free, in case of following to certain requirements. Non-Black Sea states were allowed to pass through the straits ships with a displacement of up to 10 thousand tons with artillery of caliber up to 201 mm inclusive.

For the passage of civil aircraft between the Mediterranean and Black Seas, the Turkish government had to indicate routes outside the restricted areas. Civil

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<sup>22</sup> Shyrokorad, A. B. *Rossia i Turtsia*. – Moscow: Veche, 2016 – 416 p.

aircraft could use these ways, notifying the Turkish government. Turkey also had the opportunity to maintain armed forces in the straits area without any restrictions and build coastal fortifications there<sup>23</sup>. Thus, at the Montreaux conference, Turkey achieved success in upholding its national interests. Decisions on the demarcation of warships of the Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers were also beneficial for the USSR.

### 1.3.1. WWII and Turco-Russian Relations

The outbreak of World War II led to significant changes in Soviet-Turkish relations. Military-political blocs between states began to be formed. In April-May 1939, the first stage of the Soviet-Turkish negotiations was held. Turkey, at the same time discussing the conclusion of a military alliance with Britain and France, sought to get help from Moscow, expressing its readiness to participate in a general agreement with Western democracies and the USSR. However, despite the fact that president of Turkey İsmet İnönü urged the Soviet leadership to ally with England and France, the USSR did not want to join the alliance.

On May 12, 1939, Turkey and England signed a declaration, on the basis of which both sides, before concluding the final long-term agreement, expressed their readiness to cooperate effectively and provide mutual assistance and support to each other in case of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean region. In June 1939, an identical declaration was signed between Turkey and France.

Meanwhile, on August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact. The second stage of the Soviet-Turkish negotiations begins. It was held during the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Saraçoğlu to Moscow in October 1939. During the negotiations, the Soviet leadership acted in the interests of its new partner, Hitler, and sought to prevent Turkey from rapprochement with Britain and France, which that time were considered as the main Soviet's opponents. However, the change in Moscow's foreign policy made a negative impression on Turkey and made it impossible to conclude a Soviet-Turkish mutual assistance pact.

The same time, negotiations between Turkey and England and France continued. Turkey has achieved the inclusion of Protocol No. 2 in the already signed

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<sup>23</sup> Convention regarding the regime of the straits signed at Montreux, July 20th, 1936 - [http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Montreux\\_ENG.pdf](http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Montreux_ENG.pdf) (a.d. 22.03.2017)

treaty. According to this protocol, the commitments undertaken by Turkey according to this treaty could not force it to act the way Turkey would be involved in military operations against the USSR<sup>24</sup>.

The German attack on the USSR in 1941 changed the dispositions of the forces. England declared its unconditional support for the USSR and soon, together with Soviet troops, occupied Iran. All these changes were negatively received by Turkey. Despite the fact that the governments of England and the USSR sent notes to the Turkish government guaranteeing the preservation of the integrity of Turkey and respect for its sovereignty, there was a strong coldness in relations between the countries.<sup>25</sup>

For Germany, this has become a pretext for rapprochement with Turkey. In September 1941, Turkey and Germany signed an agreement on the supply of chrome in exchange for artillery. The Turkish side said that it can start deliveries only after 1943, since it was obligated to export all chrome to England before this date. Although the agreement on chrome in the form in which it was signed did not suit the Germans, it provoked a negative reaction from the Allies, especially the United States.

During the war, the German leadership has repeatedly tried to persuade Turkey to cooperate. Germany planned to get Turkish support in attacks against the Soviet Union and to create the buffer zones in the Caucasus. Despite the fact that the successes of the German armed forces against the Soviet Union created a great revival in the ranks of pan-Turkists, the Turkish government understood that such a situation was fraught with danger. Turkey's official position was as follows: Turkey does not pretend to any territory outside its borders. Turkey was forced to balance between the Axis countries on the one hand and the Allies on the other. Therefore, Turkey continued the policy of active neutrality. This policy ensured neutrality in the war and made it possible to side with the winners at the end of the war.

After the victory of England under El-Alamein and the beginning of the counter-offensive of the Soviet army at Stalingrad, the course of the war began to develop in favor of the Allies. The pressure on Turkey increased. The question about moving to the Balkans through Turkey arose, which meant Turkey's entry into the

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<sup>24</sup> Kurban, V. *Russian-Turkish Relations from the First World War to the Present*. - Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017 p.315

<sup>25</sup> Korsun, N.G. *Pervaya mirovaya voyna I kavkazski front*. - Moscow: Military Publishing House of the USSR, 1946. - 98 p

war. Nevertheless, the Turkish government still tried to avoid entering the war, justifying it by the fact that Turkey is too weak in terms of military equipment. At a conference in Casablanca in 1943, the United States and England discussed initiatives to prepare Turkey for entry into the war by supplying Turkey with the latest military equipment.

The defeat of Italy changed the strategy of the Allies. In particular, Churchill strengthened the idea of opening a second front in the Balkans. The Soviet leadership was opposed to this option and did not want the English and American troops to enter the Balkans before the Soviet. Moscow preferred Turkey's entry into the war. The Soviet press criticized Turkish neutrality as a factor providing the German army with an easy covering of the Balkan flank and enabling it to throw more strength on the Soviet-German front. Turkey's position was discussed at the Tehran conference in December 1943, but the Turkish government never made a decision to enter the war. The dissatisfaction of the Allies over the deviation policy of Turkey grew - Britain and the USA stopped provide Turkey with the help.

At the Yalta Conference of 1945, Stalin made a special statement on the Montreaux Convention. According to him, the treaty outlived itself and needed to be renewed. Stalin proposed a free passage of Soviet warships through the straits at any time. It was also decided that only countries, which would declare war on a common enemy by March 1, 1945 will be able to participate in the United Nations negotiations. Allies' pressure, fear of spoiling relations, led to a rejection of neutrality by Turkey. February 25, 1945 Turkey declared war on Germany to become a participant in the conference on the creation of the UN, and not to spoil relations with its allies so that in the future it would be possible to count on their assistance against the USSR<sup>26</sup>.

### **1.3.2. Soviet Demands from Turkey**

In March 1945, the Soviets denounced the Soviet-Turkish treaty of friendship and neutrality. At the beginning of June 1945, the Turkish Ambassador Sarper paid a visit to Molotov to discuss the issues of concluding a new treaty. During the visit Molotov said, that in order to restore friendly relations, it is necessary to return to the USSR those vilayets that were lost after the First World War. It was also announced

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<sup>26</sup> Gasratyan, M. A, Moiseev, P.P. *SSSR i Turtsia, 1917-1979*. - Nauka, Moscow, 1981 – p. 320.

that the USSR could be based in the straits. According to Sarper, such conditions were unacceptable for Turkey<sup>27</sup>.

Further, the problem of the Straits was discussed at the Potsdam Conference in August 1945. The allies proposed the principle of free passage of merchant ships through the straits. Such a regime was to be guaranteed by the USA, USSR and England. Claims of the USSR on the establishment of bases in the straits were not supported by the United States and England. Territorial claims of the USSR against Turkey were also lifted. However, the USSR required the fulfillment of all its demands. There followed an exchange of notes between the states, but no agreement was reached to change the doctrine of Montreaux. Discussion of this issue continued until the end of 1946, but as a result, the exchange of notes stopped and the issue was not resolved<sup>28</sup>.

The Second World War greatly changed the alignment of forces in the world. New actors came to the fore, the US and the USSR, competing for the status of a world leader. The foreign policy aim of the Turkish Republic in these conditions was to get the support of a right ally. The country was still greatly weakened, so the government was faced with the task of restoring the economy and strengthening its position on the international arena. It forced Turkey to seek support from other states. Before the events of WW2, the Soviet Union played an important role in the restoration of Turkey, providing it with economic support. However, in this way the Soviet government planned to make Turkey its strategic ally in opposing the capitalist world. This development of events went against Turkey's foreign policy line, which was not going to be in the socialist camp. Nevertheless, the interest of the Soviet Union in Turkey as a strategic ally in the region on the one hand, and Turkey's need for economic support on the other, formed a special model of Soviet-Turkish relations, which developed after the Second World War in conditions formation of the bipolar world.

#### **1.4. USSR and Republic of Turkey: Post-WWII period**

The territorial claims of the USSR to Turkey, as well as the desire of the USSR to strengthen its positions in the Straits, negatively affected the Soviet-Turkish

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<sup>27</sup> USSR's foreign policy documents – Moscow – Gospolitizdat, 1958. Volume II.

<sup>28</sup> Materials of the Potsdam Conference, Volume 6. -Moscow: Publishing house of political literature, 1984. [http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/War\\_Conf/berlin\\_main.htm](http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/War_Conf/berlin_main.htm) (a.d. 18.03.2017)

relations. However, after the death of Stalin, the situation began to change. In May 1953, Molotov made a statement to the Turkish ambassador, Faik Hozar, which stated: "In the name of preserving good-neighborly relations and strengthening peace and security, the Armenian and Georgian governments deemed it possible to abandon their territorial claims to Turkey. As for the question of the Straits, the Soviet government revised its previous opinion on this issue and considers it possible to ensure the security of the USSR from the side of the Straits on conditions which are equally acceptable both for the USSR and for Turkey. «In response, Faik Hozar reported on the satisfaction of the Turkish government and concern for the preservation of good-neighborly relations between Turkey and the USSR<sup>29</sup>.

Another step in the development of Soviet-Turkish economic relations became a loan 3.4 million rubles at 2.5% per annum for a period of 3 years, which the USSR granted Turkey in 1958<sup>30</sup>. It made possible to build a glass factory in the city of Çayırova. It transformed Turkey from the glass importer to its exporter.

Nevertheless, the Soviet still had very negative image and was treated as a "north neighbor" which could threaten the national interest of Turkey. The political course of the Turkish government was anti-Soviet and anti-communist. After the World War II, Turkey, became a part of the Marshal's plan, and received USA' aids. The same time Turkish government actively supported the United States' policy in the Middle East. In particular, Turkey was among the eight states in the region that supported the doctrine of Eisenhower (1957), which involved the intervention of the USA in the policy of the Middle East states. American initiatives regarding the Middle East were perceived by Turkish government as a defense against the influence of the USSR on the region<sup>31</sup>. The emplacement of American missile complex in Turkey was one such an initiative.

#### **1.4.1. The U.S. Missiles and Spy Aircraft on Turkish Soil**

In 1959 Turkey allowed to deploy on its territory 865th squadron of strategic missiles of the US Army. Its armament consisted of thirty 50-ton Jupiter missiles with a range of 3,180 kilometers. The installation of American missiles in Turkey

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<sup>29</sup> *USSR's foreign policy documents* – Moscow – Gospolitizdat, 1958. Volume II.

<sup>30</sup> Kalugin P. E, "Modern strategic cooperation between Russian Federation and Turkey in the energy sector." <http://isu.ru/filearchive/dissert/kalugin.pdf> (a.d. 22.03.2017)

<sup>31</sup> Zhelobtsov, F.F. "Sovetsko-turetskie otnosheniya v 1950-e gg." [Http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/sovetsko-turetskie-otnosheniya-v-1950-e-gg-po-materialam-demokraticeskogo-ezhenedelnika-akis](http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/sovetsko-turetskie-otnosheniya-v-1950-e-gg-po-materialam-demokraticeskogo-ezhenedelnika-akis) (a.d. 31.03.2017)

was one of the reasons for sending Soviet analogs of twenty-four R-12 launchers and sixteen P-14 launchers to Cuba. This situation caused a strong tension between the USSR and the United States, and consequently between the USSR and Turkey.

Soviet-Turkish relations also were heated even more because of the US-scouted plane U-2, which was shot down by the Soviet Union in its air space in May, 1960. As it was established, this aircraft flew from the Turkish base İncirlik while carrying out an American mission. The use of Turkish military bases by US intelligence received a very negative response from the Soviet government in the form of Khrushchev's letter with threats. In turn, Turkey also reminded the USSR of the presence of Soviet hydrographic ships in the Straits area<sup>32</sup>.

In October 1962, a representative of the Soviet government of Riskov met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Cemal Erkin. During the visit, Riskov stated that the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba could only be possible with the removal of the Jupiter missile system from Turkey. Kennedy reacted negatively to this statement. Also the dismantling of Jupiter missiles was not included in the plans of the Turkish government, which said that there should be no bargaining on this issue<sup>33</sup>. Turkey viewed the presence of the American missile complex on its territory as a way to protect itself from possible threats from the Soviet Union. Besides, at the stage of discussion of the missile installation project, the US made it clear that Turkey's refusal would negatively affect its relations with both the US and other NATO countries<sup>34</sup>. So, the missile problem continued to arise.

The situation between Turkey and the USSR was so deep that the United States really considered the possibility of the USSR attacking Turkey, if its demands would not be fulfilled. Actually both states – the USA and the USSR really considered the possibility of conducting nuclear attacks, which would entail the outbreak of the Third World War. In Soviet historiography, it is said that N. Khrushchev sent a confidential message to US President Kennedy, in which he expressed his consent to the "exchange of missiles." Immediately after Khrushchev's

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<sup>32</sup> Can, Burhanettin. "Türkiye'nin bağımsız dış politika uygulaması açısından 27 Mayıs darbesi ve 12 Mart muhtırası" - *Milli Gazete*, 2017 - [http://www.milligazete.com.tr/turkiye%e2%80%99nin\\_bagimsiz\\_dis\\_politika\\_uygulaması\\_acısından\\_27\\_mayıs\\_darbesi\\_ve\\_12\\_mart\\_muhtırası/prof\\_dr\\_burhanettin\\_can/kose\\_yazısı/32753](http://www.milligazete.com.tr/turkiye%e2%80%99nin_bagimsiz_dis_politika_uygulaması_acısından_27_mayıs_darbesi_ve_12_mart_muhtırası/prof_dr_burhanettin_can/kose_yazısı/32753) (a.d. 04.04.2017)

<sup>33</sup> Akdoğan, Ozkan. "Kuba, "13 gun krizi" ve Türkiye." <http://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/bilinmeyen/kuba-13-gun-krizi-ve-turkiye.16007> (a.d. 13.04.2017)

<sup>34</sup> Baran, Eda. "Kuba füzeleri krizi ve Türkiye." <http://edabarannn.blogspot.com.tr/2015/04/kuba-fuzeleri-krizi-ve-turkiye.html> (a.d. 13.04.2017)

message, the Soviet ambassador in Ankara N. Ryzhov made it clear to the Turkish authorities that if the Soviet proposal would not be adopted, then Turkey could be struck. The Turkish troops were put on alert; the government began to develop plans for the evacuation of the population from Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir and other big cities<sup>35</sup>. Fortunately, the USA finally accepted the Khrushchev's plan, the American missiles as well as Soviets were removed and the situation around the missile systems was stabilized.

The Cuban crisis intensified the tension between Turkey and the USSR, but at the same time, this situation showed that the US acted according to its interests without taking into account Ankara's position on this issue, that made Turkish government to lose some of its confidence in the United States. Thus, in spite of the fact that the image of the USSR continued to remain negative, the first contradictions in Turkey's one-side western orientation came into sight.

The first publications on the impossibility of ignoring the USSR's greater influence on the world politics became to appear in the Turkish press. Thus, the Turkish researcher Doğan Avcioğlu in his publication expressed the need to revise the pro-Western policy of Turkey. "Stabilization of the situation in the Middle East, - he said, - requires the development of the region's economy, which will become possible with the support not of yesterday's, but of today's political forces."<sup>36</sup> Also, in the September edition of the magazine *Akis* in 1959, appeared a publication in connection with the delivery of the Soviet coat of arms to the Moon, that said: "Today it became impossible to turn a blind eye to communism and deny the strength of the opposite regime."<sup>37</sup> So, there was the realizing of the need for changes in Turkey's foreign policy.

Along with the controversy within the Turkish society regarding relations with the USSR, there were also external factors contributing to the development of Soviet-Turkish relations. Particularly, in 1960, Cyprus got a status of an independent state that caused the appearance of so-called Cyprus issue on the international arena. The population of Cyprus is Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. After the independence of the island, a new constitution proclaimed the existence of the Greek

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<sup>35</sup> Shyrokorad, A. B. *Russia and Turkey*. – Moscow: Veche, 2016 – 416 p.

<sup>36</sup> Avcioğlu, Doğan. "Orta doğudaki fertina" - *Akis*, p. 10, 1957, 31 Ağustos, №173.  
[http://www.inonuvakfi.com/akis/1957\\_173.pdf](http://www.inonuvakfi.com/akis/1957_173.pdf) (a.d. 31.03.2017)

<sup>37</sup> "Lunik II-den sonra" - *Akis*, p.14, 1959, 22 Eylül. №269  
[http://www.inonuvakfi.com/akis/1959\\_269.pdf](http://www.inonuvakfi.com/akis/1959_269.pdf) (a.d. 31.03.2017)

(80% of the island's population) and Turkish (18%) communities. The power would be shared between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on a 7: 3 ratio. Such inequality caused discontent of the Turkish community, which caused tension between the two sides, which subsequently spilled over into numerous ethnic conflicts<sup>38</sup>.

The situation in Cyprus directly affected the interests of the Turkish Republic, as well as Britain, which, after the abolition of its mandate to Cyprus, reserved the right to have two military bases on the island. In ethnic conflicts, naturally, Turkey was on the side of the Turkish Cypriots, which caused a negative reaction in the West. Thus, the Cyprus issue complicated Turkey's cooperation with Western countries. Under these circumstances, cooperation with the USSR became a new alternative for Turkey. In addition, it is important to say that political disagreements between the USSR and Turkey were always shaded by the economic interests of the two states. In this way, new political realities forced Turkey to review the relations with the USSR, especially in the economic sphere.

During the period 1948-1953 the share of the USSR in Turkish imports was very low and by the end of the 1950's hardly exceeded to 1%. However, from 1960 to 1969, in these ratios very important changes were observed<sup>39</sup>. Since April 1961 Moscow initiated negotiations on the revision of the Soviet-Turkish railway convention of 1922 and on direct rail communication between the Soviet Union and Turkey. The next step was an agreement on the establishment of telephone communications between the USSR and Turkey signed in June, 1962. Also a visit of Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin to Moscow from October 30 to November 6, 1964 became a significant step in the rapprochement between the USSR and Turkey. During this visit, the sides signed an agreement on cultural cooperation and exchange between the USSR and Turkey.

#### **1.4.2. Rapprochement and Second Spring in the Relations**

The next agreement was signed during the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü to Moscow in August, 1965, and his meeting with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin. The agreement involved opening about 10 large plants and enterprises in Turkey with the financial support

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<sup>38</sup>[http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy\\_brussels.nsf/geninfo\\_en/geninfo\\_en?opendocume](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy_brussels.nsf/geninfo_en/geninfo_en?opendocume)

<sup>39</sup> Kaygusuz, J. "Osobennosti sovetsko-turetskih ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy v 1960-e godi." <http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/osobennosti-sovetsko-turetskih-ekonomicheskikh-otnosheniy-v-1960-e-gody> (a.d. 31.03.2017)

and technical assistance of the USSR. Among these projects were metallurgical, aluminum, oil refineries, sulfuric acid plants and wood fiber panels and the Arpaçay reservoir. Also, during the further visits of the Soviet delegation to Ankara (1965) and A.N. Kosygin (1967) an agreement on economic and technical cooperation between Ankara and Moscow was signed. This agreement provided for the opening of some large enterprises in Turkey with the financial and technical support of the USSR, the provision of industrial equipment, technical services and payment terms<sup>40</sup>.

After signing this important agreement, Prime Minister of Turkey Süleyman Demirel paid a working visit to Moscow from 19 to 29 September 1967 and discussed with Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin key issues of Soviet-Turkish economic cooperation and the Cyprus problem. During the visit, the heads of both states agreed that the Cyprus problem should be resolved only peacefully and only through negotiations of all interested sides, and that the development of Soviet-Turkish trade and economic relations in the near future will bring benefits and will strengthen friendship between the peoples of the USSR and Turkey. Upon arrival in Turkey, Demirel in his statement to the press also said that “Turkey is building foreign policy not according to any moods or negative beliefs, but according to its national interests and the principle of rationality.”<sup>41</sup>

Continuing the policy of strengthening Soviet-Turkish relations, in April 1968, Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Çaglayangil arrived in the Soviet Union to discuss a long-term agreement on the transit of Turkish goods to Scandinavian countries through the territory of the USSR. Also in November 1969, Turkish President Cevdet Sunay paid a visit to Ankara, during which he discussed the signing of a long-term trade agreement and an agreement on transportation<sup>42</sup>.

Thus, during the 60's years we can observe about a significant rapprochement with the Soviet Union, especially in the economic sphere. In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey also received a number of Soviet credits: in 1962, 500 million dollars at 1.5% per annum, in 1967 - 200 million dollars for 15 years at 2.5% per annum, in 1972

<sup>40</sup> Yıldız, Ahmet. "Kosigin suleyman!" ya da Soguk Savas doneminde Demirel. [http://www.insanbu.com/eski/a\\_haber38c3.html?nosu=1801](http://www.insanbu.com/eski/a_haber38c3.html?nosu=1801) (a.d. 04.04.2017)

<sup>41</sup> Yıldız, Ahmet. "Kosigin suleyman!" ya da Soguk Savas doneminde Demirel. [http://www.insanbu.com/eski/a\\_haber38c3.html?nosu=1801](http://www.insanbu.com/eski/a_haber38c3.html?nosu=1801) (a.d. 04.04.2017)

<sup>42</sup> Tavukçu, Sinan. “Eksen değişikliği can yakar: iki örnek olay.” - *Haber*, 2010. - [http://www.haber10.com/yazar/sinan\\_tavukcu/eksen\\_degisikligi\\_can\\_yakar\\_iki\\_ornek\\_olay-37288](http://www.haber10.com/yazar/sinan_tavukcu/eksen_degisikligi_can_yakar_iki_ornek_olay-37288) (a.d. 04.04.2017)

288 million dollars for the modernization of the steel mill in Iskenderun, in 1977, already 1.3 billion dollars for 10 years. Turkey, in turn, led a pragmatic policy of balancing between the two camps<sup>43</sup>.

As mentioned above, the revision of the foreign policy vector of Turkey was to a greater extent caused by the discontent of the US over the policy of Turkey in Cyprus. Despite attempts to resolve the Cyprus issue, the situation on the islands continued to heat up. Despite attempts at a peaceful settlement of the situation, in 1974 the Greek Cypriot organization EOKA-B under the leadership of Nikos Sampson staged a coup to overthrow the democratically elected Government of Cyprus, headed by Archbishop Makarios III. The military coup caused a tough reaction from Turkey, which saw it as a threat to its national interests in Cyprus, and prompted the Turkish government to military intervention. So in July 1974, more than 35% of the island was occupied by the 30-thousand Turkish corps. De-facto the island was divided with the so-called "green line" into two parts - southern Greek and northern Turkish parts. Under the control of UN peacekeepers, the Greeks and Turks were resettled from one part to another<sup>44</sup>. Turkish intervention was immediately condemned by the UN Security Council, which demanded the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus<sup>45</sup>. Nevertheless, the Turkish corps continued to remain on the island's territory and in 1983 the Greek community proclaimed the state of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The UN Security Council resolution №541 declared such a step illegal and called on all states not to recognize the newly proclaimed state<sup>46</sup>. However, the Turkish Republic began diplomatic relations with the Southern Cyprus, thereby officially recognizing the existence of this state. It also condemned by the UN Security Council<sup>47</sup> and caused a sharp deterioration in relations between Turkey and the West.

During bilateral visits, the Cyprus problem was repeatedly discussed between the representatives of the USSR and Turkey. Even before the military coup, the

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<sup>43</sup> Kalugin P. E, "Modern strategic cooperation between Russian Federation and Turkey in the energy sector." <http://isu.ru/filearchive/dissert/kalugin.pdf> (a.d. 22.03.2017)

<sup>44</sup> [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy\\_brussels.nsf/geninfo\\_en/geninfo\\_en?opendocument](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy_brussels.nsf/geninfo_en/geninfo_en?opendocument)

<sup>45</sup> The UN Security Council resolution on the Turkish intervention №353, July 20, 1974. [http://undocs.org/ru/s/res/353\(1974\)](http://undocs.org/ru/s/res/353(1974)) (a.d. 31.03.2017)

<sup>46</sup> The UN Security Council resolution №541, 1983. [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=s/res/541\(1983\)&referer=/english/&lang=e](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/res/541(1983)&referer=/english/&lang=e) (a.d. 31.03.2017)

<sup>47</sup> The UN Security Council resolution №550, 1984. [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=s/res/550\(1984\)&referer=/english/&lang=e](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/res/550(1984)&referer=/english/&lang=e) (a.d. 31.03.2017)

Turkish government was considering the possibility of invading the island, but the Turkish authorities understood that such a move could lead to unpredictable consequences. According to the Turkish researcher Göktepe, the Turkish intervention of Cyprus could lead to a war between Greece and Bulgaria, which would lead to the entry of NATO and the USSR into the war, and consequently the beginning of the third world war. Also, the Turkish authorities referred to the incompetence of the Turkish fleet, and, consequently, the inability of Turkey to conduct successful operations in the Mediterranean zone<sup>48</sup>.

In the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union also repeatedly warned Turkey against a possible military operation in Cyprus. However, after the coup and the overthrow of President Makarios of Cyprus, the USSR refrained from condemning the Turkish intervention of Cyprus. Soviet government hoped that Makarios would return to power, because his policy was aimed at maintaining neutrality and friendly relations with the USSR. However, soon it became clear that in any scenario, the return of Makarios to an arm is impossible. In addition, the Soviet Union was worried by the fact that Turkey is increasing its military presence in Cyprus. Nevertheless, the presence of Turkish troops on the island was a big problem for the NATO countries, which led to the lack of Moscow's reaction. In official statements, the USSR only called for the preservation of the unity and sovereignty of the island<sup>49</sup>.

The economic cooperation between the USSR and Turkey in the 1970s was marked by two important visits. In 1975 A. Kosygin, at the invitation of the Turkish government, again arrived in Ankara. His visit was dedicated to the opening of the Iskenderun iron and steel plant, built in the framework of the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1967<sup>50</sup>. Also, in 1978, Prime Minister of Turkey Ecevit paid a friendly visit to Moscow. During the visit, the sides signed a political document on the principles of good-neighborly and friendly partnership, which involved the expansion of economic and technical cooperation, trade, cultural exchange and exchange in other areas<sup>51</sup>.

<sup>48</sup> Goktepe, C. "Kıbrıs meselesi'nde kriz süreci ve Türkiye (1964-1974)" <http://www.ayk.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/g%c3%96ktepe-cihat-kıbrıs-meseles%c4%b0%e2%80%99nde-kr%c4%b0z-s%c3%9crec%c4%b0-ve-t%c3%9cruk%c4%b0ye-1964-1974.pdf> (a.d. 04.04.2017)

<sup>49</sup> Kaygusuz, Dzh. "Razvitie sovetsko-turetskih otnosheniy v kontekste Kiprskogo konflikta" <http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/razvitie-sovetsko-turetskih-otnosheniy-v-kontekste-kiprskogo-konflikta> (a.d. 04.04.2017)

<sup>50</sup> "Vizit Sovetskoy Pravitelstvennoy delegatsii v Turtsiyu." (1976) <https://www.net-film.ru/film-7765/> (a.d. 13.04.2017)

<sup>51</sup> Bülent Ecevit Sovyetler Birliği ziyareti, 1978 <http://v.bajarfb.com/10154862446953330> (a.d. 13.04.2017)

During the 1980s Soviet-Turkish relations mostly were developing within the framework of these agreements.

Nevertheless, the new political realities had their own effect on Soviet-Turkish relations. In 1978, the Civil War began in Afghanistan. The conflict started between the government forces of Afghanistan on the one hand and the numerous armed formations of Afghan Mujahideen on the other. At the request of the Government of Afghanistan and in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation of December 5, 1978, in 1979 the USSR introduced a military contingent to Afghanistan. It is worth to note, that the anti-government forces of Afghanistan used the political, financial, material and military support of the leading NATO states. Concerning the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan on January 14, 1980, the UN General Assembly at its Extraordinary Session adopted a resolution in which it expressed "deep regret" and concern about the situation with the refugees and called for the withdrawal of "all foreign troops"<sup>52</sup>. Despite the resolution of the UN Security Council, Soviet troops continued to participate actively in the war until 1988, when the first stage of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan began.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan changed for the worse the Turkish authorities' attitude to the USSR. Also, the Turkish-American agreement on cooperation in defense and economy, signed on March 29, 1980, contributed to the cooling of Soviet-Turkish relations. The main point of the agreement was that the US got a right to use the military bases on the territory of Turkey, supply its modernization and expansion and also to build new bases<sup>53</sup>. The union with the US was regarded by Turkey as a guarantee of its security and the USA continued to be seen as a one of the main allies.

#### **1.4.3. Natural Gas Impact on Trade**

Still, Turkey continued its attempts to balance between the USA and the Soviets, and while the political rapprochement with the US complicated its cooperation with the Soviets in political sphere, economic cooperation between the countries remained at the same level. In September, 1984 the countries signed an

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<sup>52</sup> Security Council Official Records. 2189th meeting: 7 January 1980. <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/nl8/000/63/pdf/nl800063.pdf?openelement> (a.d. 13.04.2017)

<sup>53</sup> Podosokorsky, N. "Kak razvivalas' Turtsiya posle voennogo perevorota 1980 goda." <http://philologist.livejournal.com/8603987.html> (a.d. 13.04.2017)

agreement on the supply of natural gas in Ankara. According to this agreement, the USSR was supposed to begin gas supplies to Turkey in 1987 through Romania and Bulgaria. The term of the agreement was 25 years, and it should have been automatically updated every 5 years during this period. The initial volume of gas was 1.5 billion cubic meters. In 1987, it gradually increased to 5.0-6.0 billion cubic meters<sup>54</sup>. By that time, Turkey's economy had entered a stage of confident industrial growth; it needed more and more energy resources. The USSR was selling oil and coal to the republic. But the real breakthrough came with the beginning of the supply of natural gas via the Burgas–Alexandroupoli pipeline in 1987. Through the gas pipelines, a permanent trade link has been established. It was an important step for both countries, which opened a door to the further cooperation in other areas.<sup>55</sup>.

The 1980s became a time of rapid growth of Soviet-Turkish trade. Over the 1980-1990 period, Turkish exports to the USSR rose from \$ 168.96 million a year to \$ 531.12 million a year, while Soviet exports to Turkey increased even more significantly over the same period, from \$ 167.14 million a year to \$ 1158 million, 97 million dollars a year<sup>56</sup>. The end of the 1980s became the heyday of Soviet-Turkish trade.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the proclamation of new independent states led to great changes in the world. The bipolar world system, created by decades, was destroyed. In this system, Turkey adhered to the capitalist side, but pursued a policy of balancing between the US and the USSR. Russia's capitalist reorientation, as well as its significant weakening and loss of superpower status, forced the Turkish government to stop seeing Russia as a threat, which further deepened relations between countries. In turn, Russia, as the recipient of the Soviet Union, continued the policy of strengthening the economic relations with Turkey.

Thus, in 1992, an agreement on good-neighborliness and cooperation was signed between the countries. In the same year, a Russian-Turkish Economic Commission was set up. The first meeting of the commission was held on November 2, 1992 in Ankara. The parties discussed the increase in gas supplies from Russia to Turkey from 5-6 billion to 7-8 billion cubic meters. During the 90's years Turkish-

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<sup>54</sup> “Rossiya i Turtsiya: 70 let sotrudnichestva v energetike. 2011 — 2013” - *Vesti Ekonomika*. <http://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/60234/print> (a.d. 13.04.2017)

<sup>55</sup> Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Enerji ve Doğal kaynaklar Bakanlığı <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/tr-TR/Sayfalar/Dogal-Gaz-Boru-Hatlari-ve-Projeleri> (a.d. 22.03.2017)

<sup>56</sup> Kalugin P. E, “Modern strategic cooperation between Russian Federation and Turkey in the energy sector.” <http://isu.ru/filearchive/dissert/kalugin.pdf> (a.d. 22.03.2017)

Russian energy cooperation was developing very actively. In December, 1996 a new supply contract was signed between the Turkish state company BOTAS and the Russian state-owned company Gazexport. In following years, the growth of gas demand in Turkey led to closer cooperation between the two countries. Turkey and Russia agreed to build a gas pipeline on the bottom of the Black Sea in 1997. This project was called the Blue Stream. According to the agreement, the Russian state company Gazprom and Italian ENI were to build a gas pipeline about 1213 km long through the Black Sea to the Turkish city of Samsun. And then Turkey would extend the gas pipeline from Samsun to Ankara. Also the agreement about Blue Stream stipulated that Russia would begin gas supplies to Turkey in 2000. The term of the agreement was 25 years. The volume of gas supplies is 0.5 billion cubic meters. In 2000, and it gradually increased to 16 billion cubic meters in 2007. At the same time, Turkey was to receive Russia's permission to re-export gas. After the implementation of the Blue Stream project, Turkey became the second largest importer of Russian gas to Germany.<sup>57</sup>

In addition to energy, Turkish-Russian trade relation also was developing in other industries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy experienced painful changes that caused a national production crisis. It led to a demand for goods from abroad. Under these conditions, Turkey turned out to be one of the main suppliers of a wide range of products for the Russian Federation. In addition, Turkey and Russia began the cooperation in the tourism sector. In 1995, the “Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on Cooperation in the Field of Tourism” was signed. This agreement opened one more very important area for the Russian-Turkish partnership.<sup>58</sup>

#### **1.4.4. Military Cooperation under the Shadow of Chechen War**

A new page was opened in military-technical cooperation between the two countries. Being a member of NATO, Turkey has always cooperated with the USA and European countries in this sphere. However, in 1992 Russia and Turkey signed an agreement on the supply of Russian arms and military equipment to the Turkish

<sup>57</sup> “Rossiya i Turtsiya: 70 let sotrudnichestva v energetike. 2011 — 2013”, - *Vesti Ekonomika*. <http://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/60234/print> (a.d. 13.04.2017)

<sup>58</sup> Chakmak, M. “Rossisko-Turetskie otnosheniya v novyh geopoliticheskikh usloviyah v otrazhenii SMI.” <http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/rossijsko-turetskie-otnosheniya-v-novyh-geopoliticheskikh-usloviyah-v-otrazhenii-smi#ixzz4de69l8zp> (a.d. 18.04.2017)

side for up to \$ 100 million. Among the supplied weapons there were armored personnel carriers BTR-80 and multipurpose Mi-8/Mi-17 helicopters, 7.62-mm Kalashnikov machine guns, 7.62mm Dragunov sniper rifles and 40mm RPG-7 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers. It should be noted that 107-mm light multiple-launch rocket system TR-107 and medium-range ML-systems TR-122, T-122 and STR-122 were delivered to artillery units and subunits, the main ammunition of which is the 122-mm projectile of the world-famous BM system -21 "Grad". Also in April 1994, Moscow and Ankara signed an agreement on cooperation in military-technical and defense industry. For Russia, this also was the first such an agreement signed with a member country of NATO.<sup>59</sup> The cooperation in this sphere continued with the Memorandum of Understanding between the general staffs of the Russian and Turkish military forces in May, 1998<sup>60</sup>.

In March, 2001, Turkey and Russia concluded an intergovernmental agreement on military cooperation and the training of military personnel. The agreement was prepared on the basis of the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey of May 25, 1992 and the Agreement of April 20, 1994. According to the draft Agreement, the sides carry out cooperation in such areas as training military personnel in military educational institutions of the states; consultations on issues related to soldiers' service and their social protection; cooperation between the general staffs and staffs of the branches of the armed forces; exchange of experience on logistics and technical support; development of links in the field of navigation, hydrography and oceanography, military medicine and culture; environment protection.<sup>61</sup>

The establishment of Mixed Russian-Turkish Commission on Military Technical Issues in May 2001 became one more important development. The first meetings of which were held in 2002 and 2003. Also, in January 2002, the chief of

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<sup>59</sup> Zadonsky, S. "Sostojanie i perspektivy voenno-tehnicheskogo sotrudnichestva Rossii i Turtsii." - *Institut blizhnego vostoka*, <http://www.iimes.ru/?p=7556> (a.d. 18.04.2017)

<sup>60</sup> Chakmak, M. "Rossisko-Turetskie otnosheniya v novyh geopoliticheskikh usloviyah v otrazhenii SMI." <http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/rossiysko-turetskie-otnosheniya-v-novyh-geopoliticheskikh-usloviyah-v-otrazhenii-smi#ixzz4de6918zp> (a.d. 18.04.2017)

<sup>61</sup> Statya Ministra Inostrannyih Del Rossii S.V.Lavrova "Rossiysko-Turetskie Otnosheniya: Novyiy Etap" – *MID RF*, 2001 - [http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23K1b76LY2/content/id/453782](http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23K1b76LY2/content/id/453782) (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, A. Kvashin, paid a working visit to Turkey.<sup>62</sup>

Also, at the initiative of Turkey, in 2001 was created a Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR), which included 6 Black Sea countries: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. The aims of the organization are the development of ties and good neighborly relations between states, as well as cooperation in ensuring regional security.<sup>63</sup>

A factor which negatively influenced the Turkish-Russian relations was the Chechen war. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chechen Republic announced its withdrawal from the USSR. As a result, Chechnya has become virtually independent, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. On the territory of Chechnya, there was a struggle between the officially elected government with the former general of the Soviet Air Force Dzhovkhar Dudayev in head and the anti-government forces supported by Russia. In 1994, numerous conflicts developed into a civil war. In December of this year, Russian troops were introduced to Chechnya and stayed there until August 1996, when in Khasavyurt (Dagestan) representatives of Russia and Chechnya signed an agreements on armistice. Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001. It should be noted that the final settlement did not happen, as in the end of 1999 the Second Chechen War started and the all the agreements were violated.<sup>64</sup>

During the Chechen war, a widespread pro-Chechen propaganda was organized in Turkey. Through Chechens (Liaison offices), which were organizing anti-Russian protests and sending volunteers to Chechnya to help the Chechen people fight for its independence. In response to Turkey's actions, Russia began to provide assistance to Kurdish separatists (PPK party), by cooperation with the PKK in the field of reconnaissance and training of military personnel, and also supplied them with armament. All this activity was conducted informally. By this way, Russia tried to put pressure on the Turkish government and force it to stop supporting the

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<sup>62</sup> Ovsepyan, L. "Osnovnye tendentsii i perspektivy turetsko rossiyskogo voenno-tehnicheskogo sotrudnichestva." <file:///c:/users/admin/downloads/osnovnye-tendentsii-i-perspektivy-turetsko-rossiyskogo-voenno-tehnicheskogo-sotrudnichestva.pdf> (a.d. 18.04.2017)

<sup>63</sup> Karadeniz Deniz İş Birliği Görev Grubu (BLACKSEAFOR). [https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/data/icerik/229/Karadeniz\\_2.pdf](https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/data/icerik/229/Karadeniz_2.pdf) (a.d. 24.04.2017)

<sup>64</sup> *Vojna v Chechne. Hronika vojny. Po materialam Genshtaba RF.* [http://web.archive.org/web/20110813122042/chechnya.genstab.ru/chr\\_94\\_02.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20110813122042/chechnya.genstab.ru/chr_94_02.htm) (a.d. 18.04.2017)

Chechens. The current situation caused great tension between the countries. As a result, in 1995 Turkey and Russia concluded a "Protocol on Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime". In fact, this document assumed the rejection of Chechen support from Turkey, and similar actions from Russia towards the PKK. It is worth noting that despite the agreements which were reached by Russia and Turkey, the Turkish nationalists continued its statements in support of the independence of Chechnya. However, Ankara's official position on this issue was more moderate. In 1999, during the Prime Minister of Turkey B. Ecevit's visit to Moscow, the sides signed one more "Declaration on Cooperation in Struggle against Terrorism." Also, the Turkish Prime Minister stated that "The war in Chechnya is a matter of Russia's domestic policy."<sup>65</sup> So, despite the fact that the Chechen conflict has become the subject of political tension between the countries, multilateral economic ties between Russia and Turkey have helped to smooth out this issue.

Also an indicator of the harmonious development of Russian-Turkish relations can be numerous bilateral visits by representatives of both countries. The first visit after the collapse of the Soviet Union was paid by of Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel in 1992 year. Then T. Chiller visited Moscow in 1993 as Prime Minister and in 1996 as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1997, the head of the Russian government, V. Chernomyrdin, paid a working visit to Turkey. In 2000, Prime Minister Rossi Kasyanov visited Ankara. Thus, during the visits between Turkey and Russia, about 60 agreements in various spheres were signed, which indicates a high level of cooperation between the states.<sup>66</sup>

A new step in the development of the political dialogue between Russia and Turkey became "A plan for the development of cooperation between Turkey and Russia in Eurasia" signed between the sides in 2001 year. Within the framework of this dialog, the states are exchanging their opinions on such fundamental issues as the formation of a multi-polar world, strengthening the role of the UN, and discussing regional problems.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Acar, O. "Türkiye'nin Cecenistan sorununa ilişkin politikasi."

<http://www.kafkassam.com/turkiyenin-cecenistan-sorununa-iliskin-politikasi.html> (a.d. 18.04.2017)

<sup>66</sup> "Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti arasındaki ilişkilerin bükü durumu."

[http://www.turkey.mid.ru/relat\\_1\\_t.html](http://www.turkey.mid.ru/relat_1_t.html) (a.d. 18.04.2017)

<sup>67</sup> Zadonsky, S. "Sostojanie i perspektivy voenno-tehnicheskogo sotrudnichestva Rossii i Turtsii". - *Institut blizhnego vostoka*, <http://www.iimes.ru/?p=7556> (a.d. 18.04.2017)

During the time of the Cold War, the Soviet leadership's policy towards Turkey was similar to the policy it led towards many other countries in the world, which were at a crossroads between capitalism and socialism. Namely, the USSR provided soft loans, sent Soviet engineers and other specialists to develop industrial facilities and large construction projects, purchased national products of that countries without taking into account the domestic Soviet demand and needs. This way the USSR was trying to drag Turkey from the NATO camp to the socialist camp. It is important to note, that Soviet-Turkish relations to some extent depended on Turkey's relations with the United States. Pro-American foreign policy of Turkey on the one hand, and its desire to benefit from economic relations with the USSR on the other, forced the Turkish government to constantly balance between the two competing countries. In periods of stable relations with the United States, Turkey positioned the USSR as a possible threat rather than as an ally. However, during the complications in Turkey's relations with the United States and NATO countries, the Soviet Union became a possible alternative to the West. Such a policy allowed Turkey to get the support and benefit from both the US and the USSR.

Despite the unstable political relations between the USSR and Turkey, the need for trade between the two countries, as well as mutual cultural influence, has always been felt. We can say that the main engine in the development of the Turkish-Russian relations has always been its economic part. Strong economic ties between the two countries reduced the tension caused by various political events.

There were also factors hampering the development of trade and economic cooperation. In particular, the economic agreements signed in the 1980s were either not fulfilled at all, or partially executed by the Russian side. Frequent changes in the governments of both Russia and Turkey, and the further disintegration of the USSR, have become an obstacle to the signing of new agreements. Nevertheless, the Turkey's lack of its own resources to cover the growing demand for energy on the one hand, and the presence of such resources in Russia, on the other, led to a very special model of interaction between the two countries.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey's perception of Russia as a "socialist threat" has decreased. It contributed to closer cooperation of countries in the political sphere. There new platforms for discussing regional problems were established, dialogue between countries within various international organizations was intensified. Bilateral dependence has increased with the beginning of

cooperation in the military-technical sphere, in the issues of combating terrorism and ensuring regional security. In this way a lasting base for the development of even closer cooperation in the 21st century was created.

## CHAPTER TWO

### TURCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS DURING THE AK PARTY GOVERNMENTS 2002-2015

#### 2.1. Political relations

In the first decade after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia and Turkey created the basis for a multifaceted cooperation. On May 25, 2002 it was an anniversary of the signing of such fundamental document for the development of the Russian-Turkish relations as the Treaty on the Basics of Relations between Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey. Due to this occasion President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin sent a congratulatory message to the President of the Republic of Turkey A. Sezer. The message reads: "Over the 10 years of the Treaty's existence, significant results have been achieved in strengthening and expanding Russian-Turkish ties in the political, trade-economic and other fields. The treaty was the starting point for successfully advancing work on developing a multifaceted partnership between our countries."<sup>68</sup>. By this way, Russia and Turkey entered the 21st century as states linked by deep economic relations and friendly to one another. During the AK party government, an expansion of political contacts with Russia and an intensification of the political dialogue at all levels can be observed.

Interparliamentary cooperation between Turkey and Russia actively develops within the framework of the Group of Friendship with Russia of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The group of friendship with Russia is the largest parliamentary group in the Turkish parliament, which includes representatives of political parties interested in Russian-Turkish relations, using their political weight for its development.<sup>69</sup> Meetings of representatives of Russian and Turkish parliaments are held on a regular basis. During the meetings the parties are discussing a wide range of issues of the Russian-Turkish cooperation – beginning with economic issues and the problems of the international fight against terrorism; finishing with the question of the development of education and science including

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<sup>68</sup> O pozdravitelnom Poslanii Prezidenta Rossii V.V.Putina Prezidentu Turetskoy Respubliki A.N.Sezeru – *MID RF*, 2002 - [http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/555798](http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/555798) (a.d. 29.04.2017)

<sup>69</sup> O vstreche predsedatelya Gosudarstvennoy dumy Rossii G.N.Seleznyova s Predsedatelem Deputatskoy Gruppyi Druzhiby s Rossiey Velikogo Natsionalnogo Sobraniya Turtsii B.Akardcali – *MID RF*, 2002 - [http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/568624](http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/568624) (a.d. 29.04.2017).

the exchange programs for scientists and students between Russia and Turkey and the preparation of generations that will continue to develop good-neighborly relations between the two countries in the future.<sup>70</sup>

An important part of the parliamentary cooperation between Russia and Turkey are meetings of representatives of Russian Muslim communities with delegates of the Turkish parliament. For example, in June 2004, the chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, Sheikh Ravil Gaynutdin, held a meeting with a representative delegation led by Nevzat Yalcintas, at the Mufti Council residence.<sup>71</sup> Such an activation of relations between the Muslim organizations of Turkey and Russia undoubtedly helps to strengthen the ties between Russia and Turkey on the basis of peace and good-neighborliness.

In July 2004, the Presidents of both countries signed the Joint Declaration on Deepening Friendship and a Multi-Dimensional Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey. The Declaration contains several sections and covers a wide range of issues, in particular the development of trade and economic relations, interparliamentary relations, cooperation in the sphere of education and culture, joint struggle against international terrorism. Representatives of the countries noted the similarity of their positions on many international and regional issues, and also expressed their desire to pursue a coordinated policy at the level of regional and international organizations.<sup>72</sup>

In September of the same year, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Turkey. An invitation to come to Ankara was received by the Russian president on September 7, 2000 in New York at the Millennium Summit from Turkish President Ahmed Necdet Sezer.<sup>73</sup> This is the first visit of the Russian president in the history of Russian-Turkish relations, therefore this visit of Putin can be considered historical. The main topics of the visit were economic issues, as well as the work of a newly established joint working group, dealing with the details of new projects in the gas

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<sup>70</sup> O Rossiysko-Turetskom Mezhparlamentskom Sotrudnichestve – *MID RF*, 2004 - [http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/469372](http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/469372) (a.d. 29.04.2017)

<sup>71</sup> O vstreche Predsedatelya Soveta Muftiev Rossii Sheyha R.Gaynutdina s Delegatsiyey Parlamenta Turtsii – *MID RF*, 2004 - [http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/469356](http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/469356) (a.d. 29.04.2017)

<sup>72</sup> Sovmestnaya Deklaratsiya ob Uglublenii Druzhyi i Mnogoplanovogo Partnerstva Mezhdru Rossiyskoy Federatsiyey i Turetskoy Respublikoy – *MID RF*, 2004 - [http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/453582](http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/453582) (a.d. 29.04.2017)

<sup>73</sup> Kasimov, O. “Okno v Ankaru”, - *Noviye izvestia*, 2004 - <https://newizv.ru/news/world/09-08-2004/9111-okno-v-ankaru> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

sector.<sup>74</sup> Putin's visit to Ankara marked the entrance of the Russian-Turkish political dialogue to a new level.

The strengthening of personal contacts between the heads of the states continued in July 18, 2005, when Russian President Vladimir Putin held talks with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The sides discussed trade and economic relations between Russia and Turkey, in particular, the issues of building up cooperation in the field of energy, construction of new gas and oil pipelines in Turkey. Also the regional issues such as the settlement of the Cyprus conflict, the situation in Iraq and Iran were discussed. Both sides noted their satisfaction with the results of the talks, describing them as outspoken and productive.<sup>75</sup> Also the meeting of V.V. Putin with the Turkish President Ahmet Sezer in June 2006 was held in a very positive light. The sides once again noted the strengthening of mutual trust and solidarity between the countries.<sup>76</sup>

Another visit of V. Putin to Turkey took place in 2009. At the very beginning of the visit, Putin had a conversation with Turkish Prime Minister R. Erdoğan, during which the parties discussed the most sensitive and actual issues of bilateral cooperation. After the prime ministers' conversation, extended intergovernmental negotiations took place. The head of the Italian government Silvio Berlusconi also joined the negotiations of Putin and Erdoğan on the issues of energy. As a result the visit, the parties signed about 20 joint documents concerning the development of Russian-Turkish cooperation.<sup>77</sup> The most important of them are the protocols on cooperation in the gas and oil sector, intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy and memorandum on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. In addition, the parties signed the protocol of the meeting of the Mixed Russian-Turkish Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation, the program of cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the field of education, science, culture and sports and memorandum on customs procedures

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<sup>74</sup> “Putin posetit Ankaru so vtoroy popyitki”, - 2004, <http://www.panarmenian.net/rus/details/42234/> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>75</sup> O vstreche Prezidenta Rossii V.V.Putina s Premer-Ministrom Turtsii Redzhepom Tayipom Erdoğanom, Sochi, – *MID RF*, 2005 - [http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/432148](http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/432148) (a.d. 29.04.2017)

<sup>76</sup> O vstreche Prezidenta Rossii V.V.Putina s Prezidentom Turtsii A. Sezerom, Moskva, – *MID RF*, 2006 - [http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/398806](http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/398806) (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

<sup>77</sup> Putin pribyl v Ankaru na peregovoryi s rukovodstvom Turtsii, - *Vesti*, 2009, <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=307934&tid=71973&date=08.08.2009> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

between the Federal Customs Service of Russia and the customs departments of Turkey.<sup>78</sup>

A number of important documents were also signed during the visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Turkey in 2010. Russian and Turkish leaders signed agreements in the field of military cooperation, in particular the agreement on air communication, on maritime transport, on cooperation between the ministries of internal affairs of the two countries. Also an important document was a memorandum of understanding on combating illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.<sup>79</sup> In addition, it was approved a program of joint actions between the Federal Agency for Tourism of Russia and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Turkey for 2010-2011. Also a significant step in developing cooperation in the tourism sector was an agreement on the abolition of visa regime between countries.

It should be noted that the most important achievement of the negotiations was the establishment of a High-level Cooperation Council (HLCC).<sup>80</sup> This Council is headed by the presidents of both countries. The aim of the Council is to coordinate the implementation of projects of political, trade-economic and cultural-humanitarian cooperation between Turkey and Russia. The meetings are held on regular base once a year<sup>81</sup>. The HLCC consists of three bodies - the Joint Economic Commission, the Joint Strategic Planning Group, which deals with foreign policy, and the Social Forum, which deals with the religious, cultural, educational and civic aspects of bilateral relations.<sup>82</sup>

The creation of the High-level Cooperation Council and its regular work point to a constant political dialogue between the countries. For the first time in the history of Russian-Turkish relations, we can see such an intensification of bilateral visits both at the highest level and at the level of ministries and civil organizations. Despite

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<sup>78</sup> Putin edet v Ankaru s "istoricheskim vizitom", - *RIA Novosti*, 2009 - <https://ria.ru/world/20090806/179906543.html> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>79</sup> Putin pribyl v Ankaru na peregovoryi s rukovodstvom Turtsii, - *Vesti*, 2009, <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=307934&tid=71973&date=08.08.2009> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>80</sup> "Sovet sotrudnichestva vysshego urovnya", - *Prezident Rossii*, 2010, - <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/7723> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>81</sup> "Rossiysko-turetskiy Sovet sotrudnichestva vysshego urovnya", - *TASS*, 2012, <http://tass.ru/politika/776475> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>82</sup> Kudryasheva, Y. "Aktivizatsiya Rossiysko-Turetskikh otnosheniy: suschnost i perspektivy" <http://ehd.mgimo.ru/IORManagerMgimo/file?id=A2D97A6E-E237-D7E0-29CD-F20684338B6D> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

the political disagreements on some regional issues, the countries treat each other's opinions with tolerance and continue a multi-faceted interaction. It shows the close cooperation of Turkey and Russia, as well as the desire of the leaders of the two countries to bring the Turkish-Russian relationship to the level of strategic partnership.

## **2.2. Turco-Russian economic relations under AK party**

In the modern world, trade is one of the most important factors in relations between countries. Economic interests lay at the root of the national strategy of the state and not only influence, but also largely shape its political line. Despite the fact that the Turkish-Russian relations have a century-old history, a really significant rapprochement between the countries took place when in the 1980s the first gas supply agreements between the USSR and Turkey were signed. With these agreements, active economic cooperation between the two countries began and continues to this day. Today, Russia occupies one of the leading positions in Turkey's foreign trade turnover, we can see rapidly development of investment cooperation, construction and industry cooperation,, and, of course, cooperation in the energy sector, which is one of the most important parts of Russian-Turkish relations.

The trade between Russia and Turkey has been steadily developing over the past decade. The countries has for many years been linked by close cooperation in energy, tourism and investment cooperation and banking. In recent years, Turkey has become one of the country's key foreign trade partners for Russia, and it is also the leader on the Russian market for some products. In the current international situation, when economic relations between Russia and Western countries are strained, Turkey has not joined European sanctions and positions itself as a stable economic partner for Russia.

According to the chairman of the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Russia, A.V. Yakovenko in 2003 the trade turnover between Russia and Turkey exceeded the level of 2002 by \$ 1 billion and amounted to \$ 6.5 billion. Russia is firmly in second place in Turkey's foreign trade. Taking into account the compliance of arrangements for the supply of Russian energy resources, the level of bilateral trade can actually

achieve the \$ 10 billions.<sup>83</sup> If in 2003 year the politicians were talking about the increasing of bilateral trade to \$ 10 billions, in 2015 this number arose dramatically. During the visit of Turkish President R. Erdoğan to Moscow in September 2015, the sides discussed plans to increase trade turnover between Turkey and Russia to \$ 100 billion.<sup>84</sup> And taking into account the dynamic growth of trade between the countries, these plans did not look fantastic.

As can be seen from the figure 1 and 2, before the incident with the Russian aircraft in 2015, which very negatively affected on Russian-Turkish relations, Turkish imports from Russia, as well as exports, have been generally positive over the past last 10 years. A significant decrease in foreign trade indicators was observed only in 2009 due to the global economic crisis and in the unfavorable situation for the Russian economy in 2014.<sup>85</sup>




Figure 1. Prepared by author according to <https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/exports-to-russia>

<sup>83</sup> Intervyu Ofitsialnogo Predstavatelya Mid Rossii A.V.Yakovenko Gazetyi "Hyurriet" N.Hadzhiloglu, – MID RF, 2005 - [http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/468570](http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/468570) (a.d. 29.04.2017)

<sup>84</sup> "Vstrechi Vladimira Putina i Redzhepa Tayipa Erdoğana", - TASS, - <http://tass.ru/info/2283778> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>85</sup> "Torgovo-ekonomicheskie otnosheniya Turtsii i Rossii," <http://moscow.emb.mfa.gov.tr/ShowInfoNotes.aspx?ID=220069> (a.d. 02.06.2017)




Figure 2. Prepared by author according to <https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/imports-from-russia>

The structure of trade between Turkey and Russia is mutually complementing each other. Russia mainly exports natural resources to Turkey; most of them are natural gas, oil products and oil. Also, Turkey and Russia jointly implement such large projects as the Turkish flow and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. A significant share of Turkish imports from Russia is made up of agricultural products. After the declaration of the food embargo by Europe and the fall in the ruble, and also thanks to the state support of a number of directions, many Russian companies have increased the supply of food products. Turkey is one of the key buyers of Russian fat and oil products and cereals.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>86</sup> “Торгово-экономическое сотрудничество между Российской Федерацией и Турецкой Республикой”, - *Министерство экономического развития РФ*, 2014 - [http://www.ved.gov.ru/exportcountries/tr/tr\\_ru\\_relations/tr\\_ru\\_trade/](http://www.ved.gov.ru/exportcountries/tr/tr_ru_relations/tr_ru_trade/) (a.d. 02.06.2017)




Figure 3. Prepared by author according to <http://www.gks.ru/>

The largest share of Turkish exports to Russia is food products. So, in January-September 2015, food products worth more than \$ 923 million were imported from Turkey to Russia. The largest share in this case was fruits and vegetables. Tomatoes, citrus fruits, apricots and grapes take the share in the import of food. It should also be added that for many products, Turkey is the market leader in Russia - it is tangerines, lemons, watermelons and peaches. In second place in terms of imports are machinery, equipment and vehicles. The largest articles are automotive components and cars. In addition, more than a dozen Turkish enterprises which manufacture products and components for cars are operating in Russia today. The third largest share of Russian imports from Turkey is the products of the textile industry. Traditionally, Russia buys garments, knitwear, shoes and carpets, but a significant amount falls on the yarn, linen and fibers that are needed for Russian production needs.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>87</sup> “Obzor torgovyih otnosheniy Rossii i Turtsii”, - *Exportery Rossii*, 2015 - <http://www.rusexporter.ru/research/country/detail/2427/> (a.d. 02.06.2017)




Figure 4. Prepared by author according to <http://www.gks.ru/>

The development of mutual trade between Turkey and Russia is actively promoted by the "Simplified Customs Corridor", which began operating in 2009. Due to this project, Turkish companies provide the Turkish customs officials with the necessary information on the goods being transported, and the Turkish customs passes it directly to their Russian territory. As a result, Turkish companies receive priority at customs checkpoints at Russian customs and minimize customs examination, except for cases related to combating customs offenses and smuggling.<sup>88</sup>

As can be seen from the data presented above, large volumes of Turkish imports from Russia, caused by energy purchases, create a deficit of Turkish exports. However, due to the tourism sector, the balance of trade in services is in favor of Turkey. For Russians, Turkey is the most massive outbound destination in the summer season and, therefore, throughout the year. For Turkey, Russia is the second country after Germany on an inbound tourist flow. As can be seen from the figure 5, the flow of Russian tourists to Turkey is growing every year and brings big revenues to the Turkish budget.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>88</sup> "Udar na \$44 mlrd: vo skolko mozhet oboytis konflikt Rossii i Turtsii", - *RBK*, 2015 - <http://www.rbc.ru/economics/24/11/2015/565491679a794731607274ef> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>89</sup> "Gde otdyihayut rossiyskie turisty", - *RIA Novosti*, 2015 - <https://ria.ru/infografika/20130927/966341527.html> (a.d. 02.06.2017)




Figure 5. Prepared by author according to <http://moscow.emb.mfa.gov.tr/>

Thus, it can be concluded that Russian-Turkish economic cooperation over the past ten years is experiencing a period of intensification. Trade and economic cooperation covers more and more new spheres, leads to an increase in the well-being of the population and, undoubtedly, becomes a factor that will contribute to the prosperity of the economies of the two countries.

### 2.3. Turco-Russian cooperation in energy sphere.

#### 2.3.1. Turkey and oil transportation corridors of Russia.

Basically, Russian oil supplies to the Mediterranean market are carried out by tankers from Novorossiysk and other Black Sea ports through the Turkish Straits.<sup>90</sup> However, this kind of transportation causes a heavy workload of the straits, and, as a consequence, can create an emergency situation that entails very serious environmental catastrophe. Over the past few years, Turkey has been seriously concerned about the congestion of the Straits. Referring to the difficulties of navigation in the straits and the ecological danger of oil traffic, the Turkish government imposed quite strict restrictions on the passage of oil tankers. Russia, for

<sup>90</sup> Tomilova, Y. "Problemy, perspektivy energeticheskogo sotrudnichestva Kossii i Eurcii v kontekste ih geopoliticheskikh interesov", - <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/problemy-perspektivy-energeticheskogo-sotrudnichestva-rossii-i-turtsii-v-kontekste-ih-geopoliticheskikh-interesov> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

its part, considering the restrictions, seeks for alternative ways of transporting Russian oil to the Mediterranean market, bypassing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.<sup>91</sup>

To this end, In May 2006, Transneft's board of directors approved the draft design for the Bosphorus bypass oil pipeline. In June 2003, the Ministry of Energy of Russia hosted a presentation of this project by the Anadolu group of companies, and in December a memorandum of understanding between Transneft and Anadolu was signed. The project envisages the construction of a new oil pipeline, from the village of Kiyioyi on the south-western coast of the Black Sea to the city of Ibrikbaba on the Aegean coast.



Map 1. Prepared by author according to [www.mid.ru](http://www.mid.ru)

The estimated volume of oil pumping is 60 million tons per year. The construction of all the facilities will take two years. According to experts, the economic efficiency of the project can be compared with the efficiency of oil transportation by tankers through the straits.<sup>92</sup>

However, it should be noted that the possibility of implementing this project has caused serious repercussions in Turkish society. The fact is that the site of the

<sup>91</sup> P. E. Kalugin "Modern strategic cooperation between Russian Federation and Turkey in the energy sector." <http://isu.ru/filearchive/dissert/kalugin.pdf> (a.d. 22.03.2017)

<sup>92</sup> O proekte Transfrakiyskogo nefteprovoda – MID RF, 2004 - [http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23K1b76LY2/content/id/470660](http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23K1b76LY2/content/id/470660) (a.d. 29.04.2017)

territory on which this pipeline was to be laid is an array of forest. The implementation of the project included the creation of a corridor with a width of 500 meters, and consequently, deforestation in this area. Turkish society sharply negatively evaluated such a project, and its implementation was postponed indefinitely.<sup>93</sup>

The other oil pipeline project, that was created in order to bypass the Straights, is Burgas-Alexandroupolis project. In 2007, Russia, Bulgaria and Greece signed an intergovernmental agreement on the construction of an oil pipeline stretching almost 300 km from the Bulgarian port of Burgas on the Black Sea to the Greek port of Alexandroupolis in the Aegean Sea.<sup>94</sup>



Map 2. Source <http://www.novinite.com/>

The capacity of the pipeline was planned at a rate of up to 35 million tons per year with the subsequent expansion to 50 million tons, which is comparable to the supply of Russian oil through the Black Sea ports in 2006. The cost of the project at that time was estimated as \$ 1.5 billion. It was supposed that the pipeline would be

<sup>93</sup> Sevgi Murat, Petrol, doğalgaz - boru hattı ve Kiyiköy, <http://www.trakyaolay.com/haber-26704-petrol-dogalgaz-boru-hatti-ve-kiyikoy.html> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>94</sup> Nefttransportnyie arterii Rossii", -2007, - [http://nordport.ru/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=12:-&catid=15:-&Itemid=35](http://nordport.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12:-&catid=15:-&Itemid=35) (a.d. 02.06.2017)

put into operation in 2011.<sup>95</sup> However, the implementation of the project was many times postponed because of the growing political tension between Russia and Europe. The beginning of the construction started but was stopped because Bulgaria had cut to finance the building of its part. In December 2011, Bulgaria invited Russia to conclude an agreement on its withdrawal from the project by mutual agreement, and in 2013 it withdrew from the intergovernmental agreement on the project unilaterally.<sup>96</sup>

In 2006, in order to transport Russian oil through the territory of Turkey another project was developed. The project involves the building of oil pipeline from the Turkish port of Samsun on the Black Sea coast to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast. The implementation of the project assumed the transformation of Ceyhan into the one of the largest terminals.<sup>97</sup>



<sup>95</sup> “Transneft’: Proekt nefteprovoda Burgas-Aleksandrupolis”, - *Neftegaz*, 2014, - <http://neftegaz.ru/news/view/152877-Transneft-Proekt-nefteprovoda-Burgas-Aleksandrupolis-mozhet-byt-dopolnen-nefteproduktoprovodom> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>96</sup> “Bolgarija ne budet oplachivat’ RF zatraty po Burgasu-Aleksandrupolisu”, - *RIA Novosti*, 2011, - <https://ria.ru/economy/20111227/527918884.html> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>97</sup> Y. Kudryasheva, “Aktivizatsiya Rossiysko-Turetskih otnosheniy: suschnost i perspektivy” <http://ehd.mgimo.ru/IORManagerMgimo/file?id=A2D97A6E-E237-D7E0-29CD-F20684338B6D> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

Map 3. Source <http://www.klassa.bg/>

In October 2009, Russia, Turkey and Italy signed an interstate agreement on cooperation in this project. The construction of the pipeline was to be carried out by the Turkish company “Çalık Group”, Italian “ENI” and Russian “Gazprom”. It was assumed that the construction will begin in 2010.<sup>98</sup>

The project looked very promising, but in the course of the calculation it turned out that the project is financially inexpedient. Taking into account all the costs of construction, transportation of 1 ton of oil to Europe via the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline will cost \$ 76. While the usual price for 1 ton of oil for transportation by tankers is 56 dollars. In connection with this fact, the pipeline construction project was canceled due to its economic unattractiveness.<sup>99</sup>

To sum up, we can say that none of the projects including ground transit of Russian oil transported through the Black Sea to Europe has been implemented. Nevertheless, Russia is unlikely to give up this idea, because for Russia it is a very profitable method of transportation. Firstly, the way through the Black Sea and the Straits is the shortest one. Secondly, while transporting oil by tankers through the Black Sea, Russia does not have to pay additional costs for transit to third countries. For Turkey, the presence on its territory of one more transit corridor is also beneficial, because it meets the intention of Turkey to gain its weight as an important transit-state, regulating the supply of energy resources. That’s why it seems possible to see the resumption of previous projects or the creation of the new ones.

### **2.3.2. Blue Stream project.**

The Blue Stream project and the intergovernmental agreement on gas supplies signed between Russia and Turkey in 1997 have closely linked these countries for at least 25 years, and have become not only a powerful link between the countries, but also a source of disagreement.

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<sup>98</sup> Eken, Evrim. “Energeticheskij vektor v otnosheniyah Turcii i Rossii: itogi i perspektivy vstrech premerov V. V. Putina i T. Erdoğan”, - <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/energeticheskij-vektor-v-otnosheniyah-turtsii-i-rossii-itogi-i-perspektivy-vstrech-premierov-v-v-putina-i-t-erdogana> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>99</sup> “Samsun - Ceyhan boru hattı iptal oldu, Türkiye oyuna getirildi.”, *Samsun Gazetesi*, - 2013, - <https://www.samsungazetesi.com/ekonomi/samsun-ceyhan-boru-hatti-iptal-oldu-turkiye-oyuna-getirildi-h6351.html> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

The Turkish gas market has an important strategic significance for Russia. Since the 1980s, Turkey began to import gas from the USSR and occupied the third place in the Soviet foreign trade turnover. However, after the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new independent states that also possess gas reserves and want to implement them, Russia has faced the problem of competition. Turkey began to consider gas purchase projects from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, as well as from the Middle East countries. That's why one of the tasks of the energy strategy of Russia became to hold the gas market of Turkey in their hands. By this way the "Blue Stream" gas pipeline project came into agenda.

The Blue Stream gas pipeline runs directly to Turkey through the Black Sea. It takes its beginning in the Stavropol region of Russia, passes the Krasnodar Region and then its underwater parts becomes. The underwater part has a length 396 km and reaches the city of Samsun in Turkey (figure 1).<sup>100</sup>



Map 4. Source [www.gazprom.ru](http://www.gazprom.ru)

The Blue Stream gas pipeline not only delivers big volumes of gas to Turkey, but also solves the problem of transit. As it is known, the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has faced with the problems of transporting its energy resources. Transit of gas to Europe was carried out through the territory of Ukraine and Belarus, however, as these countries got the status of a separate states, the order of transit

<sup>100</sup> Blue Stream, -Gazprom, - <http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/65/395913/blue-stream-map-en-2016-06-03.jpg> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

changed. In order to deliver its gas to the European consumer Russia has to pay for transit tariffs. So the Blue Stream gas pipeline has become for Russia an alternative gas main to Turkey, making it possible to bypass transit countries.<sup>101</sup>

The “Blue Stream” project was unique, because for the first time in the world practice it was necessary to place a gas pipeline on the bottom of the Black Sea at a depth of 2150 meters, which exceeded the depth of all the existing underwater pipelines. The project was implemented by the Russian company Gazprom in cooperation with the Italian company Eni. In November 1999, these companies registered in the Netherlands a Russian-Italian company “Blue Stream Pipeline Company”, which now owns the offshore section of the gas pipeline. The owner and operator of the land section is Gazprom.<sup>102</sup>

As it is mentioned above, the Blue Stream project is a continuation of intergovernmental gas agreement between Russia and Turkey. Without this agreement, the Blue Stream project would not have been possible. The agreements are based on the "take or pay" principle. According to this scheme, the buyer country is obliged to pay all the gas volume specified in the contract, regardless of whether the country has a need for gas purchases or not. The gas agreement has a period of 25 years, during which, Turkey will be obliged to purchase 364.5 cubic meters of gas. The volume of gas supplies should increase from 0.5 billion cubic meters in 2000 to 16 billion cubic meters in 2007. Despite the fact that according to the agreement the gas supplies were to begin already in 2000, the Blue Stream gas pipeline was put into operation only in 2002 and the first deliveries were started in 2003. But after the several months working, gas supplies from Russia to Turkey were stopped. The reason for this was the disagreement between the parties on the price of gas and the volume of supplies.<sup>103</sup>

The point is that the 1997 agreement was concluded by the government of Demirel and Mesut Yılmaz, but at the time of the implementation of the agreement, the AKP party came to power in Turkey, revised the terms of the agreement and found them unacceptable for Turkey. The fact is that the volumes of purchases specified in the contract in many respects exceeded the real need of Turkey for gas.

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<sup>101</sup>“ Gde Beret Nachalo "Goluboy Potok"” – *Giprospetsgaz*, - <http://www.gsg.spb.ru/node/43> (a.d. 02.06.2017)


<sup>102</sup> “Goluboy Potok,” - *Gazprom*, - <http://www.gazprom.ru/about/production/projects/pipelines/active/blue-stream/> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>103</sup> “Rossiya i Turtsiya: 70 let sotrudnichestva v energetike”, - *Vesti Ekonomika*, 2015, <http://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/60234/print> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

According to the Turkish analytical magazine Paradigm, the calculations of the Turkish gas company Botaş, on the basis of which the project was concluded, are very different from the calculations made by the state. For example, according to Botaş, Turkey's need for gas will reach 55 million cubic meters by 2010, while state calculations called the figure of 30 million.<sup>104</sup> In this situation, the Turkish side tried to challenge the terms of such a disadvantageous contract. In turn, Russian Gazprom said that it is not responsible for the mistake in the calculations of its Turkish counterparts and did not intend to make concessions on the contract. The Russian-Turkish gas conflict continued to heat up. The parties began its threats to appeal to the arbitration court. However, the prospect of years of litigation and freezing of huge investments forced the parties to come to a compromise. Turkey agreed to “take or pay” concept, but significantly reduced its obligations for gas collection and agreed on a single price of supplies. Thus, the prerequisites for arbitration were eliminated and in August 2003 the supplies via the Blue Stream gas pipeline were restored.<sup>105</sup>

It is important to note that despite the agreements reached, real gas supplies are much lower than planned. As can be seen on the graph, real gas supplies approached the planned 16 million cubic meters only in 2015.

#### **The volume of gas, importing by Turkey via the Blue stream**



*Prepared by author according to [www.gazprom.ru](http://www.gazprom.ru)*

<sup>104</sup> Ogan, Sinan, “Mavi akim projesi: Bir Enerji Stratejisi ve Stratejisizligi ornegi” <http://www.emreozgur.com/Mavi.pdf> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>105</sup> Bulanov, N., “Konflikt ischerpan . "Gazprom" i Turtsiya dogovorilis o postavkah gaza.” <http://www.sostav.ru/news/2003/11/21/63/> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

As it was mentioned above, Blue Stream project created not just advantages for Turkey, but also became the source of contradictions. One of the problems is Turkey's trade deficit to Russia, caused by large purchases of gas. According to the gas agreements of the 1980s, there was a barter system and Turkey paid for part of Russian gas with its goods. However, according to a new agreement, Turkey has to pay money. It led to a deficit of almost \$ 177 billion over the past 10 years (2005-2014). For comparison, in the previous decade, the deficit was only \$ 23 billion (1995-2004).<sup>106</sup>

The Blue Stream project is called "blue dependence" by Turkish researchers. Russian gas takes the largest share in Turkish gas exports. The Turkish government tries to diversify the system of its gas exports by purchasing gas from Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Nigeria and other countries. However, the signed 25-year agreement with Russia limits Turkish capabilities. How is Russian gas used in Turkey? Most of it goes to gas power plants, industrial enterprises and gas supply of the population. Under the terms of the concluded agreement, Turkey also has the right to re-export Russian gas with the permission of Russia. However, in the issue of gas export to Europe, it is difficult for Turkey to compete with other exporters, including Russia. Today Turkey exports gas only to Greece and the volume of exports for 2014 amounted to only 0.68 million cubic meters.<sup>107</sup> Taking into account the fact that Turkey aspires to take the place not only of the transit country, but also to become an exporter of the natural resource, it can be concluded that Turkey will further develop the direction of re-exporting gas, by increasing gas supplies from Russia as well. In this issue, a new project "Turkish Stream" takes on special significance.

### **2.3.3. Turkish Stream**

As it was mentioned before, after the collapse of the USSR, one of the most important aspects of Russia's energy strategy is the creation of alternative ways of delivering its gas to Europe and expanding the gas main system. The Blue Stream project allowed Russia to deliver large volumes of gas in Turkey, bypassing the

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<sup>106</sup> Okan Yradimci, "Energy cooperation in the history of Turkish-Russian relations" <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/energy-cooperation-history-turkish-russian-relations-okan-yard%C4%B1mc%C4%B1> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>107</sup> Ogan, Sinan, "Mavi Akim: Turk-Rus Iliskilerinde Mavi Bagimlilik" <http://www.turksam.org/tr/makale-detay/548-mavi-akim-turk-rus-iliskilerinde-mavi-bagimlilik> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

transit countries. However, the South European market is also of great interest to Russia. In order to strengthen its positions in this market, Russia, in cooperation with the Republic of Turkey, created a project "Turkish Stream".

The Turkish Stream gas pipeline project appeared as an alternative to another Russian project. Initially, Russia intended to build four new pipelines up to 2300 kilometers long, passing through the Black Sea to Bulgaria, and from there to other European countries. This project was named "South Stream".<sup>108</sup>



Map 5. Source [www.gazprom.ru](http://www.gazprom.ru)


European countries are a major importer of Russian gas, and this project was aimed at reducing transit risks in the unstable situation around Russia and Ukraine. The implementation of the project South Stream would facilitate the transit of Russian gas and would help to strengthen Russia's relations with the states of Central and Eastern Europe. However, such rapprochement with Russia does not always fit into the European geopolitical strategy. In addition, this project could compete with the Nabucco gas pipeline, which supplies gas to Europe from Azerbaijan. Thus, during the discussion of the South Stream project, the European Commission expressed disagreement with such a proposal of Russia. According to the European Union, the South Stream project does not comply with the European standards, according to which a gas supplier company cannot own a gas pipeline in the EU. As a result, without obtaining permission from the European Commission to build the

<sup>108</sup> "Yuzhnyiy potok", - *Expert*, 2014 - <http://expert.ru/dossier/story/552230/> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

part of the pipeline through the territory of Bulgaria, in June 2014 the work on the project was stopped.<sup>109</sup>

Nevertheless, Russia has not abandoned its plans to lay a gas pipeline across the Black Sea to Europe. During the working visit of Vladimir Putin to Turkey in 2014, Gazprom and Turkish company Botaş Petroleum Pipeline Corporation signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the construction of an offshore gas pipeline Turkish Stream. The Russian President stated that the "Turkish Stream" will replace the "South Stream".<sup>110</sup>

The Turkish Stream project involved the construction of a gas pipeline along the bottom of the Black Sea from the coast of Russia to the European coast of Turkey and further to the Turkish border with Greece. The length of the sea part of the pipe will be about 910 km, the overland part on the Turkish territory - 180 km.



Map6. Source [www.bbc.com](http://www.bbc.com)

The cost of the project is estimated at € 11.4 billion. It is expected that the volume of Russian gas that will pass through the Turkish flow will amount to 63

<sup>109</sup> “Reshenie Rossii po «Yuzhnomu potoku» – chast bolshoy geopoliticheskoy igryi”, - *Vzglyad*, 2014 - <https://vz.ru/politics/2014/12/10/719554.html> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>110</sup> “Ankara dala dobro na stroitelstvo «Turetskogo potoka»”, - *Vzglyad*, 2016- <https://vz.ru/economy/2016/7/26/823611.html> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

billion cubic meters, of which 47 billion will go to the European market, and 16 billion will be sent for Turkish consumption.<sup>111</sup>

Despite the worsening of relations between Russia and Turkey, caused by incidents with the Russian aircraft, the project continues, and on October 10, 2016 in Istanbul, the Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Alexander Novak and the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of the Turkish Republic Berat Albayrak in the presence of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed the intergovernmental agreement on the construction of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline. The parties expressed the hope, that new gas pipeline will help bring the trade between them to a new level, and strengthen their ties with the European Union.<sup>112</sup>

This pipeline is of great importance for Turkey. First of all, the Turkish Stream project will ensure a stable and regular supply of energy resources to Turkey at low prices. According to news agency RIA Novosti, President Vladimir Putin, after talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced the agreement on the procedure for presenting a discount on the price of Russian gas for Turkey.<sup>113</sup> In addition, Turkey will benefit from the proceeds from transit. According to the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey Taner Yıldız, Turkey's economic benefit from the implementation of the project of a new gas pipeline system for the delivery of Russian gas to the countries of Southern Europe can exceed € 400 million a year.<sup>114</sup> In the case of the implementation of the Turkish flow project, Turkey acquires an important strategic and geopolitical significance. If this project will be implemented, a new stage in Russian-Turkish relations will begin. Until now, Russia has seen Turkey only as a market for gas supplies, but now this view will be changed. Turkey will have excellent opportunities for investment in its gas transportation infrastructure. The new gas pipeline system can turn Turkey into an important energy base of Europe along with Germany and Italy.

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<sup>111</sup> TurkStream <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/projects/> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>112</sup> “V Stambule podpisano mezhpravitelstvennoe soglasenie po stroitelstvu "Turetskogo potoka"”, - *Ministerstvo energetiki RF*, 2016 - <https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/6193> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>113</sup> “Gazoprovod "Turetskiy potok"”, - *RIA Novosti*, 2014-  
<https://ria.ru/spravka/20170507/1493850942.html> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

<sup>114</sup> “Ministr: dohodyi Turtsii ot novoy GTS namnogo prevyisyat 400 mln evro”, - *RIA Novosti*, 2014 -  
<https://ria.ru/economy/20141202/1036245186.html> (a.d. 02.06.2017)

### 2.3.4. Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant

Nowadays, energy policy plays very important role in national strategy of the states. More than 80% of energy in the world is produced by using of fossil resources, but the reserves of hydrocarbon resources are gradually diminishing. The same time, need for energy is increasing. That's why it became vital necessity to find out alternative sources of energy. One of such alternative source is nuclear energy, the importance of which is growing rapidly.

The pioneers in this area were the USA and the USSR, which put into operation first nuclear power plants in the early 1950s. For a long time the image of nuclear power plants was overshadowed by the Chernobyl catastrophe and seemed to be very dangerous and harmful for environment. But, despite lots of prejudices about nuclear energy, it is a fact, that modern technologies made the production of energy by nuclear power plant even more safe and environmental friendly than using natural gas or oil. Today many countries started to revise its energy structure giving priority to nuclear energy. A bright example of using nuclear power can be France, where nuclear power plants produce more than 70% of all energy.

Turkey is also a country interested in developing its nuclear energy. In 1956, Turkish government established Atomic Energy Commission, responsible for the research of nuclear technologies. In 1962, Turkey put into operation its first research atom reactor, which was purchased from the American company "Machine and Foundry". The next step became the establishment of Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center. Later in 1967, a similar centre was created in Ankara.<sup>115</sup> The question of building a nuclear power plant on the territory of Turkey for the first time arose in 1976, when Turkish government announced a tender for NPP project. French and Swiss firms conducted negotiations with Turkey on this issue; however the project was not realized. In the early 1980s, Turkey was discussing the implementation of the Akkuyu NPP project with representatives from Germany, Canada and the United States, but in the end, the negotiations did not bring results. After the tragedy in Chernobyl in 1986, Turkey temporarily suspended its nuclear program and returned to it only in the 1990s. Despite numerous low-intensity discussions of this issue, as in the case of the previous attempts, the NPP project was

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<sup>115</sup> Türkiye Atom Enerjisi Kurumu – Tarihçe, <http://www.taek.gov.tr/en/institutional/history.html> (a.d. 27.05.2017)

closed because of economic and political reasons.<sup>116</sup> In 2004, Turkey once again announced its plans to build 3 nuclear reactors.

As a location was chosen a place near the town of Sinop, however, such a choice of territory caused a negative reaction among local residents. So the city of Mersin, Akkuyu was chosen as the place for the construction of the first nuclear power plant.<sup>117</sup> In September, 2007, Turkish parliament adopted the law, concerning the construction and operation of nuclear power plants and the sale of energy generated from those plants. At the end of 2008, an official tender for the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant one more time was announced. Among the participants of the tender were firms from Canada, Japan, France, Belgium, China, Germany and Russia. In total, 13 countries have presented its projects, but during the negotiations it became obvious that Russian companies “Atomstroyexport” and “Inter RAO AES” became the favorites of this race.<sup>118</sup>

During 2009 year, there was a significant revival of bilateral contacts between Turkey and Russia. The issue of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy was discussed during the visits of Foreign Minister A. Davutoğlu and the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey T. Yıldız, as well as during the May talks of two prime ministers - V. Putin and T. Erdoğan in Sochi. According to the news agency RIA Novosti, V. Putin said that Russia is ready to take part in the construction of Turkish nuclear power plant. In turn, T. Erdoğan noted that the other candidatures of the tender are no longer considered and Turkey works to complete all procedures on this issue as soon as it is possible.<sup>119</sup> In addition, during the bilateral meetings, a legal basis for the cooperation of the two countries in the nuclear energy sphere was established. In particular, such documents as the agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the agreement on prompt notification of a nuclear accident and the exchange of information on nuclear

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<sup>116</sup> Eksi, Muharrem. “Turkiye’nin nukleer enerji stratejisi: büyük güç olma ideali”, - *BILGESAM*, 2014 - [http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-355-2014121621guvenlik\\_kongresi\\_bildirileri-7.pdf](http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-355-2014121621guvenlik_kongresi_bildirileri-7.pdf) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>117</sup> “Ulkemizde Nukleer Enerji - Nukleer Akademi”, 2017, - <http://nukleerakademi.org/nukleer-enerji/ulkemizde-nukleer-enerji/> (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>118</sup> “Mersin Akkuyu Nukleer Enerji Santral Kurma İhalesi”, - 2008, - <http://www.hisse.net/forum/showthread.php?t=28537> (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>119</sup> Rossijskie kompanii gotovy uchastvovat' v stroitel'stve v Turcii AES, - *RIA Novosti*, 2009, - <https://ria.ru/economy/20090516/171247744.html> a.d. 27.05.2017)

installations were signed.<sup>120</sup> Such an active cooperation of the two countries shows that both sides were seriously set to realize the project.

In November 2009, the Akkuyu project experienced a new turn – after all the negotiations and preparation work, Turkish government again annulled the results of the tender. Without the announcement of a new one, on May 12, 2010, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Turkey signed an agreement on cooperation in the construction and operation of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in the Republic of Turkey. This was a beginning of one of the largest and most discussed nuclear power projects.

The implementation of the NPP construction project in Turkey includes four phase - the preparatory phase, then the construction of the nuclear power plant, its operation, and the final phase - decommissioning. Today the project is at the end of the preparatory phase, which involves obtaining all licenses, as well as carrying out works on engineering surveys. It is expected that the nuclear power plant will be put into operation seven years after receiving all the necessary licenses. At the same time, the service life of the nuclear power plant will be 60 years.<sup>121</sup>

According to the agreement, the Russian side takes most of obligations on the implementation of the project. These are investment, as well as the design, construction and operation of the station. As the project uses Russian technology, most of Russia's obligations are also related to the production of critical equipment - the nuclear "island" and its infrastructure. In addition, the obligation of the Russian side is the export of spent nuclear fuel and the supply of the station with fresh fuel.

The Turkish side provides a site for the construction of the plant, and also provides the protection of the facility and promotes the activities of Russian companies in many aspects. Also, one of the most important points of the intergovernmental agreement is that Turkey undertakes to purchase part of the generated electricity (70% of the production of the first and second units and 30% of the third and fourth units) for 15 years at a fixed price of 12.35 cents. It is worth noting that the fixed price covers 50% of energy purchased by Turkey, the second

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<sup>120</sup> Fomina, M., Garaev, A. Atomnaya ehnergetika i mezhdunarodnaya politika: novyj etap Rossijsko-Tureckih otnoshenij, <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/atomnaya-energetika-i-mezhdunarodnaya-politika-novyy-etap-rossijsko-turetskih-otnosheniy> (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>121</sup> Realizaciya Proekta, - *Akkuyu Nuclear*, -<http://www.akkunpp.com/realizatsiya-proekta> (a.d. 27.05.2017)

half will be purchased at a market price. The intergovernmental agreement also involved the export of electricity generated by Akkuyu NPP to the third countries.<sup>122</sup>

Nowadays, 100% shares of the project company Akkuyu NPP belong to Russian investors, namely Atomstroyexports (33%), INTER RAO ES (33%), Rosenergoatom (31%), Atomtekenergo (1%) and Atomenergoremont (1%). However, from a formal point of view, the project company is a legal entity of Turkey. Russian companies possess a majority stake (51%) of the shares during the all service life of the project, while 49% of shares can be acquired by Turkish or other foreign investors. The project will be implemented according to "build-own-operate" scheme. This is the first nuclear power project implemented under this scheme. However, Turkey is already familiar with this concept, as the "build-own-exploit" model has been applied to its thermal power plants.<sup>123</sup>

The principle "build-own-operate" is working like this - foreign or national company invests money in the construction of an energy facility and sells produced electricity under long-term purchase contracts to the country in which the facility is built. For the investor this is a very profitable investment, because energy is a stable and rather profitable industry. For the state in which the power facility is built, the "build-own-operate" model makes possible to obtain the needed power capacities, without investing large financial resources. As the general director of the project A. Superfin says, the "build-own-operate" model is winning for both sides. From the point of Russian view, in spite of really big investments (according to estimates the price of the project is \$ 20 billion), the project is profitable. The project company plans to receive up to \$ 4 billion a year that means that the project can pay off in 18-19 years.<sup>124</sup> For Turkey, this is an opportunity to obtain an atomic facility, in which Turkey do not yet have competencies. The creation of a nuclear power plant helps to cover the growing need of Turkey for energy, and will also reduce dependence on hydrocarbon resources. In addition, within the framework of the project, Russia started an educational program, according to which students from Turkey will be

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<sup>122</sup> "Akkuyu Nükleer Santrali", - *Enerji Atlasi*, 2016, - <http://www.enerjiatlasi.com/nukleer/akkuyu-nukleer-santrali.html> (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>123</sup> "Atomnaya Elektrostanciya «Akkuyu»" [http://www.atomeks.ru/mediafiles/u/files/presentAE2011\\_login/Superfin.pdf](http://www.atomeks.ru/mediafiles/u/files/presentAE2011_login/Superfin.pdf) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>124</sup> Superfin, A. "Interview to Rossijskoe atomnoe soobshchestvo", 2012, - <http://www.atomic-energy.ru/interviews/2012/09/21/36197> (a.d. 27.05.2017)

able to study in Russian universities the specialties related to the monitoring and operation of nuclear power plants.<sup>125</sup>

At the same time in Turkey there is an opposition to this project. Opponents of the NPP are worried that the presence of nuclear facility in the territory of Turkey will negatively affect the ecology of the region. Considering the fact that Mersin is located close to the resort city of Antalya, the side effects caused by NPP neighborhood can bring harm to local residents and reduce the attractiveness of Turkey for tourists. Anxiety of local residents around the construction of nuclear power plants is primarily due to the fact that people are little aware of what the nuclear power plant is and associate the presence of nuclear reactors with the danger of severe environmental pollution. In fact, according to the latest research, the Akkuyu nuclear power plant will become one of the safest nuclear power plants in the world. All Russian design plants, including Akkuyu, underwent stress tests, an in-depth analysis of all security and reliability systems under conditions similar to what happened at Fukushima. The probability of accidents on such a complex technological facility, of course, presents, but it is extremely low. According to the Russian nuclear community, due to the peculiarities of this technology, the nuclear power plant, even under the most unfavorable circumstances will not affect the environment.<sup>126</sup>

It is also worth noting that the presence of a nuclear power plant does not make any difference to the tourism sector of agriculture. The examples of the United States and France, the tourist and agricultural areas of which have not been affected by the presence of numerous nuclear power plants, can be a proof to it.<sup>127</sup> In order to reduce the negative perception of the construction of nuclear power plants, the government of Turkey, in cooperation with Russia, is carrying out explanatory work with local residents. For this purpose, there is an information centre in the areas close to the future nuclear power plant. In addition, it is planned to build an interactive information and entertainment center, where people can see models and even play games, showing how the equipment of the nuclear power plant works. The centre

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<sup>125</sup> Obrazovanie, - *Akkuyu Nuclear*, - <http://www.akkunpp.com/obrazovanie> (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>126</sup> Superfin, A. Interview to *Rossijskoe atomnoe soobshchestvo*, 2012, - <http://www.atomic-energy.ru/interviews/2012/09/21/36197> (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>127</sup> Turkiye'nin Nukleer Santral Projeleri: Soru-Cevap, - Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanlığı, 2016 - [http://www.enerji.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2F1%2FDocuments%2FSayfalar%2FT%C3%BCrkiyeni\\_n\\_N%C3%BCkleer\\_Santral\\_Projeleri\\_Soru-Cevap.pdf](http://www.enerji.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2F1%2FDocuments%2FSayfalar%2FT%C3%BCrkiyeni_n_N%C3%BCkleer_Santral_Projeleri_Soru-Cevap.pdf) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

also is planning to give lectures and organize various events on the question of peaceful atom.

Besides the environmental factor, it is important to note the political side of the issue. The implementation of such a long and large-scale project as the Akkuyu nuclear power plant will tie Turkey and Russia for many years and create a certain degree of dependence from each other. The conclusion of large-scale economic agreements is always accompanied by political rapprochement. However, as practice shows, such a rapprochement with Russia can cause a complication of relations between Turkey and NATO countries. On the other hand, Turkey in its foreign policy has always been able to find a balance between the West and the East. Currently, the Turkish government works to pursue a multifaceted foreign policy. The development of the nuclear sector in the Turkish energy industry is one of the national priorities and Akkuyu project can bring significant economic benefits for both Russia and Turkey.

#### **2.4. Russian-Turkish military-technical cooperation.**

The military-technical industry is a relatively new sphere of cooperation between Russia and Turkey. The first steps in this sphere were made during the time of Lenin and Atatürk, when both countries experienced a period of reformation and restoration. After the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian Empire was presented to the world community as a completely different state - the USSR, with a new ideology, a new political system and new priorities in foreign policy. Turkey was in a similar position. The Turkish Republic became the successor of the Ottoman Empire, but the format of the new state was very different from the previous one. Under the new political realities, both states were in search of allies and were open for cooperation. Thus, the agreement on friendship and cooperation between Turkey and the USSR concluded at that time became the start of active interaction between the two countries. However, the difference of the political systems of the states increasingly was becoming an obstacle to cooperation. And if the interaction in the economic sphere continued to develop, then military-technical cooperation was rather limited and practically came to naught after the Second World War, when, in the context of the struggle between the communist and capitalist blocs, Turkey perceived the USSR more as a possible threat than as an ally. As a member of NATO, the Republic of

Turkey in the military-technical field relied on the bloc countries and primarily on the United States.

Nevertheless, after the collapse of the USSR, Russian-Turkish relations got a new start. In the issue of modernization of military complexes, Turkey, in addition to cooperation with NATO countries, began to consider alternative options. The same time, Russia, as a country, which produces high-quality and competitive military-technical products, began to claim the role of an alternative supplier of arms for Turkey. In this way, during Yeltsin's time, Russia and Turkey concluded important agreements created the legal basis for military-technical cooperation, and for the first in a long time, signed contracts for purchasing of military equipment by Turkey from Russia.

#### **2.4.1. Attack Helicopters Tender**

Another page in the Turkish-Russian military cooperation became the situation around the "ATAK" tender. Back in 1995 Turkey opens a tender for the purchasing of 145 attack and tactical reconnaissance helicopters. Since 1997, the Russian military holding "Kamov" was participating in the tender, along with the Italian firm "Augusta", the German-French joint venture "EuroCopter" and the American firm "Bell Textron". The Russian company introduced a double version of the Russian military helicopter Ka-50, named Erdoğan. It was designed strictly for those tactical and technical parameters that were determined by the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey. Moreover, the Russian version, as experts say, was much superior to its American contestant attack helicopter AH-1z "King-Cobra". The Russian helicopter was much more maneuverable; it possessed greater speed and range of flight and was ideal for operations in the mountains and fire support for Special Forces. In addition, within the ATAK program such events as demonstrative flights of Russian and Russian-Turkish crews and Ka-50-2 combat firing were held. Also the Turkish specialists got acquainted with the technology of construction of Russian helicopters.<sup>128</sup>

Moreover, the Russian side has provided very favorable conditions of the contract, including the partial production of these helicopters in Turkish territory, as

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<sup>128</sup> Zadonsky, S. Sostojanie i perspektivy voenno-tehnicheskogo sotrudnichestva Rossii i Turtsii. *Institut blizhnego vostoka*, <http://www.iimes.ru/?p=7556> (a.d. 18.04.2017)

well as re-exporting of products.<sup>129</sup> As Russian President Vladimir Putin stated, creating a proposal of the contract with Turkey, the Russian side made such concessions that the partners, as a rule, do not.<sup>130</sup> In addition, the price of the Russian project was 350 million \$ lower than the US' project. So at the meeting of the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey, the Russian project was rated as one of the favorites for the tender. However, because of political pressure from the USA, in 2004 the tender was canceled. The Turkish authorities announced the opening of a new tender in August 2004, and later it was announced about the win of the Italian firm "Augusta".<sup>131</sup>

After the Turkish side refused to purchase Russian KA-50 helicopters, there were some statements in the media that Turkish military experts will begin negotiations with Moscow about possible deliveries of other types of military vehicles to Turkey. We are talking about the newest Mi-28N helicopters, which are the results of joint development of the "Moscow Helicopter Plant named after Mil" and the "Rostvertol" corporation. Nevertheless, no real action was taken by the Turkish government. During the meeting of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and A. Gül held in Ankara, Ivanov noted that rather than economic there are some political realities which limit Russian-Turkish military-technical cooperation. According to the minister, the Russian side hopes that while making decisions on the supply of weapons, Turkey will mainly be guided by the criteria of "price-quality."

In addition, the minister noted that the Russian side has other proposals. For example, the modernization of armored personnel carriers BTR-80 and landing helicopters Mi-17-1V, which now are in service in the Turkish army. Also there are some projects on the development of advanced armored vehicles and the construction of an arms factory in Turkey.<sup>132</sup> In addition to talking about military technical supplies, an important result of the ministerial meeting was signing of two agreements on the mutual protection of intellectual property and the protection of

<sup>129</sup> "Turtsiya mozhnet Otkazatsya ot zakupki 145 "Chernyih Akul"", - *Aviaport*, 2004, - <https://www.aviaport.ru/digest/2004/09/06/83409.html> (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

<sup>130</sup> Vyistuplenie Prezidenta Rossii V.V.Putina na Rossiysko-Turetskom Delovom Forume, Ankara, – *MID RF*, 2004 -[http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23K1b76LY2/content/id/453606](http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23K1b76LY2/content/id/453606) (a.d. 29.04.2017)

<sup>131</sup> Ozbay, F. "Askeri Amacli Helikopter Alimi İhalesi Ve Turkiye-Rusya", - *TASAM*, 2005 - [http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/281/askeri\\_amacli\\_helikopter\\_alimi\\_ihalesi\\_ve\\_turkiye-rusya](http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/281/askeri_amacli_helikopter_alimi_ihalesi_ve_turkiye-rusya) (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

<sup>132</sup> Tretyakov, U. "Chernaya akula" proletela mimo Turtsii, - *Trud*, 2004 - [http://www.trud.ru/article/10-12-2004/81163\\_chernaja\\_akula\\_proletela\\_mimo\\_turtsii.html](http://www.trud.ru/article/10-12-2004/81163_chernaja_akula_proletela_mimo_turtsii.html) (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

classified information related to the defense structure of the two countries.<sup>133</sup> These agreements have added a legal basis for the development of mutually beneficial military-technical cooperation between Russia and Turkey.

#### 2.4.2. Air Defense Systems Tenders

In 2009, Turkey announced a tender for the purchase of air defense systems. The existing Turkish air defense system, represented by American complex Nike Hercules, was installed in 1953. The question of modernization of this system was arising in Turkey since the early 1990s and in 1994 Turkish government conducted negotiations with the USA about the purchasing of American PAC-2 missiles. However, due to such internal factors as economic crises, aggravation of conflicts with the PKK and the inconsistency of the coalition governments, Turkey had to postpone for a while the air defense modernization project. With the coming to power of the AKP party and the stabilization of the situation in the country, the issue of air defense again became urgent.

As it was mentioned above, in 2009 Turkey announced a tender which was named "Turkish Long Range Air and Missile Defense System" (T-LORAMIDS). The tender drew the attention of companies from the US, China, Russia, as well as a joint French-Italian company. Along with negotiations with other tender participants, the Russian-Turkish negotiations on the possible procurement of Russian military developments were intensified. Attention of Turkey was attracted by the Russian system of anti-aircraft missile systems S-300, which is already used by Greece. Officially the complexes belong to the government of the Republic of Cyprus, but under the pressure of Ankara they are located on the Rhodes Island and are under the control of the Greek military.<sup>134</sup> It shows that Russian air defense systems can be integrated with NATO military complex, which is an important factor in the purchasing of military equipment from non-NATO countries.

According to the portal "Vzglyad", the negotiations were not only about the S-300 system, but also about the new S-400 system, which is the modified version of S-300.<sup>135</sup> However, according to the information provided by the report of the

<sup>133</sup> Philippova, N. "Bratya po oruzhiyu", - *Evraziyskiy kommunikatsionnyiy tsentr*, 2014, - <http://eurasiancenter.ru/politicsexperts/20141015/1003717367.html> (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

<sup>134</sup> "Rossiyskiy ZRK S-300 PMU-2 mozhet byt prodan v Turtsiyu." - <http://forum-msk.org/material/news/8216.html> (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

<sup>135</sup> "Turetskiy zadel", - *Vzglyad*, 2009, - <https://vz.ru/society/2009/4/27/280851.html> (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

Turkish research center SETA, negotiations about the S-400 system were not carried out as the new system was not tested and, therefore, was not ready for export.<sup>136</sup> At the same time, the S-300 system, according to one version, was already withdrawn from production, on the other - at the intergovernmental level; there was an unofficial moratorium on the sale of air defense systems of a similar class to the countries of the region for several years. Anyhow, the main issue of the Turkish-Russian negotiations was the Russian system Antey-2500.

According to the NATO classification, Antey-2500 is the only mobile anti-aircraft missile system in the world which is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with launch ranges up to 2500 km. A distinctive feature of this air defense system is high mobility, a short time of transfer from transport to combat position, as well as the ability to hit up to 16 ballistic missiles flying at speeds up to 4,500 m / sec.<sup>137</sup> According to the SETA report, this system is the most preferable option, as it is ahead of its competitors in technological terms.<sup>138</sup> However, during the negotiations Turkey and Russia could not come to an agreement on the price of the project. Also one of the most important criteria for Turkey is the possibility of a partial production of a military complex in Turkey's territory with the transfer of technologies. Russia did not offer such conditions. Thus, negotiations with Russia around the Antey-2500 complex have come to naught.

There were also other proposals from the Russian military industry; in particular, Turkey was interested in buying from Russia anti-air defense complexes Tor-M2E and Buk-M2E. Nevertheless, upon completion of negotiations with other countries, it was announced that the tender was won by a Chinese company that offered the HQ-9 anti-aircraft missile system, which in fact is a modernized copy of Soviet-Russian S-300 systems, but at a lower price and with the possibility of transferring the part of the technologies.

Turkey's decision to acquire a missile-antiaircraft complex from China caused a sharp negative reaction from the NATO countries. Its representatives expressed their uncertainty about the need to install an air defense system in Turkey. According to them, as Turkey is part of NATO's security system, in case of any

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<sup>136</sup> Seren M. "Turkiye'nin füze savunma sistemi. ihale süreci. Temel dinamikler ve aktörler". – SETA, 2015 -[http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150916125435\\_fuze-rapor-16-9-15.pdf](http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150916125435_fuze-rapor-16-9-15.pdf) (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

<sup>137</sup> "Chto predstavlyayet soboy zenitno-raketnyiy kompleks «Antey-2500»?" – *Argumenty I fakty*, 2015 - [http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/file/zenitno-raketnyi\\_kompleks\\_Antei-2500](http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/file/zenitno-raketnyi_kompleks_Antei-2500) (a.d. 27.05.2017 )

<sup>138</sup> Seren M "Turkiye'nin füze savunma sistemi. ihale süreci. Temel dinamikler ve aktörler". – SETA, 2015 -[http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150916125435\\_fuze-rapor-16-9-15.pdf](http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150916125435_fuze-rapor-16-9-15.pdf) (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

attack, NATO countries will be able to protect Turkey using their military complexes. In addition, if Turkey will purchase the Chinese military complex, there were problems with its integration into the air defense system of the NATO countries.<sup>139</sup> In this situation, Turkey decided to abandon the contract with China and close the tender for anti-aircraft missile systems. At the same time, the Turkish government did not abandon the idea of modernizing its air defense system and invested the funds intended for the tender in the development of its own defense industry.<sup>140</sup>

### 2.4.3. Other Military Technical Cooperation Issues

There were also negotiations between Turkey and Russia on the procurement of other military equipment. In 2008, the Russian Defense Minister A. Serdyukov paid a two-day visit to Turkey. During the visit, the sides discussed a number of regional problems, as well as possible joint projects of assembly of Russian T-80 and T-90 tanks, BTR-80 and BTR-90 armored vehicles and "Tiger" armored vehicles, Tor-M, "Buk" and "Strelets", licensed according to NATO standards.<sup>141</sup>

Despite the setbacks in the previous two tenders, in 2009 Russian-Turkish military technical cooperation got a new impetus. Turkey summed up the results of the tender conducted within the framework of the MRAWS (Medium Range Anti-Tank Weapon System) program and announced the victory of the Russian project. This was a great success for the Russian company Rosoboronexport, which bypassed such competitor-companies as Denel (South Africa), Rafael (Israel) and Raytheon (USA). Turkey and Russia signed an agreement on the supply of 80 anti-tank complexes "Cornet-E" and 800 missiles worth \$ 80 million. According to the representative of Rosoboronexport A. Aksenov, Turkey was also interested in the subsequent acquisition of the modified Cornet-EM complex, but the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey preferred purchase the anti-tank system of Turkish company Roketsan.<sup>142</sup>

<sup>139</sup> "Turkiye'nin milli fuze aciklamasi, NATO'yu sasirtti", - *Fars Haber Ajansi*, 2016 - <http://tr.farsnews.com/world/news/13941030000444> (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

<sup>140</sup> Koltsov, A. "Modernizatsiya voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa Turtsii" <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/modernizatsiya-voenno-promyshlennogo-kompleksa-turtsii> (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

<sup>141</sup> "Rossiya i Turtsiya mogut vmeste sozdat novyy kompleks PVO", - *Voennoe obozrenie*, 2013 - <https://topwar.ru/27649-rossiya-i-turciya-mogut-vmeste-sozdat-novyy-kompleks-pvo.html> (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

<sup>142</sup> "Rossiya zavlekaet Turtsiyu voennym sotrudnichestvom, nesmotrya na NATO." - *Blackseanews*, 2015, -<http://www.blackseanews.net/read/99032> (a.d. 27.05.2017)

After the International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF) 2009, the head of the Turkish Defense Industry Secretariat, M. Bayar, with a delegation visited Moscow, where he met with M. Dmitriev, Chairman of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation and S. Chermizov, representative of the Russian military holding Rosteek. During the conversation, the Turkish side expressed its interest in the Russian long-range air missile defense systems, medium range anti-tank systems, pedestal mounted air defense systems and the maintenance of Mi-17 Helicopters, previously purchased from Russia.<sup>143</sup>

In May 2013, XI International exhibition IDEF 2013 was held in Istanbul. The Russian company Rosoboronexport demonstrated more than 200 promising models of Russian military products for aviation, fleet and ground forces. In particular, the reconnaissance and attack helicopter Ka-52, the multi-purpose military transport helicopter Mi-171Sh, the combat Mi-28NE, the Mi-35M transport-combat helicopter, the light multi-purpose helicopters “Ansat” and the Ka-226T and other machines, which are in high demand on the international market. The Ministry of Environment and Forestry of Turkey paid special attention to the firefighting helicopters Ka-32A11BC, which also were presented in the Russian exposition. In addition, Rosoboronexport presented a project of an airborne landing craft 12061E Murena-E, which can become an effective component of the Turkish amphibious ships.<sup>144</sup> So we can say that Turkey steadily takes interest in Russian military developments.

It is important to note that modern military-technical cooperation between Turkey and Russia involved not only purchasing of military equipment, but also the integration of Russian weapons systems to Turkish armored vehicles and warships, as well as the joint production of such systems. Thus, in 2015 year Russia and Turkey presented a joint project of a short-range missile system that integrated the Turkish platform with the Russian missile system “Igla”. The system was created by

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<sup>143</sup> “Rusya Federasyonu’na Ziyaret” (28-30 Eylül 2009)  
<http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/yayinlar/ssmdergi/20094/Documents/77-82.pdf> (a.d. 27.05.2017 )

<sup>144</sup> “Rosoboroneksport predstavit bolee 200 obraztsov vooruzheniya i voennoy tekhniki v Stambule,” - *Rosoboronexport*, 2013 - [http://roe.ru/press-centr/news/rosoboroneksport-predstavit-bolee-200-obraztsov-vooruzheniya-i-voennoy-tekhniki-v-stambule/?sphrase\\_id=68237](http://roe.ru/press-centr/news/rosoboroneksport-predstavit-bolee-200-obraztsov-vooruzheniya-i-voennoy-tekhniki-v-stambule/?sphrase_id=68237) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

Russian “Rosoboronexport” and Turkish “Aselsan” companies and was named PMADS-IGLA.<sup>145</sup>

In addition to such large projects, Russian ammunition, components and spare parts are steadily supplied to Turkey. For 2009, the trade turnover between Russia and Turkey in this area reached about \$ 200 million.<sup>146</sup>

Another promising area of Russian-Turkish cooperation is the exploration of outer space. In September 2003, the Turkish satellite Bilsat-1 was launched into orbit from the Plesetsk cosmodrome by a Russian carrier rocket.<sup>147</sup> Then, on February 15, 2014, the Turkish telecommunication spacecraft TURKSAT-4A was successfully launched into the orbit. The TURKSAT-4A spacecraft was launched from the Baikonur cosmodrome (Republic of Kazakhstan) under a contract between Rosoboronexport and the American company International Launch Services, for the interests of the Turkish satellite communications operator Turksat Satellite Communication and Cable TV Operation AS. Besides the retransmission of radio and television broadcasts, TURKSAT-4A will support the activities of the Turkish armed forces.<sup>148</sup>

Talking about the military-technical cooperation we can't bypass such an important branch of Russian-Turkish relations as cooperation in the field of security and struggle against international terrorism. One of the foremost directions of this cooperation is the joint work on security of the Black Sea region.

Thus, within the framework of the Blackseafor group, created a year earlier, in April, 2002 the Black Sea states signed a Document on Security in the naval area on the Black Sea. According to the statement of the official representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs A.Yakovenko, the document became an important step in the issue of the security of the Black Sea zone, because for the first

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<sup>145</sup> “Rusya, savunma alanında Türkiye ile işbirliğine hazır”, - *Kirim haber ajansı*, 2015, - <http://gha.com.ua/tr/siyaset/rusya-savunma-alaninda-turkiye-ile-isbirligine-hazir/137364/> (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>146</sup> Korolkov, A. “Before the divorce: 10 key moments of Russian-Turkish military cooperation” [https://www.rbth.com/defence/2015/12/17/before-the-divorce-10-key-moments-of-russian-turkish-military-cooperation\\_552079](https://www.rbth.com/defence/2015/12/17/before-the-divorce-10-key-moments-of-russian-turkish-military-cooperation_552079) (a.d. 15.05.2017 )

<sup>147</sup> Ozbay, F. “Turetsko-rossiyskie voenno-tehnicheskie otnosheniya: Istoriya i evolyutsiya”, - *Nizhegorodskiy Gosudarstvenniy Universitet im. N.I. Lobachevskogo, Institut Strategicheskikh Issledovaniy*, Novgorod, 2004.

<sup>148</sup> “Proton-M vyivel na orbitu Turetskiy Sputnik Svyazi”, - *Rosoboronexport*, 2014 - [http://roe.ru/press-centr/news/proton-m-vyivel-na-orbitu-turetskiy-sputnik-svyazi/?sphrase\\_id=68237](http://roe.ru/press-centr/news/proton-m-vyivel-na-orbitu-turetskiy-sputnik-svyazi/?sphrase_id=68237) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

time, the states agreed to supply each other with information about the number and composition of their naval forces.<sup>149</sup>

### 2.4.3. Black Sea Security Cooperation

Also in November 2004, Turkey formally invited the Black Sea countries to join the "Black Sea Harmony" operation. The purpose of this operation is to monitor the south-western part of the Black Sea for suspected ships and to identify their possible illegal activities, in particular terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Russia became the first country to respond to the invitation. On December 27, the Agreement on the Accession of the Russian Federation to Operation "Black Sea Harmony" came into force. The main forms of Russian participation in the operation would be the exchange of information about suspicious ships and, if necessary, using of Russian ships and aircraft in the northeastern part of the Black Sea. Considering the fact, that full organization of Blackseafor group's effective work may take some time, the operation "Black Sea Harmony" is an important addition to the issue of ensuring security in the region.<sup>150</sup>

Also it should be noted, that dialogue between Russian and Turkish military representatives plays a big role in strengthening of mutual trust between countries. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, met with the Commander of the Turkish Navy Admiral Eşref Uğur Yiğit. The meeting was held in 2012, in Moscow, at the Main Staff of the Navy. In May of the same year, with the aim of strengthening military cooperation between the countries a detachment of Turkish ships arrived in the port of Novorossiysk. On their board of "İskenderun" and "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa" arrived about 500 cadets of maritime educational institutions.<sup>151</sup> Also, within the framework of the Blackseafor, the ships of the Black

<sup>149</sup> "O prinyatii dokumenta o Merah Doveriya na Chyornom More", – *MID RF*, 2002 - [http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/chernomorskoe-ekonomiceskoe-sotrudnicestvo-ces-/-/asset\\_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/558526](http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/chernomorskoe-ekonomiceskoe-sotrudnicestvo-ces-/-/asset_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/558526) (a.d. 29.04.2017)

<sup>150</sup> "O Prisoedinenii Rossiyskoy Federatsii k operatsii «Chernomorskaya Garmoniya»" – *MID RF*, 2006 - [http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/384356](http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23Klb76LY2/content/id/384356) (a.d. 29.04.2017 )

<sup>151</sup> "V Novorossiysk pribyil otryad korably voenno-morskih sil Turtsii" - *Ministerstvo oboronyi Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, 2012 - [http://function.mil.ru/news\\_page/country/more.htm?id=11136689@egNews](http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11136689@egNews) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

Sea naval group left the main naval base of Gölcük and began to work out tasks at sea. The Russian Navy is represented by a large amphibious ship Novocherkassk.<sup>152</sup>

Also, in the period from September 19 to September 21, the Turkish naval base Ereğli will host the Teaching of the Turkish Navy "Black Sea Trust". Observers from the Russian Navy, the Navy of Bulgaria, Ukraine and Romania were invited to take part in the exercise.<sup>153</sup>

Along with the military cooperation in naval sphere, there is close interaction between all branches of the Russian and Turkish armed forces. Thus, in 2011, within the framework of the implementation of the international treaty on the open sky, a group of Russian inspectors carried out an observation flight on an An-30B aircraft over the territory of the Republic of Turkey. The flight was carried out from the Eskişehir airfield and passed along the agreed route, the maximum length of which was 1500 km. On board the Russian aircraft, Russian and Turkish experts jointly monitored the use of technical equipment and the implementation of the agreements.<sup>154</sup> Also, joint flights over the territory of the Russian Federation on a Turkish observation aircraft CN-235 were carried out in 2013 and 2014. In 2015, the joint mission of Turkey and the United States carried out an observation flight over the territory of the Russian Federation.<sup>155</sup> Such flights are carried out on a regular basis.

In May 2011, in accordance with the decision of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force, Colonel-General Alexander Zelin paid a working visit of o Turkey. The visit was held at the invitation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Air Force, General of the Army Hassan Aksai, in order to further development of bilateral ties between the armed forces of the two countries in the field of military aviation. Within five days, the A.

<sup>152</sup> “Mezhdunarodnoe soedinenie «Bleksifor» nachalo otrabotku zadach v more”. - *Ministerstvo oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, 2013 -

[http://function.mil.ru/news\\_page/country/more.htm?id=11292459@egNews](http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11292459@egNews) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>153</sup> “Predstavitel Chernomorskogo flota priglashen na uchenie VMS Turtsii” - *Ministerstvo oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, 2013-

[http://function.mil.ru/news\\_page/country/more.htm?id=11842754@egNews](http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11842754@egNews) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>154</sup> “Rossiyskie inspektoryi vyipolnyat nablyudatelnyiy polet nad territoriei Turtsii” - *Ministerstvo oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, 2011 -

[http://function.mil.ru/news\\_page/country/more.htm?id=10718590@egNews](http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=10718590@egNews) (a.d. 27.05.2017 )

<sup>155</sup> “Missiya Turtsii vyipolnit nablyudatelnyiy polet nad territoriei Rossii” - *Ministerstvo oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii* 2013 -

[http://function.mil.ru/news\\_page/country/more.htm?id=11982363@egNews](http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11982363@egNews) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

Zelin took part in an international conference of Air Force commanders and in an air show dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Air Force.<sup>156</sup>

In October of the same year, the Military delegation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation led by the Deputy Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces for Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense (RCBD) and Scientific Research Colonel Sergei Kikotem arrived in Istanbul for a four-day International Conference on the RCBD. Within the framework of the conference there was also an exhibition of the newest means of intelligence and protection from the leading companies of foreign countries, during which the Russian military delegation got acquainted with the latest developments of foreign scientists in this field. The representatives of Russian defense industry enterprises also attended the exhibition.<sup>157</sup> In June, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Ground Forces, Colonel-General Alexander Postnikov, with a group of officers and generals from the High Command of the Army, paid a four-day working visit to the Republic of Turkey. The main purpose of the visit was the experience exchange in the sphere the combat training.<sup>158</sup> Also in 2012, there was a meeting of the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Anatoly Antonov and Deputy Minister of Defense of Turkey General V. Sunal. During the meeting, the sides discussed a set of issues of the development of bilateral relations in the context of the 8th meeting of the Intergovernmental Russian-Turkish Joint Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation.<sup>159</sup>

To sum up, we can say that the numerous bilateral visits, joint military training between Turkey and Russia show the intensification of Turkish-Russian cooperation in the sphere of international security. According to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, "after the coming of the Prime Minister Erdoğan

<sup>156</sup> "Glavnokomanduyuschiy VVS Rossii general-polkovnik Aleksandr Zelin posetit Turtsiyu s rabochim vizitom" - *Ministerstvo oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, 2011 -

[http://function.mil.ru/news\\_page/country/more.htm?id=10510863@egNews](http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=10510863@egNews) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>157</sup> "Voennaya delegatsiya Minoboronyi Rossii ubyivaet v Turtsiyu na Mezhdunarodnuyu konferentsiyu po RHB zaschite" - *Ministerstvo oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, 2011 -

[http://function.mil.ru/news\\_page/country/more.htm?id=10761443@egNews](http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=10761443@egNews) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>158</sup> "Glavnokomanduyuschiy Suhoputnyimi voyskami otpravilsya s rabochim vizitom v Turtsiyu" - *Ministerstvo oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, 2011 -

[http://function.mil.ru/news\\_page/country/more.htm?id=10967936@egNews](http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=10967936@egNews) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

<sup>159</sup> "Zamestitel Ministra oboronyi RF Anatolii Antonov prinyal zamestitelya ministra oboronyi Turtsii divizionnogo generala V. Sunala" - *Ministerstvo oboronyi Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, 2012 -

[http://function.mil.ru/news\\_page/country/more.htm?id=11542226@egNews](http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11542226@egNews) (a.d. 27.05.2017)

and the AKP party to the power, Russian-Turkish relations in the fight against terrorism have acquired a stable character".<sup>160</sup>.

In terms of Russian-Turkish cooperation in the military-technical sphere, we can say that it has great potential. According to the Turkish researcher F. Ozbay, the dynamic development of economic ties between countries, as well as the similarity of their views on many regional and international problems, indicates a significant rapprochement between Russia and Turkey.<sup>161</sup> Despite the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO, Russia has never lost its interest in Turkey as a profitable market for its military products. Turkey, in turn, is actively modernizing its armed forces and open for cooperation in this field, not only with NATO countries, but also with other countries that can offer high-quality products. Nevertheless, as the situation around the tenders showed, it is not easy to break into the Turkish military technical market, not because of the high competition with European and American companies, but rather because of Turkey's political orientation toward the West, and first of all towards the United States. Thus, the Russian-Turkish military-technical cooperation largely depends on how much independent foreign policy Turkey wants to pursue towards its NATO allies. In addition, in recent years, priority of Turkish government is not the purchasing of military equipment abroad, but the development of its own military production. Taking into account this factor, Russia can become an important partner for Turkey in the sphere of the joint military developments and the technologies exchange.

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<sup>160</sup> "O vstreche Ministra Inostrannykh Del Rossii S.V.Lavrova s Zamestitelem Premer-Ministra, Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii A.Gyulem" – *MID RF*, 2004 - [http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset\\_publisher/Fn23K1b76LY2/content/id/467898](http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/tr/-/asset_publisher/Fn23K1b76LY2/content/id/467898) (a.d. 29.04.2017)

<sup>161</sup> Ozbay, F. "Turetsko-rossiyskie voenno-tehnicheskie otnosheniya: Istoriya i evolyutsiya", - *Nizhegorodskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet im. N.I. Lobachevskogo, Institut Strategicheskikh Issledovaniy*, Novgorod, 2004.

## CONCLUSIONS

Relations between Turkey and Russia have a long history. Despite the differences in political systems, religion and culture, countries have gone through similar historical stages. After the First World War, both the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire ceased to exist. Because of such internal causes as revolution and the change of political system, a new independent state, the Soviet Union, at the head of whose political doctrine were the ideas of communism, came on the place of Russian Empire. At that time the Ottoman Empire was in a very difficult political and economic situation, because most of its territory was occupied by European states, and there was the question of partitioning the Ottoman Empire. In this situation, a liberation movement, headed by Mustafa Kemal, was formed inside Turkey. In order to fight foreign interventionists, Mustafa Kemal, despite differences in political views, turned to the Soviet Union for help. The USSR was also interested in cooperation, because, in case of failure of the Turkish liberation movement, the problem of joining the Armenian Republic to the USSR would arise. Thus, Mustafa Kemal and Lenin became allies. This was the beginning of the cooperation of the Soviet Union and the newly proclaimed after the end of the War of Independence, the Republic of Turkey. In 1925 the states concluded such an important agreement as a Treaty of friendship and neutrality. Until the Atatürk's death in 1938 soviet-Turkish relations were developing in the framework this treaty. First time in the history of Turkish-Russian relations, the countries began to cooperate in the military-technical sphere, trade relations began to develop. However, the events of 1939, namely the beginning of the Second World War, made the big changes both in the foreign policy course of states, and in the world international order as a whole.

During the Second World War, Turkey tried to maintain neutrality to the last and entered the war on the side of the USSR, the US and Britain only a few months before its end. This step was taken by Turkey in order to be able to participate in the post-war reconstruction. The main actors of the new international order were the three great powers - the USSR, the United States and Great Britain. In post-war conditions, the world divided into two poles - a capitalist led by the United States and a communist led by the Soviet Union. At that time, Soviet-Turkish relations were

complicated by the issue of control over the straits and the territorial question. The leadership of the USSR demanded Turkey to return the territories it lost during the First World War; in connection with this factor relations between the countries in the first decade after the war were virtually frozen. Despite the fact that the territorial claims of the USSR after Stalin's death were lifted, this had the negative impact on Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union.

It was one of the reasons, why Turkey followed the capitalist development path and oriented its foreign policy toward cooperation with Western countries. Nevertheless, Turkey has always been a very important point for the USSR because of its unique geographical position that makes it a bridge between Asia and Europe and the owner of the Straits, whose strategic importance is difficult to overestimate. That's why the USSR never lost its interest in developing cooperation with Turkey. In fact, Turkey was the only state of the capitalist camp with which the USSR continued to develop relations. During the 1960s-1970s, Turkey received several loans from the USSR, and trade relations between countries also were developing. But a new stage in Soviet-Turkish relations began in 1987, when the countries signed the first agreement on the supply of Soviet gas to Turkey. This was the beginning of the emergence of strong trade ties between countries, which had a positive impact on bilateral political relations. In these years, a modern model of Russian-Turkish relations began to be laid, in which bilateral economic dependence is an important factor in the foreign policy lines of the two countries. Thus, despite the fact that Turkey was a member of NATO and an ally of the United States, the Turkish leadership did not want to sacrifice the benefits of economic cooperation with the USSR and tried to implement a policy of balance between the two blocs.

The disintegration of the USSR was a landmark event in Russian-Turkish relations. Turkey's perception of Russia as a possible threat has changed, while Russia has begun to pursue a more open foreign policy towards its Western allies. Russian-Turkish relations, moving away from the former perception of relations within the framework of historical rivalry and the conditions of the struggle between the capitalist and communist blocs, have approached the process of multilateral cooperation.

For the first time since the signing of the Treaty of friendship and neutrality with the USSR in 1925, Russia and Turkey resumed military-technical cooperation. In 1994, the countries signed an agreement on cooperation in the military-technical

and security spheres, in 1998 - a memorandum of understanding between the Turkish and Russian General Staffs of the Armed Forces. It became establishing the legal component of cooperation between the two countries in these areas. The creation in 2001 of the Mixed Russian-Turkish Commission on Military Technical Issues supplemented this legal framework. In addition, the cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the energy sector was developing dynamically. Turkey began to play an important role in the export of Russia and after signing the gas agreement in 1997 Turkey came out on the second place in Russia's foreign trade turnover on gas purchases. In the same year, the Blue Stream project - a new gas pipeline passing through the Black Sea - was launched/ It allowed to carry out direct gas supplies from Russia to Turkey.

This project plays an important role in energy cooperation between countries. After the collapse of the USSR, such large gas exporters as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan appeared on the international gas market, seeking to take their place in Turkish imports. It was very important for Russia to maintain its leading position. The Blue Stream project was created to this end, and as a result linked Turkey and Russia with a contract for the gas supply for a period of 25 years. The project has strengthened the interdependence of Turkey and Russia and has become a great success of the Russian energy policy. From the point of view of geopolitics, Turkey contributes to strengthening Russia as a leading energy supplier for Europe. Thus, in the first decade after the collapse of the USSR, was created the foundation for a multifaceted and diversified cooperation between the two countries.

The coming to power in Turkey the AKP party marked another period in Russian-Turkish relations, characterized by a significant rapprochement between the two countries and the development of cooperation in all spheres. With the establishment of a well-coordinated government in Turkey, the country has got a favorable situation for the implementation of large-scale projects and the development of new industries.

In particular, we are talking about the development of the military-technical industry and the build-up of military power. In the post-war period, Turkey joined the NATO bloc and its military-technical sphere developed in the framework of cooperation with the bloc countries, and primarily with the United States. The development of its own military industry in Turkey was limited by the fact that the country is in the zone of the NATO security system that is why the Turkish NATO

allies did not see the need for the establishment of a developed military production in Turkey. However, the issue of modernization the defense industry has more than once stood on the agenda of the Turkish government. Due to such internal problems as the frequent change of governments, the economic crisis and the intensification of the struggle against the PAC, the development of this issue was postponed. When the AKP party came to power, it set itself the task of modernizing and bringing to a new level the military-technical equipment of Turkey, as well as creating its own production.

In this regard, Russia is an important partner for Turkey. Russia has many years of experience in the production of military-technical equipment, has advanced technologies and produces high-quality competitive products. In addition, the Russian leadership is interested in penetrating the Turkish military-technical market and, as practice shows, is ready to make big concessions. As it was mentioned earlier, Turkey tries to modernize its military-technical system not only through the purchases equipment from other countries, but mainly through the creation of its own production. Russia is ready to cooperate with Turkey in this area and conclude contracts not only for purchases, but also for joint production of military-technical equipment. At present, Russia and Turkey have already implemented several large joint projects; in particular, in 2009 Russian companies won a tender for the production of the Medium Range Anti-Tank Weapon System, in 2015 Turkey and Russia presented a joint project of a short-range missile system that integrated the Turkish platform with the Russian missile system "Igla".

It is worth noting that, despite the aspirations of the two countries, the cooperation of Russia and Turkey in the military-technical sphere is complicated by some political factors. Turkey is a member of NATO and in the issue of modernization of the military-technical system it has to follow the certain standards and take into account the positions of its allies in the bloc. The rapprochement between Turkey and Russia in this area may complicate Turkey's relations with European states and the US, therefore, the Turkish government again has to pursue a policy of balance between the West and the East. However, despite the existence of such restrictions, in recent years, Turkey has sought to pursue an increasingly independent foreign policy and is not going to lose such an important strategic partner as Russia.

Another important and most large-scale sector of cooperation between Turkey and Russia is economy, and first of all energy. During the AKP party's management, it is observed a dynamic growth of trade turnover between the countries; the tourist sphere is actively developing. Over the past ten years, two important agreements Turkey and Russia have been concluded between, and these agreement will determine the nature of bilateral relations for many years. This is an agreement on the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project and the Turkish gas pipeline project.

In 2010, Turkey and Russia agreed on the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Turkey. This project, worth \$ 20 billion, is Russia's major investment in the Turkish economy, and has already been called the Business Challenge of the Century. The implementation of this project will initiate the development of a peaceful atom in Turkey and will become an important part of Turkey's energy system, which will cover the growing need for electricity every year.

Another joint Russian-Turkish project - the Turkish Stream gas pipeline - is of great strategic importance for Turkey. Being a traditional importer of natural gas, with the implementation of this project Turkey can acquire a fundamentally new status and from the transit country turn into an exporter country. This development will strengthen Turkey's position not only in the region, but also in the international arena.

By this way, assessing all of the factors above, it can be concluded that during the period of AKP government Russian-Turkish relations reached a fundamentally new level. The implementation of such large-scale and long-term projects shows the mutual trust between Russia and Turkey. Strong economic interdependence between countries became the factor which helps to overcome some political disagreements between the states. In spite of the fact that during the last times the countries share common views on many regional problems, and also pursue a coordinated policy at the level of international dialogue, there are a number of political differences between Turkey and Russia. Nevertheless, practice shows that mutual cooperation meets the national interests of the two states and continues to develop in the framework of a tactical partnership.

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## ANNEXES




Figure 1. Prepared by author according to <https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/exports-to-russia>




Figure 2. Prepared by author according to <https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/imports-from-russia>




Figure 3. Prepared by author according to <http://moscow.emb.mfa.gov.tr/>

### The volume of gaz, importing by Turkey via the Blue stream




Figure 4. Prepared by author according to [www.gazprom.ru/](http://www.gazprom.ru/)




Figure 5. Prepared by author according to <http://www.gks.ru/>




Figure 6. Prepared by author according to <http://www.gks.ru/>



Map 1. Prepared by author according to [www.mid.ru](http://www.mid.ru)



Map 2. Source <http://www.novinite.com/>




Map 3. Source <http://www.klassa.bg/>



Map 4. The Blue Stream gas pipeline. Source [www.gazprom.ru](http://www.gazprom.ru)



Map 5. The South Stream gas pipeline. Source [gazprom.ru](http://gazprom.ru)



Map 6. The Turkish Stream gas pipeline. Source [www.bbc.com](http://www.bbc.com)

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